# M/S Shrasty Computer Solution & Tech. Lko v. Employee Provident Org. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2024) 4 ILRA 1427
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-04-10
- **Case number:** Writ-C No. 3277 of 2024
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-shrasty-computer-solution-tech-lko-v-employee-provident-org-ors-51697
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-Employees Provident funds
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,1952Section 7A-The petitioner challenged the
dismissal of appeal by the Central
Government Industrial Tribunal(CGIT)-
The petitioner failed to file the appeal
within the prescribed period of 60 days
which
could
only
be
extended
by
another 60 days under Rule 7(2) of the
EPF Appellate Tribuanl(Procedure)Rules,
1997-Despite a previous writ petition
allowing a 15-day extension to file the
appeal,
the
petitioner
missed
this
extended deadline as well-The appeal
was dismissed for being time-barred, as
the
tribunal
lacks
jurisdiction
to
condone delays beyond the statutory
maximum
of
120
days-The
court
observed
that
the
petitioner's
explanation (illness) for the delay was
deemed inadequate since the appeal
was
filed
even
after
recovery-the
petitioner failed to deposit 75% of the
amount due, as mandated by Rule 7(2),
a prerequisites for filing such appealsThe writ petition is dismissed as there
were no valid grounds to extend the
limitation further or to waive procedural
requirements.(Para 1 to 20)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

4 All. M/S Shrasty Computer Solution & Tech. Lko. Vs. Employee Provident Org. & Ors.
1427
16. This Court has also taken the
note of fact that the Director Homeopathy
has also written a letter to the State
Government mentioning the names of the
15
candidates
including
the
present
petitioners and brought the facts into the
knowledge of the State Government that
due to some technical flaw the names of
these petitioners could not be uploaded on
portal, but in response thereto, the State
Government vide letter dated 14.03.2024
has observed that as per the Government
Order dated 10.12.2021, nothing remains to
be done by the State Government and thus,
there became a deadlock.

17. In view of the above-said
submissions and discussions and to resolve
the controversy at this Stage, the opposite
party no. 9 as well as the NCISM, are
hereby directed to upload the names of the
petitioners on the portal/website meant
therefor, and further, do as needful.

18. It is further provided that the
aforesaid proceedings shall be carried out
by the NIC and NCISM, within a period of
two weeks from the date of certified copy
of this order produced before it.

19.

With
the
aforesaid
observations, the instant petition is hereby
allowed.

20. Appearance of Dr. Raj Kumar
Kasyap is hereby exempted.

21. Counsel appearing for the
opposite parties shall communicate this
order
to
the
respective
authorities
forthwith.
----------
(2024) 4 ILRA 1427
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.04.2024
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ-C No. 3277 of 2024

M/S Shrasty Computer Solution & Tech.
Lko. ...Petitioner
Versus
Employee Provident Org. & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Jai Narayan Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Akhilesh Pratap Singh, C.S.C.

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India,1950Article 226-Employees Provident funds
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,1952Section 7A-The petitioner challenged the
dismissal of appeal by the Central
Government Industrial Tribunal(CGIT)-
The petitioner failed to file the appeal
within the prescribed period of 60 days
which
could
only
be
extended
by
another 60 days under Rule 7(2) of the
EPF Appellate Tribuanl(Procedure)Rules,
1997-Despite a previous writ petition
allowing a 15-day extension to file the
appeal,
the
petitioner
missed
this
extended deadline as well-The appeal
was dismissed for being time-barred, as
the
tribunal
lacks
jurisdiction
to
condone delays beyond the statutory
maximum
of
120
days-The
court
observed
that
the
petitioner's
explanation (illness) for the delay was
deemed inadequate since the appeal
was
filed
even
after
recovery-the
petitioner failed to deposit 75% of the
amount due, as mandated by Rule 7(2),
a prerequisites for filing such appealsThe writ petition is dismissed as there
were no valid grounds to extend the
limitation further or to waive procedural
requirements.(Para 1 to 20)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. C/M Angoori Devi Inter College & ors. Vs St.
of U.P. & ors. (2019)12 ADJ 62

2. Collector (LA) Vs Katiji(1987) 2 SCC 107

3. Sheo Raj Singh Vs U.O.I.(2023) 10 SCC 531

4. Basawaraj Vs Land Acquisition Officer(2013)
14 SCC 81

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Sri Jai Narayan Mishra, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Sri S. K. Khare,
learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel
and Sri Akhilesh Pratap Singh, the learned
counsel for the Respondents No. 1 to 4.

2. By means of the instant writ
petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the petitioner has
challenged the validity of an order dated
04.03.2024
passed
by
the
Central
Government
Industrial
Tribunal/EPFAT,
Lucknow in Appeal No. 67 of 2023, whereby
the appeal has been dismissed as being barred
by the period of limitation as provided under
Section 7(2) of the Employees' Provident
Fund Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules,
1997, which was filed by the petitioner
against an order dated 31.03.2023 passed by
the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner,
Regional Office, Lucknow, under Section 7A
of the Employees' Provident Funds and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act.

3. The provisions of limitation for
filing an Appeal under Section 7A of the
Employees'
Provident
Funds
and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act is provided in
Rule 7(2) of the Employees Provident Fund
Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997,
which reads as under:-

"7. Fee, time for filing appeal,
deposit of amount due on filing appeal-
(2) Any person aggrieved by a
notification
issued
by
the
Central
Government or an order passed by the
Central Government or any other authority
under the Act, may within 60 days from the
date of issue of the notification/order,
prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.
Provided that the Tribunal may if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal
within the prescribed period, extend the said
period by a further period of 60 days:
Provided further that no appeal by
the employer shall be entertained by a
Tribunal unless he has deposited with the
Tribunal (a Demand Draft payable in the
Fund and bearing) 75 per cent of the
amount due from him as determined under
Section 7-A:
Provided also that the Tribunal
may for reasons to be recorded in writing,
waive or reduce the amount to be deposited
under Section 7-O."

4. The petitioner did not file the
appeal within the time prescribed by the
aforesaid Rule. He had filed Writ-C No.
8978 of 2023 challenging the aforesaid
order dated 31.03.2023 and the writ
petition was dismissed on the ground of
availability of alternative remedy of filing
the appeal and it was provided in the order
that in case the petitioner files an appeal
within a period of 15 days, the same shall
be decided on its merits and shall not be
rejected on the ground of delay.

5. The time of 15 days granted by
this court expired on 31.10.2023. The
petitioner did not file the appeal within the
extended time granted by this Court and he
filed the appeal on 07.11.2023.

6. The Central Government
Industrial Tribunal dismissed the appeal
4 All. M/S Shrasty Computer Solution & Tech. Lko. Vs. Employee Provident Org. & Ors.
1429
holding that the appeal was not filed even
within the extended time granted by this
Court and it had been filed belatedly and
the Tribunal has no power to condone any
delay beyond 60 days.

7. The Tribunal has relied upon
numerous judgments on the point.

8. In Kushang Security and
House
Keeping
Private
Limited v.
Central Government Industrial, 2019
SCC OnLine All 3080, a coordinate Bench
of this Court has dealt with this issue and
after discussing numerous precedents on
the issue, as held that: -

"32. In view of the foregoing
discussion,
the
legal
position
which
emerges that in terms of Section 7-I (2)
every appeal is to be filed in such form and
manner,
within
such
time
and
be
accompanied by such fees, as may be
prescribed. Rule 7 (2) of the Rules, 1997
provides for filing of the appeal within 60
days from the date of issuance of the order.
The
first
proviso
thereunder
further
stipulates that the Tribunal may, if it is
satisfied that the appellant was prevented
by sufficient cause from preferring the
appeal within the prescribed period, extend
the said period by a further period of 60
days.
33. It is thus seen that the EPF Act
is a special law providing for institution of
provident funds, pension fund and depositlinked insurance fund for employees in
factories and other establishments and in
terms of the rules framed thereunder a
certain period of limitation for filing an
appeal having been provided for in clear
terms and a further provision having been
made for extension of such period only upto
a specified time period and no further, the
Appellate
Tribunal
would
have
no
jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an
appeal
filed
before
it
beyond
such
maximum time limit specified in terms of
the statutory rules.
34. Moreover, in terms of the scheme
and the intent of the provisions contained in
the EPF Act it is seen that the legislature
intended it to be a complete code by itself. As
a consequence, even if the provisions of the
Limitation Act may be held to have not been
expressly excluded the principle of implied
exclusion would apply in terms of the nature
of the subject matter, the purpose and the
scheme of the Act. The provisions contained
under the Limitation Act, 1963 would
therefore not be applicable for seeking
extension of time beyond the statutory time
period of 60 days from the date of issue of the
notification/order, extendable by a further
period of 60 days, upon the Tribunal being
satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal
within the prescribed period. The maximum
period for filing the appeal would be thus 120
(60+60) days from the date of the issuance of
the notification/order which is sought to be
challenged.
35. It is a well settled principle of
statutory interpretation that where the statute
confers power on the authority to condone
the delay only to a limited extent the same
cannot be stretched or extended beyond what
has been provided under the statute."

9. The decision in Kushang
Security and House Keeping Private
Limited (Supra) has been followed and
reiterated in Committee of Management,
Angoori Devi Inter College and Others
Versus State of U.P. and Others 2019 (12)
ADJ 62, wherein it was held that: -

"35. ...the EPF Act, 1952 being a
special statute and having prescribed a
certain period of limitation for filing a
1430 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
particular application thereunder and also
having provided in clear terms that such
period on sufficient cause being shown,
may be extended, in the maximum, only
upto a specified time-limit, the Tribunal
concerned would have no jurisdiction to
treat within limitation, an application filed
before it beyond such maximum time-limit
specified in the statute, by excluding the
time spent in prosecuting in good faith and
due diligence any prior proceeding on the
analogy of Section 14(2) of the Act, 1963.
36. It may be noticed that in the
instant case against the order dated
28.12.2018 passed under Section 7-A of the
EPF Act, 1952 a writ petition, Writ-C No.
5308 of 2019, was filed and the same was
dismissed at the threshold vide order dated
18.2.2019 with liberty to the petitioners to
avail the statutory remedy of appeal under
Section 7-I of the EPF Act, 1952. A copy of
the aforesaid order which has been filed as
Annexure-9 to the writ petition indicates
that a certified copy of the order dated
18.2.2019 was applied for on 10.6.2016
and the same was issued on 12.6.2019. It
appears that only thereafter the appeal
bearing Appeal A.T.A. No. 06 of 2019 was
filed which came to rejected as time barred
vide order dated 15.7.2019 passed by the
Appellate
Authority/Presiding
Officer,
Central Government Industrial Tribunalcum-Labour Court, Kanpur. These facts
also go to show that the necessary
requirement under Section 14 that the prior
proceeding should have been prosecuted in
good faith and with due diligence also does
not stand fulfilled.
37. The time limit is prescribed by
the rule making authority for filing an
appeal and also the extended period having
been provided, and no further extension
thereof
having
been
envisaged
or
contemplated,
the Appellate Authority
could not have granted any further
extension. In view of the aforesaid, the
order passed by the Appellate Authority
recording its conclusion that the appeal
was filed beyond the statutory period of
limitation, cannot be faulted with."

10. By means of its order dated
16.10.2023 passed in Writ-C No. 8978 of
2023 passed in exercise of its extraordinary
Writ jurisdiction, this Court had extended
the period of limitation prescribed by law
and had granted 15 days' time to the
petitioner to file the appeal, but the
petitioner did not file the appeal within the
aforesaid period. The Tribunal had no
power to condone any delay for expiry of
the extended period granted by this court.
In
these
circumstances,
the
Central
Government Industrial Tribunal/EPFAT,
Lucknow has not committed any illegality
in passing of the impugned order dated
04.03.2024.

11. The learned Counsel for the
petitioner has placed reliance upon the
judgment in the case of Collector (LA) v.
Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 and Sheo Raj
Singh v. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC
531.

12. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji,
(1987) 2 SCC 107 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court had held that: -

"3. The legislature has conferred
the power to condone delay by enacting
Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing
of matters on "merits". The expression
"sufficient
cause"
employed
by
the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of justice
- that being the life-purpose for the
4 All. M/S Shrasty Computer Solution & Tech. Lko. Vs. Employee Provident Org. & Ors.
1431
existence of the institution of courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has
been making a justifiably liberal approach
in matters instituted in this Court. But the
message
does
not
appear
to
have
percolated down to all the other courts in
the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach
is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:
"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can
result in a meritorious matter being thrown
out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when
delay is condoned the highest that can
happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be
explained" does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every
hour's delay, every second's delay? The
doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against
each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that
delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In
fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary
is respected not on account of its power to
legalize injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.
Making a justice-oriented approach
from this perspective, there was sufficient
cause for condoning the delay in the
institution of the appeal. The fact that it
was the "State" which was seeking
condonation and not a private party was
altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of
equality before law demands that all
litigants, including the State as a litigant,
are accorded the same treatment and the
law is administered in an even-handed
manner. There is no warrant for according
a step-motherly treatment when the "State"
is the applicant praying for condonation of
delay. In fact experience shows that on
account of an impersonal machinery (no
one in charge of the matter is directly hit or
hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected
to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic
methodology imbued with the note-making,
file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos,
delay on its part is less difficult to
understand
though
more
difficult
to
approve. In any event, the State which
represents the collective cause of the
community, does not deserve a litigant-nongrata status. The courts therefore have to
be informed with the spirit and philosophy
of the provision in the course of the
interpretation of the expression "sufficient
cause". So also the same approach has to
be evidenced in its application to matters at
hand with the end in view to do evenhanded justice on merits in preference to
the approach which scuttles a decision on
merits."

13. In Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of
India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 also the Hon'ble
Supreme Court explained the scope of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act and held
that: -

"31. Sometimes, due to want of
sufficient cause being shown or an
acceptable explanation being proffered,
delay of the shortest range may not be
condoned whereas, in certain other cases,
1432 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
delay of long periods can be condoned if
the
explanation
is
satisfactory
and
acceptable. Of course, the courts must
distinguish between an "explanation" and
an "excuse". An "explanation" is designed
to give someone all of the facts and lay out
the cause for something. It helps clarify the
circumstances of a particular event and
allows the person to point out that
something that has happened is not his
fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must,
however, be taken to distinguish an
"explanation" from an "excuse". Although
people tend to see "explanation" and
"excuse" as the same thing and struggle to
find out the difference between the two,
there is a distinction which, though fine, is
real.
32. An "excuse" is often offered by
a person to deny responsibility and
consequences when under attack. It is sort
of a defensive action. Calling something as
just an "excuse" would imply that the
explanation proffered is believed not to be
true. Thus said, there is no formula that
caters to all situations and, therefore, each
case for condonation of delay based on
existence or absence of sufficient cause has
to be decided on its own facts. At this stage,
we cannot but lament that it is only
excuses, and not explanations, that are
more often accepted for condonation of
long delays to safeguard public interest
from those hidden forces whose sole
agenda is to ensure that a meritorious
claim does not reach the higher courts for
adjudication."

14. Both the aforesaid cases
explain the scope of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act and the approach to be
adopted by the Courts while deciding an
application under Section 5. As Section 5
of the Limitation Act does not apply to the
appeals filed under the Section 7A of the
Employees'
Provident
Funds
and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, the law laid
down in Collector (LA) v. Katiji and Sheo
Raj Singh v. Union of India (Supra)
would have no application to the present
case.

15. So far as the question of this
Court exercising its extraordinary powers
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India for again extending the prescribed
period of limitation is concerned, this Court
has already exercised this power in favour
of the petitioner while passing the order
dated 31.03.2023 in Writ-C No. 8978 of
2023 filed by the petitioner by providing
that in case the petitioner filed an appeal
within a period of 15 days, the same should
be decided on its merits and should not be
rejected on the ground of delay.

16. Although, the petitioner
claimed that he could not file the appeal
within time granted by this Court as he had
fallen ill, the medical certificate annexed
with the writ petition mentions that he was
under
treatment
of
a
doctor
since
17.10.2023 to 31.10.2023 and he became
medically fit on 31.10.2023. The appeal has
been filed seven days after expiry of the
time granted by this Court as well as after
his regaining fitness.

17. It is also relevant to note that
the Second Proviso appended to Rule 7(2)
of the Employees Provident Fund Appellate
Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1997 provides
that no appeal by the employer shall be
entertained by a Tribunal unless he has
deposited with the Tribunal a Demand
Draft payable in the Fund and bearing 75
per cent of the amount due from him as
determined under Section 7-A. The learned
Counsel for the Employees Provident Fund
Organization has pointed out even while
4 All. Dilip Charan Wahal & Anr. Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
1433
filing the time barred appeal, the
petitioner did not comply with this
provision.

18.
In
Basawaraj
v.
Land
Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that: -

"12. It is a settled legal proposition
that law of limitation may harshly affect a
particular party but it has to be applied
with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on
equitable grounds. "A result flowing from
a statutory provision is never an evil. A
court has no power to ignore that
provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The
statutory provision may cause hardship
or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it
giving full effect to the same. The legal
maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the
law is hard but it is the law", stands
attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently
been
held
that,
"inconvenience is not" a decisive factor
to be considered while interpreting a
statute"

19. Keeping in view the entire facts
and circumstances of the case, it appears that
the petitioner has not complied with the
mandate of Rule 7 C of the Employees
Provident
Fund
Appellate
Tribunal
(Procedure) Rules, 1997 on two counts - (1)
he did not file the appeal in the prescribed
period of limitation or even in the extended
period granted by this Court and (2) he did
not deposit 75% of the amount due from him
as determined under Section 7-A. Therefore,
there appears to be no good ground for again
extending the period of limitation for filing
the appeal by the petitioner.
20. The writ petition lacks merit
and the same is hereby dismissed.
----------
(2024) 4 ILRA 1433
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.04.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.
THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Writ -C No. 3400 of 2024

Dilip Charan Wahal & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Samarth Saxena

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sanjeev Singh

Cantonment Act, 2006-A lease deed was
executed on behalf of the Central Government -
for a period of 30 years-renewable up to 90
years-petitioners
are
in
actual
physical
possession-CLA Rules of 2021 have replaced the
CLA Rules of 1937-all subsisting leases given
under Cantonment Codes of 1989 and 1912 and
Cantonment Land Administration Rules 1925
and 1937, shall continue to be governed under
the said Rules - CLA Rules of 2021 not
applicable - as their lease was admittedly
subsisting till 24.10.1923-petitioners were given
a calculation sheet-which clearly specifies that
Standard Table Rent -fixation of such rent per
sq. mts. per annum is not arbitrary. No ground
for interference.

Writ Petition dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Vishnu Traders Versus State of Haryana:
(1995) Supp SCC 461

2. Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC
651 (77)