# M/s Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Pvt. Ltd. & Anr v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2024) 4 ILRA 756
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-12-22
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 40581 of 2023
- **Bench:** Gajendra Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-shiv-shakti-infra-vision-pvt-ltd-anr-v-state-of-u-p-anr-50981
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Law
-

Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973 -Section 482- Quashing of
Summoning Order Denied - The applicants
sought to quash the summoning order dated
13.06.2022, non-bailable warrant issued on
18.04.2023, and proceedings in Complaint Case
No. 4147 of 2019 (now No. 208 of 2023) under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 - Held, no illegality or abuse of process
was found in the impugned order, and the
application was dismissed. (Paras 2, 19, 20)

B. Section 138 and 141 of N.I. Act -
Liability of Authorized Signatory - The
applicant company (drawer) and its authorized
signatory were summoned for dishonour of a
cheque - Held, as per Aneeta Hada Vs
Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., the
authorized signatory of a company is considered
a "drawer" under Section 7, and specific
averments under Section 141 are not required
for their liability. (Paras 6, 7, 13, 14)

C. Section 141 of N.I. Act - Vicarious
Liability - The complaint did not explicitly
4 All. M/s Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
757
invoke Section 141 or make specific averments
against the authorized signatory - Held, as per
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs Neeta Bhalla and
K.K. Ahuja Vs VSK. Vora, no specific averments
are needed for the signatory of a dishonoured
cheque, who is prima facie liable under Section
141(2). (Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 13)

D. Prima Facie Case under Section 138 -
The court found that a prima facie case was
established against the applicants based on the
dishonour of a cheque for Rs. 20,90,770/- and
failure to pay after demand notice - Held, the
summoning order was justified, and the
applicants could rebut the presumption under
Section 139 during trial. (Paras 14, 15)

E. Judicial Application of Mind - The
applicants failed to demonstrate any illegality or
perversity in the summoning order - Held, the
court below applied judicial mind, and no
grounds existed to interfere with the order
under Section 482 CrPC. (Paras 18, 19)

Application Dismissed.

List of Cases cited:

## Text

756 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
empowering
the
Trial
Courts
to
reconsider/recall summons in respect of
complaints under Section 138 shall be
considered by the Committee constituted by
an order of this Court dated 10.03.2021.

8) All other points, which have
been raised by the Amici Curiae in their
preliminary report and written submissions
and not considered herein, shall be the
subject matter of deliberation by the
aforementioned Committee. Any other issue
relating
to
expeditious
disposal
of
complaints under Section 138 of the Act
shall also be considered by the Committee.

6. From the above mentioned
judgements of Hon'ble Apex Court, it is
clear that the Apex Court for expeditious
disposal of cases under N.I. Act, has issued
several directions which the concerned
court/Magistrate has to follow while
deciding the cases under N.I. Act. From the
observations of the Apex Court as well as
analysis of Sections 138 & 143 of N.I. Act,
it is expedient that all the proceedings
under N.I. Act should be concluded
expeditiously
without
going
into
unnecessary technicality.

7.

Considering
the
aforesaid
judgements,
this
Court
directs
the
Additional Civil Judge (J.D.) Ist/Judicial
Magistrate, Jaunpur to conclude the trial
of complaint case No. 19412 of 2022
(Ramdhari Pal vs Ajay Yadav), u/s 138
N.I. Act, P.S. Kotwali, District Jaunpur,
keeping in mind the direction of the Apex
Court
in
above
mentioned
cases,
expeditiously preferably within a period
of six months from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order, strictly in
accordance with statutory provision of
Sections 143(2) and143(3) of the N.I.
Act.

8. With the aforesaid direction, the
application is disposed of.
----------
(2024) 4 ILRA 756
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.12.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE GAJENDRA KUMAR, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 40581 of 2023

M/s Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Pvt. Ltd. &
Anr. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri Rahul Chaudhary, Sri Aman Kumar
Dwivedi

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
G.A.

Criminal
Law
-

Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973 -Section 482- Quashing of
Summoning Order Denied - The applicants
sought to quash the summoning order dated
13.06.2022, non-bailable warrant issued on
18.04.2023, and proceedings in Complaint Case
No. 4147 of 2019 (now No. 208 of 2023) under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
1881 - Held, no illegality or abuse of process
was found in the impugned order, and the
application was dismissed. (Paras 2, 19, 20)

B. Section 138 and 141 of N.I. Act -
Liability of Authorized Signatory - The
applicant company (drawer) and its authorized
signatory were summoned for dishonour of a
cheque - Held, as per Aneeta Hada Vs
Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., the
authorized signatory of a company is considered
a "drawer" under Section 7, and specific
averments under Section 141 are not required
for their liability. (Paras 6, 7, 13, 14)

C. Section 141 of N.I. Act - Vicarious
Liability - The complaint did not explicitly
4 All. M/s Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
757
invoke Section 141 or make specific averments
against the authorized signatory - Held, as per
S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs Neeta Bhalla and
K.K. Ahuja Vs VSK. Vora, no specific averments
are needed for the signatory of a dishonoured
cheque, who is prima facie liable under Section
141(2). (Paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 13)

D. Prima Facie Case under Section 138 -
The court found that a prima facie case was
established against the applicants based on the
dishonour of a cheque for Rs. 20,90,770/- and
failure to pay after demand notice - Held, the
summoning order was justified, and the
applicants could rebut the presumption under
Section 139 during trial. (Paras 14, 15)

E. Judicial Application of Mind - The
applicants failed to demonstrate any illegality or
perversity in the summoning order - Held, the
court below applied judicial mind, and no
grounds existed to interfere with the order
under Section 482 CrPC. (Paras 18, 19)

Application Dismissed.

List of Cases cited:

1. Aneeta Hada Vs Godfather Travels and Tours
Pvt. Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 661

2. S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. Vs Neeta Bhalla,
2005 SCC (Cri) 1975

3. K.K. Ahuja Vs VSK. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48

4. National Small Industries Corp. Ltd. Vs
Harmeet Singh Paintal, (2010) 3 SCC 330

5. Sunita Palita Vs M/s Panchami Stone Quarry,
2022 LiveLaw (SC) 647

6. GHCL Employees Stock Option Trust Vs
Indian Infoline Ltd., (2013) 4 SCC 505

7. S.K. Alagh Vs St. of U.P., (2008) 5 SCC 662

8. Sarad Kumar Sanghi Vs Sangita Rane, (2015)
12 SCC 781

9. Sushil Seth Vs St. of Arunachal Pradesh,
(2020) 3 SCC 240
10. Roop Mani Pandey Vs St. of U.P., Application
u/s 482 Cr.P.C. No. 3336 of 2014, order dated
16.02.2016

11. Dayle De'Souza Vs Government of India,
Criminal Appeal a/o S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 3913 of
2020, order dated 29.10.2021

(Delivered by Hon'ble Gajendra Kumar, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
applicants and learned AGA for the State.

2. The present application u/s 482
Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicants
with the prayer to quash the summoning
order dated 13.06.2022 and order dated
18.04.2023 which continued till 16.10.2023
where by non bailable warrant was issued
as well as the entire proceeding of
Complaint Case No.4147 of 2019 (New
Complaint Case No.208 of 2023), under
Section 138 of N.I. Act, pending in the
court of Additional Court No.1, Gautam
Buddh Nagar.

3. In brief, facts of the case are as that
the opposite party no.2 filed a complaint
against the applicant no.1, the company i.e.
M/S. Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Private
Limited
and
applicant
no.2
as
the
Authorized Signatory of the said company,
on account of dishonour of cheque being
Cheque no.014022 dated 1st June, 2019 for
the sum of Rs.20,90,770/- drawn by the
applicant no.1. The said cheque was given
to opposite party no.2 in discharge of
liability pursuant to an agreement entered
into between the applicants and opposite
party no.2 and the said cheque was also
returned unpaid for the reason that
"payment stopped by the drawer". It is
further alleged that despite receipt of
demand/legal notice, the drawer of the
cheque failed to make the payment and thus
a complaint under Section 138 N.I. Act was
758 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
filed by the opposite party no.2. In support
of the complaint, the opposite party no.2
filed his statement under Section 200
Cr.P.C. dated 06.12.2019 in form of an
affidavit. The court of Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, Gautam
Buddh Nagar vide order dated 13th June,
2022 took cognizance of the offence under
Section 138 of N.I. Act against the
applicants and issued summons to the
applicants. It is further alleged that opposite
party no.2 provided the wrong address in
the complaint which was rectified by him
in the month of June, 2023 by seeking an
amendment in the complaint regarding the
correct address, which was allowed by the
court on 16.06.2023. When the applicants
came to know about the present proceeding
without
further
delay,
the
applicant
company approached the Court by means
of application under Section 305 Cr.P.C.
and further made an application for the
cancellation of N.B.W. and without further
delay this application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. has been filed whereby summoning
order dated 13.06.2022 is challenged.

4. Learned counsel for the applicants
submits that the applicants are innocent and
have been falsely implicated in the present
matter due to ulterior motive. Further
submission is that as per the opposite party
no.2, the applicant no.2 is the Authorized
Signatory of the applicant no.1 the
company namely M/S. Shiv Shakti Infra
Vision Private Limited and applicant no.2
admittedly is not the drawer of the cheque.
Further submission is that the applicant
no.2 has neither been prosecuted nor
summoned in his capacity as a director of
the applicant no.1, the company since there
are no averments or pleadings in the
complaint in accordance with Section 141
of N.I. Act. Further submission is that
applicants
being
aggrieved
by
the
summoning order dated 13th June, 2022
and the pleadings emanating therefrom are
preferring the present application for
quashing the summoning order. Further
submission is that the court below has erred
in law in not appreciating that the applicant
no.2 is not the drawer of the cheque in
question and thus no criminal liability can
be fastened upon him under Section 138 of
N.I. Act. Further submission is that as the
opposite party no.2/complainant has not
made
the
directors
of
applicant
no.1/accused no.1 as accused and has not
pleaded essential ingredients of Section 141
of N.I. Act, thus, the summoning order
should not have been passed against the
applicants.
The
opposite
party
no.2/complainant has not even invoked
Section 141 of N.I. Act and the complaint
lacks essential ingredients of Section141 of
N.I. Act and in view of this, the
summoning order against the applicants is
bad in law. Even in summoning order dated
13th June, 2022 there is no reference to
Section 141 of N.I. Act, thus, the applicants
should not have been summoned, merely
because the applicant no.2 is the Signatory
to the cheque and is neither the drawer of
the cheque nor any allegations have been
made against him in accordance with
Section 141 of N.I. Act. It is further
submitted that it is a settled proposition of
law that the offence under Section 138 of
N.I. Act is capable of being committed only
by the drawer of the cheque and every
person signing a cheque on behalf of the
company on whose account the cheque is
drawn does not became the drawer of the
cheque. Such a signatory only a person
duly authorized to sign the cheque on
behalf of the company/drawer of the
cheque. It is further submitted that criminal
liability on account of dishonour of cheque
primarily falls on the drawer of the cheque
and if the drawer is a company, then drawer
4 All. M/s Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
759
company and is extended to the officers of
the company in view of Section 141 of N.I.
Act but does not extended to the authorized
signatory of the cheque, who is merely
authorized to sign the cheque on behalf of
the drawer company. It is further submitted
that the opposite party no.2/complainant
has not made specific averments as
contemplated by Section 141 of N.I. Act
against the applicant no.2 and in absence of
specific averments, the cognizance of the
offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act
against the applicant no.2 is bad in law.
The vicarious liability on the officer of the
company can be fastened only under
Section 141 of N.I. Act and non-invocation
of Section 141 of N.I. Act renders the
summoning order, bad in law as against the
applicants. In support of his submissions,
learned counsel for the applicants has
placed reliance upon the judgements of
Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of GHCL
Employees Stock Option Trust Vs. Indian
Infoline Ltd., (2013) 4 Supreme Court
Cases 505, S.K. Alagh Vs. State of U.P.
And others (2008) 5 Supreme Court Cases
662, Sarad Kumar Sanghi Vs. Sangita
Rane (2015) 12 Supreme Court Cases 781,
Sushil Seth and another Vs. State of
Arunanchal Pradesh and others, (2020) 3
Supreme Court Cases 240, Roop Mani
Pandey Vs. State of U.P. and another
passed in Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C.
No.3336 of 2014 vide order dated
16.02.2016,
Dayle
De'souza
Vs.
Government of India passed in Criminal
Appeal a/o S.L.P. (Crl.) No.3913 of 2020
dated 29th October, 2021 and Aneeta
Hada Vs Godfather Travels and Tours
Pvt. Ltd, (2012) 5 Supreme Court Cases
661.

5. On the other hand, learned AGA
has opposed the prayer and submitted that
there is no illegality and perversity in the
impugned order. A prima facie case is
made out against the applicants. Applicant
no.1 is the company, who has been
summoned by virtue of its role as a drawer
of cheque and applicant no.2 is a signatory
of the cheque. Signatory of the cheque is
included in the definition of drawer as
given in Section 7 of the N.I. Act. So far
as the specific averments in the complaint
are concerned, there is no need for the
same as it is apparent that authorized
signatory of the cheque is vicariously
liable for the act of the company i.e.
applicant no.1.

6. From the perusal of the record and
submissions made by the rival parties, it is
apparent that so far as the argument of the
learned counsel for the applicants is
concerned with regard to the effect that
applicant no.2 is not drawer of the cheque
but merely an authorized signatory of the
cheque, under the scheme of Section 141
of N.I. Act only drawer of the cheque i.e
company is liable and signatory is not
liable as he has merely signed the cheque
for no debt/liability of his own. In this
respect, it will be pertinent to refer to the
case law, Aneeta Hada (supra), in which in
paragraph no.20 it has been clarified that
an authorized signatory of a company is a
drawer, which read as under:-

"20. The section 7 of the Act
defines "drawer" to mean the maker of a
bill of exchange or a cheque. An
authorized
signatory
of
a
company
becomes a drawer as he has been
authorized to do so in respect of the
account maintained by the company."

7. In view of the above, as held by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the
expression "drawer" under Section 7 and
Section 141 of N.I. Act covers "the
760 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
authorized signatory" of a company, thus
the argument in this regard is not
sustainable.

8. So far as the argument regarding
the specific averments have not been made
in the complaint which are necessary for
fastening vicarious liability upon the
authorized signatory of the cheque is
concerned, in this regard it will be pertinent
to refer to S.M.S. Pharmaceutical Ltd. Vs.
Neeta Bhalla and another 2005 SCC (Crl.)
1975, in which the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held and observed that:-

"To sum up, there is almost
unanimous judicial opinion that necessary
averments ought to be contained in a
complaint before a persons can be
subjected to criminal process. A liability
under Section141 of the Act is sought to be
fastened vicariously on a person connected
with a Company, the principal accused
being the company itself. It is a departure
from the rule in criminal law against
vicarious liability. A clear case should be
spelled out in the complaint against the
person sought to be made liable Section141
of the Act contains the requirements for
making a person liable under the said
provision. That respondent falls within
parameters of Section141 has to be spelled
out. A complaint has to be examined by the
Magistrate in the first instance on the basis
of averments contained therein. If the
Magistrate is satisfied that there are
averments which bring the case within
Section141 he would issue the process. We
have seen that merely being described as a
director in a company is not sufficient to
satisfy the requirement of Section141. Even
a non director can be liable under
Section141 of the Act. The averments in
the complaint would also serve the
purpose that the person sought to be made
liable would know what is the case which
is alleged against him. This will enable
him to meet the case at the trial.

In view of the above discussion,
our answers to the questions posed in the
Reference are as under:

(a) It is necessary to specifically
aver in a complaint under Section141 that
at the time the offence was committed, the
person accused was in charge of, and
responsible for the conduct of business of
the company. This averment is an essential
requirement of Section141 and has to be
made in a complaint. Without this averment
being
made
in
a
complaint,
the
requirements of Section141 cannot be said
to be satisfied.

(b) The answer to question posed
in sub-para (b) has to be in negative.
Merely being a director of a company is
not sufficient to make the person liable
under Section141 of the Act. A director in a
company cannot be deemed to be in charge
of and responsible to the company for
conduct of its business. The requirement of
Section141 is that the person sought to be
made liable should be in charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the business
of the company at the relevant time. This
has to be averred as a fact as there is no
deemed liability of a director in such cases.

(c) The answer to question (c )
has to be in affirmative. The question notes
that the Managing Director or Joint
Managing Director would be admittedly in
charge of the company and responsible to
the company for conduct of its business.
When that is so, holders of such positions
in a company become liable under
Section141 of the Act. By virtue of the
office they hold as Managing Director or
4 All. M/s Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
761
Joint Managing Director, these persons are
in charge of and responsible for the conduct
of business of the company. Therefore, they
get covered under Section141. So far as
signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured
is concerned, he is clearly responsible for
the incriminating act and will be covered
under sub-section (2) of Section 141."

9. In the case of K.K. Ahuja Vs. V.K.
Vora and another, 2 (2009)10 SCC 48, it has
been held that:-

10. The position under Section 141 of
the N.I. Act can be summarized thus:-

"(ii) In the case of a director or an
officer of the company who signed the cheque
on behalf of the company, there is no need to
make a specific averment that he was in
charge of and was responsible to the
company, for the conduct of the business of
the company or make any specific allegation
about consent, connivance or negligence. The
very fact that the dishonoured cheque was
signed by him on behalf of the company,
would give rise to responsibility under subsection (2) of Section 141."

11. In the case of National Small
Industries Corp. Ltd. Vs. Harmeet Singh
Paintal and another, (2010) 3 SCC 330, it
has been held that:-

"25) From the above discussion,
the following principles emerge:-

(vi) If accused is a Director or an
Officer of a company who signed the cheques
on behalf of the company then also it is not
necessary to make specific averment in
complaint."

12. In the case of Sunita Palita and
others Vs. M/s Panchami Stone Quarry,
2022 Livelaw (SC) 647, it has been held as
under:-

"43. Liability depends on the
role one plays in the affairs of a company
and not on designation or status alone as
held
by
this
Court
in
S.M.S.
Pharaceuticals
Ltd.
(supra).
The
materials on record clearly show that
these Appellants were independent, nonexecutive Directors of the company. As
held by this Court in Pooja Ravinder
Devidasani v.State of Maharashtra and
Anr. (supra) a non-Executive Director is
not involved in the day-to-day affairs of
the company or in the running of its
business. Such Director is in no way
responsible for the day-to-day running of
the Accused Company. Moreover, when a
complaint is filed against a Director of
the company, who is not the signatory of
the
dishonoured
cheque,
specific
averments have to be made in the
pleadings to substantiate the contention
in the complaint, that such Director was
in charge of and responsible for conduct
of the business of the Company or the
Company, unless such Director is the
designated Managing Director or Joint
Managing Director who would obviously
be responsible for the company and/or
its business and affairs.

44. The High Court correctly
observed that three categories of persons
were covered by Section 141 of the NI Act
- the company who committed the offence
as alleged; everyone who was in-charge
of or was responsible for the business of
the company and any other person who
was a Director or a Manager or a
Secretary or Officer of the Company with
whose connivance or due to whose
neglect the company had committed the
offence.
762 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

49. For the reasons discussed
above, the appeal is allowed. The judgment
and order of the High Court is set aside.
Criminal Case No. AC/121/2017 pending
under Section 138/141 of the NI Act in the
Court of Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Court,
Suri Birbhum is quashed in so far as these
Appellants are concerned. It is made clear
that the proceedings may continue against
the other accused in the criminal case,
including in particular the Accused
Company,
its
Managing
Director/
Additional Managing Director and/or the
signatory of the cheque in question."

13. In view of the above, legal
position is settled and certain that in respect
of authorized signatory of the cheque,
specific averments are not necessary to be
made in the complaint as the very
objective/purpose of averments to be made
in the complaint is that the person sought to
be made liable would know, what is the
case, which is alleged against him and this
will enable him to meet the case at trial.

14. I n this complaint, the applicant
no.2 has been shown as an authorized
signatory of the company i.e. applicant
no.1. There is no confusion regarding his
role/act in drawing/signing the cheque for
which he has been prima facie found liable
and resultatly has been summoned for the
offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act. It is
needless to emphasize that the Court taking
cognizance of the complaint under Section
138 of the Act is required to be satisfied as
to whether a prima facie case is made out
under the said provision. The drawer of the
cheque undoubtedly gets an opportunity
under Section 139 of the Act to rebut the
presumption at the trial.

15. So far as the non invoking of
section 141 of N.I. Act is concerned, it is
made clear that in case of dishonour of
cheque Section 138 of N.I. Act is
charging/penal section and Section 141 of
the N.I. Act is only enabling section for
fasting the vicarious liability upon the
accused in case where the offence under
Section 138 of N.I. Act is committed by the
company. As such offence under Section
138 of N.I. Act is committed by the
company. It is a penal provision wherein if
a person draws a cheque on an account
maintained by him with the Banker for
payment of any amount of money to
another person from out of that account for
the discharge, in whole or in part of any
debt or other liability, is returned by the
Bank unpaid, on the ground either because
of the amount of money standing to the
credit of that account is insufficient to
honour the cheque or that it exceeds the
amount arranged to be paid from that
account by an agreement made with that
bank, such person shall be deemed to have
committed an offence.

16. At this juncture, it may be referred
to Section 141 of N.I. Act, which deals
with offences by companies. As the spine
of the controversy rests on the said
provision, it is reproduced below:

"141. Offences by companies. -
(1) If the person committing an offence
under section 138 is a company, every
person who, at the time the offence was
committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to the company for the conduct
of the business of the company, as well as
the company, shall be deemed to be guilty
of the offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded
against
and
punished
accordingly;

Provided that nothing contained
in this sub-section shall render any person
4 All. M/s Shiv Shakti Infra Vision Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
763
liable to punishment if he proves that the
offence
was
committed
without
his
knowledge, or that he had exercised all due
diligence to prevent the commission of such
offence:

Provided further that where a
person is nominated as a Director of a
Company by virtue of his holding any office
or employment in the Central Government or
State Government or a financial corporation
owned
or
controlled
by
the
Central
Government or the State Government, as the
case may be, he shall not be liable for
prosecution under this Chapter.

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1), where any
offence under this Act, has been committed
by a company and it is proved that the
offence has been committed with the
consent or connivance of, or is attributable
to, any neglect on the part of, any director,
manager, secretary or other officer of the
company,
such
director,
manager,
secretary or other officer shall also be
deemed to be guilty of that offence and
shall be liable to be proceeded against
and punished accordingly."

17. On a reading of the said provision,
it is plain as day that if a person who
commits offence under Section 138 of the
Act is a company, the company as well as
every person/officer in charge of and
responsible to the company for the conduct
of business of the company at the time of
commission of offence is deemed to be
guilty of the offence. The first proviso
carves out under what circumstances the
criminal liability would not be fastened.
Sub-section (2) enlarges the criminal
liability by incorporating the concepts of
connivance, negligence and consent that
engulfs many categories of officers. It is
worth noting that in both the provisions,
there is a 'deemed' concept of criminal
liability.

18. Counsel for the applicants has not
been able to point out any such illegality
much less than any abuse of court's process
which may persuade this Court to interfere
in the impugned order. The impugned order
reflects judicial application of mind. There
appears no good ground to castigate the
impugned order. The view taken by the
court below seems to be correct and even
this Court does not have reason to take a
different view in the matter.

19. Having regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case, after perusing
the impugned order as well as the materials
brought on record and having considered
the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties, I do not find any
good ground to quash the impugned order.
Hence, the prayer made in the application
is refused.

20. With the aforesaid observations,
the present application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is
devoid of merits and is, accordingly,
dismissed.
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(2024) 4 ILRA 763
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 12.03.2024
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHUTOSH SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters U/A 227 No.602 of 2024 (Civil)

Piyush Shukla ...Petitioner
Versus
Ram Kumar Gupta ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Prakhar Tandon