# M/s Shipra Hotels Ltd v. Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad

- **Citation:** WRIT-C No. 70208 of 2009
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-12-11
- **Case number:** WRIT-C No. 70208 of 2009
- **Bench:** Ramesh Sinha, Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-shipra-hotels-ltd-v-ghaziabad-development-authority-ghaziabad-45219
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. Civil Law-U.P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 - Proviso to SubSection (4) of Section 18 - Lease to develop
amusement park over the leased land -
Determination - Right to the lessor of re-entry -
Sufficient Reason - The import of the proviso is
putting a caveat to the main provision in favour
of a lease holder - Sub Section 4 of Section 18
shows that legislative intent of giving right to
the lessor of re-entry upon failure of the lessee
to
make
constructions
as
provided
and
contemplated under the lease agreement - But
that too is when found without sufficient reason,
meaning thereby for not undertaking any action
or performing as per land use under the lease
agreement, one must ensure that it was not for
any 'sufficient reason' to record. (Para 17)
Writ Petition allowed (E-1)

## Text

3-5 All. M/s Shipra Hotels Ltd. Vs. Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad
1911
order passed by the Conciliation Officer on
the application of the workman that delay is
condoned and thereafter notice is issued,
calling upon the parties to file their
evidence, was not an order which could
operate as res judicata, so as to prevent the
Conciliation Officer, after the parties had
led evidence, to arrive at the conclusion
that the dispute is not a live one, worthy of
being referred to the Labour Court. Thus,
this Court finds no force in the submission
of learned counsel for the petitioner that
once the Conciliation Officer at initial stage
condoned the delay in approaching him, he
could
not
have
made
an
adverse
recommendation to the State Government
for not referring the dispute to Labour
Court on ground of delay. Even otherwise,
the State Government is not bound by the
recommendation made by the Conciliation
Officer. It is competent to take its own
independent view as to whether on basis of
material brought before it, there exists any
dispute in praesenti, worthy of reference to
the Labour Court and if it comes to the
conclusion that there is no such material, it
is fully competent in declining to make
reference,
as
in
the
instant
case.
Consequently,
this
Courts
finds
no
illegality in the impugned orders to warrant
interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution.

10. The petition lacks merit and is
dismissed.
----------

(2020)03-05ILR A1911
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.12.2019

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAMESH SINHA, J.
THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.
WRIT-C No. 70208 of 2009

M/s Shipra Hotels Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
Ghaziabad
Development
Authority,
Ghaziabad ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Anurag Khanna, Sri Abhishek Misra, Sri
H.R. Misra, Sri Tarun Agrawal

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri V.B. Mishra, Sri Ashwani Kumar Mishra,
Sri M.N. Singh, S.C.

A. Civil Law-U.P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 - Proviso to SubSection (4) of Section 18 - Lease to develop
amusement park over the leased land -
Determination - Right to the lessor of re-entry -
Sufficient Reason - The import of the proviso is
putting a caveat to the main provision in favour
of a lease holder - Sub Section 4 of Section 18
shows that legislative intent of giving right to
the lessor of re-entry upon failure of the lessee
to
make
constructions
as
provided
and
contemplated under the lease agreement - But
that too is when found without sufficient reason,
meaning thereby for not undertaking any action
or performing as per land use under the lease
agreement, one must ensure that it was not for
any 'sufficient reason' to record. (Para 17)
Writ Petition allowed (E-1)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, J.)
&
Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anurag Khanna, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Tarun
Agrawal, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior
Advocate and Additional Advocate General
assisted by Sri M.N.Singh, learned counsel
for the respondent/ Development Authority.

2. By means of present writ petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
1912 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
India, the petitioner has come up with
prayer for a writ of certiorari for quashing
of the order dated 26.5.2009 whereby
Ghaziabad Development Authority (for
short "Authority") has determined the lease
of the petitioner for the reason that
petitioner did not abide by the terms and
conditions of the lease as the land use for
which
lease
was
granted,
was
not
performed.

3. Briefly stated facts of the case are
that respondent authority executed the lease
deed on 29.12.1999 in respect of the land
earmarked as "green belt", in favour of the
petitioner to develop the amusement park
over the leased land. However, when the
petitioner did not perform as per terms of
the lease, the authority came to determine
the same under the order impugned.

4. Assailing the order impugned,
learned Senior Advocate, Sri Khanna has
argued that order having been passed in
violation of the provision contained under
Section 18(4) of the U.P. Urban Planning
and Development Act, 1973 (for short "Act
No. 11 of 1973"), the order impugned is
liable to be rendered unsustainable and
deserves to be quashed.

5. Relying upon the proviso to sub
section 4 of Section 18 of the Act No. 11 of
1973, it has been argued that authority
before passing any order determining the
lease under sub-section 4 of Section 18
whereby lessor is meant to re-enter the land
forfeiting the lease, it is mandatory to issue
a show cause notice of such a proposed
action. However, in the present case, as he
submits, it is quite reflective from various
documents that have been brought on
record in the form of notice alongwith
counter affidavit issued to the petitioner on
12th March, 2005, 20th May, 2005,
6.10.2005 and 23rd March, 2007, that all
are referable to a proposed action under
Section 27 of the Act No. 11 of 1973 and
cannot
be
construed
as
a
notice
contemplated under the proviso prior to the
exercise of power under sub section 4 of
Section 18 of the Act No. 11 of 1973.

6. Sri Khanna submits that these
notices
only
question
the
construction/development activity as an
unauthorized one without sanction of
approval by the authority and are meant for
the proposed demolition exercise, whereas
under the proviso to sub section 4 of
Section 18 of Act No. 11 of 1973, show
cause notice will be in respect of the
proposed action of determination of lease
and cancellation thereof.

7. Sri Khanna has further drawn our
attention to the contents of paragraphs 14
and 15 of the counter affidavit to
demonstrate that ultimate action in question
has been taken only on the basis of these
notices as the petitioner had failed to reply
the same. He, therefore, submits that the
averments as have come to be made
amount to complete admission on the part
of the respondent authority that they never
issued any notice under the proviso to sub
section 4 of Section 18 of Act No. 11 of
1973.

8. Learned Senior Advocate has
argued that the order passed cancelling the
lease and entire proceeding preceding the
order of cancellation undertaken by the
respondent authority, where de hors the
procedure prescribed and so the said order
is liable to be held bad and unsustainable.

9. Per contra, learned Senior
Advocate Sri M.C. Chaturvedi appearing
for contesting respondent, Development
3-5 All. M/s Shipra Hotels Ltd. Vs. Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad
1913
Authority has sought to justify the order for
the reasons assigned therein. However,
alternatively, he has argued that if non
issuance of the notice is the only reason
that makes the order liable to go, this plea
being technical, the matter can be remitted
to the authority and the order impugned can
be taken to be notice as contemplated under
the proviso to sub section 4 of section 18 of
Act No. 11 of 1973. He has sought to urge
that no pleadings even raised regarding
merit of the order nor, any averment has
come up to demonstrate that petitioners
complied with terms and condition of the
lease as stipulated thereunder and thus, he
submits that the matter can be revisited
before the authority and decision afresh can
be directed to be taken.

10. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and their respective arguments
raised across the bar and having perused
the record, we are needed to test the order
impugned in the light of the provision
contained under sub section 4 of Section 18
of the Act, 1973, as we find that in the
counter
affidavit,
respondents
have
authority has admitted that notices were the
same notices as have been appended, to
have preceded the order impugned. We
proceed to examine the notice filed as CA1,2 and 3 in the first instance to find as to
whether these notices can be termed as the
ones contemplated under the proviso to sub
section 4 of section 18 of the Act No. 11 of
1973.

11. A bare perusal of the notice as per
contents, undoubtedly notices revealed it to
be in respect of the some development
activity as alleged to have been undertaken
by the petitioner without there being any
sanction for the same of the authority and
so notices are meant for an explanation to
be submitted by the petitioner of the
proposed action under Section 27 read with
section 28 of Act No. 11 of 1973. For better
appreciation, Sections 27 and 28 of the Act,
1973 are reproduced as under:

27. "Order of demolition of
building - (1) where any development has
been commenced or is being carried on or
has been completed in contravention of
the master plan or zonal development plan
or without the permission, approval or
sanction referred to in Section 14 or in
contravention of any conditions subject to
which such permission, approval or
sanction has been granted in relation to
the development area, then without
prejudice to the provisions of Section 26
(the Vice Chairman or any officer of the
authority empowered by him In that
behalf may make an order directing that
such development shall be removed by
demolition, felling or otherwise by the
owner thereof or by the person at whose
instance
the
development
has
been
commenced or is being carried out or has
been completed, within such period not
being less than fifteen days and more than
forty days from the date on which a copy of
the order of removal, with a brief statement
of the reasons therefore, has been delivered
to the owner or that person as may be
specified in the order and on his failure to
comply with the order, (the Vice Chairman
or such officer) may remove or cause to be
removed the development and the expenses
of such removal as certified by (the Vice
Chairman or such officer) shall be
recoverable from the owner or the person
at whose instance the development was
commended or was being carried out or
was completed as arrears of land revenue
and no suit shall lie in the Civil Court for
recovery of such expenses.

Provided that no such order shall
be made unless the owner or the person
1914 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
concerned has been given a reasonable
opportunity to show cause why the order
should not be made.

(2) Any person aggrieved by an
order under Sub-section (1) may appeal to
the 4(Chairman) against that order within
thirty days from the date thereof and the
5[Chairman) may after hearing the parties
to the appeal either allow or dismiss the
appeal or may reverse or vary any part of
the order.

(3)The 6[Chairman) may stay the
execution of an order against which an
appeal has been filed before it under Subsection(2).

The decision of the 7(Chairman)
on the appeal and, subject only to such
decision, the order under Sub-section (1),
shall be final and shall not be questioned in
any Court.

The provisions of this section
shall be in addition to, and not in or
derogation of, any other provision relating
to demolition of buildings of contained in
any other law for the time being In force.

28. Power to stop development-
(I)
Where
any
development
in
a
development area has been commenced or
continued in contravention of the Master
Plan or Zonal Development Plan or
without the permission, approval or
sanction referred to in Section 14 or In
contravention of any conditions subject to
which such permission, approval or
sanction has been granted, then, without
prejudice to the provisions of Sections 26
and 27, the Vice Chairman of the
Authority or any officer of the Authority
empowered by him in that behalf may
make an order requiring the development
to be discontinued on and from the date of
the service of the order, and such order
shall be complied with accordingly.

Where such development is not
discontinued in pursuance of the order
under Sub-section (1), the Vice-Chairman
or the said officer of the Authority may
require any police officer to remove the
person by whom the development has been
commenced and all his assistants and
workmen from the place of development
within such time as may be specified in the
requisition, and such police officer shall
comply with the requisition accordingly.

After the requisition under Subsection (2) has been complied with the
Vice-Chairman of the Authority may depute
by a written order a police officer or an
officer or employee of the Authority to
watch the place in order to ensure that the
development is not continued.

Any person failing to comply with
an order under Sub-section (1) shall be
punishable with fine which may extend to
two hundred rupees, for every day during
which the non-compliance continues after
the service of the order.

No
compensation
shall
be
claimable by any person for any damage
which he may sustain in consequence of the
removal of any development under Section
27
or
the
discontinuance
of
the
development under this section.

The provisions of this section
shall be in addition to and not in
derogation of, any other provision relating
to
stoppage
of
building
operations
contained in any other law for the time
being in force.

(Emphasis added)

12. From a bare reading of the
aforesaid provisions, the legislative intents
is quite apparent that a person is to
undertake every development activity in an
area within the territorial limits of the
Authority with the prior approval of such
authority or else shall face the action of
demolition.
The
development
activity
therefore, always has to be in tune with the
development plan and, therefore, illegal
3-5 All. M/s Shipra Hotels Ltd. Vs. Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad
1915
development activity and constructions to
that extent are meant to be arrested at the
earliest and we find that such a proceeding
has nothing to do with the right of a person
to the property.

13. Now Development of land has to
take place in accord with the develop
scheme as per zonal development plan as
may be developed and prescribed by the
Development
Authority
and
a
consequential
Master
Plan
with
the
approval of the State Government (vide
sections 8,910, 11 and 12 of the Act No. 11
of 1973). Section 14 that has an effect of
consequential action in case of violation of
the plan, under Section 27 of the Act, is
reproduced hereunder:

14. Development of land In the
developed area.-

(1) After the declaration of any
area as development area under Section 3,
no
development
of
-land
shall
be
undertaken or carried out or continued in
that area by any person or body (including
a department of Government)- unless
permission for such development has been
obtained in writing from the [ViceChairman)
in
accordance
with
the
provision of this Act.

(2)
After
the
coming
into
operation of any of the plans in any
development area no development shall be
undertaken or carried out or continued in
that area unless such- development is also
in accordance, with such plans.

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained In Sub-sections (1) and (2), the
following
provisions
shall
apply
in
relation-to development of land by any
department of any State Government or the
Central Government or any local authority-

when any such department or
local authority intends to carry out any
development of land it shall inform the
(Vice Chairman] in writing of its intention
to do so -giving full, particulars thereof,
including any plans and documents, at least
30
days
before
undertaking
such
development;

in the case of a department of any
State
Government
or
the
Central
Government, if the (Vice-Chairman) has no
objections
it
should
inform
such
department of the same within three weeks
from the date of receipt by it under Clause
(a) of the department's intention, and if the
Vice-Chairman
does'not
make
any
objection within the said period the
department shall be free to carry out the
proposed development;

where the C 4[Vice-Chairman)
raises any objection to the proposed
development on the ground that the
development is not conformity with any
Master Plan or Zonal Development Plan
prepared or intended to be prepared by it,
or on any other ground, such department
or the local authority, as the case be, shall-

(i)either
make
necessary
modifications in the proposal development
to meet the objections raised by the 5[ViceChairman] or

(ii) submit the proposals for
development together with the objections
raised by the[Vice-Chairman] to the State
Government for decision under Clause (d)

the State Government, on receipt
of proposals for development together with
the objections of the 2[Vice-Chairman)
may either approve the proposals with or
without
modifications
or
direct
the
department or the local authority, as the
case may be, to make such modification as
proposed by the Government and the
decision of the State Government shall he
final:

the development of any land
begun by any such department or subject to
1916 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the provisions of Section 59 by any such
local authority before the declaration
referred to in Sub-section (1) may be
completed by that department or local
authority
with
compliance
with
the
requirement of Sub-sections (1) and (2).

(Emphasis added)

14. So the scheme of Act No. 11 of
1973 in the light of the above provision is
that development of an area has to take
place as per zonal and Master Plan floated
with the approval of the State Government
and any constructions thereof invites action
under Sections 27 and 28 of the Act No. 11
of 1973.

15. Now Section 17 of the Act,
provides for compulsory acquisition of land
by the Authority and its disposal as per the
plan. Section 18 that deals with the disposal
of the acquired land under the Act, is
reproduced hereunder in its entirety:

18. Disposal of land by the
Authority
or
the
local
Authority
concerned.-

(1) Subject to any directions
given by the State Government in this
behalf, the Authority or, as the case may
be, the local Authority concerned may
dispose of

any land acquired by the State
Government and transferred to it, without
undertaking
or
carrying
out
any
development thereon; or

any such land after undertaking
or carrying out such development as it
thinks fit.

to such persons, in such manner
and subject to such terms and conditions as
it considers expedient for securing the
development of the development area
according to plan.

(2) Nothing in this Act shall be
construed as enabling the Authority or the
local Authority concerned to dispose of
land by way of gift,(***) but subject
thereto, references in this Act, to the
disposal of land shall be construed as
references to the disposal thereof in any
manner, whether by way of sale, exchange
or lease or by the creation of any easement,
right or privilege or otherwise.

2(3) Notwithstanding, anything
contained in Sub-section (2), the Authority
or the local Authority concerned may
create a mortgage or charge over such
land (including any building thereon) in
favour of the Life Insurance Corporation of
India.
the
Housing
and
Urban
Development Corporation, or a banking
company as defined in the Uttar Pradesh
Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act,
1972 or any other financial institution
approved by general or special order in
this behalf by the State Government.

1[(4) Where vacant land has
been disposed of under this section by way
of lease for making constructions within
the time with right of forfeiture of the
lease and re-entry upon failure to make
constructions within such time, and the
lessee fails without sufficient reason, to
make the constructions or a substantial
portion thereof, within the stipulated time
or such extended time as the lessor may
grant, the 2[lessor may subject to the
provisions of Sub-section (4-A) forfeit] the
lease and re-enter upon the land:

Provided that no forfeiture and
re-entry shall be made unless the lessee
has been allowed reasonable opportunity
to show cause against the proposed action.

3[(4-A) Where a lessee fails to
make construction within the stipulated
time, and the extended time, if any, under
Sub-section (4) so that the total period from
the date of lease exceeds five years, a
3-5 All. M/s Shipra Hotels Ltd. Vs. Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad
1917
charge at the rate of two per cent of the
prevailing market value of the concerned
land shall be realised every year from him
by the lessor and if from the date of
imposition of the said charge a further
period of five years elapses the lease shall
stand forfeited and the lessor shallre-enter
upon the land :)

4[Provided that where the period
of five years has expired before the
commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Urban
Planning and Development (Amendment)
Act, 1997, or where the period of five years
expires
within
one
year
after
such
commencement,
the
charge
shall
be
realizable after a period of one year from
the date of such commencement.]

(5) Upon such forfeiture and reentry, the premium paid by the lessee for
such land shall be refunded without any
interest, after deducting-

(a) the amount, if any, due to the
lessor under that lease, and

(b) a sum equivalent to 5 per cent
of
the
premium,
for
administrative
expenses.

(6)Any person aggrieved by an
order under Sub-section (4) may, within 30
days from the date of knowledge thereof,
prefer an appeal to the District Judge
whose decision shall be final.

(7)The land so re-entered upon
after forfeiture of lease may be disposed of
in accordance with the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2)].
 (Emphasis added)

16. Sub Section 1 thus provides for
transfer of land on such terms and
conditions as the Authority may consider
expediant for securing development under
the development area but of course,
according to the plan Sub Section (2)
provides
for
various
modes
of
transfer/disposal of land and lease is one
such mode prescribed for. And Sub Section
(4) empowers forfeiture of lease and reentry for violation of terms of lease.

17. The import of the proviso is
putting a caveat to the main provision in
favour of a lease holder. Sub Section 4 of
Section 18, from its bare reading, shows
that legislative intent of giving right to the
lessor of re-entry upon failure of the lessee
to make constructions as provided and
contemplated under the lease agreement but
that too is when found without sufficient
reason,
meaning
thereby
for
not
undertaking any action or performing as
per land use under the lease agreement, one
must ensure that it was not for any
'sufficient reason' to record. Here comes
the
element
of
adjudication
because
authority has to evaluate the explanation of
the lessee qua the charges of violation of
the lease and then adjudicate the issue
regarding right to re-entry. The natural
corollary is unless a show cause notice is
given of the proposed action for the
forfeiture of the lease deed and re-entry of
the
lessor,
offering
a
'reasonable
opportunity' to explain no action can be
undertaken by the authority forfeiting the
lease and making re-entry.

18. So in the entire regime of the
Act two different actions/ coercive
measures are contemplated to meet two
different
contingencies
and
the
consequential effect of the respective
actions are also different and there is no
overlapping of procedures to make one
notice as substitution of the other
merely because the authority is one and
the same. The contents of the order
impugned since clearly indicate that
impugned action has been undertaken
for not developing the amusement park
to
house
sport
activities
like
1918 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
recreational
one:
swimming,
golf
course, joyride etc, it clearly speaks of
an action as contemplated under sub
section 4 of Section 18 and, therefore,
in our ultimate conclusion that we
arrive is that notices appended as C.A.
1,2 and 3 cannot be read and held to be
notices under the proviso to sub section
4 of Section 18 of the Act No. 11 of
1973 to justify the consequential order.

19. Applying the above legal principle
to case in hand and in view of the facts
discussed above, we find that there is no
such notice and, therefore, we find merit in
the argument of learned Senior Advocate
that the order impugned cannot be
sustained in law as it being a result of
exercise power de hors the procedure
prescribed.

20. It is also sought to be urged
by learned Senior Advocate Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi,
appearing
for
the
respondent that the petitioner has the
opportunity to explain his position and
meet the charges on merits here itself
in
this
petition.
He
argues
that
endeavour
of
the
Court
while
exercising power under Article 226
should
be
aimed
at
achieving
substantial justice. He submits that
since the pleadings are absolutely
silent qua the grounds/charges for
violation of terms of the lease, it is
writ large on the face of it that
petitioner does not have any reasonable
explanation to offer to sustain the lease
rights.

21. Meeting this above argument,
suffice it to say that determination of
lease for violation of its terms entail a
detail fact finding enquiring and at
times personal opportunity of hearing
may even become necessary. Such
matters cannot be decided on mere
affidavits. The element of adjudication
as we have already referred to above
being involved in the exercise of
power under Section 18(4), it is always
proper to let the competent authority
decide the same. Once can argue that
appeal involves a question of law so
the said remedy may be bypassed in a
certain case but task of primary
authority cannot be bypassed, more so,
in case where for lack of notice, a
litigant had neither any opportunity to
offer explanation nor, had offered any
explanation.

22. However, since the lease has
come to be determined for violation of
the terms and conditions thereof and
grounds have been clearly spelt out in
the order, we take it that the petitioner
now has requisite notice and so what is
required at his end is to submit reply.
So we find merit in the argument of
learned Senior Advocate Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi to the extent that matter
may be remitted to the authority
concerned to revisit the entire issue
and decide afresh in accordance with
law
and
that
too
without
being
influenced by any finding returned in
the order impugned.

23. In view of the above the order
impugned 26.05.2009 (Annexure No. 1
to the writ petition) to the extent it
determines the lease and cancels the
same and findings are returned in
support thereof, is hereby quashed,
however, contents thereof and reasons
assigned therein are directed to be
treated as a notice to the petitioner to
submit his reply and offer explanation
to the alleged violation of terms and
3-5 All. Dinesh Kumar Vs. State of U.P.
1919
conditions
of
the
lease
and
non
performance of the land use for which
land in question was leased out to the
petitioner.

24. Accordingly, the petitioner is
directed to submit reply/explanation
within period of four weeks from today
and authority shall consider the reply
of the petitioner and thereafter shall
proceed to pass order afresh. The
authority
shall
conclude
the
proceedings as directed hereinabove
within a further period of eight weeks
from the date of submission of reply of
the petitioner.

25. We may, however, hasten to
add and clarify that if any proceeding
has been initiated by the authority under
Section 27 of the Act No. 11 of 1973,
that will be a separate one and it will be
open for the authority to bring that to a
logical end in the light of provisions
prescribed for in that regards under the
Act No. 11 of 1973.

26. The writ petition is allowed to
the extent indicated hereinabove and
subject to the aforesaid observations
and directions but, with no order as to
cost.
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(2020)03-05ILR A1919
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.03.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Crl. Misc. Ist Bail Application No. 38764 of
2017

Dinesh Kumar ...Applicant (In Jail)
Versus
State of U.P. ...Opposite Party

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Kamal Kaushal Upadhyay, Sri Ankit
Saran, Sri Jai Narayan, Sri Rohan Gupta
Counsel for the Opposite Party:
A.G.A.

A. Criminal Law- Dowry Prohibition
Act,
1961-Sections
498-A,
304-B-
Section 3⁄4 - Indian Penal Code, 1860
-
application-adjournment-Counsel
for applicant did not appear to arguethe applicant is in jail for 3 years-
counsel did not show any interest to
argue the matter.(Para 2)

The matter is adjourned. (E-6)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sudhir
Agarwal, J.)

1. A request has been made by
Sri Rohan Gupta, Advocate holding
brief of Sri Ankit Saran, learned
counsel for applicant to adjourn this
matter today.

2.
 This
bail
application
is
pending since 2017 and applicant is in
jail since 20.10.2016. It appears that
learned counsel for last more than
three years did not make any attempt
to
argue
the
case
but
allowed
detention of his client in jail. Even
today, he did not show any interest by
arguing the matter. He does not want
to give a chance to his client to
celebrate Holi at his residence.

3. Under these circumstances, I
have no option but to adjourn this
matter for today.

4. List in the next cause list.
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