# M/s Shakuntla Educational & Welfare Society, New Delhi v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 9 ILRA 607
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-05-28
- **Case number:** WRIT - C No. 28968 of 2018
- **Bench:** Pankaj Mithal, Vipin Chandra Dixit
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-shakuntla-educational-welfare-society-new-delhi-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46016
- **Pages:** 20

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - Societies Registration
Act,1860 - Indian Trusts Act,1854 - Land
Acquisition Act,1894 - Section 5A ,Section
17,Section 18,Section 54 - U.P. Urban
Planning
and
Development
Act,1973-
Section 41 - The Transfer of property
Act,182 - Section 105- Any Government
Order which provide for any further benefit
not mentioned in the Act would be
inconsistent with the intention of the
parliament -such a Government Order
would be invalid - violative of Article 16 of
the Constitution - it has to be ignored by
the authorities - exercise of equitable
jurisdiction is an ornament of the courts of
law and cannot be exercised by the
government - equity always follows the
law
-
cannot
override
the
statutory
provisions - where statutory provisions
exist for the assessment and determination
of the compensation for the acquired land -
compensation
has
to
be
awarded
accordingly and cannot be awarded by
adjusting the equities. (Para-63,68,69,70,71)

Petitioner is an educational society registered
under the Societies Act - challenges the action
of the State of U.P. and the Yamuna
Expressway Industries Development Authority
(Y.E.I.D.A.) - for quashing of the demand of
additional amount in respect of the land leased
out to it - resolution of the Board of Y.E.I.D.A.
dated 15.09.2014 - Government Order dated
29.08.2014 whereby the aforesaid demand was
permitted and was allowed to be recovered
from the allottees - petitioner sought a direction
that the State as well as Y.E.I.D.A. be restrained
from demanding any additional amount over
and above the one mentioned in the lease deed.
(Para-1,3)

HELD:- The impugned Government Order dated
29.08.2014 is declared to be illegal and without
jurisdiction and consequently all demands raised
on its basis are quashed. (Para-119)

Petitions allowed. (E-7)
608 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
List of cases cited: -

## Text

_Characters 0–39,996 of 66,435. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39996 for what follows._

9 All. M/s Shakuntla Educatioal & Welfare Society, New Delhi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
607
Management and the same having been
referred for determination of the Deputy
Director of Education under Section 16A(7) and at present there being no
recognised Manager, the District Inspector
of Schools rightly considered the present to
be a fit case for invoking powers under
Section 5(1) of the Act.

6. There is no merit in this
petition and the same is dismissed."

36. In view of the deliberations and
discussion aforesaid, this Court finds that
the exercise of power by the Inspector, in
the facts of the present case to pass an order
of single operation of accounts is clearly
justified and is in consonance with the law
laid down by this Court. The challenge laid
to the order passed by the District Inspector
of Schools, Firozabad, dated 26th June,
2019
fails
and
the
writ
petition,
accordingly, is dismissed. No order as to
costs.
----------
(2020)09ILR A607
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 28.05.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
THE HON'BLE VIPIN CHANDRA DIXIT, J.

WRIT - C No. 28968 of 2018
with
WRIT - C No. 68724 of 2015
with
WRIT - C No. 45929 of 2016
&
other connected cases

M/s Shakuntla Educational & Welfare
Society, New Delhi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashish Kumar

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Aditya Bhusan Singhal

(A) Civil Law - Societies Registration
Act,1860 - Indian Trusts Act,1854 - Land
Acquisition Act,1894 - Section 5A ,Section
17,Section 18,Section 54 - U.P. Urban
Planning
and
Development
Act,1973-
Section 41 - The Transfer of property
Act,182 - Section 105- Any Government
Order which provide for any further benefit
not mentioned in the Act would be
inconsistent with the intention of the
parliament -such a Government Order
would be invalid - violative of Article 16 of
the Constitution - it has to be ignored by
the authorities - exercise of equitable
jurisdiction is an ornament of the courts of
law and cannot be exercised by the
government - equity always follows the
law
-
cannot
override
the
statutory
provisions - where statutory provisions
exist for the assessment and determination
of the compensation for the acquired land -
compensation
has
to
be
awarded
accordingly and cannot be awarded by
adjusting the equities. (Para-63,68,69,70,71)

Petitioner is an educational society registered
under the Societies Act - challenges the action
of the State of U.P. and the Yamuna
Expressway Industries Development Authority
(Y.E.I.D.A.) - for quashing of the demand of
additional amount in respect of the land leased
out to it - resolution of the Board of Y.E.I.D.A.
dated 15.09.2014 - Government Order dated
29.08.2014 whereby the aforesaid demand was
permitted and was allowed to be recovered
from the allottees - petitioner sought a direction
that the State as well as Y.E.I.D.A. be restrained
from demanding any additional amount over
and above the one mentioned in the lease deed.
(Para-1,3)

HELD:- The impugned Government Order dated
29.08.2014 is declared to be illegal and without
jurisdiction and consequently all demands raised
on its basis are quashed. (Para-119)

Petitions allowed. (E-7)
608 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
List of cases cited: -

1. Gajraj Singh & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
2011(11)ADJ 1(FB)

2. Savitri Devi Vs St. of U.P. & ors., (2015) 7
SCC 21

3. Mange @ Mange Ram Vs St. of U.P. &
ors.,(2016) 8 ADJ79(DB)

4. Khatoon & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,(2018) 1
UPLBEC 340

5. Rajeshwari & 3 ors. Vs St.of U.P. & two ors.,
Writ -C No. 18948 of 2017

6. Ramesh & ors. Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2019(4)
ADJ 225

7. Delhi Administration (Now NCT of Delhi) Vs
Manohar LAl, AIR 2002 SC 3088

8. Ravindra Kumar Vs D.M., Agra & ors., (2005)
1 UPLBEC 118

9. Madamanchi Ramappa & anr. Vs Muthalpur
Bojjappa, AIR 1963 SC 1633

10.
Ahmedabad
Municipal
Corporation
Vs
Virendra Kumar Jayantibhai Patel, AIR 1997 SC
3002

11. Soora Ram Pratap Reddy Vs District
Collector, Ranga Reddy & ors. , (2008) 9 SCC
552

12. Express News paper (P) Ltd. Vs U.O.I.,
(1986) 1 SCC 133

13. Bondu Ramaswamy & ors., Vs Banglore
Development Authority & ors., (2010) 7 SCC
129

14. D.D.A. Vs Sukhbir Singh, (2016) 16 SCC 258

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J.
& Hon'ble Vipin Chandra Dixit, J.)

1. All the above writ petitions are
based upon similar and identical facts and
challenges the action of the State of U.P.
and the Y.E.I.D.A.1 regarding demand of
extra amount from the petitioners in respect
of plots of land leased out to all of them
separately and independently.

2. The Writ Petition No. 28968 of
2018 of M/s Shakuntla Educational and
Welfare Society is taken as the lead case to
which counsel for the parties have
consented during the course of the
arguments. Accordingly, we narrate below
only the facts in relation to the said writ
petition and proceeds to refer the petitioner
therein as the sole petitioner.

3. The petitioner is an educational
society registered under the Societies Act2.
It
had
invoked
the
extraordinary
jurisdiction of the High Court for the
quashing of the demand of additional
amount in respect of the land leased out to
it, the resolution of the Board of Y.E.I.D.A.
dated 15.09.2014 and the Government
Order dated 29.08.2014 whereby the
aforesaid demand was permitted and was
allowed to be recovered from the allottees.
The petitioner has also sought a direction
that the State as well as Y.E.I.D.A. be
restrained from demanding any additional
amount over and above the one mentioned
in the lease deed.

4. In order to appreciate the
controversy and the issues arising in the
above
petition(s),
we
consider
it
appropriate to narrate the facts in brief
which have led to the impugned demand,
passing of the resolution by the Board of
Y.E.I.D.A. and the issuance of the
Government Order dated 29.08.2014.

5. A vast area of land was acquired by
the State of U.P. in district Gautam Budh
Nagar for public purpose for the benefit of
9 All. M/s Shakuntla Educatioal & Welfare Society, New Delhi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
609
Y.E.I.D.A. After the acquisition was
completed, Y.E.I.D.A. invited applications
for the allotment of plots of land of 25 to
250 acres in the area developed by it. In
response to the notice inviting applications
for such allotment, the petitioner applied
for allotment of 50 acres of the land within
the institutional area for establishing a
University.

6. The petitioner was informed vide
letter dated 14.09.2009 that a plot of 50
acres
has
been
reserved
for
it.
Subsequently, a letter of allotment dated
10.12.2009 was issued to the petitioner
allotting plot No.2 in sector 7-A having an
area of 50 acres equivalent to 202350 sq.
meters.

7. The aforesaid allotment letter in
unequivocal
terms
provided
that
the
premium of the land allotted is Rs.1055/-
per sq. meters and the petitioner has to pay
E.D.C.3 @ Rs.574/- per sq. meters.

8. It also mentioned that as the
petitioner had deposited 10% of the
premium amount the balance 90% shall be
payable
in
monthly
installments
as
specified in the chart contained therein.

9. The allotment order categorically
stated that the lease deed shall be executed
and the possession of the land shall be
handed over after completion of the
acquisition proceedings, though the land is
in possession of Y.E.I.D.A.

10. On the basis of the aforesaid
reservation and allotment letters, lease deed
of the land was executed in favour of the
petitioner on 22.01.2010 for a period of 90
years after the petitioner had substantially
complied with the terms and conditions of
the allotment and had deposited the
necessary amounts. The lease deed in
addition to the amounts payable by the
petitioner as mentioned in the allotment
letter further provided for the payment of
2.5% of the total premium of the plot per
year as annual lease rent. The lease deed
was very specific and reiterated that the
premium amount was Rs.1055/- per sq.
meter and E.D.C. as Rs.574/- per sq. meter
as was mentioned in the allotment letter.

11. At the time of possession when
the land was surveyed and measured it was
found that the aforesaid plot allotted to the
petitioner had an excess area of about 2
acres. This excess land was also leased out
to the petitioner on the same terms and
conditions and a supplementary lease deed
in respect thereof was executed on
07.04.2010.

12. In the lease deed the petitioner
was described as a Society under the Trust
Act4 instead of under the Societies Act and
as such a corrigendum deed was executed
on 23.08.2010 providing that the petitioner
is a Society registered under the Societies
Act and not under the Trust Act.

13.
 The petitioner
was
given
possession of the aforesaid land and on it a
University known as Galgotia University
was developed which establishes that the
acquisition proceedings in respect thereof
stood completed.

14. It may not be out of context to
mention here that at one stage Y.E.I.D.A.
came out with a policy and gave option to
the petitioner to deposit the entire premium
amount in lump-sum rather than in
installments subject to certain rebate.

15. Accordingly, the lump-sum
amount was worked out by the Y.E.I.D.A.
610 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and the same was paid by the petitioner
with the understanding that in case due to
any clerical error or miscalculation of the
lump-sum amount if any demand arises in
future the petitioner would pay the same. In
this regard an undertaking of the petitioner
on affidavit was taken on 07.06.2012. The
said undertaking was only in respect of the
lump-sum premium amount and had
nothing to do with the demand of any
additional amount of the premium.

16. It so happened that in respect of
acquisition of land for the benefit of
NOIDA and Greater NOIDA a very large
number of writ petitions were filed
challenging the acquisition on various
grounds inter alia that there was no urgency
for acquiring the land and that the enquiry
contemplated under Section 5A of the L.A.
Act5 was incorrectly dispensed with.

17. All the said petitions came to be
decided vide judgement and order dated
21.10.2011 passed in the leading case of
Gajraj 6. The Full Bench of the Court
though found that the urgency clause was
illegally invoked and the farmers were
unnecessarily denied opportunity to object
to the acquisition but in view of the fact
that the land had been developed and third
party rights have accrued considered it
appropriate
to
save
the
acquisition.
Accordingly, on equity allowed payment of
additional compensation of 64.7% plus
some other benefits to certain class of
farmers. The said benefits were not
extended to all the farmers. It was not
granted in all the writ petitions and most of
them were dismissed after the court noticed
that there was no equity in favour of the
farmers or the petitioners therein.

18.

The
aforesaid
additional
compensation of 64.7% was permitted to be
paid in view of the fact that in respect of
one of the villages i.e. Patwari, the NOIDA
itself had entered into negotiations with the
farmers and had extended the benefit of
additional compensation at the above rate
over and above the compensation awarded.

19. The aforesaid judgement and
order of the Full Court of the High Court
was approved by the Supreme Court in the
case Savitri Devi7 on the concession of the
parties, but it was observed that as the
additional amount granted by the Full
Bench was under the special and peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case, the
same should not be treated as a precedent.

20. It may be noteworthy that the
acquisition of the land which was allotted
to the petitioner was completed earlier and
even the lease deed in favour of the
petitioner was executed in the year 2010
much before the judgement of Gajraj and
Savitri Devi have come into existence.

21. Since the farmers whose lands
were acquired for NOIDA and Greater
NOIDA were allowed to receive 64.7%
additional amount, it appears that there was
some unrest amongst the farmers whose
land was acquired for the Y.E.I.D.A. The
Chief Executive Officer of Y.E.I.D.A. in
such a situation wrote a letter dated
10.04.2013 to the State Government
requesting to hold meetings with the
farmers and to pacify them. The State
Government acting upon the said letter
instructed
the
Commissioner,
Meerut
Division,
Meerut
vide
letter
dated
10.04.2013 to take necessary action and to
hold meetings with the farmers.

22. The Commissioner held meeting
with the various groups of farmers in
association with the concerned District
9 All. M/s Shakuntla Educatioal & Welfare Society, New Delhi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
611
Magistrates and on 16.07.2013 submitted a
report
to
the
State
Government
recommending for constituting a high level
committee.

23. The State Government accordingly,
vide
office
memo
dated
03.09.2013
constituted a high level committee under the
Chairmanship of Sri Rajendra Chaudhary,
Minister of Prison, State of U.P. with the
Commissioners and the District Magistrates
as it members for resolving the issue with the
farmers. The said committee submitted it
recommendations to the State Government
inter alia recommending for the payment of
64.7% additional amount as "no litigation
incentive" to the farmers and for its
reimbursement from the allottees in the
appropriate proportion. It further provided
that the costing of the land remaining for the
allotment be done accordingly keeping in
mind the above benefits also.

24. The State Government accepted
the aforesaid recommendations of the
Committee and issued a Government Order
dated 29.08.2014 inter alia mentioning that
looking to the agitation of the farmers and
the legal complications, it is necessary for
an out of court settlement with the farmers
by offering 64.7% additional amount
provided they withdraw their petitions
challenging the acquisition proceedings and
undertakes not to institute any litigation
and
create
any
hindrance
in
the
development work of the Y.E.I.D.A.

25. Thus, Government directed for the
payment of 64.7% additional amount to the
farmers and to recover it from the allottees
making it clear that the burden of this
additional amount would be borne by the
Y.E.I.D.A. from its own sources and the
Government
would
not
provide
any
financial aid in that regard.

26. It would be relevant at this
juncture alone to point out that there is no
material on record to establish that there
was any challenge to the acquisition
proceedings of the land acquired for the
benefit of Y.E.I.D.A. The Government
Order probably proceeds on the incorrect
assumption that some litigation challenging
the acquisition is pending so as to issue the
direction
for
payment
of
aforesaid
additional amount subject to the farmers
withdrawing their petitions challenging the
acquisition.

27. The aforesaid Government Order
was placed before the Board meeting of
Y.E.I.D.A. on 15.09.2014 at item No.151/4
and the same was approved in the fifty-first
meeting of the Board on the said date itself.

28. It is in pursuant to the above that
demand notices initially on 15.12.2014 and
then on 09.02.2018 were issued to the
petitioner demanding additional premium
@ Rs.600/- per sq. meters for the land
allotted
and
leased
out,
totaling
to
Rs.12,14,10,000/-
and
directing
the
petitioner to pay the same in four
installments as specified therein.

29. It is in the aforesaid background
that the petitioner has preferred this writ
petition for the quashing of the demand
notice dated 15.12.2014, Board resolution
dated 15.09.2014 and the Government
Order dated 29.08.2014.

30. We have heard S/Sri Sunil Gupta,
Navin Sinha and Anurag Khanna, all the
Senior Counsel for the petitioners in
various writ petitions. Sri Ajit Singh,
Additional Advocate General, assisted by
Sri J.N. Maurya, on behalf of the State of
U.P. and Sri Ravikant & Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi both Senior Counsel assisted by
612 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sri Aditya Bhushan Singhal for the
Y.E.I.D.A. were heard in opposition.

31. The primary contention on behalf
of the petitioner is that the decision in the
case of Gajraj and others is not applicable in
respect of acquisition of land for Y.E.I.D.A.
as it was in relation to the acquisition of land
for NOIDA and Greater NOIDA only. The
said decision is subsequent to the completion
of the acquisition proceedings in respect of
land acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. and finalisation
of the contract of lease of the petitioner with
Y.E.I.D.A.

32. The Government could not have
directed for extending any additional
benefit to the farmers in respect of the land
acquired for Y.E.I.D.A. on the basis of the
decision of Gajraj. At least, the burden to
realise this additional amount could not
have been shifted upon the allottees. The
Government was concerned only with the
demand of the farmers and in considering
the same is not justified in putting the
burden to satisfy the said demand upon the
allottees. Y.E.I.D.A. cannot legally realise
any amount over and above that was
mentioned in the allotment letter or the
lease deed which brings about a binding
contract between the parties.

33. Sri Ajit Singh, on behalf of the
State placed reliance upon the short-counter
affidavit filed by the State in Writ Petition
No.52310 of 2017 and submitted that as the
decision of the Supreme Court in Savitri
Devi's case had come later on, the decision
of Gajraj was taken as the precedent in
accepting the recommendations of the high
level committee and in issuing Government
Order dated 29.08.2014.

34. The aforesaid Government Order
is neither illegal nor arbitrary and is
binding upon all concerned. Since dispute
arises out of a concluded contract the
petitioners have a remedy of a civil suit
before the Civil Court.

35. Sri Ravikant, Senior Counsel
supplemented the defence arguments by
contending that by demanding additional
amount as per the aforesaid Government
Order, the concluded contract which had
come into existence between the parties,
had
not
been
disturbed
rather
the
Government has exercised its power of
eminent domain in issuing the above
Government Order so as to enhance the
compensation payable to the farmers. Since
the enhancement of compensation has been
done in exercise of powers of eminent
domain the petitioners who are making
huge profits from the land allotted to them
are equally responsible to share the burden.

36. The aforesaid Government Order
is a policy decision and is binding upon all
concerned in view of Section 41 of the
Urban Planning Act.8

37. There is no illegality or any
arbitrariness in the policy decision taken by
the Government keeping in mind the
agitation of the farmers which may
otherwise would have the effect of killing
the acquisition as a whole.

38. There is actually no change in the
premium amount mentioned in the lease
deeds and the demand is only to meet out
the additional burden of extra payment due
to exercise of powers of eminent domain.

39. Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, Senior
Counsel submitted that the petitioners have
an alternative remedy under Section 41(3)
of the Urban Planning Act and that several
writ petitions of similar nature have been
9 All. M/s Shakuntla Educatioal & Welfare Society, New Delhi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
613
disposed of by the Court relegating the
petitioners to the said remedy.

40. The petitioners if aggrieved, may
institute a civil suit and the writ petitions
are not maintainable.

41. Having noted the brief facts and
the respective submissions of the parties,
we begin with the effect and impact of the
decision in the case of Gajraj.

42. The impugned Government Order,
resolution of the Board and the demand for
additional compensation have been issued,
passed and raised basically on account of
the decision in the case of Gajraj directing
in equity to pay farmers additional
compensation over and above that was
admissible to them under the provisions of
the L.A. Act. It must be remembered that
the directions in the Gajraj's case were
issued
in
the
peculiar
facts
and
circumstances of the case so as to save the
acquisition which otherwise was not legally
tenable. The said decision was in respect of
the acquisition of land in Noida and Greater
Noida and the petitioners who were before
the court. It was not mandated to be applied
in respect of other acquisitions of land viz.
that of Y.E.I.D.A. covered by separate
notifications and to persons who were not
present before the court.

43. Thus, one of the questions which
falls for our consideration is whether the
directions in the case of Gajraj are
applicable to the farmers or villagers whose
land were acquired for Y.E.I.D.A.; who
were not even parties in the writ petitions
decided along with Gajraj and who had
their land acquired under the different
notifications other than which were the
subject matter of challenge in those
petitions so as to entitle them for additional
benefit of 64.7% as has been granted to the
farmers therein.

44. In order to address the above
question it is important to consider the
directions of the Gajraj's case and to find
out upon whom they apply.

45. In the case of Gajraj, the writ
petitions challenging the notifications of
land acquisition proceedings of land situate
in different villages of Greater Noida and
Noida which were acquired for those two
Authorities
were
decided
and
were
disposed of in terms of the following
directions :-

"481. As noticed above, the land
has been acquired of large number of
villagers in different villages of Greater
Noida and Noida. Some of the petitioners
had earlier come to this Court and their
writ petitions have been dismissed as
noticed above upholding the notifications
which
judgments
have
become
final
between them. Some of the petitioners may
not have come to the Court and have left
themselves in the hand of the Authority and
State under belief that the State and
Authority shall do the best for them as per
law. We cannot loose sight of the fact that
the
above
farmers
and
agriculturers/owners whose land has been
acquired are equally affected by taking of
their land. As far as consequence and effect
of the acquisition it equally affects on all
land losers. Thus land owners whose writ
petitions have earlier been dismissed
upholding the notifications may have
grievances
that
the
additional
compensation which was a subsequent
event granted by the Authority may also be
extended to them and for the aforesaid,
further spate of litigation may start in so
far as payment of additional compensation
614 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is concerned. In the circumstances, we
leave it to the Authority to take a decision
as to whether the benefit of additional
compensation shall also be extended to
those with regard to whom the notifications
of acquisition have been upheld or those
who have not filed any writ petitions. We
leave this in the discretion of the
Authority/State which may be exercised
keeping in view the principles enshrined
under Article 14 of the Constitution of
India.

"482. In view of the foregoing
conclusions we order as follows:

1.
The
Writ
Petitions........................................................
......

..............................................................
..........................

which have been filed with
inordinate delay and laches are dismissed.

2.
(i)
The
writ
petitions........................................................
.....

..............................................................
.............................

are allowed and the notifications
dated 26.5.2009 and 22.6.2009 and all
consequential actions are quashed. The
petitioners shall be entitled for restoration
of their land subject to deposit of
compensation which they had received
under
agreement/award
before
the
authority/Collector.

2(ii)
Writ
petition
................................................relating
to
village Yusufpur Chak Sahberi is allowed.
Notifications dated 10.4.2006 and 6.9.2007
and all consequential actions are quashed.
The petitioners shall be entitled for
restoration of their land subject to return of
compensation received by them under
agreement/award to the Collector.

2(iii)
Writ
Petition.....................................................
relating to village Asdullapur is allowed.
The notification dated 27.1.2010 and
4.2.2010 as well as all subsequent
proceedings are quashed. The petitioners
shall be entitled to restoration of their land.

3. All other writ petitions except
as mentioned above at (1) and (2) are
disposed of with following directions:

(a) The petitioners shall be
entitled
for
payment
of
additional
compensation to the extent of same ratio
(i.e. 64.70%) as paid for village Patwari in
addition to the compensation received by
them under 1997 Rules/award which
payment shall be ensured by the Authority
at an early date. It may be open for
Authority to take a decision as to what
proportion of additional compensation be
asked to be paid by allottees. Those
petitioners who have not yet been paid
compensation
may
be
paid
the
compensation
as
well
as
additional
compensation as ordered above. The
payment of additional compensation shall
be without any prejudice to rights of land
owners under section 18 of the Act, if any.

(b) All the petitioners shall be
entitled for allotment of developed Abadi
plot to the extent of 10% of their acquired
land subject to maximum of 2500 square
meters. We however, leave it open to the
Authority in cases where allotment of abadi
plot to the extent of 6% or 8% have already
been made either to make allotment of the
balance of the area or may compensate the
land owners by payment of the amount
equivalent to balance area as per average
rate of allotment made of developed
residential plots.

4.The Authority may also take a
decision as to whether benefit of additional
compensation and allotment of abadi plot
to the extent of 10% be also given to;
9 All. M/s Shakuntla Educatioal & Welfare Society, New Delhi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
615

(a) those land holders whose
earlier
writ
petition
challenging
the
notifications
have
been
dismissed
upholding the notifications; and

(b) those land holders who have
not come to the Court, relating to the
notifications which are subject matter of
challenge in writ petitions mentioned at
direction No.3.

5............................................................
..........................

6............................................................
.........................."

46. The above directions explicitly
permits only a few categories of the
petitioners mentioned in sub-paragraph 3(a)
of paragraph 482 of the decision in Gajraj's
case
to
be
entitled
to
additional
compensation to the extent of 64.7% in
addition to the compensation already
received by them and some other benefits
and to no others.

47. It may be pertinent to note that
there was no direction for grant of payment
of
additional
compensation
or
for
conferment of other benefits by the
Authority in respect of those persons whose
land had not been acquired in terms of
notifications which were subject matter of
challenge in the case of Gajraj and
connected bunch of writ petitions. There
was no specific direction that the additional
compensation so directed to be paid is
recoverable from the allottees rather the
matter was left to be decided by State or the
Authority concern in accordance with law.

48. The judgment in the case of Gajraj
was challenged before the Supreme Court
in the case of Savitri Devi. One of the
argument of the authorities was that the
award of additional compensation by the
High Court is against the statute. The Apex
Court though agreeing with the above
submission
but
on
account
of
the
concession of the counsel for the parties,
left the decision of the High Court
undisturbed taking notice of the facts of the
case that the High Court was faced with a
peculiar situation where, on one hand,
invocation of urgency provisions under
Section 17 of the L. A. Act and dispensing
with the right to file objections under
Section 5 - A of the L. A. Act were both
illegal and on the other hand, there was a
situation where because of delay in
challenging
the
acquisitions
by
the
landowners, development had taken place
in the villages and in most of the cases,
third party rights had been created.

49. The Supreme Court in the case of
Savitri
Devi
clearly
observed
that
directions in Gajraj were issued by the
High Court in the peculiar circumstances of
the case and therefore would not form a
precedent for future cases. The relevant
extracts from the judgment in the case of
Savitri Devi are reproduced herein below:-

"44. We have also to keep in mind
another important feature. Many residents
of Patwari village had entered into
agreement with the authorities agreeing to
accept enhanced compensation @ 64.7%.
This
additional
compensation
was,
however, agreed to be paid by the
authorities only in respect of landowners of
Patwari village. The High Court has bound
the authorities with the said agreement by
applying the same to all the land owners
thereby
benefiting
them
with
64.7%
additional compensation. There could have
been argument that the authorities cannot
be
fastened
with
this
additional
compensation, more particularly, when
616 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
machinery for determination for just and
fair compensation is provided under the
Land Acquisition Act and the land owners
had, in fact, invoked the said machinery by
seeking
reference
Under
Section
18
thereof. Likewise, the scheme for allotment
of land to the land owners provides for 5%
and 6% developed land in Noida and
Greater Noida respectively. As against
that, the High Court has enhanced the said
entitlement to 10%. Again, we find that it
could be an arguable case as to whether
High Court could grant additional land
contrary to the policy. Notwithstanding the
same, the Noida authority have now
accepted this part of the High Court
judgment after the dismissal of the appeals
filed by the Noida authority, and a
statement to that effect was made by Mr.
Rao.

45. ...................................

46. Thus, we have a scenario
where, on the one hand, invocation of
urgency provisions under Section 17 of the
Act and dispensing with the right to file
objection under Section 5A of the Act, is
found to be illegal. On the other hand, we
have a situation where because of delay in
challenging these acquisitions by the
landowners, developments have taken place
in these villages and in most of the cases,
third party rights have been created. Faced
with this situation, the High Court going by
the spirit behind the judgment of this Court
in Bondu Ramaswamy came out with the
solution which is equitable to both sides.
We are, thus, of the view that the High
Court considered the ground realities of
the matter and arrived at a more practical
and workable solution by adequately
compensating the land owners in the form
of compensation as well as allotment of
developed Abadi land at a higher rate i.e.
10% of the land acquired of each of the
landowners against the eligibility and to
(sic under) the policy to the extent of 5%
and 6% of Noida and Greater Noida land
respectively.

47. Insofar as allegation of some
of the Appellants that their abadi land was
acquired, we find that this allegation is
specifically
denied
disputing
its
correctness. There is specific averment
made by the NOIDA Authority at so many
places that village abadi land was not
acquired. It is mentioned that abadi area is
what was found in the survey conducted
prior to Section 4 Notification and not what
is alleged or that which is far away from
the dense village abadi. It is also
mentioned that as a consequence of the
acquisition, the Authority spends crores
and crores of rupees in developing the
infrastructure such as road, drainage,
sewer, electric and water lines etc. in the
unacquired portion of the village abadi.
During the course of hearing, Chart No. 2
in respect of each village of Greater Noida
was handed over for the consideration of
this Court, wherein the amount spent by the
Authority on the development, including
village
development
(which
is
the
unacquired village abadi), has been given
in Column No. 4 thereof. It has been the
consistent stand of the NOIDA Authority
that prior to the issuance of Section 4
Notification under the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894, survey was conducted and the
abadi found in that survey was not
acquired. In fact, affidavits in this respect
have also been filed not only in this Court
but also in the High Court. We have
mentioned that there has been a long gap
between acquisition of the land and filing
of the writ petitions in the High Court by
these
Appellants
challenging
the
acquisition. If they have undertaken some
construction during this period they cannot
be allowed to take advantage thereof.
Therefore, it is difficult to accept the
9 All. M/s Shakuntla Educatioal & Welfare Society, New Delhi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
617
argument of the Appellants based on parity
with three villages in respect of which the
High Court has given relief by quashing the
acquisition.

48. To sum up, following benefits
are accorded to the land owners:

48.1-
increasing
the
compensation by 64.7%;

48.2-
directing
allotment
of
developed abadi land to the extent of 10%
of the land acquired of each of the land
owners;

48.3- compensation which is
increased at the rate of 64.7% is payable
immediately without taking away the rights
of
the
landowners
to
claim
higher
compensation
under
the
machinery
provided in the Land Acquisition Act
wherein the matter would be examined on
the basis of the evidence produced to arrive
at just and fair market value.

49.
This,
according
to
us,
provides
substantial
justice
to
the
Appellants.

Conclusion

50. Keeping in view all these
peculiar circumstances, we are of the
opinion that these are not the cases where
this Court should interfere Under Article
136 of the Constitution. However, we
make it clear that directions of the High
Court are given in the aforesaid unique
and peculiar/specific background and,
therefore, it would not form precedent for
future cases.

51. We may record that some of
the Appellants had tried to point out certain
clerical
mistakes
pertaining
to
their
specific cases. For example, it was argued
by one Appellant that his land falls in a
village in Noida but wrongly included in
Greater Noida. These Appellants, for
getting such clerical mistakes rectified, can
always approach the High Court.

52. The Full Bench judgment of
the High Court is, accordingly, affirmed
and all these appeals are disposed of in
terms of the said judgment of the Full
Bench."

50. Thus, from the above directions
and observations, it is quite implicit that
judgment in Gajraj was rendered in the
peculiar facts & circumstances of that case
and is not a binding precedent. The award
of 64.7% additional compensation over and
above admissible under the L.A. Act is not
by way of any legal principle but only for
adjusting the equities. It at the same time
gave no direction for grant of additional
compensation to those persons whose land
was not covered by the notifications of
acquisition under challenge in those bunch
of petitions. The directions therein were not
in rem and were not meant to be applied to
notifications issued for acquiring land
elsewhere or in respect of acquisition for
Y.E.I.D.A. or to persons who were not
party to the proceedings before the court in
any form.

51. The submission that the Supreme
Court decision in Savitri Devi had come
later on by which time a conscious decision
was already taken by the Government and
the Board to follow the directions of Gajraj
and therefore the observation in Savitri
Devi that the directions in Gajraj would not
be treated as precedent does not affect the
decision of the Government/Board is bereft
of any merit. The directions given in Gajraj
could not have been applied in the present
case concerning acquisition of land for the
benefit of Y.E.I.D.A. for two specific
reasons. First, it was not a judgement in
rem. It was not applicable to other
acquisitions such as for Y.E.I.D.A. which
were not the subject matter of challenge in
Gajraj. Secondly, the directions issued in
618 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Gajraj were not in the nature of binding
precedent from day one. The mere specific
declaration subsequently that the directions are
not by way of precedent would not mean those
directions had the binding precedent earlier
and ceased to be binding later on. If the
directions are not binding precedents they
happen to be so from the inception irrespective
of the declaration by the court subsequently.
The declaration in Savitri that directions in
Gajraj are not binding makes the directions
non-applicable from day one irrespective of
the date of the decision of Savitri's case. Even,
assuming that the decision to hold those
directions as not binding may have come
subsequently nonetheless it cannot be applied
to the acquisition of land for Y.I.E.D.A. due to
first reason mentioned above. This apart even
the decision in Gajraj's case make it
abundantly clear that the directions have to be
applied in a limited manner as aforesaid
therein. It no where directed to grant additional
benefit of compensation to persons whose
acquisition of land was not the subject matter
of the bunch petitions along with Gajraj.

52. In Mange @ Mange Ram9, the
petitioners therein claimed the same relief
as was granted in Gajraj and upheld in
Savitri Devi. The claim raised therein was
turned down by the court recording that the
benefit granted by Gajraj cannot be
extended to the petitioners therein though
they may be similarly situated as the
Authority had not taken a decision to
extend all the benefits of Gajraj to every
similarly situate person. It was held that all
benefits of Gajraj cannot be extended to the
petitioners therein, even though they may
be similarly situated and their land had
been acquired under the same notification.

53. The aforesaid decision in Mange
@ Mange Ram was subjected to challenge
before the Supreme Court in Khatoon &
Others10. The Supreme Court held that the
petitioners therein have no legal right to
claim all benefits of Gajraj. The L.A. Act
does not provide for grant of such reliefs
when the State has already paid the
statutory compensation. The reliefs in
Gajraj were granted by the High Court by
exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution in the light
of the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case. They were confined only to the
land owners, who had filed their petitions.
The Supreme Court in Savitri Devi case has
already held that the directions given in
Gajraj are not to be treated as precedent for
being adopted in other cases in future and
they be treated as confined to the case of
Gajraj only. Thus, the view taken by the
High Court in Mange Ram was approved
and the petitions were dismissed.

54. The question of admissibility of
the benefit of the directions contained in
the
Gajraj
for
providing
additional
compensation of 64.70% and other benefits
came up for consideration before a
coordinate Division Bench of this court in
the case of Rajeshwari and 3 others11
decided on 03.05.2017 and it was held that
the relief which was granted in Gajraj's
case and as affirmed by the Supreme Court
in Savitri Devi can not be made applicable
to the acquisition proceedings which were
not assailed and were not the subject matter
of adjudication before the Full Bench. The
directions of the Full Bench of Gajraj do
not stand attracted in the case of persons
whose lands were not acquired in terms of
the notifications under challenge in the case
of Gajraj.

55.