# M/S Universal Cylinders Ltd v. The Presiding Officer Labour Court (2), U.P. Kanpur & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 1 ILRA 1069
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-13
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 15333 of 2019
- **Bench:** Manoj Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-universal-cylinders-ltd-v-the-presiding-officer-labour-court-2-u-p-kanpur-45532
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 - Section 4K - Reference of disputes
to Labour Court or Tribunal - Section 6-A -
award becomes enforceable on the expiry
of 30 days from the date of its publication -
Section
23
-
Power
of
the
state
government to frame rules - The Uttar
Pradesh Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 -
Rule 16 - Labour Court or Tribunal or
Arbitrator may proceed ex-parte - sufficient
cause - application to be filed within 10
days from the date of passing of the order -
The Labour Court/Tribunal is not functus
officio
after
the
award
has
become
enforceable as far as setting aside an ex
parte award is concerned - It is within its
powers to entertain an application as per
the scheme of the Act and in terms of the
rules of natural justice. (Para 9)

The exparte award was passed on20.12.2017
and published on 19.5.2018 and as per Section
6-A, the award becomes enforceable on the
expiry of 30 days from the date of its
publication. The application was filed on
11.6.2018 i.e. before expiry of 30 days from
the date of publication of the award or it
becoming
enforceable
under
law.
The
1070 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application having been filed before the award
became enforceable could not be thrown out
on the ground that it was filed beyond the
period prescribed under Rule 16 (2). (Para 16)

Held:- The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, in
exercise of its ancillary and incidental powers,
on the broader principles contained under
Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is competent to entertain
an application to set aside an exparte order/
award
and
the
said
power
cannot
be
circumscribed by any limitation -The application
filed by the petitioner for setting aside exparte
award allowed. (Para 9 & 19)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1.M.K. Prasad Vs. R. Arumugam, 2001 (3) AWC 2395

2.Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. vs. Phool Chand,
(2018) (16) SCC 567

3.Sangham Tape Company Vs. Hans Raj,
(2005) 9 SCC 331

4.Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi Vs. L.H. Patel,
(2009) 2 SCC 81

5.Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420

## Text

1 All. Smt. Anarkali & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1069

(i) After determination of lease,
lessor or his representative has accepted
rent from lessee or under lessee or assent
to his continuing in possession; and

(ii) Lessee or under-lessee has
remained in possession.

98. None of the above conditions are
attracted/satisfied in this case. Hence
Section 116, TP Act, 1882 is not attracted.
We, therefore, answer third and fourth
questions accordingly.

99. The fifth and last question is
"whether re-entry/resumption of land by
Lessor i.e. State Government is valid?"

100. So far as validity of resumption of land
for 'public purpose' is concerned, it could not be
disputed that land has been sought to be required
by State for 'public purpose'. Allahabad City has
been selected for development as a Smart City and
respondents have pleaded that demand of huge
land has been made by various Government
departments since various Offices, Workshops,
Parks, Parking places etc. have to be constructed.
The land in dispute has been found suitable for
"construction of affordable houses for Weaker
Section under 'Pradhan Mantri Avas Yojana
(Urban)'" which are public purpose. In fact, on this
aspect, no substantial argument has been made and
in our view, resumption of land by State is for
'public purpose'.

101. In the result, all the writ
petitions lack merit. Dismissed.

102. However, considering the facts
and circumstances and also the fact that
petitioners already enjoyed interim order
passed by this Court and continued in
possession over land in dispute for the last
almost more than a year, we direct petitioners
to vacate disputed land within one month from
the date of delivery of judgment.
----------
(2020)1ILR 1069

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.

Writ C No. 15333 of 2019

M/S Universal Cylinders Ltd. ...Petitioner
Versus
The Presiding Officer Labour Court (2),
U.P. Kanpur & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Vijay Kumar Ojha

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ranjeet Kumar Mishra

A. Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 - Section 4K - Reference of disputes
to Labour Court or Tribunal - Section 6-A -
award becomes enforceable on the expiry
of 30 days from the date of its publication -
Section
23
-
Power
of
the
state
government to frame rules - The Uttar
Pradesh Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 -
Rule 16 - Labour Court or Tribunal or
Arbitrator may proceed ex-parte - sufficient
cause - application to be filed within 10
days from the date of passing of the order -
The Labour Court/Tribunal is not functus
officio
after
the
award
has
become
enforceable as far as setting aside an ex
parte award is concerned - It is within its
powers to entertain an application as per
the scheme of the Act and in terms of the
rules of natural justice. (Para 9)

The exparte award was passed on20.12.2017
and published on 19.5.2018 and as per Section
6-A, the award becomes enforceable on the
expiry of 30 days from the date of its
publication. The application was filed on
11.6.2018 i.e. before expiry of 30 days from
the date of publication of the award or it
becoming
enforceable
under
law.
The
1070 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application having been filed before the award
became enforceable could not be thrown out
on the ground that it was filed beyond the
period prescribed under Rule 16 (2). (Para 16)

Held:- The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, in
exercise of its ancillary and incidental powers,
on the broader principles contained under
Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is competent to entertain
an application to set aside an exparte order/
award
and
the
said
power
cannot
be
circumscribed by any limitation -The application
filed by the petitioner for setting aside exparte
award allowed. (Para 9 & 19)

Writ Petition allowed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1.M.K. Prasad Vs. R. Arumugam, 2001 (3) AWC 2395

2.Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. vs. Phool Chand,
(2018) (16) SCC 567

3.Sangham Tape Company Vs. Hans Raj,
(2005) 9 SCC 331

4.Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi Vs. L.H. Patel,
(2009) 2 SCC 81

5.Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp SCC 420

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar
Gupta, J.)

1. By means of instant petition, the
petitioner has called in question the order
dated 14.2.2019 passed by Presiding
Officer, Labour Court II, U.P. Kanpur
rejecting the application of the petitioner
praying for setting aside the exparte award
dated 20.12.2017 (published on the notice
board on 19.5.2018) in Adjudication Case
No.33 of 2015.

2. The background facts leading to
the instant petition are that respondent
no.2 raised an industrial dispute alleging
that he was appointed on the post of
Mistri/Mechanic by respondent no.3 in the
month of February, 1991; that he worked
till 31.10.2014; that his service was
illegally terminated without passing any
order in writing on 1.11.2014. The
application
filed
in
this
regard
by
respondent no.2 dated 13.3.2015 was
registered as C.P. Case No.47 of 2015. On
10.8.2015,
respondent
no.2
sought
impleadment of the petitioner in C.P. Case
No.47 of 2015. Since the conciliation
proceedings did not yield any result,
therefore, the dispute was referred under
Section 4-K for adjudication by the Labour
Court and it came to be registered as
Adjudication Case No.33 of 2015. The
petitioner
was
represented
by
Sri
Gyaneshwar Mishra. According to the
petitioner, Sri Gyaneshwar Mishra, due to
his personal problems, could not attend the
case on regular basis and later, abstained
from appearing in the case without any
information to the petitioner, resulting in
an exparte award dated 20.12.2017 being
passed against it. The Labour Court
directed for reinstatement of respondent
no.2 with continuity of service and full
back wages. According to the petitioner, it
came to know of the exparte award when
copy of the same was received by it on
26.5.2018. On 11.6.2018, it moved an
application for setting aside the exparte
award alongwith affidavit of Manager
(Operation). The application was opposed
by respondent no.2. The Labour Court by
impugned
order
rejected
the
said
application holding that the explanation
furnished for non-appearance is not
satisfactory and also on the ground that
under Rule 16 (2) of the Rules framed
under the Act, an application praying for
setting aside of exparte award could be
filed only within ten days from the date of
publication of the award. In other words,
the view taken is that after expiry of the
time prescribed under Rule 16 (2), the
1 All. M/S Universal Cylinders Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Officer Labour Court (2), U.P. Kanpur & Ors.
1071
award had become enforceable rendering
the Labour Court functus officio to
entertain or decide any application.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that in the first place the Labour
Court has committed a manifest illegality
in ignoring cogent explanation offered by
the petitioner entitling it to a hearing and
case being decided on merits. In support of
the said submission, he has placed reliance
on the judgement of the Apex Court in
M.K. Prasad Vs. R. Arumugam, 2001
(3) AWC 2395. In addition, it is urged that
the law that after publication of award and
expiry of the prescribed period, the award
becomes enforceable rendering the Labour
Court/Tribunal functus officio is no longer
good law in view of the recent decision of
the Supreme Court in Haryana Suraj
Malting Ltd. vs. Phool Chand, (2018)
(16) SCC 567.

4. On the other hand, learned counsel
for the respondent workman submitted that
the Labour Court has rightly discarded the
explanation furnished by the petitioner for
its non-appearance when the matter was
taken up for hearing. He further submitted
that the other reasoning given by the
Labour Court that the application was not
entertainable in view of Rule 16 (2), as it
was filed beyond ten days from the date of
passing of the award, is also perfectly legal
and valid.

5. The judgement of the Supreme
Court in Haryana Suraj Malting Ltd. is
by a Larger Bench of Three Judges
resolving divergent views in Sangham
Tape Company Vs. Hans Raj, (2005) 9
SCC 331 and Radhakrishna Mani
Tripathi Vs. L.H. Patel, (2009) 2 SCC
81. The reference to the Larger Bench was
made
for
answering
the
following
question:-

"1.
Whether
the
Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court becomes functus
officio
after
30
days
of
the
pronouncement/publication of the award
and loses all powers to recall an ex parte
award on an application made by the
aggrieved party after 30 days from the
date of pronouncement/publication of the
award is the question that once again
arises for consideration in these cases."

6. It is pertinent to note paras 2 and 3
of the referring order to have an insight
into the background in which two
conflicting views were taken:-

"2. It may be noted that on this
question two Division Bench decisions
have taken apparently conflicting views. In
Sangham Tape Co. v. Hans Raj a twoJudge Bench held and observed that an
application for recall of an ex parte award
may be entertained by the Industrial
Tribunal/Labour Court only in case it is
filed before the expiry of 30 days from the
date of pronouncement/ publication of the
award. A contrary view was taken in
Radhakrishna Mani Tripathi v. L.H. Patel
to which one of us (Aftab Alam, J.) was a
party.

3. In both cases, that is to say,
Sangham Tape Co. and Radhakrishna
Mani Tripathi, the Court referred to and
relied upon the earlier decisions in
Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt.
Industrial Tribunal and Anil Sood v.
Labour Court but read and interpreted
those
two
decisions
completely
differently."
1072 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

7. The Larger Bench of the Supreme
Court, while answering the reference, took
into consideration virtually all previous
judgements on the point and thereafter
observed as follows:-

"31. Therefore, all the decisions
hereinabove noted by us referred to
Grindlays (supra). On a close reading of
paragraph-14 of Grindlays (supra), in the
background of the analysis of law under
paragraphs-10 to 13, it is difficult for us to
comprehend that the power to set aside an
ex parte award is not available to a
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal. On the
principles of natural justice, and on a
purposive interpretation of the scheme of
the Act and Rules, we find it difficult also
to discern that the ratio of the decision in
Grindlays (supra), is what is stated in
paragraph-14 to the extent that an
application for setting aside an ex parte
award has to be filed within 30 days of
publication of the award. On the contrary,
the ratio in Grindlays (supra) is that the
Tribunal can exercise its ancillary and
incidental
powers,
on
the
broader
principles contained under Order IX Rule
13 of the CPC. No doubt, the Limitation
Act, 1963 is not applicable to the Labour
Court/Tribunal."

8. Thereafter, the Larger Bench laid
down its conclusions in paragraphs 34, 35
and 37 of the Law Report as follows:-

"34. In case a party is in a
position to show sufficient cause for its
absence before the Labour Court/Tribunal
when it was set ex parte, the Labour
Court/Tribunal, in exercise of its ancillary
or incidental powers, is competent to
entertain such an application. That power
cannot be circumscribed by limitation.
What is the sufficient cause and whether
its jurisdiction is invoked within a
reasonable time should be left to the
judicious
discretion
of
the
Labour
Court/Tribunal.

35. It is a matter of natural
justice that any party to the judicial
proceedings should get an opportunity of
being heard, and if such an opportunity
has been denied for want of sufficient
reason, the Labour Court/Tribunal which
denied such an opportunity, being satisfied
of the sufficient cause and within a
reasonable time, should be in a position to
set right its own procedure. Otherwise, as
held in Grindlays [Grindlays Bank Ltd. v.
Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980
Supp SCC 420 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 309] ,
an award which may be a nullity will have
to be technically enforced. It is difficult to
comprehend such a situation under law.

37. Merely because an award
has
become
enforceable,
does
not
necessarily mean that it has become
binding. For an award to become binding,
it should be passed in compliance with the
principles of natural justice. An award
passed denying an opportunity of hearing
when there was a sufficient cause for nonappearance can be challenged on the
ground of it being nullity. An award which
is a nullity cannot be and shall not be a
binding award. In case a party is able to
show sufficient cause within a reasonable
time for its non-appearance in the Labour
Court/Tribunal when it was set ex parte,
the Labour Court/Tribunal is bound to
consider such an application and the
application cannot be rejected on the
ground that it was filed after the award
had become enforceable. The Labour
Court/Tribunal is not functus officio after
the award has become enforceable as far
as setting aside an ex parte award is
concerned. It is within its powers to
entertain an application as per the scheme
1 All. M/S Universal Cylinders Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Officer Labour Court (2), U.P. Kanpur & Ors.
1073
of the Act and in terms of the rules of
natural justice. It needs to be restated that
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a
welfare legislation intended to maintain
industrial peace. In that view of the
matter, certain powers to do justice have
to
be
conceded
to
the
Labour
Court/Tribunal,
whether
we
call
it
ancillary, incidental or inherent."

9. It is thus well settled now that the
Labour
Court/Industrial
Tribunal,
in
exercise of its ancillary and incidental
powers, is competent to entertain an
application to set aside an exparte order/
award and the said power cannot be
circumscribed by any limitation. The ratio
in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central
Govt. Industrial Tribunal, 1980 Supp
SCC 420, as interpreted by the Larger
Bench is that the Tribunal can exercise the
said power on the broader principles
contained under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.
The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963
do not apply to the Labour Court/
Tribunal. In case a party is in position to
show sufficient cause for its absence
before the Labour Court/Tribunal, it is
competent to entertain such application
and exercise its judicious discretion to find
out whether the party has approached
within reasonable time and whether
sufficient cause has been shown or not.
Merely because an award has become
enforceable upon expiry of 30 days from
the date of its publication would not mean
that it has also become binding on the
party seeking recall of the exparte
order/award. For an award to become
binding, it should have been passed in
compliance with the principles of natural
justice. An award passed denying an
opportunity of hearing when there was a
sufficient cause for non-appearance can be
challenged on the ground of it being
nullity. An award which is a nullity cannot
be and shall not be a binding award. In
case a party is able to show sufficient
cause within a reasonable time for its nonappearance in the Labour Court/Tribunal
when it was set ex parte, the Labour
Court/Tribunal is bound to consider such
an application and the application cannot
be rejected on the ground that it was filed
after the award had become enforceable.
The Labour Court/Tribunal is not functus
officio after the award has become
enforceable as far as setting aside an ex
parte award is concerned. It is within its
powers to entertain an application as per
the scheme of the Act and in terms of the
rules of natural justice. The judgment in
Suraj Malting was rendered in context of
the Central Act (Industrial Disputes Act,
1947). The instant Act applicable in U.P.
contains pari materia provisions, some of
which are relevant to note.

10. Section 5-C (3) invests the Labour
Court/Tribunal with the same powers as are
vested in a Civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 when trying a suit in respect of
following matters, namely:-

"(a) enforcing the attendance of
any person and examining him on oath or
affirmation or otherwise;

(b) requiring the discovery and
production of documents and material objects;

(c) issuing commissions for the
examination of witnesses;

(d) inspection of any property or
thing including machinery concerning any
such dispute; and

(e) in respect of such other
matters as may be prescribed;"
1074 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. Section 6 of the Act lays down
the manner in which award is to be given
and published. Sub-section (3) provides
that every award shall within a period of
30 days of its receipt by the State
Government be published in such manner
as the State Government thinks fit. Under
sub-section (4), the State Government has
been invested with power to a limited
extent
and
upon
factors
mentioned
thereunder, to remit the award for
reconsideration. An award published as
per provisions of Section 6-A has been
given

finality subject to clerical or arithmetical
errors being corrected, in which case,
again the procedure relating to publication
of award has to be followed. Section 6-A
provides for commencement of the award.
The relevant part of Section 6-A is as
follows:-

"6-A. Commencement of the
award. - (1) An award (including an
arbitration
award)
shall
become
enforceable on the expiry of thirty days
from the date of its publication under
Section 6:"

12. Section 6-D is also worth
noticing, which reads thus:-

"6-D.
Commencement
and
conclusion of proceeding. - Proceedings
before a Labour Court or Tribunal shall
be deemed to have commenced on the date
of reference of a dispute to adjudication,
and such proceedings shall be deemed to
have concluded on the date on which the
award becomes enforceable under Section
6-A."

13. The State Government has
framed Rules in exercise of power under
Section 23 of the Act. Rule 16 of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Rules, 1957 framed by
the State Government, on which reliance
has been placed in the impugned order,
reads thus:-

"16. Labour Court or Tribunal
or Arbitrator may proceed ex-parte. - (1)
If, on the date fixed or on any other date to
which the hearing maybe adjourned, any
party to the proceedings before the Labour
Court or Tribunal or an Arbitrator is
absent, though duly served with summons
or having the notice of date of hearing, the
Labour
Court
or
Tribunal
or
the
Arbitrator, as the case may be, may
proceed with the case in his absence and
pass such order as it may deem fit and
proper.

(2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or an
Arbitrator may set aside the order passed against
the party in his absence, if within ten days of such
order, the party applies in writing for setting
aside such order and shows sufficient cause for
his absence. The Labour Court, Tribunal or an
Arbitrator may require the party to file an
affidavit, setting the cause of absence. As many
copies of the application and affidavit, if any,
shall be filed by the party concerned as there are
persons on the opposite side. Notice of the
application shall be given to the opposite parties
before setting aside the order."

14. Again, under Rule 21, the Labour
Courts/Tribunals have been invested with
the power of a civil court in respect of
discovery and inspection; granting of
adjournment; reception of evidence taken
on affidavit.

15. Rule 16 is the source of power of
the Labour Court/Tribunal to proceed with
the case in absence of a party duly served
with summons or having notice of date of
hearing. It has also been conferred power
to set aside the order passed against the
1 All. M/S Universal Cylinders Ltd. Vs. The Presiding Officer Labour Court (2), U.P. Kanpur & Ors.
1075
party in his absence provided sufficient
cause is shown for absence. The Rule
provides that such application has to be
filed within 10 days from the date of
passing of the order. The said time limit, in
my opinion, is not an embargo placed
upon
the
Labour
Court/Tribunal
to
entertain application even if the delay in
filing such application is sufficiently
explained. If the application is filed within
10 days, the party will not be asked to
explain why it had not approached earlier,
but it has only to show sufficient cause for
its absence. However, after 10 days, the
party seeking setting aside of an exparte
order, apart from showing sufficient cause
for non-appearance, will also have to
furnish
explanation
for
not
filing
application within 10 days. This is all that
the provision means in prescribing a time
limit for filing the application. Any other
interpretation would be contrary to the
broad principles laid down by the Supreme
Court in Suraj Malting and would render
the provision illegal and ultra vires. The
above interpretation, while obviating the
need to strike down the provision, would
offer a practical solution and also subserve
the ends of justice. Take for instance a
case where a party is not duly served with
summons and comes to know of the
exparte award or the order to proceed
exparte after expiry of 10 days. In such a
case, if the time limit prescribed under
Rule 16 (2) is held to be sacrosanct, the
Labour
Court/Tribunal
would
stand
denuded of its power to set aside the
exparte order/award. It would be against
basic tenets of jurisprudence that dispute
between the parties should be decided after
due service of notice and opportunity of
hearing to both the sides. Rule 16 (2) was
thus not an impediment in the way of the
Labour
Court
in
entertaining
the
application filed by the petitioner for
setting aside the exparte award or deciding
the same on merits. The view taken to the
contrary is manifestly illegal.

16. In the instant matter, it is worth
noticing that the award was published on
19.5.2018 and as per Section 6-A, the
award becomes enforceable on the expiry
of 30 days from the date of its publication.
The application was filed on 11.6.2018 i.e.
before expiry of 30 days from the date of
publication of the award or its becoming
enforceable under law. In such view of the
matter, even otherwise, the application
having been filed before the award became
enforceable could not be thrown out on the
ground that it was filed beyond the period
prescribed under Rule 16 (2).

17. Coming to the second aspect as to
whether
the
Labour
Court/Tribunal
committed any error in declining to accept
the explanation offered by the petitioner
for its non-appearance, it is worthwhile to
note the exact explanation offered by the
petitioner for its non-appearance. The case
taken by the petitioner in this regard was
that it came to know of exparte award on
26.5.2018. Its Manager Mahendra Singh
Shekhawat (who filed affidavit in support
of the application) met the authorised
representative Sri Gyaneshwar Mishra. At
that stage, he informed the Manager that
since 5th July, 2017 he had to make
frequent visits to his home district Jaunpur
on account of personal work and that he
had deputed his junior to do pairvi in the
case, but who did not discharge the
responsibility properly. Thereafter, the
Manager
requested
the
authorised
representative to take appropriate steps so
that the matter is decided on merits, but he
expressed his inability and said that he will
not be able to take any step in this regard
till August, 2018 as he will remain busy
1076 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
with his personal work. Thereafter, the
petitioner Company approached another
person to act as its representative and got
the application filed without any further
delay on 11.6.2018. The Labour Court has
observed that the petitioner has offered a
confusing explanation and in case it was
having knowledge that its authorised
representative was visiting his home
district on regular basis, it ought to have
authorised another person to act on its
behalf.
Evidently,
the
Tribunal
has
completely
misread
the
explanation
offered by the petitioner. In M.K. Prasad
(supra) where also explanation offered
was that the counsel did not appear after a
particular date to contest the case without
any information to the party, the Supreme
Court has observed thus:-

"10. In the instant case, the
appellant tried to explain the delay in
filing the application for setting aside the
ex-parte decree as is evident from his
application filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act accompanied by his own
affidavit. Even though the appellant
appears not to be as vigilant as he ought
to have been, yet his conduct does not, on
the whole, warrant to castigate him as an
irresponsible litigant. He should have been
more vigilant but on his failure to adopt
such extra vigilance should not have been
made a ground for ousting him from the
litigation with respect to the property,
concededly to be valuable..."

18. In my opinion, it is a fit case where the
explanation offered has to be accepted in the
interest of justice. While at the same time, the
inconvenience cause to the respondent workman
could be compensated in terms of cost.

19. Accordingly, the application dated
11.6.2018 filed by the petitioner for setting
aside exparte award is allowed. The exparte
award dated 20.12.2017 is set aside subject to
payment of a cost of Rs.5000/- to the
respondent-workman within three weeks from
today. The Tribunal shall now decide the
matter afresh, after providing opportunity of
hearing to both the sides.

20. The writ petition stands allowed
accordingly.
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(2020)1ILR 1076

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 08.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
THE HON'BLE VIPIN CHANDRA DIXIT, J.

Writ C No. 17774 of 2013

Kul Bhushan Virmani & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad U.P.
& Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri S.P. Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.,
Sri
Satish
Madhyan,
Sri
M.C.
Chaturvedi

A. Petitioner's bid for purchase of the
house was accepted-allotted the housePetitioner
paid
the
entire
sale
consideration of Rs. 4,75,000/--given
possession-sale
deed
not
executedadditional amount of Rs. 1,35,607/- for
getting sale deed registered -Respondent
obliged to execute the sale deed in favour
of the Petitioner without any additional
amount.

Writ Petition allowed. (E-9)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Mithal, J. &
Hon'ble Vipin Chandra Dixit, J.)