# M/s Shiva Enterprises & Anr v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 3 ILRA 1164
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-24
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 25126 of 2012
- **Bench:** Suneet Kumar, Rajendra Kumar-Iv
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-shiva-enterprises-anr-v-u-o-i-ors-49896
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

A. The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 -
Section 45 - liability for acts of partners
done after dissolution - If the firm has
been dissolved but no notice to the
creditors or public notice of such a
dissolution is given, the act of a partner
shall bind the other partners even after
dissolution, as if, the act was done before
the dissolution - thus, till public notice of
the dissolution is given, other partners
will continue to remain liable for the act of
one partner, as if, such an act was done in
a continuing partnership - Public notice
would include personal information or
knowledge of such dissolution to the third
party - The third party cannot take a plea
of lack of information for want of public
notice,
where,
the
third
party
was
informed
or
had
knowledge
of
the
dissolution - only persons who were not
aware of the retirement of a particular
partner could take advantage of Section
32(3) or Section 45 (Para 13, 16, 17)

B. Partnership firm M/s Maa Gayatri
Construction,
was
dissolved
and
a
proprietorship firm with the same name
was reconstituted with Ranveer Singh as
the sole partner - second petitioner
ceased to be the partner of M/s Maa
Gayatri Construction upon dissolution -
Both
the
partners
informed
the
respondent Bank of the dissolution of the
firm - Ranveer Singh deposited forged
cheque in the account of his firm on
account of which Bank suffered loss due
to the fraud - Bank seized the bank
account of the second petitioner to satisfy
the loss caused to the Bank by the sole
proprietor
of
M/s
Maa
Gayatri
Construction for the reason that second
petitioner earlier was a partner of the firm
M/s Maa Gayatri Construction - Held - As
the bank had notice/information of the
dissolution of the firm, therefore the
outgoing
partner/
second
petitioner
would
not
be
liable
for
the
fraud
committed
by
the
reconstituted
proprietorship firm, from the date of
notice/ information to the bank in view of
Section 45 of the Act - In view of Section
45 of the Act the second petitioner would
not
be
liable
for
any
act
of
the
proprietorship firm after the dissolution of
the earlier partnership firm (Para 24, 30)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1164 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
would cause great injustice if a literal
interpretation is given to the expression
"had not made an application to the
Collector under Section 18" in Section 28A of the Act. The aforesaid expression
would mean that if the landowner has made
an application for reference under Section
18 and that reference is entertained and
answered. In other words, it may not be
permissible for a landowner to make a
reference and get it answered and then
subsequently make another application when
some other person gets the reference
answered and obtains a higher amount. In
fact in Pradeep Kumari case [(1995) 2 SCC
736] the three learned Judges, while
enumerating the conditions to be satisfied,
whereafter an application under Section 28-A
can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC
p. 743, para 10) "the person moving the
application did not make an application to the
Collector under Section 18". The expression
"did not make an application", as observed by
this Court, would mean, did not make an
effective
application
which
had
been
entertained by making the reference and the
reference was answered. When an application
under Section 18 is not entertained on the
ground of limitation, the same not fructifying
into any reference, then that would not
tantamount to an effective application and
consequently the rights of such applicant
emanating from some other reference being
answered to move an application under
Section 28-A cannot be denied. We,
accordingly answer Question 1(a) by holding
that the dismissal of an application seeking
reference under Section 18 on the ground of
delay would tantamount to not filing an
application within the meaning of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

(emphasis by Court)

7. In the present case, since on the
petitioner's application under Section 18 of
the Act, no reference was made by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer, which
was declined on the ground of limitation, it
cannot be said that there was any reference
made at the petitioner's instance that was
decided by the Court so as to curtail the
petitioner's right to take advantage of the
remedy under Section 28A of the Act.

8. This Court is, therefore, of the
opinion that the impugned order declining
to re-determine the compensation payable
to the petitioner on an application filed
under Section 28A of the Act is manifestly
illegal and based on a flawed understanding
of the provisions of Section 28A. The
petitioner's application under Section 28A
is competent and maintainable.

9. In the result, this writ petition
succeeds and is allowed. The impugned
order dated 30.04.2022 passed by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer (Joint
Organization), Aligarh (Annexure No.1 to
the writ petition) is hereby quashed. In
consequence, the petitioner's application
under Section 28A of the Act is restored to
file, which the Special Land Acquisition
Officer shall consider and decide by a
reasoned and speaking order after hearing
the parties concerned expeditiously.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 1164
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

Writ-C No. 25126 of 2012

M/s Shiva Enterprises & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents
3 All. M/s Shiva Enterprises & Anr. Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
1165
Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri R.D. Tiwari, Sri Arun Kumar Singh, Sri
M.D. Singh Shekhar (Sr. Adv.), Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi (Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Ms. S.C., Sudha Pandey, Sri
Narendra Kumar Pandey

A. The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 -
Section 45 - liability for acts of partners
done after dissolution - If the firm has
been dissolved but no notice to the
creditors or public notice of such a
dissolution is given, the act of a partner
shall bind the other partners even after
dissolution, as if, the act was done before
the dissolution - thus, till public notice of
the dissolution is given, other partners
will continue to remain liable for the act of
one partner, as if, such an act was done in
a continuing partnership - Public notice
would include personal information or
knowledge of such dissolution to the third
party - The third party cannot take a plea
of lack of information for want of public
notice,
where,
the
third
party
was
informed
or
had
knowledge
of
the
dissolution - only persons who were not
aware of the retirement of a particular
partner could take advantage of Section
32(3) or Section 45 (Para 13, 16, 17)

B. Partnership firm M/s Maa Gayatri
Construction,
was
dissolved
and
a
proprietorship firm with the same name
was reconstituted with Ranveer Singh as
the sole partner - second petitioner
ceased to be the partner of M/s Maa
Gayatri Construction upon dissolution -
Both
the
partners
informed
the
respondent Bank of the dissolution of the
firm - Ranveer Singh deposited forged
cheque in the account of his firm on
account of which Bank suffered loss due
to the fraud - Bank seized the bank
account of the second petitioner to satisfy
the loss caused to the Bank by the sole
proprietor
of
M/s
Maa
Gayatri
Construction for the reason that second
petitioner earlier was a partner of the firm
M/s Maa Gayatri Construction - Held - As
the bank had notice/information of the
dissolution of the firm, therefore the
outgoing
partner/
second
petitioner
would
not
be
liable
for
the
fraud
committed
by
the
reconstituted
proprietorship firm, from the date of
notice/ information to the bank in view of
Section 45 of the Act - In view of Section
45 of the Act the second petitioner would
not
be
liable
for
any
act
of
the
proprietorship firm after the dissolution of
the earlier partnership firm (Para 24, 30)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Malayandi Vs Narayanan 36 IC 225

2. Muthuswami Vs Sankaralingam 2 LW 823

3. Ratanji Bhagwanji & Co. Vs Prem Shanker
AIR 1938 All 619

(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri M.D. Singh Shekhar
and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior
Counsels assisted by Shri R.D. Tiwari
and Shri Arun Kumar, learned counsels
for the petitioners, and Sri Narendra
Kumar Pandey and Ms. Sudha Pandey,
learned counsel for respondent Bank.

2. The first petitioner i.e. M/s Shiva
Enterprises, is a proprietorship firm,
second petitioner is the proprietor of the
firm. The firm is engaged in the business
of construction. Initially, petitioner-firm
was a partnership firm which was
subsequently
dissolved
in
2008,
thereafter, became a sole proprietorship
firm. The firm has a current account,
with overdraft facility, being Account
No. 1886009300021932, with Panjab
National Bank, Branch Kidwai Nagar,
Kanpur Nagar.
1166 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

3. On 9 July 2009, partnership firm in
the name and style M/s Maa Gayatri
Construction was constituted, wherein, one
Ranveer Singh and second petitioner were
partners. The firm was having facility of
current
account
being
Account
No.
1886002100023313 in the same branch of
the respondent-bank. On 11 July 2011, one
of the partner of M/s Maa Gayatri
Construction filed an application with the
fourth respondent stating therein that the
partnership firm has since been dissolved
and second partner i.e. second petitioner,
henceforth, has no concern with the affairs
of the firm. In other words, Ranveer Singh
informed the Bank that the firm (M/s Maa
Gayatri
Construction)
has
been
reconstituted as proprietorship firm of the
same name and Ranveer Singh is the sole
proprietor. Thereafter, on 12 July 2011,
second petitioner being the outgoing
partner of the dissolved firm filed an
application before the fourth respondent
informing that he is no more the partner of
M/s Maa Gayatri Construction, with a
further request that the account of the firm
i.e. A/c No. 1886002100023313, having
''zero' balance, be closed upon dissolution
of the firm. The statement of account dated
4 July 2011 has been filed (at Annexure-5)
to the writ petition to substantiate that on
the date when the application was moved
by the second petitioner informing the
fourth respondent that second petitioner is
no longer partner, the outstanding balance
in the aforenoted account of the dissolved
firm was ''zero'.

4. It appears that on 21 July 2011,
Ranveer Singh, sole proprietor of the
reconstituted firm, i.e., M/s Maa Gayatri
Construction placed a cheque, bearing No.
FAQ 237452 dated 20 July 2011, for an
amount at Rs.55,11,000/- in the account of
the
dissolved
firm
(A/c
No.
1886002100023313). The amount was
credited in the bank account which was
later transferred by Ranveer Singh to one
Prashant Shukla having account in Indus
Bank, Swaroop Nagar, Kanpur Nagar, the
deposited
money
was
subsequently
withdrawn
by
Prashant
Shukla.
It
subsequently surfaced that the aforenoted
amount at Rs.55,11,000/- was debited from
the
account
of
Meerut
Institute
of
Engineering and Technology (A/c No.
2159000100049043).
On
receiving
telephonic
information
from
Chief
Manager, Punjab National Bank, Branch
Sports Complex, Meerut, that the original
Cheque No. FAQ 237452 is with the
issuing party, the fourth respondent lodged
an FIR being Case Crime No. 676 of 2011,
under Sections 419, 420 IPC, Police Station
Naubasta, District Kanpur Nagar, alleging
the fraud. In other words, the cheque
deposited by Ranveer Singh in the account
of his firm (M/s Maa Gayatri Construction)
was forged and manufactured document.
The Bank suffered loss due to the fraud.

5. During investigation, name of
Ranveer
Singh,
Arvind
Verma
and
Adhyant Tiwari surfaced, subsequently,
they came to be arrested. Prashant Shukla
was absconding. The charge-sheet was
submitted against the accused persons,
including, Ranveer Singh, sole proprietor
of M/s Maa Gayatri Construction on 11
September 2011. The accused including
Ranveer Singh came to be convicted under
Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with 120B IPC, Police Station Naubasta, District
Kanpur Nagar, and sentenced to 5 years
simple
imprisonment
and
fine
at
Rs.10,000/- each, by the Additional Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate-I, Kanpur Nagar,
vide order dated 11 December 2017, in
Criminal Case No. 6350 of 2011, State vs.
Ranveer Singh and others.
3 All. M/s Shiva Enterprises & Anr. Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
1167

6. It is admitted that second petitioner
was neither named in the FIR, nor, was he
charge-sheeted. Application under Section
319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
19731, was filed by the prosecution during
trial seeking to summon the second
petitioner to face trial along with other coaccused. The application was rejected. The
order was not challenged, consequently,
attained finality.

7. In the intervening period, the fourth
respondent seized the bank account of M/s
Shiva Enterprises of the second petitioner
to satisfy the loss caused to the Bank by the
sole proprietor of M/s Maa Gayatri
Construction. Probably for the reason that
second petitioner earlier was a partner of
the firm M/s Maa Gayatri Construction.
The second petitioner, thereafter, made
several representations to the bank to
permit the petitioner to operate the bank
account of his firm M/s Shiva Enterprises,
but in vain. It is submitted that the
respondent-bank did not respond to the
applications, consequently, petitioner was
not permitted to operate the bank account
(A/c No. 1886009300021932), thereafter,
on
21
December
2012,
the
fourth
respondent seized the Fixed Deposit
Receipts2 of the second petitioner, which
had no concern with the account and the
affairs of M/s Maa Gayatri Construction. It
is submitted that seizure order was passed
behind the back of the petitioner without
affording an opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner.

8. Petitioners have challenged the
seizure order dated 21 December 2012,
through an amendment application, and the
order dated 31 October 2011, directing the
second
petitioner
being
jointly
and
severally liable to make good the loss
caused to the bank, so as to enable the bank
to permit the second petitioner to operate
the bank account of M/s Shiva Enterprises.

9. In the afore-noted factual backdrop,
the
short
question
that
arises
for
determination
is
as
to
whether
the
respondent bank was justified in seizing the
bank account and F.D.Rs. of the petitioner
firm (M/s Shiva Enterprises) to satisfy the
loss caused to the bank by a third firm (M/s
Maa
Gayatri
Construction)
after
the
petitioner ceased to be a partner.

10. The facts, inter se, parties are not
in dispute.

11. The Indian Partnership Act,
19323, defines dissolution of firm and
liability for acts of partners done after
dissolution. Section 39 & 40 is extracted:

"39. Dissolution of a firm.-- The
dissolution of a partnership between all the
partners of a firm is called the ''dissolution
of the firm'.

40. Dissolution by agreement.-- A
firm may be dissolved with the consent of
all the partners or in accordance with a
contract between the partners."

12. As per the provisions of the Act,
dissolution of the firm can be brought about
on consent of the partners or by an
agreement. Notwithstanding the dissolution
of a firm the partners continue to be liable
as such to third parties of any act done by
any of them before the dissolution. A
partner who retires from the firm is not
liable to third parties for the acts done by
any of the partners of a firm. After
dissolution of a firm, partners are bound
during the winding up of the firm to
complete
the
transactions
begun but
unfinished.
1168 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

13. If the firm has been dissolved but
no notice to the creditors or public notice of
such a dissolution is given, the act of a
partner shall bind the other partners even
after dissolution, as if, the act was done
before the dissolution.

14. In case of dissolution, after the
notice to the creditors or the public notice
of
the
dissolution
is
given
the
acknowledgement given by one partner
cannot bind the other partners. In other
words, after the dissolution of the firm the
outgoing partner would not be liable either
to a third party or upon reconstitution of the
firm for the act of the firm/partner until
public notice is given to the creditor.

15. Section 45 of the Act provides for
the liability of acts of partners after
dissolution. Section 45 is extracted:

"45. Liability for acts of partners
done after dissolution.--

(1) Notwithstanding the dissolution
of a firm, the partners continue to be liable as
such to third parties for any act done by any
of them which would have been an act of the
firm, if done before the dissolution, until
public notice is given of the dissolution :

Provided that the estate of a partner
who dies, or who is adjudicated an insolvent,
or of a partner who, not having been known
to the person dealing with the firm to be a
partner, retires from the firm, is not liable
under this section for acts done after the date
on which he ceases to be a partner.

(2) Notices under sub-section (1)
may be given by any partner."

16. As per Section 45, it therefore
follows, that even after the dissolution of a
firm, partners continue to be liable as such
to third parties for any act done by them
which would have been an act of the firm if
done before the dissolution until public
notice is given of the dissolution. Thus, till
the time public notice of the dissolution is
given, other partners will continue to
remain liable for the act of one partner, as
if, such an act was done in a continuing
partnership. Thus the principle of presumed
continuance of "mutual agency" underlines
the rule which is subject to the exception
provided in the proviso to Section 45.
However, in case the creditor had notice of
dissolution of the partnership that would
not bind the other partner. (Refer:
Malayandi
v.
Narayanan4,
and
Muthuswami v. Sankaralingam5)

17. Section 45, therefore, mandates
that notwithstanding the dissolution of the
firm, the partners continue to be liable to
third party for any act done by any of the
partners until notice is given of the
dissolution. Public notice would include
personal information or knowledge of such
dissolution to the third party. The third
party cannot take a plea of lack of
information for want of public notice,
where, the third party was informed or had
knowledge of the dissolution.

18. In the given facts at hand, M/s
Maa Gayatri Construction, a partnership
firm came to be dissolved as agreed
between the partners and a proprietorship
firm with the same name was immediately
thereafter reconstituted with Ranveer Singh
as the sole partner. The second partner i.e.
the second petitioner ceased to be the
partner of of M/s Maa Gayatri Construction
upon
dissolution.
Both
the
partners
informed the respondent-Bank of the
dissolution of the firm and its subsequent
reconstitution in the same name. The
3 All. M/s Shiva Enterprises & Anr. Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
1169
relevant documents have been brought on
record. In view of Section 45 of the Act the
second petitioner would not be liable for any
act of the proprietorship firm after the
dissolution of the earlier partnership firm from
the date of notice/ information to the bank.

19. The stand of the respondent-bank
in the counter affidavit is that the bank was
not informed of the dissolution of the firm,
consequently, the second petitioner would
''jointly and severally' be liable for the
fraud and loss caused to the bank by the
first partner i.e. Ranveer Singh. The bank,
therefore, was justified in seizing and
freezing the bank account/F.D.Rs. of M/s
Shiva Enterprises for the loss caused by the
erstwhile partner of M/s Maa Gayatri
Construction.

20. The term or phrase, ''jointly and
severally', is a legal term used to describe a
partnership whereby each party or member
holds equal responsibility for liability. A
common term for ''jointly and severally' is ''joint
and several liability'. In a legally binding
document, the term jointly and severally
clarifies the responsibility that is shared by each
party to an agreement. Essentially, it states that
all of those named are obligated to perform all
of the actions required under the agreement. For
example, if a bank lends Rs.100,000 to two
people jointly and severally, both of those
people are equally responsible for making sure
that the total amount of the loan is repaid to the
bank. If the loan is in default, the bank may
choose to pursue either for repayment of the
entire outstanding balance. In such cases, the
person who is forced to repay the loan will have
same legal recourse against the other person
named in the agreement, but only after the bank
is repaid in full.

21. In this backdrop, the question that
arises for determination is as to whether the
second petitioner would be held ''jointly
and
severally'
liable
for
the
fraud
committed by Ranveer Singh, sole partner
of the reconstituted proprietorship firm or
in the alternative as to whether the bank
had notice/information of the dissolution of
the firm.

22. The partnership firm i.e. M/s Maa
Gayatri
Constructions
came
to
be
reconstituted on 10 July 2011. On 11 July
2011, an application was filed before the
fourth respondent informing that the second
partner i.e. second petitioner is no longer
the partner and Ranveer Singh is the sole
proprietor of the reconstituted firm by the
same name. The fraud was committed by
Ranveer Singh, thereafter, on 21 July 2011
i.e. eleven days after the dissolution of the
partnership firm. On 22 July 2011, an FIR
came to be lodged by the bank against one
Prashant Shukla. The second petitioner was
not named in the F.I.R.

23. The respondent-Bank in para 25
and 26 of the counter affidavit, has
categorically pleaded that dissolution of the
partnership
firm
M/s
Maa
Gayatri
Constructions was neither served upon the
respondent-bank, nor, the same is on the
bank's record. It has been denied that the
alleged communication dated 11 July 2011
and 12 July 2011, written by Ranveer
Singh,
and
the
second
petitioner
respectively was received with the bank.

24. The ''act of a firm' is an act
omission of the partner and binds the other
partner(s) of the firm. In other words, a
partner commits fraud and thereby causes
loss to the bank, the partners would be
liable to make good the loss caused to the
bank under the principle ''jointly and
severally'. The bank in that event would be
justified in seizing the bank account/FDRs
1170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
of the other partners of the firm to satisfy
its loss. But in the given facts of the case, it
would be otherwise if the bank had
notice/information of the dissolution of the
firm. In that event the outgoing partner
would not be liable for the fraud committed
by the reconstituted proprietorship firm in
view of Section 45 of the Act.

25. The petitioner has taken a
categorical stand that the bank was
informed
of
the
dissolution
of
the
partnership firm and the reconstitution of
proprietorship firm with the same name and
title. The second petitioner ceased to be the
partner. The fraud was committed with the
bank several days thereafter. It is not the
case of the bank that after dissolution of the
firm the second petitioner continued to act
or present himself as a partner of the
dissolved firm. Further, it is not denied by
the bank that the then officers of the bank
were
not
aware
of
the
dissolution/reconstitution of the firm. A
feeble stand taken by the bank is that they
have no information of dissolution or
reconstitution of the firm. The affidavit has
been sworn by the present officer of the
bank on personal knowledge. It is to be
noted that it is not the affidavit of the then
officer of the bank. Further, the stand of the
bank cannot be taken on face value for the
reason
that
fraud
was
committed
immediately after dissolution of the firm.
The balance in the bank account of the firm
on the date of dissolution admittedly was
''zero'. There was no occasion for the
outgoing partner, not informing about his
status that he ceased to be the partner. The
involvement of the bank officials in
commission of the fraud cannot be ruled
out in view of the trial court judgment. All
the accused came to be convicted in the
criminal trial. It appears that the bank in
order to protect and cover-up the acts of its
officer seized the bank account and FDRs
of the second petitioner in retaliation. It is
not the case of the bank that the then
officers (on date of dissolution of the firm)
had no knowledge, and/or, were not aware
of the dissolution of the firm and
reconstitution of the proprietorship firm by
the same name.

26. It is admitted by the learned
counsel for the respondents that para-25, 26
of the counter affidavit has been sworn by
the
present
Senior
Manager,
Punjab
National Bank, Kanpur, on personal
knowledge, and not on the basis of record.

27. In Ratanji Bhagwanji & Co. v.
Prem Shanker6, Court, recognized that a
retiring/outgoing
partner
could
escape
liability in respect of transactions entered into
by the continuing partners after his retirement
if the third party was aware that the former
had ceased to be a partner of the firm. In the
opinion of the court the proviso to Section
32(3) and the corresponding provision in
Section 45, with its proviso indicate beyond
doubt, that only persons who were not aware
of the retirement of a particular partner could
take advantage of Section 32(3) or Section
45.

28. Public notice as contemplated under
Section 63 and Section 72, is intended only to
serve a purpose, namely, to bring home to the
persons concerned the fact of retirement. That
purpose will undoubtedly be served in a
better way by personal or actual notice. To
contend that actual notice cannot take the
place of the public notice is to miss the
substance of the matter and argue counter to
the
very
principle
on
which
the
retiring/outgoing partner's liability is based.

29. The transactions pertaining to the
partnership firm came to an end with its
3 All. M/s Shiva Enterprises & Anr. Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
1171
dissolution. The forming of proprietorship
firm was in the same name but was a
different and distinct entity. There was
neither the extension, nor, the renewal of
the partnership. The proprietorship was a
unilateral act on the part of its proprietor
i.e. Ranveer Singh. The second petitioner
had no role in the constitution of the
proprietorship firm in the same name.

30. The public notice mandated under
Section 45, as noted herein above, would
include personal notice to the bank with
regard to the dissolution of the partnership
firm and reconstitution of proprietorship
firm with the same name. The respondentbank has not denied that their officers at the
relevant time had no knowledge or
information of the dissolution, rather, a
vague stand has been taken that the
documents with regard to constitution of
the partnership firm and the notice served
upon the bank is not available on record.
This is not sufficient to bind the outgoing
partner for the fraudulent act of the
proprietorship firm. Petitioner cannot be
bound for the loss for the reason that the
fraudulent
act
was
committed
after
dissolution of the firm and after due
information to the respondent-bank. There
is no reason to disbelieve that the second
petitioner had not given information to the
bank for the reason that he was the
outgoing partner and would not entail any
liability upon himself.

31. Further it cannot be ruled out that
the officers of the bank were not involved
in the fraud by clearing the fake cheque.
Merely because they were not charge
sheeted, would not mean that the then
officials of the bank were not in complicity
with Ranveer Singh in commission of the
fraud. The trial court has made an
observation that the officers of the bank
were negligent in clearing the fake cheque.
The second petitioner was neither named,
nor, charge-sheeted. In any case, the trial
court judgement would not have a bearing
on the rights/liability of the parties for the
loss, including, contract made with the
bank. It is not in dispute that the fraud was
committed after the dissolution of the
partnership firm. The denial of the
notice/information by the bank is not
emphatic and not by the then officer. The
present officers of the bank (and not the
then officer) has sworn the paragraphs on
personal knowledge. At the most, it can be
inferred that the communications by the
petitioner and Ranveer Singh is not
available in record of the bank, but that
would certainly not mean or imply that the
then
officers
had
no
information/knowledge of the dissolution
of the firm.

32. In writ jurisdiction, the wit
petition is decided on pleadings, affidavits
and material placed on record by the
respective parties. Having regard to the
admitted facts and the stand taken by the
bank, the scale of justice considerably tilts
in favour of the petitioners. In the
circumstances the writ petition is allowed.

33.

The
impugned
order/
communications are accordingly quashed.

34. The respondent-bank is directed to
release the bank account, F.D.Rs. and any
other
security
asset,
seized
of
the
petitioners forthwith from the date of
service of this order.

35. The petitioners shall be entitled to
interest
as
admissible
on
the
deposits/F.D.Rs. due from time to time till
the
date
of
release
of
the
bank
account/F.D.Rs. etc.
1172 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

36. It is clarified that no other point or
ground was pressed by the learned counsel
for the respective parties.

37. This order, however, shall not
preclude the respondent bank from taking
recourse before the appropriate forum/court
for recovery of its loss as per law, if so
advised.
----------
(2023) 3 ILRA 1172
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE UMESH CHANDRA SHARMA, J.

Writ-C No.46905 of 2000

Shiv Gopal Gupta ...Petitioner
Versus
Additional Collector Finance & Revenue,
Kanpur Nagar & Ors. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri A.K. Sachan

Counsel for the Respondent:
C.S.C.

Civil Law - Illegal Occupation of Gaon
Sabha Property - U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 - Section
122-B-
there
cannot
be
adverse
possession of any Gaon Sabaha land - no
one can be allowed to take illegal
possession of the Gaon Sabha land and if
any one makes such an attempt, the State
should stop - recovery of the amount of
compensation - U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Rules, 1952, 115F - All
damages ordered to be recovered and
expenses incurred in the execution of the
orders of the Collector shall be realised as
arrears of land revenue and credited to
the Consolidated Gaon Fund - If the
damage
or
loss
caused
through
misappropriation is of such a nature as is
not capable of being repaired or made
good, the Collector shall assess the
amount of damage or loss in terms of
money at the prevailing market rate in the
locality - In case of wrongful occupation
of land, the damage caused to the Gaon
Sabha, shall be assessed for each year of
such wrongful occupation or any part
thereof at 100 times the amount of rent
computed at the sanctioned hereditary
rates applicable to the plots concerned -
In case the occupant of land continued to
remain in such wrongful occupation, he
shall be further liable to pay one-eighth of
the damages so assessed for every month
of the continued occupation after the date
of the order - In the instant petitioner
illegally occupied 0.019 hectare of Chak
road and merged it with his plot number
461 - Revenue Authorties directed to
impose the amount of compensation as
per Rule 115 (E) and (F) of Uttar Pradesh
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
Rules, 1952, and the petitioner directed to
pay it within thirty days

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. St. of U.P. Vs Rajaram 1983 Revenue
Decision 351

2. Chob Singh & anr. Vs St. Of U.P & ors. (2000)
REVDEC 233

3. Suraj Bali Vs Gaon Sabha 1982 AWC (R) 149

4. Sripati Vs Gaon Sabha 1004(24) ALR

(Delivered by Hon'ble Umesh Chandra
Sharma, J. )

1. याचिकाकर्ाा के चिद्वान अचििक्ता श्री ए. के. सिान
एिम् राज्य की र्रफ से चिद्वान अचर्ररक्त मुख्य स्थायी अचििक्ता श्री
चिर्ेंद्र नारायण राय को ध्यानपूिाक सुना गया र्था पत्रािली का
पररशीलन चकया गया।

2. यह दीिानी ररट याचिका उत्तरदार्ा सं० 2 अपर
र्हसीलदार कानपुर नगर के पास चदनांकः 10.1.2000 र्था