# M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 634
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-02
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 8939 of 2025
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Prashant Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-sahu-land-developers-pvt-ltd-v-state-of-u-p-ors-52958
- **Pages:** 16

## Text

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634 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is wholly unauthorized, illegal, and without
legal sanctity, constituting a mere act of
encroachment upon government land.

vi. The alleged allottee Kaushal
Kishore Shukla, the father of the petitioner
belonged to the General Category and,
being an ex-army personnel, did not fall
within any of the eligible categories
prescribed for allotment under Section 122C of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and
Land Reforms Act, 1950, namely, the
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Other
Backward Classes, persons of the General
Category living below the poverty line,
agricultural labourers, or village artisans.
Consequently, no allotment could have
been legally made in his favour under the
applicable rules. Therefore, the mere
production of certain receipts or papers not
issued or authenticated by any competent
authority cannot establish that any valid
patta ever existed in his name; hence, the
question of cancellation of such patta does
not arise at all. The action of the L.D.A. is,
therefore, entirely justified and fully in
accordance with law.

vii. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
has consistently emphasized that fraud,
concealment, and misrepresentation strike
at the very integrity of the judicial process.
A litigant invoking the jurisdiction of the
Court must act with utmost candour and
make full disclosure of all material facts.
Withholding documents, suppressing truth,
or presenting distorted facts amounts to
fraud and attracts the maxim suppressio
veri, expressio falsi. Any order or judgment
procured through such deceit is a nullity in
law. Given the equitable and discretionary
nature of jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, courts may reject
a petition at the threshold when the litigant
is
guilty
of
suppression
or
misrepresentation.

90. For all the aforesaid reasons, the
writ petition stands dismissed.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 634
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 02.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

Writ C No. 8939 of 2025

M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd.
 ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to Whether the order passed by
National
Commission
in
its
Appellate
or
revisional jurisdiction can be challenged before
the High Court in writ jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India and If so, then
under what circumstances should such writs be
entertained and what is the scope of challenege
before the writ court under Article 226? (Paras
3, 18-21)
Headnotes
Maintainability of writ petition - Challenge
to
concurrent
findings
of
District
Commission,
State
Commission
and
National
Commission
-
Scope
of
interference under Articles 226/227 - Rule
of
alternate
remedy
-
Exceptions
-
Disputed questions of fact - Consumer
Protection Act, 2019. (Paras 8-27)
Alternative remedy - Not an absolute bar -
Self-imposed restraint by High Court -
Exercise
of
writ
jurisdiction
only in
exceptional
circumstances
such
as
violation of fundamental rights, principles
of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction or
patent illegality. (Paras 12-21)
Concurrent findings of fact - District
Commission holding unfair trade practice -
State
Commission
and
National
Commission affirming - Re-agitation of
12 All. M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
635
factual
issues
impermissible
in
writ
jurisdiction. (Paras 22-26)
Held: when supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution is available, writ
petition under Article 226 should not be
normally entertained, except in exceptional
circumstances involving violation of fundamental
rights, principles of natural justice, or patent
illegality - findings recorded by the District
Commission, State Commission and National
Commission were based on appreciation of
evidence and did not suffer from perversity or
jurisdictional error - the issues raised by the
petitioner relating to possession, consolidation
proceedings and force majeure were purely
factual and disputed in nature and could not be
re-examined in writ jurisdiction - petitioner
failed to make out a case for interference, and
accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.
(Paras 21 - 27) (E-7)

Case Law Cited
Whirlpool
Corporation
v.
Registrar
of
Trademarks, Mumbai, (1998) 8 SCC 1;
Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,
(2003) 2 SCC 107; Radha Krishan Industries
v. State of H.P., (2021) 6 SCC 771; Ibrat
Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome (P) Ltd., (2023)
11 SCC 594; Universal Sompo General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand Jain,
(2024) 9 SCC 148; Rikhab Chand Jain v.
Union of India, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2510; L.
Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3
SCC 261; Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v.
P.N. Sharma, AIR 1965 SC 1595; Estralla
Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC
97; Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel,
(2022) 4 SCC 181; Satyabrata Ghosh v.
Mugneeram Bangur & Co., AIR 1954 SC 44;
Alopi Prasad & Sons v. Union of India, AIR
1960 SC 588; Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd.
v. State of U.P., (2011) 9 SCC 354; Pioneer
Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of
India, (2019) 8 SCC 416.

List of Acts
Constitution of India; Consumer Protection Act,
2019; Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings
Act, 1953; Indian Contract Act, 1872; Real
Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016

List of Keywords
Writ
jurisdiction;
Alternative
remedy;
Supervisory jurisdiction; Consumer Commission;
Consolidation
proceedings;
Unfair
trade
practice; Disputed questions of fact; Force
majeure; Concurrent findings.

Case Arising From
ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION:
Order
dated
09.01.2024 passed by the District Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Lucknow, as
affirmed by order dated 01.08.2024 of the State
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Uttar
Pradesh, Lucknow, and order dated 01.04.2025
of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal
Commission.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant (Petitioner):
Learned counsel for M/s Sahu Land Developers
Pvt. Ltd.
Advs. for the Respondents:
Learned counsel for the State of U.P. and
respondent nos. 5 to 7

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

The present writ petition has been
filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India wherein the petitioner has prayed
for the issuance of a writ of certiorari
quashing the impugned judgement and
order dated August 1, 2024 and January 9,
2024 passed by State Consumer Disputes
Redressal
Commission,
Lucknow
(hereinafter referred to as the 'State
Commission')
and
District
Consumer
Disputes Redressal Commission, Lucknow
(hereinafter referred to as the 'District
Commission') respectively. The petitioner
in furtherance prays for the issuance of a
writ
of
prohibition,
prohibiting
the
respondent no. 5 to 7 as well as other
complainants in respect of recovery of
claims. Moreover, the petitioner further
prays for writ of mandamus commanding
the Commissioner, Lucknow (hereinafter
referred to as 'respondent no.2') to specify
the
time
frame
to
conclude
the
636 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
consolidation operation in the concerned
area.

FACTS

2. The factual matrix of the present
writ petition is delineated below:

a. The petitioner is a Private
Limited Company incorporated in the year
2007, engaged in the business of real estate
development in Lucknow has launched a
residential plotting development scheme
titled "Sahu City Phase-2" on August 29,
2012 at Village Shivpuri, Tehsil Bakshi Ka
Talab, District Lucknow. The said land was
located outside the municipal and planning
area as per Section 2(zh) of the Real Estate
(Regulation & Development) Act, 2016 at
the time of launch.

b. Subsequent to launch of the
scheme, the layout plan of the project was
duly approved by the Zila Panchayat,
Lucknow in two parts under the Uttar
Pradesh (Kshetra Panchayats and Zila
Panchayats) Adhiniyam, 1961, in two
phases on April 28, 2018 and April 29,
2019.

c. Respondent nos. 5 to 7 and
other consumers booked residential plots
under valid booking agreements, and the
petitioner proceeded with development
work in accordance with the scheme
wherein possession was to be delivered
within the specified time, subject to
completion of development.

d. However, after initiation of the
project and acceptance of bookings,
consolidation proceedings in the said
village was initiated pursuant to a
notification issued by the State of Uttar
Pradesh under Section 4 of the Uttar
Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act,
1953, vide publication dated July 5, 2013.
As a result, the petitioner's project has
come to a halt and he was unable to deliver
the possession to plot allottees.

e. Respondent nos. 5 to 7 lodged
complaints before the District Commission
seeking refund of the total amount
deposited by them and petitioner filed its
objection against the said complaint.
Thereafter District Commission passed an
order dated January 9, 2024 directing the
petitioner to refund the amounts alongwith
9% interest. Respondent nos. 5 to 7
preferred cross appeal against the said
order for the enhancement of rate of
interest from 9% to 12% per annum and
also for the payment of interest from date
of deposit till the date of actual payment,
which was allowed by modification of
order dated January 9, 2024.

f. Petitioner filed appeal under
Section 41 of the Consumer Protection Act,
2019 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act')
before State Commission and the said
appeal was decided vide order dated
August 1, 2024 against the petitioner.
Subsequently
petitioner
filed
revision
against the aforesaid order before National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
(hereinafter referred to as 'National
Commission') which was dismissed vide
order dated April 1, 2025.

g. Respondent nos. 5 to 7 filed
execution proceedings before respondent
no. 4 pursuant to which a demand notice
dated January 4, 2025 was issued by
Tehsildar and attachment order dated
February 18, 2025 was issued by Sub
Divisional Magistrate thereby attaching the
bank account of the petitioner pursuant to
which the amount of Rs. 48,80,493 was
realized and paid to the respondents 5 to 7
from the account of petitioner.

h. The present writ petition is
therefore being filed seeking quashing of
the impugned orders passed by the District
Commission upheld by State Commission
12 All. M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
637
alongwith setting aside the recovery
proceedings,
and
declaring
that
the
continuation of such action is wholly
without jurisdiction and in violation of
statutory and constitutional safeguards.

ISSUE

3. A. Whether the order passed by
National Commission in its Appellate or
revisional jurisdiction can be challenged
before the High Court in writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India?

B.
If
yes,
then
under
what
circumstances
should
such
writs
be
entertained and what is the scope of
challenege before the writ court under
Article 226?

CONTENTIONS OF PETITIONER

4. The learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the petitioner has made the
following submissions:

a. On the date of launch of the
plotting scheme, the concerned land was
not under any consolidation operations.

b.
The
petitioner
sought
information from respondent authorities
regarding the initiation, stage and date of
completion
of
the
consolidation
proceedings in the concerned village but a
vague and unclear reply was given leading
to complete uncertainty and confusion
thereby rendering the petitioner incapable
of completing the project.

c. The petitioner is in absolute
possession and occupation of the land
on
which
the
residential
plotting
scheme has been launched and has
clear title to the said land without any
encumbrance.

d. Petitioner is willing to provide
possession
to
customers
once
the
development work is completed but due to
an unforeseen event that is initiation of the
consolidation proceedings which is beyond
the control of the petitioner and is akin to
force majeure event under Section 56 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872, petitioners work
has come to halt.

e. As per the terms and conditions
of the scheme, the customer is not entitled
to any interest but only to the refund of
actual amount when there is no deficiency
on the part of the petitioner

f. Despite the supervening legal
impediment
and
doctrine
of
frustration/impossibility of performance
under Section 56 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872, due to initiation of consolidation
proceedings, respondent nos. 5 to 7
initiated consumer complaints alleging
deficiency of service and sought refund
with interest and accordingly the impugned
order dated January 9, 2024 was passed by
District
Commission
directing
refund
alongwith interest which suffers from
patent
illegality,
arbitrariness
and
complete non-consideration of the statutory
bar under the U.P. Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953, and against the settled
proposition of law laid down by the
Supreme Court.

g. To buttress his arguments,
counsel has placed reliance on Satyabrata
Ghosh v. Mugneeram Bangur & Co.
reported in AIR 1954 SC 44); Alopi Prasad
& Sons v. Union of India reported in AIR
1960 SC 588; Delhi Airtech Services Pvt.
Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in (2011) 9
SCC 354; Pioneer Urban Land &
Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India
reported in (2019) 8 SCC. 416 wherein the
Supreme Court has held that supervening
impossibility/illegality
discharges
contractual obligations and court may
638 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
intervene to grant interim protection from
consumer redressal proceedings.

CONTENTIONS
OF
RESPONDENTS

5. The learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondents has rebutted the
arguments of petitioner and made following
submissions:

a. The petitioner was unable to
deliver the possession of the land within
time, therefore he is liable to return the
aforesaid amount alongwith interest to the
respondents.

b. The order of the District
Commission was passed after perusal of
evidence and was upheld by the State
Commission and thereafter the National
Commission that held that the order does
not suffer from any illegality.

b. The writ petition is not
maintainable before this court as there is an
alternative
remedy
to
approach
the
Supreme Court under Section 67 of the
Act.

ANALYSIS

6. I have given my thoughtful
consideration to the submissions canvassed
by the learned counsel for the parties and
have also perused the materials placed on
record.

7. The framework of the Consumer
Protection
Act
was
provided
by
a
resolution dated April 9, 1985 of the
General Assembly of the United Nations
Organisation
which
is
known
as
"Consumer Protection
Resolution
No.
39/248". India is a signatory to the said
Resolution. Ergo, the Act was enacted in
pursuance of the said Resolution. It further
seeks to provide for better protection of the
interests of consumers and for the said
purpose, to make provision for the
establishment of Consumer Councils and
other authorities for the settlement of
consumer
disputes
and
for
matters
connected therewith, as would appear from
the Statement of Objects and Reasons of
the Act inter alia to promote and protect the
rights of consumers.

8. In the present case writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India is filed for interfering with the
recovery proceedings initiated in pursuance
of an order passed by District Commission
which was affirmed by State Commission
and National Commission.

9. The petitioner then preferred a
revision under Section 58(1)(b) of the Act
before National Commission wherein the
commission has converted the said revision
into second appeal under Section 51(2) of
the Act which was dismissed too for the
reason that no substantial question of law
was involved in the matter. The order
passed by National Commission is quoted
hereinbelow:

"These are Revision Petitions
filed against the order dated 01.08.2024 of
the Uttar Pradesh State Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission wherein the appeals
filed by the Petitioner were dismissed. The
question before us is whether these three
Revision Petitions are maintainable before
this Commission under the Consumer
Protection Act, 2019. In a recent order of
this Commission in RP/1879/2024, Vivo
Mobile India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Mavuram
Sujatha & Ors, decided on 20.01.2025, it
has been held that revisional power of this
Commission is not available for orders
arising out of a complaint before the
12 All. M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
639
District Commission or out of an appellate
order of the State Commission. Further it
has been held that the orders pending a
complaint before the District Commission
or after a decision would only be revisable
before the State Commission and not before
this Commission under Section 58(1)(b) of
the
Consumer
Protection
Act,
2019.
Learned
Counsel
for
the
Petitioner
submitted that those revision petitions were
filed before this order of the Commission
and therefore the Revision Petitions may be
converted into Second Appeal under
Section 51(2). Accordingly these Revision
Petitions are converted as Second Appeal.

Heard the arguments of the
learned Counsel for both the parties. The
Section dealing with Second Appeal in the
2019 Act, which is Section 51(2), clearly
states that there should be a substantial
question of law involved for filing of
Second Appeal. On hearing arguments and
on perusal of record, we find there are no
substantial questions of law involved in the
Second Appeal as the State Commissioner,
had reiterated the order of the District
Commission which has been passed after
taking into account the evidences and
hearing the parties. In the grounds of
Second Appeal, only issues relating to facts
have been mentioned like allotment of plot,
giving possession development work, etc.
which have been adequately dealt with by
this Commission. Accordingly, these three
Revision Petitions converted as Second
Appeal are dismissed as not maintainable.

These
three
Second
Appeals
arising out of the same matter and decided
by Uttar Pradesh State Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission on the same date
but by different orders, again we find that
the Second Appeals have been filed without
any question of any substantial law
involved in the matter. Accordingly, these
three Second Appeals are also dismissed as
not maintainable."

10. The petitioner heavily relies on the
order passed by National Commission
Disputes Redressal Commission, New
Delhi in Vivo Mobile India Private
Limited v. Smt. Mavuram Sujatha and
others; (Revision Petition no. 1879 of
2024, decided on January 20, 2025) to
submit that the National Commission has
itself stated in the said order to invoke writ
jurisdiction before High Court against the
order of the State Commission. The
paragraphs of the order relied upon by the
petitioner is quoted hereinbelow:

"71. Accordingly, we do not find
that the power to revise a revisional order
passed by the State Commission is
available to us. The order of the State
Commission in the present case cannot be
stated to be an order in an original
complaint of a consumer dispute pending
before the State Commission. Admittedly,
the dispute is pending before the District
Commission and not before the State
Commission. Consequently, we cannot
assume the revisional jurisdiction on the
arguments
advanced
by
the
learned
Counsel for the parties.

72. We may also point out
that the remedy by way of a Writ Petition
has been held to be available in the
judgments referred to above, and in the
absence of any statutory specific remedy, it
is open to the aggrieved party to approach
the jurisdictional High Court for redressal
of their grievances. The compilation,
therefore, presented as a Revision Petition,
being not maintainable under Section
58(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act,
2019, is hereby dismissed.
640 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. Per contra, the respondents vehemently
rebuked the arguments of the petitioner and
contend that the District Commission has rightly
passed an order dated January 9, 2024 which
was decided against petitioner wherein it was
directed to deposit Rs. 8,64,000/-alongwith 9%
annual interest to the complainant from the date
of filing the complaint till the date of actual
payment within 30 days from the date of order
due to default of the petitioner.

12. In Whirlpool Corporation v.
Registrar of Trademarks, Mumbai reported in
(1998) 8 SCC 1 has held that alternative remedy
will not act as a bar for writ court in the
contingencies. The relevant paragraph of the
judgment is quoted hereinbelow:

"15. Under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court, having regard to
the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain
or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High
Court has imposed upon
itself
certain
restrictions one of which is that if an effective
and efficacious remedy is available, the High
Court would not normally exercise its
jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been
consistently held by this Court not to operate as a
bar in at least three contingencies, namely,
where the writ petition has been filed for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or
where there has been a violation of the principle
of natural justice or where the order or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or
the vires of an Act is challenged.........."
 (Emphasis added)

13. In Harbanslal Sahnia v
Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd reported in (2003)
2 SCC 107 has reiterated the view of
Whirlpool Corporation (Supra) and held as
follows:

"7.........In an appropriate
case, in spite of availability of the
alternative remedy, the High Court may
still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least
three contingencies: (i) where the writ
petition seeks enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights; (ii) where there is
failure of principles of natural justice; or
(iii) where the orders or proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of
an Act is challenged........"

(Emphasis added)

14. The Supreme Court in Radha
Krishan Industries v. State of H.P.
reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771 has discussed
in detail about the maintainability of writ
petition
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India and also laid down
principles of law that emanates from a
plethora
of
precedents.
The
relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are quoted
hereinbelow:

"C.1. Maintainability of the writ
petition before the High Court

24. The High Court has dealt
with the maintainability of the petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Relying on the decision of this Court in
CCT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer
Health Care Ltd. [CCT v. Glaxo Smith
Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2020)
19 SCC 681 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 440] ,
the High Court noted that although it can
entertain a petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution, it must not do so when the
aggrieved person has an effective alternate
remedy available in law. However, certain
exceptions to this "rule of alternate
remedy" include where, the statutory
authority has not acted in accordance with
the provisions of the law or acted in
defiance of the fundamental principles of
judicial procedure; or has resorted to
12 All. M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
641
invoke provisions, which are repealed; or
where an order has been passed in
violation of the principles of natural
justice. Applying this formulation, the High
Court noted that the appellant has an
alternate remedy available under the GST
Act and thus, the petition was not
maintainable.

25.
In
this
background,
it
becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell
on the "rule of alternate remedy" and its
judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v.
Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool
Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998)
8 SCC 1] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court
after reviewing the case law on this point,
noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14-15)

"14.
The
power
to
issue
prerogative writs under Article 226 of the
Constitution is plenary in nature and is not
limited by any other provision of the
Constitution. This power can be exercised
by the High Court not only for issuing writs
in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus,
prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari
for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights contained in Part III
of the Constitution but also for "any other
purpose".

15. Under Article 226 of the
Constitution, the High Court, having
regard to the facts of the case, has a
discretion to entertain or not to entertain a
writ petition. But the High Court has
imposed upon itself certain restrictions one
of which is that if an effective and
efficacious remedy is available, the High
Court would not normally exercise its
jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has
been consistently held by this Court not to
operate as a bar in at least three
contingencies, namely, where the writ
petition has been filed for the enforcement
of any of the Fundamental Rights or where
there has been a violation of the principle
of natural justice or where the order or
proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction
or the vires of an Act is challenged. There
is a plethora of case-law on this point but
to cut down this circle of forensic
whirlpool, we would rely on some old
decisions of the evolutionary era of the
constitutional law as they still hold the
field."

26. Following the dictum of this
Court in Whirlpool [Whirlpool Corpn. v.
Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1]
, in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd. [Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil
Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] , this Court
noted that : (Harbanslal Sahnia case
[Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn.
Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107] , SCC p. 110, para
7)

"7. So far as the view taken by
the High Court that the remedy by way of
recourse
to
arbitration
clause
was
available to the appellants and therefore
the writ petition filed by the appellants was
liable to be dismissed is concerned, suffice
it to observe that the rule of exclusion of
writ jurisdiction by availability of an
alternative remedy is a rule of discretion
and not one of compulsion. In an
appropriate case, in spite of availability of
the alternative remedy, the High Court may
still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least
three contingencies : (i) where the writ
petition seeks enforcement of any of the
fundamental rights; (ii) where there is
failure of principles of natural justice; or
(iii) where the orders or proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of
an Act is challenged. (See Whirlpool
Corpn.v.
Registrar
of
Trade
Marks
642 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
[Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade
Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] .) The present case
attracts applicability of the first two
contingencies. Moreover, as noted, the
appellants' dealership, which is their bread
and butter, came to be terminated for an
irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such
circumstances, we feel that the appellants
should have been allowed relief by the
High Court itself instead of driving them to
the
need
of
initiating
arbitration
proceedings."

27. The principles of law which
emerge are that:

27.1. The power under Article
226 of the Constitution to issue writs can
be exercised not only for the enforcement of
fundamental rights, but for any other
purpose as well.

27.2. The High Court has the
discretion not to entertain a writ petition.
One of the restrictions placed on the power
of the High Court is where an effective
alternate remedy is available to the
aggrieved person.

27.3. Exceptions to the rule of
alternate remedy arise where : (a) the writ
petition has been filed for the enforcement
of a fundamental right protected by Part III
of the Constitution; (b) there has been a
violation of the principles of natural
justice; (c) the order or proceedings are
wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires
of a legislation is challenged.

27.4. An alternate remedy by
itself does not divest the High Court of its
powers
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution in an appropriate case though
ordinarily, a writ petition should not be
entertained when an efficacious alternate
remedy is provided by law.

27.5. When a right is created by a
statute, which itself prescribes the remedy
or procedure for enforcing the right or
liability, resort must be had to that
particular statutory remedy before invoking
the discretionary remedy under Article 226
of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion
of statutory remedies is a rule of policy,
convenience and discretion.

27.6. In cases where there are
disputed questions of fact, the High Court
may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ
petition. However, if the High Court is
objectively of the view that the nature of the
controversy requires the exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, such a view would not readily
be interfered with."

(Emphasis added)

15. The Supreme Court in Ibrat
Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome (P) Ltd.
reported in (2023) 11 SCC 594 after noting
the dicta in L. Chandra Kumar v.
Union of India reported in (1997) 3
SCC 261 while dealing with the special
leave petition against the order passed
by National Commission in its appellate
jurisdiction upholding the order of State
Commission has categorically held that
National commission is a 'tribunal'
within the meaning of Article 136 of the
Constitution
and
writ
court
has
supervisory
jurisdiction
over
the
tribunal under Article 227 of the
Constitution. Ergo, the writ petition
under Article 227 before the High Court
would be maintainable. The relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are quoted
hereinbelow:
12 All. M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
643

"17. It is not in dispute that in the
present case, the appeal before the
National Commission was against the
order passed by the State Commission
under Section 47(1)(a) of the 2019 Act.
Therefore, against the order passed by the
State Commission passed in a complaint in
exercise of its powers conferred under
Section 47(1)(a) of the 2019 Act, an appeal
to
the
National
Commission
was
maintainable, as provided under Section
58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act. As per Section
67 of the 2019 Act, any person, aggrieved
by an order made by the National
Commission of its powers conferred by
sub-clause (i) or (ii) of clause (a) of subsection (1) of Section 58, may prefer an
appeal against such order to the Supreme
Court. Therefore, an appeal against the
order passed by the National Commission
to this Court would be maintainable only in
case the order is passed by the National
Commission in exercise of its powers
conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(i) or
under Section 58(1)(a)(ii) of the 2019 Act.
No further appeal to this Court is provided
against the order passed by the National
Commission in exercise of its powers
conferred under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or
under Section 58(1)(a)(iv) of the 2019 Act.
In that view of the matter, the remedy
which may be available to the aggrieved
party against the order passed by the
National Commission in an appeal under
Section 58(1)(a)(iii) or Section 58(1)(a)(iv)
would be to approach the High Court
concerned having jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution.

18.
Whether
the
National
Commission can be said to be a 'tribunal'
for the purpose of exercise of powers under
Article 227 of the Constitution by the High
Court is concerned, has been considered by
a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Associated Cement Companies [Associated
Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma,
1964 SCC OnLine SC 62 : AIR 1965 SC
1595] , which is required to be referred to.
In paras 44 and 45, it is observed and held
as under : (SCC p. 1609)

"44. An authority other than a
court may be vested by statute with judicial
power in widely different circumstances,
which it would be impossible and indeed
inadvisable
to
attempt
to
define
exhaustively. The proper thing is to
examine each case as it arises, and to
ascertain whether the powers vested in the
authority can be truly described as judicial
functions or judicial powers of the State.
For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient
to
say
that
any
outside
authority
empowered by the State to determine
conclusively the rights of two or more
contending parties with regard to any
matter
in
controversy
between
them
satisfies the test of an authority vested with
the judicial powers of the State and may be
regarded as a tribunal within the meaning
of
Article
136.
Such
a
power
of
adjudication implies that the authority must
act judicially and must determine the
dispute by ascertainment of the relevant
facts on the materials before it and by
application of the relevant law to those
facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to
be exhaustive, and it may be that other
bodies not satisfying this test are also
tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is
essential that the power of adjudication
must be derived from a statute or a
statutory rule. An authority or body
deriving its power of adjudication from an
agreement of the parties, such as a private
arbitrator or a tribunal acting under
Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal
within Article 136. It matters little that such
644 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
a body or authority is vested with the
trappings of a court. The Arbitration Act,
1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the
trappings of a court, so also the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority
acting under Section 10-A of the Act with
many of such trappings, and yet, such
bodies and authorities are not tribunals.

45. The word 'tribunal' finds
place in Article 227 of the Constitution
also, and I think that there also the word
has the same meaning as in Article 136."

Therefore,
the
National
Commission can be said to be a "Tribunal"
which is vested by statute with the powers
to determine conclusively the rights of two
or more contending parties with regard to
any matter in controversy between them.
Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the
aforesaid decision, it satisfies the test of an
authority vested with the judicial powers of
the State and therefore may be regarded as
a "Tribunal" within the meaning of Article
227 and/or 136 of the Constitution. Also, in
a given case, this Court may not exercise
its powers under Article 136 of the
Constitution, in view of the remedy which
may be available to the aggrieved party
before the High Court concerned under
Article 227 of the Constitution, as it is
appropriate
that
aggrieved
party
approaches the High Court concerned by
way of writ petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution.

19.
At
this
stage,
another
Constitution Bench decision of this Court
in L. Chandra Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar
v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997
SCC (L&S) 577] is required to be referred
to. While dealing with the jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of
the Constitution in respect of powers of
judicial review, it is observed and held in
para 90 as under : (SCC pp. 307-308)

"90. We may first address the
issue of exclusion of the power of judicial
review of the High Courts. We have
already held that in respect of the power of
judicial review, the jurisdiction of the High
Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot
wholly be excluded. It has been contended
before us that the Tribunals should not be
allowed to adjudicate upon matters where
the vires of legislations is questioned, and
that they should restrict themselves to
handling matters where constitutional
issues are not raised. We cannot bring
ourselves to agree to this proposition as
that may result in splitting up proceedings
and may cause avoidable delay. If such a
view were to be adopted, it would be open
for litigants to raise constitutional issues,
many of which may be quite frivolous, to
directly approach the High Courts and thus
subvert the jurisdiction of the Tribunals.
Moreover, even in these special branches
of law, some areas do involve the
consideration of constitutional questions on
a regular basis; for instance, in service law
matters, a large majority of cases involve
an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16
of the Constitution. To hold that the
Tribunals have no power to handle matters
involving constitutional issues would not
serve the purpose for which they were
constituted. On the other hand, to hold that
all such decisions will be subject to the
jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before
a Division Bench of the High Court within
whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal
concerned falls will serve two purposes.
While saving the power of judicial review
of legislative action vested in the High
Courts under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous
12 All. M/S Sahu Land Developers Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
645
claims are filtered out through the process
of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High
Court will also have the benefit of a
reasoned decision on merits which will be
of use to it in finally deciding the matter."

That thereafter, it is observed and
held that against the order passed by the
Tribunal,
the
aggrieved
party
may
approach the High Court concerned under
Article 227 of the Constitution.

***

23. The scope and ambit of
jurisdiction
of
Article
227
of
the
Constitution has been explained by this
Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P)
Ltd. [Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P)
Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97] , which has been
consistently followed by this Court (see the
recent decision of this Court in Garment
Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel [Garment
Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4
SCC 181 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 424] ).
Therefore, while exercising the powers under
Article 227 of the Constitution, the High
Court has to act within the parameters to
exercise the powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution. It goes without saying that even
while considering the grant of interim
stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227
of the Constitution, the High Court has to
bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of
superintendence under Article 227 of the
Constitution. Therefore, while granting any
interim stay/relief in a writ petition under
Article 227 of the Constitution against an
order passed by the National Commission,
the same shall always be subject to the rigour
of the powers to be exercised under Article
227 of the Constitution.

24.
In
view
of
the
above
discussion and for the reasons stated above
and subject to the observations made
hereinabove, it cannot be said that a writ
petition
under
Article
227
of
the
Constitution
before
the
High
Court
concerned against the order passed by the
National Commission in an appeal under
Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act was
not maintainable... ... "

(Emphasis added)

16. The Supreme Court in Universal
Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Suresh Chand Jain reported in (2024) 9
SCC 148 applying the precedent in Ibrat
Faizaan (Supra) wherein the petitioner has
directly approached the Apex Court under
Article 136 of Constitution to challenge the
order passed by National Commission that
had
affirmed
the
order
of
State
Commission, held that a party can always
approach
the
High
Court
having
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227
of
the
Constitution.
The
relevant
paragraphs of the judgment are quoted
hereinbelow:

"25. The provisions of Article
136 of the Constitution as such are not
circumscribed by any limitation. But when
the party aggrieved has alternative remedy
to go before the High Court, invoking its
writ jurisdiction or supervisory jurisdiction
as the case may be, this Court should not
entertain petition seeking special leave
thereby short-circuit the legal procedure
prescribed.