# M/s Ramraja Traders, Jhansi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 9 ILRA 1042
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-03-26
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 1868 of 2021
- **Bench:** Sanjay Yadav, Prakash Padia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-ramraja-traders-jhansi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-47349
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 - The
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner
that the order passed by the Supreme Court
in the SLP applied only to the Courts and
Tribunals and not to the Authorities like the
Revisional Authority under 78 of the Rules,
1963 who are quasi-judicial in nature. The
Revisional Authority, a quasi judicial authority,
can be brought within the ambit of Tribunal.
(Para 16)

Revision under Rule 78 of 1963 lies even
against an order remitting the matter. (Para
18)
Certain requisite conditions were laid down for
the bidders for the settlement of mining leases
of sand/moram. The petitioner did not comply
with the conditions which led to forfeiture of his
earnest money. (Para 19)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1042 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(ii) The order of suspension dated
04.12.2020 shall remain subject to the final
order as may be passed by the competent
authority regarding De-empanelment and
penalty, if any.

(iii) The competent authority
shall take decision in accordance with law
without being influenced by any of the
observations on merits of the case made by
this Court in the body of this order.
----------
(2021)09ILR A1042
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 26.03.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY YADAV, J.
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

Writ C No. 1868 of 2021

M/s Ramraja Traders, Jhansi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Udayan Nandan, Sri Shashi Nandan

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Practice & Procedure - U.P. Minor
Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 - The
Court rejected the contention of the petitioner
that the order passed by the Supreme Court
in the SLP applied only to the Courts and
Tribunals and not to the Authorities like the
Revisional Authority under 78 of the Rules,
1963 who are quasi-judicial in nature. The
Revisional Authority, a quasi judicial authority,
can be brought within the ambit of Tribunal.
(Para 16)

Revision under Rule 78 of 1963 lies even
against an order remitting the matter. (Para
18)
Certain requisite conditions were laid down for
the bidders for the settlement of mining leases
of sand/moram. The petitioner did not comply
with the conditions which led to forfeiture of his
earnest money. (Para 19)

Writ Petition Rejected. (E-10)

List of Cases cited:

1. Shivji Nathubhai Vs UOI & ors. AIR 1960 SC
606

2. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs Shyam Sunder
Jhunjhunwala & ors. AIR 1961 SC 1669

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sanjay Yadav, J.
&
Hon'ble Prakash Padia, J.)

Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Sri Udayan Nandan,
learned counsel appears on behalf of
petitioner.

Learned Standing Counsel appears on
behalf of State-Respondents.

1. A Notice Advertisement was
published on 13.09.2018
by
District
Magistrate, Banda for the settlement of
mining leases of sand/moram under the
U.P. Minor Minerals (Concession) Rules,
1963 for 5 mining Blocks, by e-tendering
and as per Condition No. 13 (6) of the
Government
Order
dated
14.08.2017
respective
applicants
had
to
deposit
Rs.15,000/- as application fee and 25% of
the bid amount as earnest money separately
for each area. That term and condition
no.19 and 22 (1) of the Advertisement
stipulated that within three days from the
date of acceptance of bid, the successful
bidder
shall
deposit
the
requisites
mentioned
therein
and
that
before
participating in the bid the bidders were
first require to satisfy themselves by
9 All M/s Ramraja Traders, Jhansi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1043
physically
verifying
the
determined
quantity of mineral and the approach road
to the site. These clauses are reproduced for
ready reference:

19. bZ&fuykeh lekIr gksus ds i'pkr 03 dk;Z
fnol ds vUnj lQy cksyhnkrk dks vius ewy vfHkys[k dk
lR;kiu ml tuin ds ftykf/kdkjh tgkW {ks= fLFkr gS] ds
}kjk vFkok funs'kd] HkwrRo ,oa [kfudeZ] funs'kky; ds }kjk
djkuk gksxkA funs'kd }kjk ewy vfHkys[k ds lR;kiu dh
fLFkfr esa vfHkys[k&lR;kiu dh vk[;k bZ&esy ds ek/;e ls
lEcfU/kr
ftykf/kdkjh
dks
izsf"kr
dh
tk;sxhA
vfHkys[k&lR;kiu ds i'pkr gh ftykf/kdkjh }kjk ysVj
vkWQ bUVsaV tkjh fd;k tk;sxkA lR;kiu esa ;fn dksbZ
vfHkys[k vFkok izek.k&i= dwVjfpr] vlR; vFkok xyr
ik;k tkrk gS rks ysVj vkWQ bUVsaV tkjh ugha fd;k tkosxk
rFkk c;kus dh /kujkf'k 1⁄4vusZLV euh1⁄2 tCt dj yh tk;sxhA

22. 'krsZa%&

1⁄411⁄2 bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls
iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa [kuu LFky ds
fy, igqWp ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj
fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ&fufonk lg bZ&fuykeh esa
Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk nkok
Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA

2. The petitioner after visiting the area
participated in the bid by getting himself
registered with all formalities with MSTC
and after transfer of earnest money and
application fee Rs.15,000/-, and the earnest
money Rs.1,57,50,000/- through RTGS
applied online on MSTC Portal for grant of
mining lease for the area in question, viz
Gata No.3/1/1, Khand-1, Area 21 hectares
of
Village
Barsanamanpur,
Tehsil
Narayani, District Banda. The bid of the
petitioner @ Rs.207/ cubic meter being
highest,
was
accepted.
And
as
per
Condition No.17 of the Government Order
dated 14/08/2017 which was Condition
No.19 of the Advertisement the petitioner
was under an obligation to get the original
documents verified within three days from
the date of completing of e-tender. The
petitioner however did not comply the said
condition which led the respondent to issue
Letter No.2698/Khanij-30, Banda dated
22/10/2018. However, as the petitioner did
not
comply
the
same,
the
District
Magistrate vide order dated 24/1/2019
forfeited the earnest money.

3. In the interregnum i.e. between the
period of acceptance of bid and the passing
of order dated 24/1/2019, the petitioner
visited this Court vide Writ-C No.
36068/2018 for the following directions:

"i. issue a writ, order or direction
in the nature of mandamus commanding
the respondent no. 2 to accept the request
of the petitioner with regard to the
withdrawal of site for mining operation on
plot no. 3/1/1 (Part-I) situated at Barsana
Manpur, Tehsil Naraini, District Banda;

ii. issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the respondent no.
2 to refund the earnest money deposited by
the
petitioner
in
pursuance
of
the
advertisement dated 13.09.2018 along with
the interest @ 9% per annum;

iii. issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the respondent no.
2 to decide the representation dated
25.10.2018 of the petitioner (Annexure No.
4 to the writ petition);

iv. issue an appropriate writ,
order or direction in the nature of
mandamus commanding the respondent no.
2 to issue a survey panel to examine the
exact quantity of mineral available on the
site."

4. With the contention that since there
was no minerals
as advertised, the
respondents be directed to look into the
grievance before issuing the letter of intent.
1044 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The petitioner was however non-suited by
order dated 30/10/2018 whereon the
petition was dismissed in the following
terms:

"4. We have considered the
submissions raised and find that Clause 22
(1) of the Advertisement dated 13.09.2018
reads as under:

22. 'krsZa%&

1⁄411⁄2 bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls
iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa [kuu LFky ds
fy, igqWp ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj
fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ&fufonk lg bZ&fuykeh esa
Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk nkok
Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA"

5. In view of the aforesaid clause,
the aforesaid relief cannot be granted as
the petitioner had made the offer with open
eyes."

5. The order being not assailed by the
petitioner has attained finality.

6. The petitioner thereafter preferred
an appeal against the order dated 24/1/2019
passed by the District Magistrate before the
Commissioner, Division Chitrakoot Dham,
wherein on 26/04/2019 by an interim order
Commissioner directed for spot inspection
whereas certain report was furnished on
28/05/2019 stating that approximately in 18
hect. area mixed minerals were found
deposited in crevices at the base of river
Ken. The report led the Commissioner pass
an order on 20/12/2019 whereby he set
aside the order dated 24/01/2019 and
remanded the matter with a direction to the
Collector to take action as per the report.

7. Evidently, the Commissioner did
not dwell on the aspect of non compliance
of the stipulation contained in Condition
No.17 of the Government Order dated
14/08/2017, nor of the fact that the claim of
the petitioner for waiver was negatived in
Writ -C No.36068/2018.

8. Be that as it may. Revision under
Rule 78 of the Rules, 1963 was preferred
by the Collector against the order dated
20.12.2019 before the State Government
with an application for condonation of
delay on 19/06/2020. The petitioner besides
raising an objection against condonation of
delay also filed the counter affidavit on
merit. However, as evident therefrom there
was no whisper as to non compliance of
Condition No.17 nor was there denial of
dismissal
of
Writ-C
No.36068/2018.
However it was stated that the issue raised
in the Writ Petition had no relation with the
order dated 24/1/2019 passed in Appeal.

9. The Revisional Authority vide
order dated 28/9/2020 while condoning the
delay set aside the order passed by
Commissioner and upheld the order of
Collector on the findings:

"fuxjkuhdrkZ dk dFku gS fd] 'kklukns'k
la[;k&1875@86&2017&57 1⁄4lk01⁄2@2017 Vh0lh0&1 fnukad
14-08-2017 esa fn;s x;s funsZ'kkuqlkj 'krZ la0&20 1⁄411⁄2 esa
mfYyf[kr fd ^*bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls
iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,d [kuu LFky ds
fy, igaqp ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj
fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ& fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa
Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr~ bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh izdkj dk nkok
Lohdkj
ugha
fd;k
tk,xkA^*
foKfIr
la[;k
&60@[kfut&30] ckank fnukad 13-09-2018 ds 'krZ la[;k
&22 1⁄411⁄2 esa mfYyf[kr gS fd ^*bZ&fufonk lg bZ&uhykeh esa
Hkkx ysus ls iwoZ {ks= esa vkadfyr mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa
[kuu LFky ds fy, igqap ekxZ vkfn ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk
fujh{k.k dj foMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks ysaA bZ&fufonk lg
bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ds i'pkr bl lEcU/k esa fdlh Hkh
izdkj dk nkok Lohdkj ugha fd;k tk;sxkA^* ek0 mPp
U;k;ky; bykgkckn esa izLrkod }kjk izLrqr fjV ;kfpdk
la[;k&36068@2018 Jh jkejktk VasMlZ cuke m0iz0 jkT;
o vU; ;ksftr fd;k x;k Fkk] tks fnukad 30-10-2018 dks
fujLr dj nh x;h] mDr vk/kkj ij Hkh ek0 U;k;ky;
vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad
20-12-2019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA m0iz0 mi[kfut 1⁄4ifjgkj1⁄2
9 All M/s Ramraja Traders, Jhansi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1045
1⁄4rSrkfyloka la'kks/ku1⁄2 fu;ekoyh&1963 ds fu;e 23 1⁄441⁄2 ds
izkfo/kkuksa ds rgr 'kklukns'k la[;k&1875@86&2017&57
1⁄4lk01⁄2@2017 Vh0lh0&1 fnukad 14-08-2017 ds fcUnq
la[;k&06 ds vUrxZr bZ&fufonk@bZ&uhykeh@bZ&fufonk
lg bZ&uhykeh ds fy, fu/kkZfjr fnukad ds iwoZ U;wure
cksyh ;k izLrko ds fu/kkZj.k ds fy, [kfut dh xq.koRrk
vkSj ek=k dk ewY;kadu ftykf/kdkjh] ckank }kjk xfBr
lfefr ftlesa vij ftykf/kdkjh 1⁄4fo0@jk01⁄2 ckank] lEcfU/kr
miftykf/kdkjh rFkk ftys esa rSukr [kku vf/kdkjh] ckank Fks
}kjk mi[kfut dh [kuu ;ksX; ek=k ,oa ml {ks= ij
vusZLV euh dk fu/kkZj.k fd;k x;k FkkA voj U;k;ky; }kjk
vius vkns'k fnukad 26-04-2019 }kjk xfBr lfefr vij
ftykf/kdkjh 1⁄4fo0@jk01⁄2 ds uhps ds vf/kdkfj;ksa }kjk
mi[kfut dk ewY;kadu fd;k x;k gS] ftlls Hkh ek0
U;k;ky; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My ckank }kjk ikfjr
vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA izLrkod dks
cksyh lekIr gksus ds mijkUr i;kZIr le; ekSf[kd :i ls@
fyf[kr :i ls vfHkys[kksa dks izLrqr djus gsrq fn;k x;k
ijUrq mlds }kjk dkQh le; O;rhr gksus ds mijkUr Hkh
vfHkys[k izLrqr ugha fd;s x;s] ftldks voj U;k;ky; }kjk
laKku esa ugha fy;k x;kA vr% ek0 U;k;ky; vk;qDr
fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 20-122019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA

izfroknh ds fo}ku vf/koDrk dks foLrkjiwoZd
lquk x;k rFkk i=koyh ij miyC/k vfHkys[kksa dk v/;;u
djus ls Li"V gS fd fuxjkuhdrkZ }kjk izLrqr iqujh{k.k
dksfoM&19 o jkT; ljdkj ls izkIr vuqefr ds dkj.k
le;kUrxZr gS rFkk 'kklukns'k la[;k&1875@86&2017&57
1⁄4lk01⁄2@2017 Vh0lh0&1 fnukad 14-08-2017 esa fn;s x;s
funsZ'kkuqlkj 'krZ la0&20 1⁄411⁄2 esa mfYyf[kr fd ^*bZ&fufonk
lg bZ&uhykeh esa Hkkx ysus ls iwoZ {ks= esa vakdfyr
mi[kfut dh ek=k ,oa [kuu LFky ds fy, igqap ekxZ vkfn
ds lEcU/k esa ekSds dk fujh{k.k dj fcMj Lo;a vk'oLr gks
ysa^* ds vuqlkj izfroknh dks foKfIr esa izfrHkkx djus ls iwoZ
ckyw&[kuu {ks= dks fujh{k.k dj vk'oLr gks ysuk pkfg,
FkkA ek0 mPp U;k;ky; bykgkckn esa izfroknh }kjk izLrqr
fjV ;kfpdk la[;k&36068@2018 Jh jkejktk VasMlZ cuke
m0iz0 jkT; o vU; ;ksftr fd;k x;k Fkk] tks fnukad 3010-2018 dks fujLr dj nh x;h] mDr vk/kkj ij Hkh ek0
U;k;ky; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank }kjk ikfjr
vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr ;ksX; gSA izLrkod dks
cksyh lekIr gksus ds mijkUr i;kZIr le; ekSf[kd :i
ls@fyf[kr :i ls vfHkys[kksa dks izLrqr djus gsrq fn;k x;k
ijUrq mlds }kjk dkQh le; O;rhr gksus ds mijkUr Hkh
vfHkys[k izLrqr ugha fd;s x;sA

ekuuh; vk;qDr fp=dwV /kke e.My] ckank
}kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 20-12-2019 fujLr fd;k tkrk
gSA vr% fuxjkuhdrkZ }kjk ikfjr vkns'k fnukad 24-01-2019
esa fdlh gLr{ksi dh vko';drk ugha gSA"

10. Aggrieved, the petitioner has filed
this petition. It is contended that the Revision
under Rule 78 of the Rules, 1963 was highly
belated and it was beyond the Revisional
Authority to have entertained the same after
the expiry of Ninety Days and that the benefit
of the order dated 23.3.2020 passed by
Supreme Court in Suo Motu Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 3/2020 was not available as the
same was applicable only to the Courts and
Tribunals.

11. Contradicting these contentions, it is
urged on behalf of the respondent that by
virtue of order dated 23.03.2020 in Suo Motu
Writ Petition (Civil) No(s) 3/2020 In Re:
Cognizance For Extension of Limitation the
Supreme Court to obviate the difficulty faced
in filling due to COVID-19 Virus directed
that a period of Limitation prescribed under
the general law on special law whether
condonable or not stood extended w.e.f. 15th
March, 2020 till further order. It is urged that
in the instant Case the Revision was to be
filed on or before 19.3.2020 could be filed on
19.6.2020 and as the limitation stood
extended w.e.f. 15.3.2020, the Revisional
Authority was within his right in condoning
the delay.

12. In SLP (C ) No(s) 3/2020 it was
held on 23.3.2020:

"This Court has taken Suo Motu
cognizance of the situation arising out of the
challenge faced by the country on account of
Covid-19 Virus and resultant difficulties that
may be faced by litigants across the country
in
filing
their
petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other
proceedings within the period of limitation
prescribed under the general law of
limitation or under Special Laws (both
Central and/or State).

To obviate such difficulties and to
ensure that lawyers/litigants do not have to
1046 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
come physically to file such proceedings in
respective Courts/Tribunals across the
country including this Court, it is herby
ordered that a period of limitation in all
such proceedings, irrespective of the
limitation prescribed under the general law
or Special Laws whether condonable or not
shall stand extended w.e.f. 15th March
2020 till further order/s to be passed by
this Court in present proceedings.

We are exercising this power
under Article 142 read with Article 141 of
the Constitution of India and declare that
this order is a binding order within the
meaning
of
Article
141
on
all
Courts/Tribunals and authorities.

This order may be brought to the
notice of all High Courts for being
communicated
to
all
subordinate
Courts/Tribunals within their respective
jurisdiction.

Issue notice to all the Registrars
General of the High Courts. Returnable in
four weeks."

13. The said SLP has now been
finally disposed of on 8/3/2021 in the
following terms.

"1. Due to the onset of COVID-19
pandemic, this Court took suo motu
cognizance of the situation arising from
difficulties that might be faced by the
litigants across the country in filing
petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all
other proceedings within the period of
limitation prescribed under the general law
of limitation or under any special laws
(both Central or State). By an order dated
27.03.2020 this Court extended the period
of limitation prescribed under the general
law or special laws whether compoundable
or not with effect from 15.03.2020 till
further orders. The order dated 15.03.2020
was extended from time to time. Though,
we have not seen the end of the pandemic,
there is considerable improvement. The
lockdown has been lifted

and the country is returning to
normalcy. Almost all the Courts and
Tribunals are functioning either physically
or by virtual mode. We are of the opinion
that the order dated 15.03.2020 has served
its purpose and in view of the changing
scenario relating to the pandemic, the
extension of limitation should come to an
end.

2. We have considered the
suggestions
of
the
learned
Attorney
General for India regarding the future
course of action. We deem it appropriate to
issue the following directions:

1. In computing the period of
limitation for any suit, appeal, application
or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020
till 14.03.2021 shall stand excluded.
Consequently, the balance period of
limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if
any, shall become available with effect
from 15.03.2021.

2. In cases where the limitation
would have expired during the period
between
15.03.2020
till
14.03.2021,
notwithstanding the actual balance period
of limitation remaining, all persons shall
have a limitation period of 90 days from
15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance
period of limitation remaining, with effect
from 15.03.2021, is greater than 90 days,
that longer period shall apply.

3. The period from 15.03.2020 till
14.03.2021 shall also stand excluded in
9 All M/s Ramraja Traders, Jhansi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1047
computing the periods prescribed under
Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and
provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any
other laws, which prescribe period(s) of
limitation for instituting proceedings, outer
limits (within which the court or tribunal
can condone delay) and termination of
proceedings.

4. The Government of India shall
amend the guidelines for containment
zones, to state.

"Regulated movement will be
allowed for medical emergencies, provision
of essential goods and services, and other
necessary functions, such as, time bound
applications, including for legal purposes,
and
educational
and
job-related
requirements."

3. The Suo Motu Writ Petition is
disposed of accordingly."

14. Though a contention is raised on
behalf of the petitioner that the order
passed by Supreme Court in the SLP
applied only to the Courts and Tribunals
and not to the Authorities like the
Revisional Authority under Rule 78 of the
Rules, 1963 who are quasi-judicial in
nature. The contentions are taken note of
and rejected at the outset. In Shivji
Nathubhai v. Union of India and Others,
AIR 1960 SC 606 it is held:

"6. This Court had occasion to
consider the nature of the two kinds of acts,
namely, judicial which includes quasi-
judicial and administrative, a number of
times. In Province of Bombay v. Kushaldas
S. Advani 1950 SCR 621: (AIR 1950 SC
222), it adopted the celebrated definition of
a quasi-judicial body given by Atkin L. J.
in R. v. Electricity Commissioners 19241KB 171 which is as follows:-

"Whenever any body of persons
having
legal
authority
to
determine
questions affecting rights of subjects, and
having the duty to act judicially act in
excess of their legal authority they are
subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the
King's Bench Division exercised in these
writs. " This definition insists on three
requisites each of which must be fulfilled in
order that the act of the body may be a
quasi-judicial act, namely, that the body of
persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to
determine questions affecting the rights of
subjects, and (3) must have the duty to act
judicially. After analysing the various
cases, Das J. (as he then was) laid down the
following principles as deducible therefrom
in Kushaldas S. Advani's case (supra) at
p.725 of SCR: (at p. 260 of AIR):

"(i) That, if a statute empowers an
authority, not being a Court in the ordinary
sense, to decide disputes arising out of a
claim made by any party under the statute
which claim is opposed by another party
and to determine' the respective rights of
the contesting parties who are opposed to
each other, there is a lis and prima facie
and in the absence of anything in the statute
to the contrary it is the duty of the authority
to act judicially and the decision of the
authority is a quasi-judicial act; and (ii) that
if a statutory authority has power to do any
act which will prejudicially affect the
subject, then, although there are not two
parties apart from the authority and the
contest is between the authority proposing
to do the act and the subject opposing it,
the final determination of the authority will
yet be a quasi-judicial act provided the
1048 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
authority is required by the statute to act
judicially.

7. It is on these principles which
are now well-settled that we have to see
whether the Central Government when
acting under R. 54 is acting in a quasijudicial capacity or otherwise. It is not
necessary for present purposes to decide -
whether State Government when it grants a
lease is acting merely administratively. We
shall assume that the order of the State
Government granting a lease under the
Rules is an administrative order. We have,
however, to see what the position is after
the State Government has granted a lease to
one of the applicants before it and has
refused the lease to others.

8. Mr. Pathak contends that even
in such a situation there is no right in
favour of the person to whom the lease has
been granted by the State Government till
the Central Government has passed an
order on a review application if any. Rule
55, however, makes it clear that the order
of the State Government is final subject to
any order on review by the Central
Government under R. 54. Now when a
lease is granted by the State Government, it
is quite possible that there may be no
application for review by those whose
applications have been refused. In such a
case the order of the State Government
would be final. It would not therefore be in
our opinion right to say that no right of any
kind is created in favour of a person to
whom the lease is granted by the State
Government. The matter would be different
if the order of the State Government were
not to be effective until confirmation by the
Central Government; for in that case no
right would arise until the confirmation was
received from the Central Government. But
R. 54 does not provide for confirmation by
the Central Government. It gives power to
the Central Government to act only when
there is an application for review before it
under R. 54. That is why we have not
accepted Mr. Pathak's argument that in
substance the State Government's order
becomes
effective
only
after
it
is
confirmed; R. 54 does not support this. We
have not found any provision in the Rules
or in the Act which gives any power to the
Central Government to review suo motu
the order of the State Government granting
a lease. That some kind of right is created
on the passing of an order granting a lease
is clear from the facts of this case also. The
order granting the lease was made in
December 1952. In April 1953 the
appellant was put in possession of the areas
granted to him and actually worked them
thereafter. At any rate, when the statutory
rule grants a right to any party aggrieved to
make a review application to the Central
Government it certainly follows that the
person in whose favour the order is made
has also a right to represent his case before
the
authority
to
whom
the
review
application
is
made.
It
is
in
the
circumstances apparent that as soon as R.
52 gives a right to an aggrieved party to
apply for review a lis is created between
him and the party in whose favour the grant
has been made. Unless therefore there is
anything in the statute to the contrary it will
be the duty of the authority to act judicially
and its decision would be a quasi-judicial
act."

15. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala and others,
AIR 1961 SC 1669 it is held:

"(30) The orders which the
Central Government passes, certainly fall
within the words "determination" and
"order". The proceeding before the Central
9 All M/s Ramraja Traders, Jhansi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1049
Government also falls within the wide words
"any cause or matter". The only question is
whether the Central Government, when it
hears and decides an appeal, can be said to
be acting as a Court or tribunal. That the
Central Government is not a Court was
assumed at the hearing. But to ascertain
what falls within the expression "Court or
tribunal", one has to begin with "Courts".
The word "Court" is not defined in the
Companies Act, 1956. It is not defined in the
Civil Procedure Code. The definition in the
Indian Evidence Act is not exhaustive, and is
for the purposes of that Act. In the Now
English Dictionary (Vol. II, pp. 1090, 1091),
the meaning given is:

"an assembly of judges or other
persons legally appointed and acting as a
tribunal to hear and determine any cause,
civil, ecclesiastical, military or naval."

All tribunals are not Courts,
though all Courts are tribunals. The word
"Courts" is used to designate those
tribunals which are set up in an organised
State for the administration of justice. By
administration of justice is meant the
exercise of judicial power of the State to
maintain and uphold rights and to punish
"wrongs".
Whenever
there
is
an
infringement of a right or an injury, the
Courts are there to restore the vinculum
juris, which is disturbed. Judicial power,
according to Griffith, C. J. in Huddart,
Parker
&
Co.
Proprietary
Ltd.
v.
Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330 (357)
means:-

"the power which every sovereign
authority must of necessity have to decide
controversies between its subjects, or
between itself and its subjects, whether the
rights relate to life, liberty or property. The
exercise of this power does not begin until
some tribunal which has power to give a
binding
and
authoritative
decision
(whether subject to appeal or not) is called
upon to take action."

(31) When rights are infringed or
invaded, the aggrieved party can go and
commence a querela before the ordinary
Civil Courts. These Courts which are
instrumentalities
of
Government,
are
invested with the judicial power of the
State, and their authority is derived from
the Constitution or some Act of legislature
constituting
them.
Their
number
is
ordinarily fixed and they are ordinarily
permanent, and can try any suit or cause
within their jurisdiction. Their numbers
may be increased or decreased, but they
are almost always permanent and go under
the compendious name of "Courts of Civil
Judicature". There can thus be no doubt
that the Central Government does not come
within this class.

(32)
With
the
growth
of
civilisation and the problems of modern
life, a large number of administrative
tribunals have come into existence. These
tribunals have the authority of law to
pronounce upon valuable rights; they act in
a judicial manner and even on evidence on
oath, but they are not part of the ordinary
Courts of Civil Judicature. They share the
exercise of the judicial power of the State,
but they are brought into existence to
implement some administrative policy or to
determine controversies arising out of some
administrative law. They are very similar to
Courts, but are not Courts. When the
Constitution speaks of 'Courts' in Art. 136,
227 or 228 or in Arts. 233 to 237 or in the
Lists, it contemplates Courts of Civil
Judicature but not tribunals other than
such Courts. This is the reason for using
both the expressions in Arts. 136 and 227.
1050 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

By "Courts" is meant Courts of
Civil Judicature and by "tribunals", those
bodies of men who are appointed to decide
controversies arising under certain special
laws. Among the powers of the State is
included
the
power
to
decide
such
controversies. This is undoubtedly one of
the attributes of the State, and is aptly
called the judicial power of the State. In the
exercise of this power, a clear division is
thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain
special matters go before tribunals, and the
residue goes before the ordinary Courts of
Civil Judicature. Their procedures may
differ, but the functions are not essentially
different. What distinguishes them has
never been successfully established. Lord
Stamp said that the real distinction is that
Courts have "an air of detachment". But
this is more a matter of age and tradition
and is not of the essence. Many tribunals,
in recent years, have acquitted themselves
so well and with such detachment as to
make this test insufficient. Lord Sankey,
L.C. in Shell Company of Australia v.
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931)
A.C. 275 (296) observed:

"The authorities are clear to show
that there are tribunals with many of the
trappings of a Court, which, nevertheless, are
not Courts in the strict sense of exercising
judicial power.... In that connection it may be
useful
to
enumerate
some
negative
propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is
not necessarily a Court in this strict sense
because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor
because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor
because two or more contending parties
appear before it between whom it has to
decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions
which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor
because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor
because it is a body to which a matter is
referred by another body.

(33).........

(34).........

(35).........

(36)
Now,
in
its
functions
Government often reaches decisions, but
all decisions of Government cannot be
regarded as those of a tribunal. Resolutions
of Government may affect rights of parties,
and yet, they may not be in the exercise of
judicial power. Resolutions of Government
may be amenable to writs under Arts. 32
and 226 in appropriate cases, but may not
be subject to a direct appeal under Art. 136
as the decisions of a tribunal. The position,
however,
changes
when
Government
embarks
upon
curial
functions,
and
proceeds to exercise judicial power and
decide disputes. In those circumstances, it
is legitimate to regard the officer who deals
with the matter and even Government itself
as a tribunal. The officer who decides, may
even be anonymous; but the decision is one
of a tribunal, whether expressed in his
name or in the name of' the Central
Government. The word "tribunal" is a word
of wide import, and the words "Court" and
"tribunal"
embrace
within
them
the
exercise of judicial power in all its forms.
The decision of Government thus falls
within the powers of this Court under Art.
136. (Emphasis supplied)"

16. In view whereof the contention
that the Revisional Authority which is a
quasi-judicial Authority cannot be brought
within the ambit of Tribunal is negatived. It
is held that the respondents were entitled
for the benefit under order passed in SLP
and it was within the competence of the
Revisional Authority to condone the delay
and entertain the Revision on merit. The
first contention therefore fails.
9 All Jaiveer Singh & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.
1051

17. It is next contended that the
Appellate Authority i.e. Commissioner,
Banda, Division Chitrakoot Dham since
remitted the matter, a revision under Rule 78
of 1963 Rule was not tenable. Rule 78 of the
Rules, 1963 mandates:

"78. The State Government may,
either suo moto at any time or on an
application made within ninety days from
the date of communication of the order, call
for the examine the record relating to any
order passed or proceeding taken by the
District Officer, committee, Director or the
Divisional Commissioner under these rules
and pass such orders as it may think fit."

18. Thus Revision lies even against an
order remitting the matter. The second
contention accordingly fails.

19. The next contention that the
Revisional Order suffers from the vice of
perversity. It is observed that the Appellate
Authority glossed over the vital facts, viz that
in Writ-C No.36068/2018 the claim of
petitioner for waiver was negatived on the
anvil of Clause 19 and 22 (1) of the
Advertisement and secondly, the petitioner
who was under an obligation to deposit the
credentials within 3 days from date of closing
the bid proceeding; having failed to comply
the same, it was not within the right of the
petitioner to have questioned the tendering of
the sand mine. In view whereof, in our
considered opinion, the Revisional Authority
was well justified in interfering with the
Appellate Order and restore the order passed
by District Magistrate.

20. Considering this we do not perceive
any merit in the petition.

21. Consequently, petition fails and is
dismissed. No costs.
----------
(2021)09ILR A1051
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 27.08.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE DINESH PATHAK, J.

Writ C No. 2959 of 2020
And
Writ C No. 42537 of 2019
And
Writ C No. 42577 of 2019
And
Writ C No. 43014 of 2019

Jaiveer Singh & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Kaushal Kumar Singh, Sri Abhinav Gaur,
Sri N.P. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Abinav Gaur, Sri Rajnish Kumar
Rai

A. Railways Act, 1989 - Section 20A, D, E -
Land Acquisition - Opportunity of Hearing
-

In the present case, the issue before the Court
was whether the land once acquired in the
district of Gautam Budh Nagar for special
railway project i.e., Eastern Dedicated Freight
Corridor, can be acquired again by way of
notification dated 11.02.2019 under Section 20A
for execution of the special railway project. To
which the Court held that notwithstanding the
earlier acquisition made vide declaration dated
30.07.2010, the Central Government had the
power to issue fresh notification under Section
20A (1) of the 1989 Act by virtue of Section 14
of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It is clear that
the acquisition in question was to align the track
of the freight corridor in a manner that it gets
straightened, shortened and, in turn, also save
land of Greater Noida Industrial Development