# M/s Sangam Travels & Ors v. The State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2020) 6 ILRA 880
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-09-23
- **Case number:** WRIT A No. 13933 of 2019
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal, Saral Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-sangam-travels-ors-v-the-state-of-u-p-anr-45818
- **Pages:** 11

## Text

880 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2020)06ILR A880
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.09.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
THE HON'BLE SARAL SRIVASTAVA, J.

WRIT A No. 13933 of 2019
&
WRIT A 13936 of 2019

M/s Sangam Travels & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
The State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

A. Civil Law - Motor Vehicles - Fixation
of age - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:
Sections 3, 28, 59, 64, 65, 95, 96, 107,
111, 138, 176, 213; General Clauses Act,
1897: Section 21; U.P. Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998: Rule 222(D); U.P. Motor
Vehicles (Twenty Sixth Amendment)
Rules, 2019 - Petitioners are aggrieved by
reduction of age limit of public service vehicles
from 15 years to 10 years which has been
introduced by the State Government in the
Rule 222(D) of Rules, 1998 by Amending
Rules, 2019, whereas the age limit of
educational institutional buses has been fixed
as 15 years from the date of original
registration.

B.
The
classification of
the
two
categories of vehicles is a reasonable
and valid classification. There is no
arbitrariness or discrimination and is
not hit by Article 14 of Constitution
of India - Anurudh Kumar and Others Vs
State of U.P. & Others, 2019 (9) ADJ 79
(DB) (Paras 5 to 7) - The categorisation is
for the reason that the two categories of
vehicle form a separate class and cannot
be equated. The use and running of
educational institutional vehicles is very
limited whereas other private/commercial
or contract vehicles have a very wide and
expensive use resulting in their speedy
wear and tear. Therefore, the life of the
two
categories
of
vehicle
has
been
provided differently.
The submission that nature of activity for
which petitioners' buses are being used is
similar to the use of school buses owned by
the schools, as the petitioners' buses are
engaged in transporting the students from
their homes to school and back to their homes
and as such are not different from educational
institution vehicles/buses cannot be accepted
for the simple reason that the educational
institutional bus has been defined U/S. 2(11)
of the Motor Vehicles Act and the nature of
activity would not bring them within the
purview of educational institutional buses as
defined under the Act. (Para 8, 9, 11, 15)

C. Competence of State government to
amend Rule 222(D) of Rules, 1998 -
State Transport Authority is empowered
to fix the age limit of the vehicle - It is a
well-established proposition of law that
where a specific power is conferred
without prejudice to the generality of
the general powers already specified,
the particular power is only illustrative
and does not in any way restrict the
general power. (Para 21, 26)

Section 65(1) puts only rider upon the State
Government not to make rules with respect to
matters specified in section 64. Thus, under
section 65(1) of the Act, 1988, the State
Government is free to make any rule for the
purpose of carrying into effect the provisions
of Chapter VI of the Act 1988 except the
matters specified in section 64. Further, the
power under section 65(1) is general power
conferred upon the State Government to make
rules and thus, the source of power making
rules is derived from sub-section 1 of section
65
and
sub-section
2
merely
provides
illustration for the general power conferred by
sub-section 1 as sub-section 2 of section 65 of
the Act, 1988 commences with the words
'without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing powers'. It is manifest that subsection 2 of section 65 of the Act, 1988
confers no such fresh powers but is merely
illustrative of the general powers conferred by
sub-section 1 of section 65. (Para 25, 27)

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent
followed:
6 All. M/s Sangam Travels & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr. 881
1. Anurudh Kumar & ors.Vs State of U.P. &
ors., 2019 (9) ADJ 79 (DB) (Para 11, 15)

2. Surise Public School through Caretaker &
ors.Vs St. of U.P. Through Principal Secretary
& ors., Writ-A No. 9950 of 2013 (Para 13, 26)

3. Om Prakash & ors.Vs Union of India & ors.,
(1970) 3 SCC 942 (Para 20)

4. Academy Nutrition Improvement & ors.Vs
Union of India (2011) 8 SCC 274 (Para 20, 22)

5. General Officer Commanding-in-Chief and
Another Vs Dr. Subhash Chandra Yadav &
anr., (1988) 2 SCC 351 (Para 23)

Precedent distinguished:

1. The State Transport Authority & Another Vs
Auto
Rickshaw
Vikram
Union
&
anr.,
Uttrakhand High Court in Special Appeal No.
534 of 2015, delivered on 04.07.2017 (Para
10, 28)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.
&
Hon'ble Saral Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Hanuman Prasad Dube,
learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri
Neeraj
Tripathi,
learned
Additional
Advocate General for the State of U.P.

2. These two writ petitions involve
common question of law, therefore, are
being decided by the common judgement.

3. The issue in the writ petitions is as
to whether the State Government is
empowered to fix the age limit of motor
vehicles.

4. For convenience, the facts are being
delineated from Writ C- No.13933 of 2019.

5. The petitioners are registered
owners of public service vehicles. The
vehicles of the petitioners are covered under
the permit granted by the Transport
Authorities and they are engaged by
different schools being run in the Kanpur
City under the agreements arrived at
between them and the concerned school to
carry the students from their homes to
schools and back i.e. to and fro.

6. The state government in exercise of
its power under Sections 28, 38, 65, 95, 96,
107, 111, 138, 176 and 213 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act No.59 of 1988)
(hereinafter referred to as ''Act, 1988') read
with Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
1897 issued a notification dated 27 May,
2019 bringing about amendments in various
rules of the U.P. Motor Vehicles Rules,
1998 by U.P. Motor vehicles (Twenty Sixth
Amendment) Rules, 2019 (hereinafter
referred to as 'amending rules, 2019'). The
amending rule 2019 by which age limit of
school vehicle is fixed reads as under:-

Age
limit of
School
Vehicle
"222 (D) (1) The educational
institution bus (diesel and clean
fuel driven) shall not be more
than 15 years old from the date
of initial registration.

(2) The diesel/CNG
driven private bus (contract
carriage) shall not be more than
10 years old from the date of
initial registration.

(3) The school van,
driven by diesel/petrol/CNG or
any other clean fuel, shall not be
more than 10 years old from the
date of initial registration."
882 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. Petitioners are aggrieved by the
reduction of the age limit of public
service vehicles from 15 years to 10 years
which has been introduced by the State
Government in the Rule 222(D) of Rules,
1998 by Amending Rules, 2019.

8. The challenge to the amendment
in Rule 222(D) of Rules 1998 has been
laid by the petitioners on two grounds;
firstly it amounts to hostile discrimination
inasmuch as the age limit of the
educational institution buses has been
fixed as 15 years from the date of original
registration whereas the age limit of
private buses like buses owned by
petitioners has been fixed 10 years from
the date of initial registration. The second
ground of attack is that the State
Government is not competent to fix the
age of the vehicles inasmuch as the field
of fixation of age of a motor vehicle is
with the Central Government in view of
Section 59 of the Act, 1988 and,
therefore, the Amending Rules, 2019 by
which Rule 222(D) of Rules of 1998 has
been amended is beyond the competence
of the State Government.

9. Elaborating the arguments,
learned counsel for the petitioners has
contended that the petitioners buses are
engaged in transporting the students from
their homes to school and back to their
homes and, therefore, nature of activity
for which their buses are being used is
similar and akin to the use of school buses
owned by the schools. Thus, the different
age fixed by the respondent-State with
respect to buses owned by the educational
institutions and private individuals is
arbitrary
and
amounts
to
hostile
discrimination, and thus being in violation
of Article 14 of the Constitution of India
deserves to be declared as ultra vires.

10. It is further contended that under
Section 59 of the Act, 1988 Central
Government is vested with the powers to
fix the age limit of motor vehicles and
there is no provision under the Act which
contemplates the powers of the State
Government to fix the age limit of motor
vehicles. Therefore, amendment in Rules
of 2019 is beyond the competence of
State Government and thus, the same is
liable Uttrakhand High Court in Special
Appeal No.534 of 2015 (The State
Transport Authority & Another Vs. Auto
Rickshaw Vikram Union & Another)
delivered on 04.07.2017.to be declared as
ultra vires. In support of the said
contention, learned counsel for the
petitioners has relied upon the judgement
of Uttrakhand High Court in Special
Appeal No.534 of 2015 (The State
Transport Authority & Another Vs. Auto
Rickshaw Vikram Union & Another)
delivered on 04.07.2017.

11.

Refuting
the
aforesaid
submissions, learned Additional Advocate
General contends that this Court by
judgement dated 08.07.2019 in the case of
Anurudh Kumar and Others Vs. State of
U.P. & Others 2019(9) ADJ 79 (DB) has
repelled the contention of private bus
owners that amendment in Rule 222 (D)
of Rules, 1988 is ultra vires to Article 14
of the Constitution of India, and thus, the
argument of learned counsel for the
petitioners
with
respect
to
hostile
discrimination fixing the age limit of
different
motor vehicles
owned by
educational
institutions
and
private
individuals does not stand to merit.

12.

As
regards
the
second
contention with respect to competence of
State Government to fix the age of a
motor vehicle by amending rules, 2019,
6 All. M/s Sangam Travels & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr. 883
learned Additional Advocate General
would submit that under Section 65 (1)
the Act of 1988, State Government is
conferred with the powers to make rules
for the purposes of carrying into effect the
provisions of chapter VI of the Act, 1988
other than the matters specified in Section
64 of the Act, 1988. He submits that the
Central Government has not issued any
notification specifying the age limit of
motor vehicles and further the power to
fix the age limit of motor vehicles is not
contemplated under Section 64 of the Act,
1988, therefore, State Government is well
within its competence under Section
65(1) of the Act to frame rules to carry
out the purposes of chapter VI of the Act
which includes fixation of age limit of
motor vehicles. The fixation of age limit
of motor vehicles falling in different
category as contemplated in the Act, 1988
is done by the State Government with an
object to further the purpose of carrying
into effect the provisions of chapter VI of
the Act. He further submits that the power
under Section 65 (1) of the Act, 1988 is
general power and power under Section
65 (2) is only illustrative and does not
restrict the power of the state government
under Section 65(1) of the Act, 1988 to
frame rules to carry out the purpose of
chapter VI of the Act .

13. He submits that this Court in
the case of Surise Public School
through Caretaker and Others Vs. State
of U.P. Through Principal Secretary
and Others (Writ A- No.9950 of 2013)
has held that the State Transport
Authority has power to fix the age limit
of a vehicle.

14. We have considered the rival
submissions of the parties and perused
the record.

15. The argument of the petitioners
that that amendment in fixing the
different age limit for the buses owned by
the educational institutions and the buses
owned by the private individuals amounts
to hostile discrimination and is hit by
Article 14 of the Constitution of India
lacks merit in view of judgment of this
court in the case of Anurudh Kumar and
Others (supra) wherein this court has
considered the similar argument and
found no merit in it .

16. Before adverting to the second
submission of the petitioners, it would be
useful to have a glance at Sections 59, 64
and 65 of the Act, 1998:-

"59 Power to fix the age limit
of motor vehicle. - (1) The Central
Government may, having regard to the
public safety, convenience and objects of
this Act, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify the life of a motor vehicle
reckoned
from
the
date
of
its
manufacture, after the expiry of which the
motor vehicle shall not be deemed to
comply with the requirements of this Act
and the Rules made thereunder:

Provided
that
the
Central
Government may specify different ages
for different classes or different types of
motor vehicles.

(2) Notwithstanding anything
contained in sub-section (1), the Central
Government may, having regard to the
purpose of a motor vehicle, such as,
display or use for the purposes of a
demonstration in any exhibition, use for
the purposes of technical research or
taking part in a vintage car rally, by
notification in the Official Gazette,
exempt, by a general or special order,
884 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
subject to such conditions as may be
specified in such notification, any class or
type of motor vehicle from the operation
of sub-section (1) for the purpose to be
stated in the notification.

(3) Notwithstanding anything
contained in section 56, no prescribed
authority or authorized testing station
shall grant a certificate of fitness to a
motor vehicle in contravention of the
provisions of any notification issued
under sub-section (1).

64. Power of the Central
Government to make rules. - The Central
Government may make rules to provide
for all or any of the following matters,
namely:-

(a) the period within which
and the form in which an application
shall be made and the documents,
particulars and information it shall
accompany under sub-section (1) of
section 41;

(b) the form in which the
certificate of registration shall be made
and she particulars and information it
shall contain and the manner in which it
shall be issued under sub-section (3) of
section 41;

(c) the form and manner in
which the particulars of the certificate of
registration shall be entered in the
records of the registering authority under
sub-section (5) of section 41;

(d) the manner in which and the
form in which the registration mark, the
letters and figures and other particulars
referred to in sub-section (6) of section 41
shall be displayed and shown;

(e) the period within which and the
form in which the application shall be made
and the particulars and information it shall
contain under sub-section(8) of section 41;

(f)
the
form
in
which
the
application referred to in sub-section (14) of
section 41 shall be made, the particulars and
information it shall contain and the fee to be
charged;

(g) the from in which and the
period
within
which
the
application
referred to in sub-section (1) of section 47
shall be made and the particulars it shall
contain;

(h) the form in which and the
manner in which the application for "No
Objection Certificate" shall be made under
sub-section (1) of section 48 and the form of
receipt to be issued under sub-section (2) of
section 48;

(i) the matters that are to be
complied with by an applicant before no
objection certificate may be issued under
section 48;

(j) the form in which the intimation
of change of address shall be made under
sub-section (1) of section 49 and the
documents to be submitted alongwith the
application;

(k) the form in which and the
manner in which the intimation of transfer of
ownership shall be made under sub-section
(1) of section 50 or 87 under sub-section (2)
of section 50 and the document to be
submitted alongwith the application;

(l)
the
form
in
which
the
application under sub-section (2) or subsection (3) of section 51 shall be made;
6 All. M/s Sangam Travels & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr. 885

(m) the form in which the
certificate of fitness shall be issued under
sub-section (1) of section 56 and the
particulars and information it shall
contain;

(n) the period for which the
certificate of fitness granted or renewed
under section 56 shall be effective;

(o) the fees to be charged for
the issue or renewal or alternation of
certificates of registration, for making an
entry regarding transfer of ownership on
a certificate of registration, for making or
cancelling an endorsement in respect of
agreement of hire-purchase or lease or
hypothecation
on
a
certificate
of
registration, for certificates of fitness for
registration
marks,
and
for
the
examination or inspection of motor
vehicle, and the refund of such fees;

(p) any other matter which is to
be, or may be, prescribed by the Central
Government.

65. Power of the State
Government to make rules. - (1) A
State Government may make rules for
the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of this Chapter other than
the matters specified in section 64.

(2) Without prejudice to the
generality of the foregoing power,
such rules may provide for -

(a) the conduct and hearing
of appeals that may be preferred
under this Chapter (the fees to be paid
in respect of such appeals and the
refund of such fees);

(b)
the
appointment,
functions
and
jurisdiction
of
registering
and
other
prescribed
authorities;

(c) the exemption of roadrollers, graders and other vehicles
designed and used solely for the
construction, repair and cleaning of
roads from all or any of the provisions
of this Chapter and the rules made
thereunder
and
the
conditions
governing such exemption;

(d) the issue or renewal of
certificate of registration and fitness
and duplicates of such certificates to
replace the certificates lost, destroyed
or mutilated;

(e)
the
production
of
certificates of registration before the
registering authority for the revision
of
entries
therein
of
particulars
relating to the gross vehicle weight;

(f) the temporary registration
of motor vehicles, and the issue of
temporary certificate of registration
and marks;

(g) the manner in which the
particulars referred to in sub-section (2)
of section 58 and other prescribed
particulars shall be exhibited;

(h) the exemption of prescribed
persons or prescribed classes of persons
from payment of all or any portion of the
fees payable under this Chapter;

(i) the forms, other than those
prescribed by the Central Government to
be used for the purposes of this Chapter;
886 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(j) the communication between
registering authorities of particulars of
certificates of registration and by owners
of vehicles registered outside the State of
particulars of such vehicles and of their
registration;

(k) the amount or amounts
under sub-section (13) of section 41 or
sub-section (7) of section 47 or subsection (4) of section 49 or sub-section
(5) of section 50; applications for their
renewal;

(m)the
extension
from
the
provisions of this Chapter, and the
conditions and fees for exemption, of
motor vehicles in the possession of
dealers;

(n) the form in which and the
period within which the return under
section 62 shall be sent;

(o) the manner in which the
State Register of Motor Vehicles shall be
maintained under section 63;

(p) any other matter which is to
be or may be prescribed."

17. Section 59 (1) of the Act
provides that the Central Government is
empowered to fix age limit of vehicles
reckoned from the date of its manufacture
having regard to the public safety,
convenience and object of the Act.
Proviso to said section further provides
that the Central Government may fix
different ages for different classes or
different types of motor vehicles.

18.
The
petitioners
though
in
paragraph 6 of the writ petition have
stated that the age limit of petitioners
vehicles was fixed under the notification
issued by the Central Government in
exercise of powers conferred under
Section 59 of the Act, 1998, but when the
counsel for the petitioners was confronted
to place the said notification on record, he
admitted that in fact no such notification
has
been
issued
by
the
Central
Government. However, he maintains that
even if no such notification has been
issued by the Central Government the
field of fixing the age limit of vehicle is
within the domain of the Central
Government under Section 59(1) of the
Act and not with the State Government.

19. A bare reading of Section 64 of
the Act, 1988, extracted herein above,
clearly shows that the said section does
not envisage any provision which confers
exclusive
power
upon
the
Central
Government to make rules with respect to
fixation of age of a motor vehicle.

20. The only rider which has been
put upon the State Government to make
rules under Section 65(1) of the Act, 1988
is that rule making power with respect to
matters specified in Section 64 of the Act,
1988 is beyond the competence of the
State
Government
otherwise
it
is
empowered to make rules on all subjects
for the purpose of carrying into effect the
provisions of chapter VI of the Act,1988.
The power of State Government under
Section 65(1) is general in its terms and
authorizes
inter-alia
of
making
or
amending any rule in so far as it is
necessary or expedient so to do for
carrying into effect the provision of
chapter VI of the Act, 1988. At this
juncture, it would be apt to refer the two
judgements of the Apex Court namely,
Om Prakash and Others Vs. Union of
India and Others 1970 (3) SCC 942 and
Academy Nutrition Improvement and
6 All. M/s Sangam Travels & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr. 887
Others Vs. Union of India (2011) 8 SCC
274.

21. In the case of Om Prakash
(supra) Apex Court had occasion to
consider the powers of the Chief
Settlement
Commissioner
under
sub
Section (1) of Section 24 of the Displaced
Persons
(Compensation
and
Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 to cancel the
allotment of land made in favour of a
person. Paragraph 6 of the judgement
being relevant in the context of the
present case is being extracted herein
below:-

"6. It is therefore contended
relying on Sub-section (2) that in as much
as no fraud or false representation or
concealment of any material fact has been
alleged or proved in this case, the Chief
Settlement Commissioner cannot exercise
the revisionary power Under Section 24.
This contention in our view has no
validity.
It
is
a
well
established
proposition of law that where a specific
power is conferred without prejudice to
the generality of the general powers
already specified, the particular power is
only illustrative and does not in any way
restrict the general power. The Federal
Court had in Talpade's case indicated the
contrary but the Privy Council in King
Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee Indian
Appeals-Vol. 72 p. 241 observed at page
258 :

"Their Lordships are unable to
agree with the learned Chief Justice of the
Federal Court on his statement of the
relative positions of Sub-sections 1 and 2
of Section 2 of the Defence of India Act,
and Counsel for the respondents in the
present appeal was unable to support that
statement, or to maintain that Rule 26 was
invalid. In the opinion of their Lordships,
the function of Sub-section 2 is merely an
illustrative one: the rule-making power is
conferred by Sub-section 1, and "the
rules" which are referred to in the opening
sentence of Sub-section 2 are the rules
which are authorised by, and made under,
Sub-section 1; the provisions of Subsection 2 are not restrictive of Sub-section
1, as, indeed is expressly stated by the
words
"without
prejudice
to
the
"generality of the powers conferred by
Sub-section 1."

22. In the case of Academy
Nutrition
Improvement
and
Others
(supra), the challenge to Rule 44-I
inserted in the Prevention of Food
Adulteration Rules 1955 was made by the
petitioners. The Apex Court dealt with the
validity of statutes delegating the powers
of making rules. Paragraph 66 of the
judgement relevant in the present case is
being extracted herein below:-

"66. Statutes delegating the
power to make rules follow a standard
pattern. The relevant section would first
contain a provision granting the power to
make rules to the delegate in general
terms, by using the words `to carry out
the provisions of this Act' or `to carry out
the purposes of this Act'. This is usually
followed
by
another
sub-section
enumerating the matters/areas in regard to
which specific power is delegated by
using the words `in particular and without
prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such rules may provide
for all or any of the following matters."
Interpreting such provisions, this Court in
a number of decisions has held that where
power is conferred to make subordinate
legislation
in
general
terms,
the
subsequent
particularisation
of
the
888 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
matters/topics has to be construed as
merely illustrative and not limiting the
scope
of
the
general
power.
Consequently,
even
if
the
specific
enumerated topics in section 23(1A) may
not empower the Central Government to
make the impugned rule (Rule 44-I),
making of the Rule can be justified with
reference to the general power conferred
on the central government under section
23(1), provided the rule does not travel
beyond the scope of the Act.

"But even a general power to
make rules or regulations for carrying out
or giving effect to the Act, is strictly
ancillary in nature and cannot enable the
authority on whom the power is conferred
to extend the scope of general operation
of the Act. Therefore, such a power "will
not support attempts to widen the
purposes of the Act, to add new and
different means to carrying them out, to
depart from or vary its terms."

23. It would not out of place to refer
the judgement of Apex Court in the case
of General Officer Commanding-inChief and Another Vs. Dr. Subhash
Chandra Yadav and Another 1988 (2)
SCC 351 wherein Apex Court has laid
down the test when a rule can have the
effect of a statutory provisions. Paragraph
14 of the judgement is extracted herein
below:

"14. This contention is unsound.
It is well settled that rules framed under
the provisions of a statute form part of the
statute. In other words, rules have
statutory force. But before a rule can have
the effect of a statutory provision, two
conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) it
must conform to the provisions of the
statute under which it is framed; and (2) it
must also come within the scope and
purview of the rule making power of the
authority framing the rule. If either of
these two conditions is not fulfilled, the
rule so framed would be void. The
position remains the same even though
sub-section (2) of section 281 of the Act
has specifically provided that after the
rules are framed and published they shall
have effect as if enacted in the Act. In
other words, in spite of the provision of
sub-section (2) of section 281, any rule
framed under the Cantonment Act has to
fulfil the two conditions mentioned above
for their validity. The observation of this
Court in Jestamani v. Scindia Steam
Navigation Company, [1961] 2 SCR 811,
relied upon by Mr. Aggarwal, that a
contract of service may be transferred by
a statutory provision, does not at all help
the appellants. There can be no doubt that
a contract of service may be transferred
by statutory provisions, but before a rule
framed under a statute is regarded a
statutory provision or a part of the statute,
it must fulfil the above two conditions.
Rule 5-C was framed by the Central
Government in excess of its rule making
power as contained in clause (c) of subsection (2) of section 280 of the
Cantonment Act before its amendment by
the substitution of clause (c); it is,
therefore, void. "

24. Keeping in view the principles
laid down by the Apex Court in the
judgement referred above regarding the
validity of a rule, the Court now proceed
to consider the arguments of learned
counsel for the petitioners in respect of
the competence of the State Government
to amend Rule 222 (D). The petitioner
does not dispute the fact that no
notification fixing the age limit as
contemplated under Section 59 (1) of the
6 All. M/s Sangam Travels & Ors. Vs. The State of U.P. & Anr. 889
Act, 1988 has been issued by the Central
Government. Section 64 (1) of the Act
does not provide any provision from
which it is explicit or it can be inferred
that rule making power with respect to
fixation of age is conferred upon the
Central Government under said section .

25. Section 65(1) puts only rider
upon the State Government not to make
rules with respect to matters specified in
Section 64. Thus, under Section 65(1) of
the Act, 1988, the State Government is
free to make any rule for the purpose of
carrying into effect the provisions of
chapter VI of the Act 1988 except the
matters specified in Section 64. Further,
the power under Section 65(1) is general
power
conferred
upon
the
State
Government to make rules and thus, the
source of power making rules is derived
from sub-Section 1 of Section 65, and
sub-Section 2 merely provides illustration
for the general power conferred by sub
Section 1 as Sub-Section 2 of Section 65
of the Act, 1988 commences with the
words ''without prejudice to the generality
of the foregoing powers'. It is manifest
that sub-Section 2 of Section 65 of the
Act, 1988 confers no such fresh powers
but is merely illustrative of the general
powers conferred by sub-Section 1 of
Section 65.

26. This Court in the case of Surise
Public School (supra) has also held that
the
State
Transport
Authority
is
empowered to fix the age limit of the
vehicle. Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the said
judgement are being extracted herein
below:-

"6. It is submitted by learned
Standing Counsel, that in Mahraj Uddin's
case all the aspects relating to the powers
of the State Transport Authority fixing the
age of the vehicles including State
carriage, school buses, taxis and three
wheelers was considered and while
upholding the power of STA to fix the
age of the vehicles and to put model
condition in the permit, the decision of
the STA dated 23.2.2010 was upheld. He
submits that in the present case the
vehicles are plying as school buses and
for which there is no exemption. The
school buses carrying children should
strictly ensure to safety standard. He
submits that the petitioners' vehicles are
about more than 15 years' old and in view
of the decision of the STA, no further
permit shall be granted to such vehicles.
Any relaxation will be hazardous to the
safety of the children, who will be
travelling in the school buses.

7. We are of the view, that the
order
dated
7.12.2012
in
Omwati
Sarswati Junior High School's case was
passed without the benefit of the Division
Bench judgment in Mahraj Uddin's case.
We further find that no new ground has
been taken nor there is any justification to
allow the old vehicles to ply on the road.
The decision of STA in this regard should
not be lightly interfered."

27. It is worth mentioning that it is
not the case of the petitioner in the writ
petition that amendment in Rule 222 (D)
does not further the object of Chapter VI
of the Act and as the State Government is
not empowered to bring the amendment
in Rule 222D of Rules 1998 in exercise of
power under Section 65 of the Act,1988.
Thus, it can't be said that the object of
bringing amendment in Rule 222 (D) is
not to further the object of Act, 1988
more particularly chapter VI of the
Act,1988.
890 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

28. The judgment of the Uttrakhand
High Court in The State Transport
Authority (Supra) does not help the
petitioners for the simple reason that it
has not considered Section 65(1) of the
Act,
1988
which
vest
the
state
government with power to frame rules
subject to the restriction put under Section
66(1) of the Act,1988.

29. Consequently, for the reasons
given above, we do not find any
substance in the argument of learned
counsel for the petitioners that the State
Government is not competent to amend
Rule 222 (D) of Rules, 1998.

30. Thus, both the writ petitions lack
merit and are dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
----------
(2020)06ILR A890
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 14.02.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PIYUSH AGARWAL, J.

WRIT A No. 14138 of 2019

Heena Bisht ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Suresh Kumar Maurya

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A. Service Law - Recruitment - Uttar
Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2000; Uttar
Pradesh Public Service (Reservation for
Physically Handicapped, Dependents of
Freedom Fighters and Ex Serviceman)
Act, 1993: Section 2(b), 2(d) - Under the
provisions of the Act of 1993, the benefit
of being a dependent of freedom fighter
can be extended only in a case where a
freedom fighter was a domicile of the
State of Uttar Pradesh. (Para 18)

Petitioner had applied for the post of
Constable in Civil Police and had claimed the
reservation under the category of "dependent
of freedom fighter". In support her claim, the
petitioner had filed a certificate issued by the
District Magistrate, Pithoragarh, State of
Uttarakhand. The certificate of dependent of
freedom fighter should be issued in the
prescribed
format,
duly
issued
by
the
authorities of the State of Uttar Pradesh;
whereas, in the case in hand, the certificate
has been issued from the authority of the
State of Uttarakhand. (Para 16, 17)
The petitioner failed to file the certificate of
dependent of freedom fighter as per the
clause 7(2)(ga)(4) of the advertisement in
question. Therefore, no interference is called
for under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India. (Para 20)

Writ petition dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:

1. State of U.P. & ors. Vs Tejaswi Kumar
Pandey (Special Appeal No. 137 of 2016,
decided on 19..07.2017) (Para 13, 15, 18)

Precedent distinguished:

1. Anmol Deep Vs St. of U.P. & 3 ors., 2018
(10) ADJ 94; 2018 (131) ALR 931 (Para 10,
11, 14)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Piyush Agarwal, J.)

1. This writ petition has been filed,
inter alia, for the following reliefs:-

"(i) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari to
quash the order of delisting as informed
by the respondent vide the information
letter dated 19.08.2019 and 21.08.2019
uploaded
on
the
jansunvai
portal.