# M/s U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Ram Prakash and others

- **Citation:** (2005) 1 ILRA 82
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2004-11-24
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48967 of 2004
- **Bench:** Ashok Bhushan
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-u-p-state-road-transport-corporation-v-ram-prakash-and-others-40389
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972-S. 7 (7)
read with Limitation Act, 1963-Ss. 29 (2)
and 5-Delay of two years and one month
in filing appeal against order passed for
payment
of
gratuity-Dismissal-Writ
Petition-held, S. 29(2) of Limitation Act
read with S. 7 (7) of payment of Gratuity
Act makes clear that extension under S.
5 of Limitation Act is permissible only for
a period of sixty days-Extension beyond
60 days impliedly excluded-by virtue of
S. 29 (2) of Limitation Act readwith S. 7
(7) of Gratuity Act, Appellate Authority
has no power to extend Limitation
beyond sixty days.

Held: Para 7

By a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act read with Section 7(7)
of the Act, it is clear that extension as
contemplated under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is permissible only for a
period of sixty days. The extension of the
limitation beyond sixty days has to be
read
as
excluded
by
necessary
implication. By virtue of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act read with Section 7(7)
of the Act it has to be learn that there is
no power with the appellate authority to
extend the limitation beyond sixty days.
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
1All] M/s U.P. State Road Transport Corporation V. Ram Prakash and others
83
Case law discussed:
AIR 1991 SC 2156

## Text

http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2005
82
date a certified copy of this order is filed
before him.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.11.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48967 of 2004

M/s
U.P.
State
Road
Transport
Corporation

...Petitioner
Versus
Ram Prakash and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Samir Sharma

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972-S. 7 (7)
read with Limitation Act, 1963-Ss. 29 (2)
and 5-Delay of two years and one month
in filing appeal against order passed for
payment
of
gratuity-Dismissal-Writ
Petition-held, S. 29(2) of Limitation Act
read with S. 7 (7) of payment of Gratuity
Act makes clear that extension under S.
5 of Limitation Act is permissible only for
a period of sixty days-Extension beyond
60 days impliedly excluded-by virtue of
S. 29 (2) of Limitation Act readwith S. 7
(7) of Gratuity Act, Appellate Authority
has no power to extend Limitation
beyond sixty days.

Held: Para 7

By a conjoint reading of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act read with Section 7(7)
of the Act, it is clear that extension as
contemplated under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is permissible only for a
period of sixty days. The extension of the
limitation beyond sixty days has to be
read
as
excluded
by
necessary
implication. By virtue of Section 29(2) of
the Limitation Act read with Section 7(7)
of the Act it has to be learn that there is
no power with the appellate authority to
extend the limitation beyond sixty days.
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
1All] M/s U.P. State Road Transport Corporation V. Ram Prakash and others
83
Case law discussed:
AIR 1991 SC 2156

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ashok Bhushan, J.)

Heard counsel for the petitioner.

1. These two writ petitions raise
similar questions and are being decided
by this common order. It is sufficient to
note facts of Writ Petition No. 48967 of
2004 for disposal of both the writ
petitions.

2. By the writ petition prayer has
been made for quashing the orders dated
18th October, 2001 passed by Controlling
Authority.

3. On an application filed by the
respondents
under
the
Payment
of
Gratuity Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to
as the Act), an order was passed by the
Controlling Authority on 18th October,
2001. Against the said order an appeal
was filed by the petitioner on 17th
December, 2003 i.e., after two years and
one month. The appellate authority has
dismissed the appeal on the ground that
according to Section 7(7) of the Act, the
appellate authority has no jurisdiction to
condone the delay of more than 120 days.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner
contended that Section 5 of the Limitation
Act will be applicable and the appellate
authority
will
have
jurisdiction
to
condone the delay in filing the appeal
even beyond 120 days by aid of Section 5
of the Limitation Act.

5. I have considered the submissions
and perused the record.

Section 7 (7) of the Act provides
appeal against an order passed under subsection (4) within sixty days from the date
of receipt of the order. Section 7 (7) is
extracted below:-
"7. Determination of the amount of
gratuity.-(1)
................................
...............................
(7) Any person aggrieved by an order
under sub-section (4), may, within sixty
days from the date of the receipt of the
order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate
Government or such other authority as
may be specified by the appropriate
Government in this behalf.
Provided
that
the
appropriate
Government or the appellate authority, as
the case may be, may if it is satisfied that
the appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring the appeal within
the said period of sixty days, extend the
said period by a further period of sixty
days.
[Provided further that no appeal by an
employer shall be admitted unless at the
time of preferring the appeal, the
appellant either produces a certificate of
the controlling authority to the effect that
the appellant has deposited with him an
amount equal to the amount of gratuity
required to be deposited under subsection (4), or deposits with the appellate
authority such amount.]"

The first proviso to sub-section (7) of
Section 7 of the Act provides that if the
appellate authority is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient
cause from preferring appeal within the
said period of sixty days, he can extend
the said period by a further period of sixty
days. From a perusal of the said
provision, it is thus clear that power to
condone the delay is only for a further
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2005
84
period of sixty days. Sub-section (7) of
Section 7 of the Act, thus, provides that
provision does not empower condonation
of delay beyond 60 days. In the present
case appeal was filed beyond more than
two years and according to provisions of
sub-section (7) of Section 7 first proviso,
the appellate authority does not have
power to condone the delay beyond sixty
days.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that with the aid of Section
5 of the Limitation Act, the appellate
authority can condone the delay. Section
5 of the Limitation Act provides for
extension of prescribed period in certain
cases. Section 5 of the Limitation Act
provides that appeal may be admitted
after the prescribed period if the appellant
or the applicant satisfies the court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within
such period. Section 29 of the Limitation
Act which is relevant for the purpose is
extracted below:-
"29. Savings.-(1) Nothing in this Act shall
affect Section 25 of the Indian Contract
Act, 1872.
(2) Where any special or local law
prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall
apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the
purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal
or application by any special or local law,
the provisions contained in Sections 4 to
24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as,
and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or
local law.
(3) Save as otherwise provided in any
law for the time being in force with
respect to marriage and divorce, nothing
in this Act shall apply to any suit or other
proceeding under any such law.
(4) Sections 25 and 26 and the definition
of "easement" in Section 2 shall not
apply to cases arising in the territories to
which the Indian Easements Act, 1882,
may for the time being extend."

7. Section 29(2) of the Limitation
Act provides that where any special or
local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or
application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed by the
Schedule, the provisions of Section 3
shall apply as if such period were the
period prescribed by the Schedule and for
the purpose of determining any period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal
or application by any special or local law,
the provisions contained in Sections 4 to
24 shall apply only insofar as, and to the
extent to which they are not expressly
excluded by such special or local law. By
a conjoint reading of Section 29 (2) of the
Limitation Act read with Section 7 (7) of
the Act, it is clear that extension as
contemplated under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act is permissible only for a
period of sixty days. The extension of the
limitation beyond sixty days has to be
read
as
excluded
by
necessary
implication. By virtue of Section 29 (2) of
the Limitation Act read with Section 7 (7)
of the Act it has to be learn that there is
no power with the appellate authority to
extend the limitation beyond sixty days.
The apex Court in AIR 1991 S.C. 2156;
Vinod Gurudas Raikar Vs. National
Insurance Co. Limited and others had
occasion to consider the provisions of
Section 217 and 166 of Motor Vehicle
Act, 1988. The limitation as prescribed
http://www.allahabadhighcourt.nic.in
1All] M/s U.P. State Road Transport Corporation V. Ram Prakash and others
85
was six months from the date of accident.
Section 166(3) of Motor Vehicle Act, as
enacted, provided:-

"166.
Application
for
compensation-(1) ..... .....
.....................................
.....................................
(3). No
application
for
such
compensation shall be entertained unless
it is made within six months of the
occurrence of the accident:
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may
entertain the application after the expiry
of the said period of six months but not
later than twelve months, if it is satisfied
that the applicant was prevented by
sufficient
cause
from
making
the
application in time."

8. In the case before the apex Court
accident took place on 22.1.1989. The
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 came into force
with effect from 1st July, 1989. The period
of limitation for filing a claim petition
both under the old Act and the new Act
being six months, expired on 22.7.1989.
The claim petition was filed belatedly on
15.3.1990 with a prayer for condonation
of delay. The apex Court considering the
provisions of Section 166(3) of Motor
Vehicle Act held that the limitation has to
be governed by the new law and
condonation being permissible only for a
maximum period of one years, the
application
could
not
have
been
entertained for condonation after one year
from the date of accident. The order of the
Claims
Tribunal
dismissing
the
application as barred by time was upheld
by the apex Court. The apex Court in the
said judgment held that question of
condonation of delay must be governed
by new law. The provisions of Section
166(3) of Motor Vehicle Act which was
considered by the apex Court in the said
judgment is almost similar to provisions
of Section 7(7) of the Act which is under
consideration in the present case. The
judgment of the apex Court as mentioned
above, fully supports the view which is
being taken in this case.

9. In view of foregoing discussions,
it is clear that the appeal filed by the
petitioner was rightly dismissed by the
appellate authority. No grounds have been
made out to interfere with the impugned
orders.

The writ petitions lack merit and are
summarily rejected.
Petition Dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.11.2004

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARUN TANDON, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 32167 of 2004

Purnima Singh

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.M. Mishra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Smt. Sunita Agrawal

Deen
Dayal
Upadhyaya
Gorakhpur
University Rules for Admission to B.Ed.
Course-Entrance Examination for B. Ed.
Course-claim of 15% weightage marks
for admission by petitioner on basis of
N.S.S. Certificates signed
issued by
principal of Institution and counter
signed
by
Project
officer-refusal
of
admission by University on ground that
petitioner not entitled to any weightage
marks-Admittedly petitioner had not put