# M/s Tata Steel Ltd v. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko

- **Citation:** (2024) 5 ILRA 1548
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2024-05-13
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Review Application No. 301926 of 2010
- **Bench:** Shekhar B. Saraf
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-tata-steel-ltd-v-commissioner-trade-tax-u-p-lko-51979
- **Pages:** 13

## Headnote

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section
114, Order XLVII, Rule 1 - Review - Review
filed
on
the
ground
that
important
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
could not be submitted before the Court.
Held - Mere failure to cite a judgment does
not, in and of itself, render the original
judgment flawed. Review jurisdiction is
not a panacea for addressing every
perceived deficiency or oversight in the
5 All. M/s Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko.
1549
original judgment; rather, it is a narrow
avenue reserved for rectifying errors
glaringly evident on the face of the record.
Failure to cite a particular judgment does
not automatically invalidate the reasoning
or merit of the decision in question. (Para
22)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,904 of 44,798. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39904 for what follows._

1548 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ghaziabad
(supra)
and
we
are
in
unequivocal agreement with the same. No
exception is drawn to that.

33. Thus, we conclude:

(i) creation of a simple mortgage
(through deposit of title deeds), though valid
in law and fully enforceable as such, would
remain beyond the clutches of the Stamp
Act, so long as there is no written agreement
executed between the parties or any
document that is made part of thereof that
evidences the bargain reached between the
parties - to deposit the title deed (with the
lender) to secure the loan availed by the
borrower.
(ii) in the present case, as noted above, there
is no written evidence yet brought on record,
of any bargain reached by the parties
requiring the borrower to deposit the title
deeds with the lender/petitioner.

34. Accordingly, we answer the
reference made by the learned single judge
thus:

(I) An equitable mortgage may
exist in favour of the petitioner, through a
deposit of title deed, against an oral
agreement. Yet, Clauses 10.5(f), 10.5(h) of
the Loan Agreement and Clause 13(iii)(b) of
the MITC to the Loan Agreement do not
constitute an 'instrument' or documentary
evidence of a written 'agreement' or bargain
reached between the parties, to thus secure
the loan availed by the borrower.

(II) Levy of stamp duty under
Article 6 of Schedule 1-B of the Stamp Act
may arise only on an 'instrument' that must
be a 'document' containing writing (as
would never include an oral agreement), to
establish the existence of an "agreement
relating to deposit of title deeds", to secure
the loan availed by the borrower. Since
thatcondition is not satisfied, no levy of
stamp duty may arise, at present.

(III) Given the above, Clauses
10.5(f), 10.5(h) of the Loan Agreement and
Clause 13(iii)(b) of the MITC to the Loan
Agreement, do not create any doubt as to the
correctness
of
the
division
bench
pronouncement in HDFC Ltd. Vs Assistant
Commissioner
Stamps,
Ghaziabad,
2015:AHC:125281-DB.

35. Let the matter be listed before the
appropriate bench.
----------
(2024) 5 ILRA 1548
REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2024

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SHEKHAR B. SARAF, J.

Civil Misc. Review Application No. 301926 of
2010
In
Sales/Trade-Tax Revision No. 225 of 2002

M/s Tata Steel Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko.
 ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Pratik J. Nagar

Counsel for the Respondent:
Bipin Kumar Pandey,A.C.S.C.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Section
114, Order XLVII, Rule 1 - Review - Review
filed
on
the
ground
that
important
judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
could not be submitted before the Court.
Held - Mere failure to cite a judgment does
not, in and of itself, render the original
judgment flawed. Review jurisdiction is
not a panacea for addressing every
perceived deficiency or oversight in the
5 All. M/s Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko.
1549
original judgment; rather, it is a narrow
avenue reserved for rectifying errors
glaringly evident on the face of the record.
Failure to cite a particular judgment does
not automatically invalidate the reasoning
or merit of the decision in question. (Para
22)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. Vs Lt.
Governor of Delhi (1980) 2 SCC 167

2. Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs Pishak Sharma
(1979) 4 SCC 389

3. Parsion Devi Vs Sumitri Devi (1997) 8 SCC 715

4. S. Madhusudhan Reddy Vs Narayana Reddy
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034

5. Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through Legal
Representatives & ors. Vs Vinod Kumar Rawat &
ors. (2021) 13 SCC 1

(Delivered by Hon'ble Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)

Civil
Misc.
Delay
Condonation
Application No.301923 of 2010

1. I have perused the affidavit
accompanying
the
delay
condonation
application and find that sufficient cause has
been made out for condoning the delay in
filing the review application. Accordingly,
the delay in filing the review application is
condoned.

2. The delay condonation application
is allowed.

Review Application

3. The instant review application
preferred by the Commissioner Trade Tax,
U.P., Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the
'Respondent') arises out of an order dated
February 15, 2010 passed by this Court in
STRE No. - 225 of 2002.

FACT

4. I have outlined the brief facts leading
up to the instant review application below:

a. In STRE No. - 225 of 2002, the
main question raised by M/S Tata Steel Ltd.
(hereinafter referred to as the 'Revisionist')
was "whether in view of the definition of
'purchase price' under Section 2(gg) of the
Uttar
Pradesh
Trade
Tax
Act,
1948
(hereinafter referred to as the 'UPTTA, 1948),
the applicant having paid the amount of Rs.
5,56,81,000/- also for the purchase of plant
and machinery, apparatus and equipment, the
same ought to have been included in the
'Fixed Capital Investment' and the Trade Tax
Tribunal was not justified in disallowing the
said amount merely on the ground that the
amount has been allowed as MODVAT
under the Central Excise Act, 1944
(hereinafter referred to as the 'CEA, 1944).
Other questions were also raised with regard
to MODVAT allowed by the excise
department.

b. The aforesaid question was
answered by this Court vide its order dated
February 15, 2010 in favour of the Revisionist.

c. Against the order dated February
15, 2010 passed by this Court, the Respondent
preferred a Special Leave Petition under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

d. The aforesaid Special Leave
Petition was dismissed as not pressed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court vide its order dated
September 9, 2010.

e. The Respondent filed the instant
review application before this Court
assailing the order dated February 15, 2010
passed by this Court.
1550 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
RESPONDENT

5. Shri B.K. Pandey, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel has
made the following submissions:

i. The relevant law which was laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Collector of Central Excise, Pune &
Ors. -v- Dai Ichi Karkaria Ltd. reported in
1999 (33) RLT 899 (S.C.) could not be
pointed out at the time of argument before
this Court.

ii. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the aforesaid case has observed that the
expression
"actual
value"
should
be
construed in a sense which commercial men
would understand. In absence of a sttatutory
definition for determining the "actual
value", the rule of accountancy has to be
adopted. MODVAT credit has to be
excluded from the value of capital goods as
per the guidance note dated March 16, 1995
issued by the ICAI. The same principle also
applies in the present case and MODVAT
has to be excluded while determining the
actual investment made by the dealer in
plant and machinery.

iii. A similar controversy came up
before the Hon'ble Supreme Cour in
Commissioner of Trade Tax -v- M/s
Kajaria Cements Ltd. reported in (2005) 11
SCC 149. while considering fixed capital
investment for grant of exemption under
notification dated February 21, 1996. The
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
relied
upon
"purchase price" as defined under Section
2(gg) of the UPTTA, 1948.

iv. The law of the land as
propounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the aforementioned judgments could not
be placed before this Court, hence the
present review application is being filed
herewith for kind consideration before this
Court.

v. On the facts and circumstances
stated above, it is absolutely necessary in the
interest of justice that the judgment passed
by this Court on February 15, 2010 be
reviewed, and the present application filed
by the Respondent be allowed and the
appropriate order be passed in accordance
with law, otherwise the Respondent would
suffer irreparable loss and injury.

CONTENTIONS
OF
THE
REVISIONIST

6. Shri Devashish Bharuka, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Pratik J.
Nagar, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the Revisionist has made the following
submissions:

i. The Respondent had challenged
the main judgment of this Court dated
February 15, 2010 before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 13259 of 2010. The same was
withdrawn by the Respondent on the ground
that, the "the main question of law, which
arose from the order passed by the Trade
Tax Tribunal, U.P., has not been dealt with
in the impugned judgment and, therefore,
the petitioner would like to file a review
application before the High Court".
Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition was
dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as
'not pressed'.

ii. In view of the aforesaid liberty,
the Respondent has filed the instant review
petition. However, instead of pointing out as
to which 'main question of law' has not been
dealt with by this Court in the main
judgment dated February 15, 2010, the
Respondent has taken a completely different
stand in the instant review application. It has
been averred that, "the relevant law which
5 All. M/s Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko.
1551
could not be pointed out at the time of
argument before this Hon'ble Court was the
law laid down by the Apex Court". Further,
the Respondent also admits that the question
of law has been answered by this Court.
Thus, the very basis on which liberty was
sought from the Hon'ble Supreme Court to
file review petition stands obliterated by the
averments of the Respondent itself.

iii. The review petition cannot be
said to be maintainable on the basis of the
sole ground taken by the Respondent. It is
well settled that failure to place judgments
cannot be a ground for review. Reference in
this regard is made to the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dokka Samuel -
v- Dr Jacob Lazarus Chelly reported in
(1997) 4 SCC 478.

iv. Furthermore, the limited
scope of review petition requires 'an error
apparent on the face of the record'. It is an
admitted position that the two judgments
referred to by the Respondent were not
even placed before this Court and
therefore, are not a part of the record. The
basic requirement of 'error apparent on the
face of the record', therefore is not even
fulfilled in the present review petition.

v. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has in Arun Dev Upadhyaya -v-
Integrated Sales Service Limited reported
in (2023) 8 SCC 11 has reiterated the wellsettled principles of review.

vi. The grounds taken in the
present review petition are nothing but an
appeal in the guise of a review petition.
The attempt of the Respondent to rely
upon two judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court to reopen issues already
decided on merits by this Court is nothing
but inviting this Court to sit in appeal over
its own order.

vii. In view of the aforesaid, it is
submitted that this Court may be pleased
to dismiss the review petition with costs.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

7. I have heard the learned counsel
appearing for the parties and perused the
materials on record.

8. Before delving into the merits of
the instant review petition, it would be
prudent on my part to lay thread bare the
principles governing the exercise of
review jurisdiction.

9. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, as
eloquent as ever, encapsulated the scope
of review jurisdiction in Northern India
Caterers (India) Ltd. -v- Ltd. Governor of
Delhi reported in (1980) 2 SCC 167 as
follows:

"A plea for review, unless the first
judicial view is manifestly distorted, is like
asking for the moon. A forensic defeat
cannot be avenged by an invitation to have
a second look, hopeful of discovery of flaws
and reversal of result."

10. In its judgment in Aribam
Tuleshwar Sharma -v- Pishak Sharma
reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court propounded that review
power and appellate power are inherently
distinct. While the appellate power enables
the courts to rectify all manners of errors in
the judgment or order under challenge,
review power does not. Relevant paragraph
is extracted herein below:

"3. The Judicial Commissioner
gave two reasons for reviewing his
predecessor's order. The first was that his
predecessor had overlooked two important
documents Exs. A-1 and A-3 which showed
that the respondents were in possession of
the sites even in the year 1948-49 and that
the grants must have been made even by
1552 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
then. The second was that there was a patent
illegality in permitting the appellant to
question, in a single writ petition, settlement
made in favour of different respondents. We
are afraid that neither of the reasons
mentioned
by
the
learned
Judicial
Commissioner constitutes a ground for
review. It is true as observed by this Court
in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR
1963 SC 1909] there is nothing in Article
226 of the Constitution to preclude a High
Court from exercising the power of review
which inheres in every court of plenary
jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice
or to correct grave and palpable errors
committed by it. But, there are definitive
limits to the exercise of the power of review.
The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within the knowledge of
the person seeking the review or could not
be produced by him at the time when the
order was made; it may be exercised where
some mistake or error apparent on the face
of the record is found; it may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But, it
may not be exercised on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal.
A power of review is not to be confused with
appellate powers which may enable an
appellate court to correct all manner of
errors committed by the subordinate court."

 (Emphasis Added)

11. At this juncture, I consider it
prudent to refer to Order 47 Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter
referred to as the 'CPC, 1908') which
delineates the boundary within which the
review jurisdiction is to be exercised: -

"(a) From the discovery of new
and important matters or evidence which
after the exercise of due diligence was not
within the knowledge of the applicant;

(b) Such important matter or
evidence could not be produced by the
applicant at the time when the decree was
passed or order made; and

(c) On account of some mistake or
error apparent on the record or any other
sufficient reason."

12. Recently, in Arun Dev Upadhyaya
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
reiterated that review power is to be
exercised strictly within the confines of
Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, 1908. Relevant
paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

"34. In another case between
Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB
[Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. v. Assam SEB,
(2020) 2 SCC 677 : (2020) 2 SCC (Civ) 788]
, this Court observed that scope of review
under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section
114CPC is limited and under the guise of
review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to
reagitate and reargue questions which have
already been addressed and decided. It was
further observed that an error which is not
self-evident and has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, can hardly be said to
be an error apparent on the face of record.

35. From the above, it is evident
that a power to review cannot be exercised
as an appellate power and has to be strictly
confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47
Rule 1CPC. An error on the face of record
must be such an error which, mere looking
at the record should strike and it should not
require
any
long-drawn
process
of
reasoning on the points where there may
conceivably be two opinions."

13. In Parsion Devi -v- Sumitri Devi
reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court espoused that the power
5 All. M/s Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko.
1553
under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC, 1908
does not allow for an erroneous decision to
be "reheard and corrected." Relevant
paragraphs are extracted below:

"7. It is well settled that review
proceedings have to be strictly confined to
the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1
CPC. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v.
Govt. of A.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1372 : (1964) 5
SCR 174] (SCR at p. 186) this Court opined:

"What, however, we are now
concerned with is whether the statement in
the order of September 1959 that the case
did not involve any substantial question of
law is an 'error apparent on the face of the
record'). The fact that on the earlier
occasion the Court held on an identical state
of facts that a substantial question of law
arose would not per se be conclusive, for the
earlier order itself might be erroneous.
Similarly, even if the statement was wrong,
it would not follow that it was an 'error
apparent on the face of the record', for there
is a distinction which is real, though it might
not always be capable of exposition,
between a mere erroneous decision and a
decision which could be characterised as
vitiated by 'error apparent'. A review is by
no means an appeal in disguise whereby an
erroneous
decision
is
reheard
and
corrected, but lies only for patent error."

 (emphasis ours)

8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v.
Nirmala Kumari Choudhury [(1995) 1 SCC
170] while quoting with approval a passage
from Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam
Pishak Sharma [(1979) 4 SCC 389] this
Court once again held that review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and
ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a
judgment may be open to review inter alia if
there is a mistake or an error apparent on
the face of the record. An error which is not
self-evident and has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, can hardly be said to
be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its
power of review under Order 47 Rule 1
CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under
Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible
for an erroneous decision to be "reheard
and corrected". A review petition, it must be
remembered has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in
disguise"."

 (Emphasis Added)

14.

In
its
judgment
in
S.
Madhusudhan Reddy -v- Narayana Reddy
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1034, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the
limited grounds on which a review petition
can be assailed under the provisions of the
CPC, 1908. The relevant paragrph reads as
under:

"3. The Judicial Commissioner
gave two reasons for reviewing his
predecessor's order. The first was that his
predecessor had overlooked two important
documents Exs. A-1 and A-3 which showed
that the respondents were in possession of
the sites even in the year 1948-49 and that
the grants must have been made even by
then. The second was that there was a patent
illegality in permitting the appellant to
question, in a single writ petition, settlement
made in favour of different respondents. We
are afraid that neither of the reasons
mentioned
by
the
learned
Judicial
Commissioner constitutes a ground for
review. It is true as observed by this Court
in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR
1963 SC 1909] there is nothing in Article
226 of the Constitution to preclude a High
Court from exercising the power of review
which inheres in every court of plenary
1554 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice
or to correct grave and palpable errors
committed by it. But, there are definitive
limits to the exercise of the power of review.
The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within the knowledge of
the person seeking the review or could not
be produced by him at the time when the
order was made; it may be exercised where
some mistake or error apparent on the face
of the record is found; it may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But, it
may not be exercised on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal.
A power of review is not to be confused with
appellate powers which may enable an
appellate court to correct all manner of
errors committed by the subordinate court."

(Emphasis Added)

15. In the cauldron of litigation, where
passions run high and stakes are higher still,
the temptation to misuse review jurisdiction
may be great. Yet, it is a temptation that
must be resisted at all costs, for to succumb
to it would be to betray the very essence of
justice itself. Review jurisdiction is not a
tool for the litigious or the disgruntled, it is
a mechanism for safeguarding the integrity
of the judicial process, for ensuring that
justice remains blind to all but the merits of
the case. Wielding the power of review
jurisdiction carries a weighty burden - one
that demands unyielding diligence and
meticulousness. Courts must resist the siren
call of extraneous influences or the
temptation to revisit contentious issues. The
realm of review jurisdiction is a realm of
perpetual tension - a tension between the
imperative of finality and the exigency of
correction,
between
the
sanctity
of
precedent and the call for innovation. It is a
tension that demands a delicate balancing
act - one that calls for the wisdom of
Solomon and the impartiality of Lady
Justice herself. And therefore, review
jurisdiction is not a weapon to be wielded
recklessly but a shield to safeguard the
sanctity of the legal process.

16. Unlike the fabled sword of
Damocles, review jurisdiction cannot be
allowed to be hung precariously above the
head of litigants, threatening the delicate
balance of legal certainty. Order 47 Rule 1
of the CPC, 1908 stands as a sentinel - a
guardian of the gates, permitting entry only
to those deemed worthy by the stringent
criteria it lays forth. It serves as a bulwark
against the tide of caprice and whim.

17. In Shri Ram Sahu (Dead) through
Legal Representatives and Others -v-
Vinod
Kumar
Rawat
and
Others
reported in (2021) 13 SCC 1, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court after examining precedents
reiterated and delineated the principles of
review -

"7.1. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani
Banik [Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik,
(2006) 4 SCC 78] while considering the
scope and ambit of Section 114CPC read
with Order 47 Rule 1CPC it is observed and
held in paras 14 to 18 as under :

"14. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala
Kumari Choudhury [Meera Bhanja v.
Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC
170] it was held that :

'8. It is well settled that the review
proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and
ambit of Order 47 Rule 1CPC. In connection
with the limitation of the powers of the court
under Order 47 Rule 1, while dealing with
similar jurisdiction available to the High
Court while seeking to review the orders
5 All. M/s Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko.
1555
under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, this Court in Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma [Aribam
Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389] speaking
through Chinnappa Reddy, J. has made the
following pertinent observations :

"3. ... It is true ... there is nothing
in Article 226 of the Constitution to preclude
the High Court from exercising the power of
review which inheres in every court of
plenary jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage
of justice or to correct grave and palpable
errors committed by it. But, there are
definitive limits to the exercise of the power
of review. The power of review may be
exercised on the discovery of new and
important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence was not within
the knowledge of the person seeking the
review or could not be produced by him at
the time when the order was made; it may be
exercised where some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record is found,
it may also be exercised on any analogous
ground. But, it may not be exercised on the
ground that the decision was erroneous on
merits. That would be the province of a court
of appeal. A power of review is not to be
confused with appellate powers which may
enable an appellate court to correct all
manner of errors committed by the
subordinate court."

15. A perusal of Order 47 Rule 1
shows that review of a judgment or an order
could be sought : (a) from the discovery of
new and important matters or evidence
which after the exercise of due diligence was
not within the knowledge of the applicant;
(b) such important matter or evidence could
not be produced by the applicant at the time
when the decree was passed or order made;
and (c) on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record or any
other sufficient reason.

16. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma
v.
Aribam
Pishak
Sharma
[Aribam
Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389] , this Court held
that there are definite limits to the exercise
of power of review. In that case, an
application under Order 47 Rule 1 read with
Section 151 of the Code was filed which was
allowed and the order passed by the Judicial
Commissioner was set aside and the writ
petition was dismissed. On an appeal to this
Court it was held as under : (SCC p. 390,
para 3)

'3. It is true as observed by this
Court in Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab
[Shivdev Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963
SC 1909] there is nothing in Article 226 of
the Constitution to preclude a High Court
from exercising the power of review which
inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction
to prevent miscarriage of justice or to
correct
grave
and
palpable
errors
committed by it. But, there are definitive
limits to the exercise of the power of review.
The power of review may be exercised on the
discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within the knowledge of
the person seeking the review or could not
be produced by him at the time when the
order was made; it may be exercised where
some mistake or error apparent on the face
of the record is found; it may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But, it
may not be exercised on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merits. That
would be the province of a court of appeal.
A power of review is not to be confused with
appellate powers which may enable an
appellate court to correct all manner of
errors committed by the subordinate court.'

17. The judgment in Aribam case
[Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam
Pishak Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389] has been
followed in Meera Bhanja [Meera Bhanja v.
1556 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC
170] . In that case, it has been reiterated that
an error apparent on the face of the record
for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be
such an error which may strike one on a
mere looking at the record and would not
require
any
long-drawn
process
of
reasoning. The following observations in
connection with an error apparent on the
face of the record in Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan
Hegde
v.
Mallikarjun
Bhavanappa
Tirumale
[Satyanarayan
Laxminarayan
Hegde
v.
Mallikarjun
Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137]
were also noted :

'17. ... An error which has to be
established by a long-drawn process of
reasoning on points where there may
conceivably be two opinions can hardly be
said to be an error apparent on the face of
the record. Where an alleged error is far
from self-evident and if it can be established,
it has to be established, by lengthy and
complicated arguments, such an error
cannot be cured by a writ of certiorari
according to the rule governing the powers
of the superior court to issue such a writ.'

18. It is also pertinent to mention
the observations of this Court in Parsion
Devi v. Sumitri Devi [Parsion Devi v.
Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715] . Relying
upon the judgments in Aribam [Aribam
Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak
Sharma, (1979) 4 SCC 389] and Meera
Bhanja [Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari
Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170] it was
observed as under:

'9. Under Order 47 Rule 1CPC a
judgment may be open to review inter alia if
there is a mistake or an error apparent on
the face of the record. An error which is not
self-evident and has to be detected by a
process of reasoning, can hardly be said to
be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its
power of review under Order 47 Rule 1CPC.
In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order
47 Rule 1CPC it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be 'reheard and
corrected'. A review petition, it must be
remembered has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in
disguise'.'

7.2. In Lily Thomas v. Union of
India [Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000)
6 SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] , it is
observed and held that the power of review
can be exercised for correction of a mistake
but not to substitute a view. Such powers can
be exercised within the limits of the statute
dealing with the exercise of power. It is
further observed in the said decision that the
words "any other sufficient reason"
appearing in Order 47 Rule 1CPC must
mean "a reason sufficient on grounds at
least analogous to those specified in the
rule" as was held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki
[Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC OnLine
PC 11 : (1921-22) 49 IA 144 : AIR 1922 PC
112] and approved by this Court in Moran
Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose
Athanasius
[Moran
Mar
Basselios
Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR
1954 SC 526] .

7.3. In Inderchand Jain v. Motilal
[Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC
663 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 461] in paras 7 to
11 it is observed and held as under :

"7. Section 114 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (for short "the Code")
provides for a substantive power of review
by a civil court and consequently by the
appellate courts. The words "subject as
aforesaid" occurring in Section 114 of the
Code mean subject to such conditions and
limitations as may be prescribed as
appearing in Section 113 thereof and for the
said purpose, the procedural conditions
contained in Order 47 of the Code must be
taken into consideration. Section 114 of the
5 All. M/s Tata Steel Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Trade Tax, U.P., Lko.
1557
Code although does not prescribe any
limitation on the power of the court but such
limitations have been provided for in Order
47 of the Code; Rule 1 whereof reads as
under : (Kamal Sengupta case [State of W.B.
v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612 :
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 735] ,

'17. The power of a civil court to
review its judgment/decision is traceable in
Section 114CPC. The grounds on which
review can be sought are enumerated in
Order 47 Rule 1CPC, which reads as under:

"1. Application for review of
judgment.-(1) Any person considering
himself aggrieved-

(a) by a decree or order from
which an appeal is allowed, but from which
no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from
which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference
from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of
new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence,
was not within his knowledge or could not
be produced by him at the time when the
decree was passed or order made, or on
account of some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record, or for any other
sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review
of the decree passed or order made against
him, may apply for a review of judgment of
the court which passed the decree or made
the order." '

8. An application for review would
lie inter alia when the order suffers from an
error apparent on the face of the record and
permitting the same to continue would lead
to failure of justice. In Rajender Kumar v.
Rambhai [Rajender Kumar v. Rambhai,
(2007) 15 SCC 513 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri)
584] this Court held :

'6. The limitations on exercise of
the power of review are well settled. The
first
and
foremost
requirement
of
entertaining a review petition is that the
order, review of which is sought, suffers
from any error apparent on the face of the
order and permitting the order to stand will
lead to failure of justice. In the absence of
any such error, finality attached to the
judgment/order cannot be disturbed.'

9. The power of review can also be
exercised by the court in the event discovery
of new and important matter or evidence
takes place which despite exercise of due
diligence was not within the knowledge of
the applicant or could not be produced by
him at the time when the order was made.
An application for review would also lie if
the order has been passed on account of
some mistake. Furthermore, an application
for review shall also lie for any other
sufficient reason.

10. It is beyond any doubt or
dispute that the review court does not sit in
appeal over its own order. A rehearing of
the matter is impermissible in law. It
constitutes an exception to the general rule
that once a judgment is signed or
pronounced, it should not be altered. It is
also
trite
that
exercise
of
inherent
jurisdiction is not invoked for reviewing any
order.

11. Review is not appeal in
disguise. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India
[Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6
SCC 224 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1056] this Court
held :

'56. It follows, therefore, that the
power of review can be exercised for
correction of a mistake but not to substitute
a view. Such powers can be exercised within
the limits of the statute dealing with the
exercise of power. The review cannot be
treated like an appeal in disguise.'

8. The dictionary meaning of the
word "review" is "the act of looking, offer
something again with a view to correction
1558 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
or improvement". It cannot be denied that
the review is the creation of a statute. In
Patel
Narshi
Thakershi
v.
Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsinghji
[Patel
Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsinghji, (1971) 3 SCC 844] , this Court
has held that the power of review is not an
inherent power. It must be conferred by law
either
specifically
or
by
necessary
implication. The review is also not an
appeal in disguise.

9. What can be said to be an error
apparent on the face of the proceedings has
been dealt with and considered by this Court
in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [T.C.
Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440] .
It is held that such an error is an error which
is a patent error and not a mere wrong
decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed
Ahmad Ishaque [Hari Vishnu Kamath v.
Syed Ahmad Ishaque, (1955) 1 SCR 1104 :
AIR 1955 SC 233] , it is observed as under :
(SCC p. 244, para 23)

"23. ... It is essential that it should
be something more than a mere error; it
must be one which must be manifest on the
face of the record. The real difficulty with
reference to this matter, however, is not so
much in the statement of the principle as in
its application to the facts of a particular
case. When does an error cease to be mere
error, and become an error apparent on the
face of the record? The learned counsel on
either side were unable to suggest any clearcut rule by which the boundary between the
two classes of errors could be demarcated."

18. Nobody is perfect. This timeless
adage resonates deeply within the realm of the
judiciary, where judges, though addressed
with titles like "Your Lordships", are not
immune to fallibility. Recognizing this
fundamental truth and to prevent miscarriage
of justice, High Courts, as Courts of Record
under Article 215 of the Constitution of India
possess the inherent power to review their own
orders. However, in recent times, there has
been a misconception that review jurisdiction
is tantamount to an appeal - a second chance
to argue an already settled matter. At its core,
review jurisdiction is a solemn duty bestowed
upon the High Courts to rectify errors that may
have crept into their judgments. It is not an
avenue for re-argument or a platform for
dissatisfied
litigants
to
reiterate
their
grievances. Instead, it serves as a bulwark
against miscarriage of justice, providing a
mechanism for the correction of judicial
fallibility. Judges, like all human beings, are
liable to err. Thus, review jurisdiction stands
as a sentinel against the tyranny of erroneous
judgments, upholding the integrity of the
judicial process.

19. Yet, the misconception persists that
review jurisdiction offers litigants a second bite
at the cherry - a chance to reopen settled matters
and re-litigate issues already adjudicated upon.
This notion not only undermines the finality of
judgments but also erodes the sanctity of judicial
pronouncements. As Justice Felix Frankfurter
once remarked, "Wisdom too often never
comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely
because it comes late." Review jurisdiction,
when exercised judiciously, embodies this
wisdom - it is a beacon of hope for those
aggrieved by manifest injustice, offering solace
in the face of adversity. At its core, review
jurisdiction is about scrutiny, not re-litigation. It
is about examining the record of proceedings
with a discerning eye, searching for errors of law,
fact, or procedure. It is not a second chance for
litigants to present their case anew or to
introduce fresh evidence. Rather, it is a solemn
duty entrusted to the judiciary, a duty to ensure
that justice is not just done, but seen to be done.

20. The jurisprudence surrounding the
power of review is as intricate as it is
unequivocal. It delineates a stringent
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1559
criterion wherein an appellant, desiring to
invoke the mechanism of review against a
judgment or order, must demonstrate the
unearthing of new and pivotal matter or
evidence - a revelation that, despite
exhaustive and diligent inquiry, remained
elusive to the court's purview. This
requirement embodies the essence of due
diligence, mandating not merely a cursory
glance but a thorough excavation into the
depths of legal enquiry. Review jurisdiction
is not to be misconstrued as a second bite at
the proverbial apple, granting aggrieved
parties an opportunity to rehash matters
already
adjudicated
upon.
In
review
jurisdiction, courts act as third umpires.
Their authority is circumscribed by the
confines of the record before them, limiting
their purview to errors glaringly evident on
the face of record. Should the pursuit of
rectifying an alleged error necessitate a
deeper and thorough examination, it stands
to reason that such an error cannot be
deemed 'apparent' in the truest sense.

21. Coming to the merits of the instant
review, the ground taken by the Respondent
that important judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme could not be submitted before this
Court, does not merit the exercise of the
power of review since the Respondent failed
to establish that despite exercise of proper
due diligence, the aforesaid judgments could
not be brought to light. In any case, as held
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dokka
Samuel (supra), failure to produce a
judgment would not tantamount to an error
apparent on the face of the record. Relevant
paragraph from the aforesaid judgment is
extracted herein:

"4. It is seen that by an order
passed by this Court on 24-11-1995, liberty
was given to the appellant, in the event of the
High Court reviewing the order on merits
against him, to agitate his rights in this
Court. The question is whether the High
Court was justified in reviewing the earlier
order and reversing the finding recorded by
the appellate court. It is not in dispute that
the sale deed is for a small sum of Rs 300
and odd and that the property sold
commands good market value.