# M/s Steag Energy Services (India) Pvt. Ltd v. GSPC Pipavav Power Company Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 478

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 167
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-01
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 2067 of 2026
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf, Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-steag-energy-services-india-pvt-ltd-v-gspc-pipavav-power-company-ltd-2026-54694
- **Pages:** 12

## Text

4 All. Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
167
in all cases, even if there is such a power. It is left to the Department to inflict any such penalty or
not depending upon as to whether circumstances in a particular case warrant such a penalty. There
has to be due application of mind by the authority competent to impose the penalty, on these
aspects. Therefore, merely because of the reason that clause 27 empowers the Department to
impose such a penalty, would not mean that this specific penalty can be imposed, without putting
the defaulting contractor to notice to this effect.

26) We are, therefore, of the opinion that it was incumbent on the part of the Department to
state in the show cause notice that the competent authority intended to impose such a penalty of
blacklisting, so as to provide adequate and meaningful opportunity to the appellant to show cause
against the same. However, we may also add that even if it is not mentioned specifically but from
the reading of the show cause notice, it can be clearly inferred that such an action was proposed,
that would fulfill this requirement. In the present case, however, reading of the show cause notice
does not suggest that noticee could find out that such an action could also be taken. We say so for
the reasons that are recorded hereinafter.

11. In the same breath, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UMC Technology Pvt. Ltd.
Vs. Food Corporation of India; reported in MANU/SC/0858/2020 : AIR 2021 SC 166; quashed a
blacklisting order not on the ground of non-issuance of show cause notice or the show cause notice
lacked any material ground but on the ground that it was silent on the proposed blacklisting actions.

12. Thus, this Court finds that the recent trend of this Court in blacklisting matter had been on
transparency and clarity at the stage of issuance of show cause notice itself. As far as the present
case is concerned, we do not find any cogent evidence of issuance of any show cause notice to the
petitioner or any opportunity of hearing granted to the petitioners.

13. In light of the same, the impugned order dated January 8, 2025 so far as it relates to
blacklisting of the petitioner-firm as being arbitrary and in violation of principal of natural justice
cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and as such is hereby quashed and set-aside.

14. With the above directions, the writ petition is disposed of.
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(2026) 4 ILRA 167
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.
THE HON'BLE ABDHESH KUMAR CHAUDHARY, J.

Writ C No. 2067 of 2026

Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents
168 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether the suspension order passed by the Government of Maharashtra amounts to a blacklisting order. If
not, whether the petitioner is entitled to relief in the present facts and circumstances?

HEADNOTES
Civil Law - Constitution of India - Article 226: - Writ Petition under Article 226 - filed against rejection
orders as well as for seeking relief of re-evaluation of technical/financial bid and participation in tender -
petitioner participated in a Tender proceeding - disqualified, on the ground that, due to substandard supply, in
a similar tender process, petitioner firm was suspended in another state - representation - rejected -
however, against said suspension of another State, petitioner challenged in High Court later on in Supreme
Court - Apex court clarified suspension confined to Maharashtra State only - legal question - Whether the
suspension order passed by Government of Maharashtra amounts to a blacklisting order in State of UP -
whether petitioner entitled to any relief - court finds that, (i) suspension cannot equal blacklisting - (ii)
Blacklisting ion was bona fide, based on expert committee evaluation and public interest - judicial review in
tender matters minimal - (ii) petitioner had not diligent in perusing his cause - (iii) petitioner approached this
court only after approaching the first Bombay High Court than Supreme court against said order of suspension
of another State - (iv) in the meantime tender in question has been finalized - held - rejection of technical
bid and representation of the petitioner against which are upheld - however, writ petition disposed of with
observation that State of UP shall not treat the suspension order of another State as blacklisting in future
tenders - petitioner free to participate in future tenders, as per law.
(Para - 23, 24, 26)
WP Disposed of. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651
Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216
Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818
Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd., (2016) 15 SCC 272
Tata Motors Ltd. v. BEST, (2023) 19 SCC 1
M/s Steag Energy Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. GSPC Pipavav Power Company Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 478
Municipal Corporation, Ujjain v. BVG India Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 462

LIST OF ACTS
Constitution of India - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - GeM General Terms & Conditions.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Writ Petition - Certiorari - Suspension order, Blacklisting, Tender rejection, technical evaluation, Judicial
review, public interest, Bona fide decision, L-1 bidder, Police communication procurement - future tenders -
disposed of.

CASE ARISING FROM
Order dated 23.01.2026, 28.01.2026 issued by the State Authorities of Uttar Pradesh.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Appellant(s): - Shri Jaideep Narain Mathur, Sr. Advocate assisted by Shri Anupras Singh,
Counsel for Intervenor: - Ms. Anantika Singh, Shri Shantanu Sharma, Utkarsh Singh, Sukrit Singh, Siddharth
Mishra,
Counsel for Respondent(s): - Shri Shailendra Kumar Singh, Chief Standing Counsel assisted by Shri Pankaj
Khare, Addl. C.S.C. and Shri Rahul Kapoor, State Counsel.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.
& Hon'ble Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary, J.)
4 All. Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
169

1. Objections to the application for vacation of interim order and objections to the application
filed on behalf of intervenor- M/S Mobile Communications (India) Pvt. Ltd. are taken on record.
(Order on Intervention/Impleadment Application (IA) No.2 of 2026.

2. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

3.. The present application seeking impleadment/intervention has been filed by the
applicant/respondent-M/S Mobile Communications (India) Pvt. Ltd., who were declared as the
successful L-1 bidder on 30.01.2026.

4. We have perused the affidavit accompanying the intervention/impleadment application and
find that sufficient cause has been made out for allowing the same.

5. Since, any order passed by this Court would have an impact on the rights that may have
accrued in favour of the applicant, this Court deems the applicant to be a necessary party to this lis.

6. Accordingly, application for intervention/impleadment is allowed.

(Order on Writ Petition)

1. Heard Shri Jaideep Narain Mathur, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Anupras
Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Shri Shailendra Kumar Singh, learned Chief
Standing Counsel assisted by Shri Pankaj Khare, Additional C.S.C. and Shri Rahul Kapoor, learned
State Counsel as well as Ms. Anantika Singh, S/Shri Shantanu Sharma, Utkarsh Singh, Sukrit
Singh and Siddharth Mishra, learned counsels appearing for the intervenor/respondent and perused
the materials available on record.

2. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, wherein the petitioner
is aggrieved by order dated 23.01.2026 and 28.01.2026 passed by the Respondents-State.
Apparently, vide the first order dated 23.02.2026, the technical bid of the petitioner with respect to
procurement of various wireless equipments viz digital VHF Base/Mobile Transceiver sets, digital
handheld VHF transceiver etc. for the Uttar Pradesh Police department, has been rejected by the
Technical Evaluation Committee and subsequently vide the second order dated 28.01.2026, the
representation preferred by the petitioner against the first order of rejection i.e dated 23.01.2026
was also rejected. It is these two orders which has been sought to be interdicted by the petitioner
and certain other consequential reliefs of seeking re-evaluation of their technical and financial bid
as well as to permit them to participate in the tendering process has been prayed for in the present
petition.

3. At the outset, it may be noted that admittedly, the tendering process has culminated with the
declaration of M/s Mobile Communications (India) Pvt. Limited as the Lowest bidder (L-1) on
30.01.2026, however before a contract could be entered between the said successful bidder and the
respondent, a coordinate bench of this court vide an interim order dated 24.02.2026 had restrained
the respondent from entering into the contract, till the next date of hearing, that is, on 06.04.2026.
However, in view of an Application (IA No. 5/2026), filed by the learned counsel for the
170 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Respondent-State on 31.03.2026, the present matter was directed to be heard today i.e 01.04.2026
at 2:15 pm. and that is how the present matter has been taken up on board, and accordingly, with
the consent of both the parties and keeping in view the urgency involved in the present Tender
Matter, the present writ petition is being finally heard.

4. The facts of the present case relevant to the context lie in a narrow compass. Admittedly,
the petitioner participated in the Tender, wherein the last date for submission of bid was 02.01.2026
and the date of opening of the technical bid was 13.01.2026, which came to be extended to
15.01.2026. Apparently before 13.01.2026, the petitioner was not encumbered in any manner in
participating in the tendering process. However, vide an order dated 13.01.2026, the State of
Maharashtra, wherein the petitioner had participated in a similar wireless equipment procurement
tender for Police Commissionerate, Amravati City, Chattrapati Sambhajinagar City, Nashik City
and Pimpri-Chinchwad Units floated by the Home Department, State of Maharashtra, suffered a
suspension order with immediate effect, pending the enquiry, inter-alia on the alleged ground that
the quality of the earlier supplied equipment of similar nature to Mumbai Railways, Ratnagiri and
Sindhudurg Police units was found to be substandard and the response of the petitioner during the
warranty period after supply of these equipments was unsatisfactory. The said suspension order
having come to the knowledge of the respondents, the technical Evaluation committee disqualified
the petitioners vide an order dated 23.01.2026, in the following words:

"With reference to the Home Department of the Government of Maharashtra, vide letter No.
PEQ 0226 P.No.18 Pol 4 dated 13.01.2026, has mentioned that the VHF sets supplied by Ms Vertel
Digital Pvt. Ltd. to Maharashtra Police units are of inferior quality, during the warranty period. The
supplier response after supply of VHF Radio sets has been unsatisfactory. Accordingly, the
Government of Maharashtra has suspended Ms Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. until completion of the
inquiry, and the said suspension order has come into effect with immediate effect. Hence the bid
has been technically disqualified."

5. On the heels of their aforesaid rejection, the petitioner immediately made a representation
dated 25.01.2026 as per the terms & conditions of the Bid Document, which however did not find
any favour with the respondent as the same was also rejected on 28.01.2026 and the response stated
the reasons for rejection as herein under:-

"3. M/s Vertel Digital has presented its case by citing the order issued by the Government of
Maharashtra."

4. The Home Department of the Government of Maharashtra, vide letter No. PEQ
0226/P.No.18/Pol-4 dated 13-01-2026, has stated that the quality of the equipment supplied by M/s
Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. to Maharashtra Police units (VHF sets) was found to be of inferior standard
and that the supplier's response during the warranty period after supply of the material was
unsatisfactory. Accordingly, the Government of Maharashtra has suspended M/s Vertel Digital Pvt.
Ltd. until completion of the inquiry, and the said suspended order has been made effective with
immediate effect.
4 All. Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
171

5. In the aforesaid order issued by the Government of Maharashtra, a question has arisen
regarding the quality of the products of M/s Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd, as well as the credibility of the
firm's after-sales service and support following the supply of radio sets.

6. It such circumstances, allowing M/s Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd, to participate in the bid, as
against other participating firms whose credibility is not under question, would not be appropriate
from the perspective of maintaining a level playing field.

7. In view of the doubts regarding the product quality of M/s Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd, if the
firm were to emerge as L-1, the transparency and fairness of the procurement would be adversely
affected.

8. It is pertinent to note that under Point No. 04, Clause xiii, "e-Bidding and Reverse Auction
(RA) on GeM", Point (e) of the GeM GTC, it is stipulated that: "The decision of the Buyer/GeM
regarding technical/commercial eligibility of the individual Seller to be invited for e-Bidding/RA
shall be final,

"In view of the above, the firm's bid was not found suitable for evaluation. Therefore, the
firm's bid has not been found technically eligible."

6. After passing of the aforesaid rejection order dated 28.01.2026 by the respondent-State, the
petitioner interestingly did not approach this Court and instead filed writ petition before the
Bombay High Court, vide Writ Petition (L) No. 3038 of 2026 (Vertel Digital Private limited &
Anr. V/s Union of India & Ors.), wherein a Division Bench of the said Court vide an order dated
29.01.2026 refused to pass any interim order in favour of the petitioner, so as to permit them to
participate in the forthcoming tenders. Obviously, the petitioner was not happy with the said order
of the Bombay High Court and as such the issue was further precipitated by them by way of a
Special Leave Petition before the Hon'ble Supreme court. The said S.L.P. (Civil) No. 5508 of 2026
came to be decided by the Supreme Court vide an order dated 09.02.2026, which is being
delineated as herein below:-

"1. Mr. Guru Krishna Kumar, learned senior counsel has brought to our notice the findings of
the suspension order dated 13.01.2026 and has submitted that these findings will have adverse
affect on the petitioner as well as its sister concerns in other tenders.

2. While we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High
Court, we clarify that the observations made in the suspension order dated 13.01.2026 will be
confined to the present tender and will not have the bearing on other tenders issued by other States.

3. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.

4. With these observations, the Special Leave Petition is disposed of.

5. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
172 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. In the interregnum, the tendering process of the Respondent-State came to be concluded
with the declaration of M/s Mobile Communications (India) Pvt. Limited as the Lowest bidder (L1) on 30.01.2026, as narrated herein above. However, the petitioner armed with the aforesaid order
dated 09.02.2026 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, filed the present Writ Petition, wherein a
coordinate bench of this Court passed an order dated 24.02.2026 directing exchange of affidavits
and restraining the State from entering into a contract with the said L-1 till the next date of listing.
The relevant portion of the said order is being extracted as herein below:-

"xxx xxx ..xxx

8. Accordingly, it is from the aforesaid facts, a case for interference is made out. It is noticed
that, firstly, there is no order of blacklisting passed by the State of Maharashtra and only certain
deficiencies have led to the initiation of proceeding against the petitioner, due to which he has been
suspended from participating in the said State. We further find that as per the terms and conditions
of the bid, only an order of blacklisting has to be in existence before a person can be disqualified
and lastly the Hon'ble Supreme Court has removed the embargo of the adverse effect of the order
dated 13.01.2026 in its application to other States including the State of U.P.

9. Let a counter affidavit be filed by the State within next three weeks. Rejoinder affidavit, if
any, may be filed by the petitioners within two weeks thereafter.

10. We have been informed that the bids have been finalised but the contract has not been
entered into till date.

11. In light of the above, the State is restrained from entering into contract in furtherance of
the advertisement dated 02.01.2026 till the next date of listing.

12. List this case on 06.04.2026.

13. The Office of the learned Standing Counsel shall inform the State Authorities about the
order passed today.

"8. Having narrated the background, in which the present writ petition came to be filed and is
being heard today, this court finds that the issue engaging the attention of this court in the present
petition is twofold:

(A) Whether the order of suspension dated 13.01.2026 passed by the Home Department,
Government of Maharashtra amounts to a blacklisting order

(B) If the answer to the above question is in the negative, can any relief be provided to the
petitioner in the present facts & circumstances

9. It is to be noted that a perusal of the relevant clauses in the Bid Document would show that
the word "suspension order" for cancellation of a bid is conspicuously absent and the said
document merely mentions the word blacklisting and as such allows for cancellation of the bid
4 All. Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
173
of an entity, if there is a blacklisting order against the said entity. Admittedly, the Government of
Maharashtra has merely passed a suspension order, which has been made subject to further enquiry
and thus technically one can argue that there is no blacklisting order. However, the fact remains
that the suspension order has been made with immediate effect and in view of the supervening
circumstances of unfavorable orders passed by the Bombay High Court and no interference by the
Supreme Court, one can argue that the suspension order has the trappings of a Blacklisting order.

10. Moreover, upon reading the contents of the order dated 13.01.2026 passed by the
Government of Maharashtra, wherein suspension has been made out with immediate effect, there is
clearly a good case that would be made out against the petitioner with regard to standard of goods
that had been supplied by the petitioner. Apparently, even the Bombay High Court and the
Supreme Court have not interfered with the said suspension order owing to the alleged quality of
equipment supplied to be substandard which technically has put on hold any participation of the
petitioner in any forthcoming tender in the State of Maharashtra. However, it does appear that the
Supreme Court has clarified that the suspension by the Government of Maharashtra would not
apply to tenders issued by other States, which in effect meant that the Supreme Court has clarified
that this suspension order should not be treated as a blacklisting order.

11. Having said so, one can also clearly understand the reasons why the respondent-authorities
in U.P. treated the said suspension letter as an order of blacklisting, as the contents of the order
suspending the petitioner prima facie make out a good case against the petitioner. This is the same
reason as to why the Bombay High Court did not interfere against the said order of suspension and
no interim relief was granted to the petitioner. Be that as it may, we need not go into this issue in
more details at this point and in the present petition, as the same is subject to inquiry that is to be
carried out by the Government of Maharashtra.

12. Further, this court finds that although in the present facts & circumstances, it can be well
argued that a suspension order is a step before the blacklisting order, however this court has no
hesitation in holding that any suspension order by itself may not amount to an order of blacklisting
as normally the process of blacklisting has the principles of natural justice ingrained in it as held in
a catena of Judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Courts. Apparently, the
principle of natural Justice has not been followed before the passing of the suspension order by the
Government of Maharashtra and as such this court fails to equate and place the suspension order
and a Blacklisting order on an equal pedestal. Furthermore, a simpliciter order of suspension with
regard to some work order could be a result of various reasons and the same may not amount to a
blacklisting per se.

13. In our view, the order of suspension that is subject to inquiry does not amount to a
blacklisting order, keeping in mind the long chain of precedents, which have held that any
blacklisting order carries grave and serious consequences and at times has been even termed to be a
civil death of an entity by the constitutional courts. Thus, any order of suspension, of the kind in the
present matter, cannot be casually & liberally interpreted to also mean a blacklisting order, as is
being sought to be done in the present case.
174 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

14. As a sequel to the above discussions, we hold that the order of suspension, subject to
inquiry being carried out by the Government of Maharashtra, may not be equated to be an order of
blacklisting, as has already been clarified by the Supreme Court.

15. It may further be noted that the Supreme Court also was not inclined to interfere with the
Judgment and order passed by the Bombay High Court and only clarified that the observations
made in the suspension order would be confined to the present tender and would not have bearing
on tenders issued by other States. However, by the time the said clarification was passed by the
Supreme Court on 09.02.2026, admittedly by that date M/S Mobile Communications (India) Pvt.
Ltd. had been declared as L-1 bidder on 30.01.2026.

16. Thus, the action of the respondent-State in rejecting the technical bid of the petitioner is
based on a bonafide assumption that the suspension order amounted to a blacklisting order and as
such cannot be treated to be an arbitrary order or having been passed with any malafide intention.
The authorities in the order dated 28.01.2026 have clearly observed that since the Government of
Maharashtra has noted that the goods being supplied by the petitioner were substandard in nature
and the fact that proper technical co-operation was not being provided by the petitioner during the
warranty period in Maharashtra, did give rise to an apprehension and reasonable doubt in the mind
of the Respondent authority that the petitioner may act in a similar manner in the State of Uttar
Pradesh. We do not find any irrationality in the said decision-making process nor does the action
smack of any malafide.

17. Further, it may also be mentioned that essentially the equipment being procured in the
present tender is meant for police functioning in the State of Uttar Pradesh. Since police
communication is a significant module from the perspective of maintaining law and order in an
area as large as the State of Uttar Pradesh, the quality of the equipments and after supply service
maintenance standard cannot be tweaked and/or compromised with in any circumstances. Further,
time and again the Courts have held that there is a certain degree of latitude and freedom granted to
the tenderer/owner in choosing its equipment and its supplier. The Courts have always taken a
consistent stand that tender process should not be interfered with until and unless specific grounds
of malafide, arbitrariness and irrationality has been pleaded and/or displayed by the party effected.
We do not find any such grounds having been pleaded or demonstrated by the petitioner in the
present petition.

18. We also find that the scope of judicial review in matters relating to tender is minimal. The
threshold of malafide intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must
be met before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision.
The Supreme Court in the celebrated judgment of Montecarlo Ltd. vs. NTPC Ltd. reported in
(2016) 15 SCC 272, expressed a word of caution emphasizing that judicial review should be
confined to ensuring that there is no arbitrariness or malafide in the process of tender evaluation.
The relevant extracts of the judgment is reproduced herein below:

"26. We respectfully concur with the aforesaid statement of law. We have reasons to do so. In
the present scenario, tenders are floated and offers are invited for highly complex technical
subjects. It requires understanding and appreciation of the nature of work and the purpose it is
4 All. Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
175
going to serve. It is common knowledge in the competitive commercial field that technical bids
pursuant to the notice inviting tenders are scrutinised by the technical experts and sometimes thirdparty assistance from those unconnected with the owner's organisation is taken. This ensures
objectivity. Bidder's expertise and technical capability and capacity must be assessed by the
experts. In the matters of financial assessment, consultants are appointed. It is because to check and
ascertain that technical ability and the financial feasibility have sanguinity and are workable and
realistic. There is a multi-prong complex approach; highly technical in nature. The tenders where
public largesse is put to auction stand on a different compartment. Tender with which we are
concerned, is not comparable to any scheme for allotment. This arena which we have referred
requires technical expertise. Parameters applied are different. Its aim is to achieve high degree of
perfection in execution and adherence to the time schedule. But, that does not mean, these tenders
will escape scrutiny of judicial review. Exercise of power of judicial review would be called for if
the approach is arbitrary or mala fide or procedure adopted is meant to favour one. The decisionmaking process should clearly show that the said maladies are kept at bay. But where a decision is
taken that is manifestly in consonance with the language of the tender document or subserves the
purpose for which the tender is floated, the court should follow the principle of restraint. Technical
evaluation or comparison by the court would be impermissible. The principle that is applied to scan
and understand an ordinary instrument relatable to contract in other spheres has to be treated
differently than interpreting and appreciating tender documents relating to technical works and
projects requiring special skills. The owner should be allowed to carry out the purpose and there
has to be allowance of free play in the joints.

19. Further, this Court finds that the rejection of the technical bid of the petitioner was not
only actuated by the suspension order of the Government of Maharashtra but was also based on
technical evaluation done by the Technical Evaluation Committee of the respondent-State.
Apparently, the Committee being an expert body has taken a decision which best suited to them as
a tenderer, who does not want any issues in maintenance service of the procured equipment nor
does it wish to compromise on the quality in any manner. This Court is bereft of any expertise to
step into the shoes of the committee and examine the specific needs and requirement of the tender.

20. In any case, this Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but merely reviews the manner in
which the decision was made. The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative
decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted, it will be substituting its own
decision without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. The Supreme Court in a
similar situation, when faced to exercise its power of judicial review in a technical issue involving a
tender matter held in Tata Motors Ltd. vs. Brihan Mumbai Electric Supply & Transport
Undertaking (BEST), (2023) 19 SCC 1:

"50. (...) In contracts involving technical issues the courts should be even more reluctant
because most of us in Judges' robes do not have the necessary expertise to adjudicate upon
technical issues beyond our domain. The courts should not use a magnifying glass while scanning
the tenders and make every small mistake appear like a big blunder. In fact, the courts must give
fair play in the joints to the government and public sector undertakings in matters of contract.
Courts must also not interfere where a magnifying glass while scanning the tenders and make every
small mistake appear like a big blunder.
176 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21. In any case, this Court is clear in its mind that it cannot set the clock back, which would
not only amount to tweaking with the decision and choice of the tenderer/owner, but would also set
at naught the entire tender process, forcing the authority to initiate a fresh tender process
consuming more time and also loss to the public exchequer due to price rise etc. Recently, the
Honble Supreme Court in M/S Steag Energy Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. GSPC Pipavav Power
Company Ltd. (GPPC) and others reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 478; decided on March 25,
2026 evaluating such a situation, had been pleased to hold as inter-alia:-

"55. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision
of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or
palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or
contract. To set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway,
would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of
time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial
burden/implications on the public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court
directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should
keep in mind. This is evident from a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court inAssn. of
Registration Plates v. Union of India [Assn. of Registration Platesv. Union of India, (2005) 1
SCC 679]

56. (..) Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must
exercise its discretionary powers under "Article 226" with great caution and should exercise it only
in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should
always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called
for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires
interference, the court should interfere.

22. Faced with the aforesaid legal precedents, it has been vehemently argued as a last resort,
by Shri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner that since there had been no
independent analysis of the quality of the equipment to be supplied in the present tender and the
Technical Evaluation Committee has merely relied on the alleged substandard material supplied in
the Maharashtra tender to reject the technical bid, the petitioner should be at least given a chance to
demonstrate their quality before the respondent-State. Although, the submission of Shri Mathur,
seems to be attractive in the first plush, however, on a deep analysis of the facts, we are unable to
subscribe to the views and submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the simple reason that this
Court has already held that it cannot substitute its view with the technical expertise of the Technical
Evaluation Committee and it is too late in the day to grant any relief, when the entire tendering
process has been completed. Further, as to the submission of Mr. Mathur, learned Sr. Counsel, that
the Respondent-State has rejected the technical bid merely taking a cue of the non-performance in
the Maharashtra tender is concerned, this Court finds that a similar argument of non-performance in
another tender having been made a ground of rejection in the ongoing tender process was raised
before the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation, Ujjain and another vs. BVG India
Limited and others reported in (2018) 5 SCC 462, wherein the non-performance of the contractor
on some other previous contract was made a basis for rejection in the ongoing tender. The Supreme
Court in the said case recorded the issue in the following words: -
4 All. Vertel Digital Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
177

"Whether under the scope of judicial review, the High Court could ordinarily question the
judgment of the expert consultant on the issue of technical qualifications of a bidder when the
consultant takes into consideration various factors including the basis of non-performance of the
bidder.

Thereafter, the Supreme Court tracing the entire precedent of cases on the said subject went on
to hold and conclude as follows :-

"60. In the matter on hand, we do not find either the decision-making process or the decision
to be arbitrary or irrational.

61. The authority concerned is in the best position to find out the best person or the best
quotation depending on the work to be entrusted under the contract. If a bidder had faced a number
of show-cause notices from various municipal corporations in the matter of non-performance of
door-to-door collection of garbage, etc. the court cannot compel the authority to choose such
undeserving person/company to carry out the work. Ultimately, the public interest must be
safeguarded. The public would be directly interested in the timely fulfilment of the contract so that
the services become available to the public expeditiously and effectively. The public would also be
interested in the quality of work undertaken. Poor quality of work or goods can lead to tremendous
public hardship and substantial financial outlay either in correcting mistakes or in rectifying defects
or even at times in re-doing the entire work.

62. Lethargy or tardiness in collecting door-to-door garbage on a day-to-day basis would
definitely lead to increased collection of garbage on the roads and public properties, which leads to
health hazards and also reduces the cleanliness of the city. Since the public is directly interested
and would be affected if the work entrusted is not carried out appropriately, and as the technical
expert has found that Respondent 1 would not be a suitable company to be entrusted the work
inasmuch as it had faced 73 show-cause notices from different municipal corporations, the High
Court could not have interfered with the decision taken by the authority. In our considered opinion,
the High Court has ignored the element of public interest involved in the matter.

63. As aforementioned, unless the Court concludes that the decision-making process or the
decision taken by the authority bristles with mala fides, arbitrariness, or perversity, or that the
authority has intended to favour someone, the constitutional court will not interfere with the
decision-making process or the decision.

64. Thus, the questions to be decided in this appeal are answered as follows:

64.1. Under the scope of judicial review, the High Court could not ordinarily interfere with the
judgment of the expert consultant on the issues of technical qualifications of a bidder when the
consultant takes into consideration various factors including the basis of non-performance of the
bidder;
178 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

64.2. A bidder who submits a bid expressly declaring that it is submitting the same independently and
without any partners, consortium or joint venture, cannot rely upon the technical qualifications of any third
party for its qualification.

64.3. It is not open to the court to independently evaluate the technical bids and financial bids of the
parties as an appellate authority for coming to its conclusion inasmuch as unless the thresholds of mala fides,
intention to favour someone or bias, arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity are met, where a decision is taken
purely on public interest, the court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint.

23. In any event, we would like to clarify that the petitioner had been not diligent in persuing his
cause as they having received the rejection order on their representation dated 28.01.2026 did not approach
this Court instantaneously and only approached this Court on 24.02.2026 after going to the Bombay High
Court and thereafter to the Supreme Court. By this time, a lot of water had flown under the bridge. Not
only the L-1 bidder had been declared with the culmination of tendering process on 30.01.2026, but the
appropriate permission, etc. had been obtained by the State Government, keeping in mind that the tender
had been finalized, as submitted by learned counsel Shri Pankaj Khare appearing on behalf of the
Respondent-State.

24. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the rejection of the technical bid of the petitioner and their
subsequent representation in the present tender by the Respondent-State cannot be faulted with.

25. For all the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is disposed of, with the aforesaid observations.

26. We make it clear that the State of U.P. shall not treat the suspension order of Government of
Maharashtra dated 13.01.2026 as a blacklisting order in future tenders that they may issue and the petitioner
shall be at liberty to participate in the same, in accordance with law, as also clarified by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court.

27. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.

28. There would be no order as to cost(s).
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(2026) 4 ILRA 178
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.
THE HON'BLE GARIMA PRASHAD, J.

Writ C No. 6882 of 2026

M/s G. V. Construction and Supplier ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U. P. & Ors. ...Respondents