# M/s Vidyawati Construction Co v. Union of India and others

- **Citation:** (2002) 2 ILRA 329
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2002-03-05
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7299 of 2002
- **Bench:** S.R. Singh, S.P. Mehrotra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-vidyawati-construction-co-v-union-of-india-and-others-39830
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Land Acquisition Act- Section 18- even if
the reference is wrongly made by the
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
330
Collector, the court will still have to
determine
its
validity
for
the
very
jurisdiction of the court to hear a
reference, depends on a proper reference
being made under section 189 and if
reference is not proper, the court will
have
no
jurisdiction
to
hear
the
reference.

Held in para 4

It goes without saying that in case the
Court converges to the conclusion that
references should have been made by
the Special Land Acquisition Officer
within
the
period
of
three
years
prescribed by Article 137 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1963 it would decline to
answer the reference. In case, it is held
by the civil court that Article 137
prescribes
Limitation
for
making
application for which no limitation is
prescribed and is not intended to lay
down a limitation for making an order of
reference, it would proceed to answer
the reference in accordance with law.

## Text

2 All] M/s Vidyawati Construction Co. Vs. Union of India and others
329
16.1.1996 to be effective from 25.1.1996.
The second Ordinance came into force on
26.3.1996 and it was replaced by a third
Ordinance on 26.6.1996. All these three
Ordinances were made effective from
25.1.1996. The first Ordinance itself had
repealed the Act of 1940. The new Act
numbered as 26 of 1996 received the
assent of the President on 16.8.1996 and
was
published
in
the
Gazette
on
19.8.1996. The notification reads as
under:-

"In exercise of the powers conferred
by sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
(26 of 1996) the Central Government
hereby appoints the 22nd day of August
1996 as the date on which the said Act
shall come into force.

7. As the old Act stood repealed
w.e.f. 25.1.1996 and the Ordinances
referred to above, were effective, the
Arbitral proceedings shall be deemed to
have been commenced under the Act of
1996 and the provisions of 1996 Act will
be applicable. The controversy has now
been settled by the decision of the Apex
Court in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. vs.
Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001) 6 Supreme
Court Cases 356 wherein the award was
given on 13.8.1996 and, thereafter the
execution proceedings were commenced.
It was urged that as the award was given
on 13.8.1996, the Act of 1940 was
applicable.
Their
Lordships
of
the
Supreme Court held that the Act of 1996
was a continuation of the Ordinance and
deemed to have been effective from
25.1.1996 and the execution application
under the Act of 1996 was applicable.

8.

Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent has placed reliance upon the
decision Shetty's Construction Co. Vs.
Konkan Railway Construction and
others 1998 (5) SCC 599 wherein it was
held that if the request is made prior to the
commencement of Act of 1996 then the
proceedings could be governed by the Old
Act. In this case it was not shown that the
proceedings were started after 25.1.1996.
This case has no application to the facts of
the present case. In the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the Act
of 1996 shall be applicable.

9. Sri P.K. Sharma was appointed as
Umpire by this Court. There was no
dispute regarding the proposal of his
name. He shall now be treated as
Presiding Arbitrator of the Tribunal
instead of Umpire.

10. The application is, accordingly,
allowed and the parties shall bear their
own costs.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.03.2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE S.R. SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE S.P. MEHROTRA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 7299 of 2002

Ghaziabad
Development
Authority,
Ghaziabad

...Petitioner
Versus
Umesh Chand and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ajay Kumar Misra

Counsel for the Respondents:
S.C.

Land Acquisition Act- Section 18- even if
the reference is wrongly made by the
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
330
Collector, the court will still have to
determine
its
validity
for
the
very
jurisdiction of the court to hear a
reference, depends on a proper reference
being made under section 189 and if
reference is not proper, the court will
have
no
jurisdiction
to
hear
the
reference.

Held in para 4

It goes without saying that in case the
Court converges to the conclusion that
references should have been made by
the Special Land Acquisition Officer
within
the
period
of
three
years
prescribed by Article 137 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1963 it would decline to
answer the reference. In case, it is held
by the civil court that Article 137
prescribes
Limitation
for
making
application for which no limitation is
prescribed and is not intended to lay
down a limitation for making an order of
reference, it would proceed to answer
the reference in accordance with law.

(Delivered by Hon'ble S.R. Singh, J.)

1. Since common questions of law
are involved in these writ petitions, and
the facts in the petitions being identical
they are amenable to common disposal by
a composite judgment and order. Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No. 7299 of 2002
shall be the leading petition and the
decision in this petition will branch out to
have its consequential effects on all the
petitions aforestated. These petitions
under Article 226 of the Constitution
instituted by the Ghaziabad Development
Authority, Ghaziabad seek issuance of a
writ in the nature of certiorari quashing
the order dated 6.1.2002 (annexure 1 to
the petition) passed by Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Ghaziabad/ Addl.
District Magistrate (Land Acquisition)
(Irrigation) Ghaziabad whereby the latter
has made reference to the civil court
under section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act 1894 on the applications moved by
individual
land
holders
of
village
Makanpur,
Tahsil
Dadri
District
Ghaziabad against the award dated 30th
July 1991 made by the Special Land
Acquisition
Officer
(Irrigation)
Ghaziabad in different cases relating to
land situated in village Makanpur Pergana
Loni Tahsil Dadri District Ghaziabad.

2. We have heard Sri A.K. Misra,
Learned
counsel
representing
the
petitioners, standing counsel representing
the State authorities, and perused the writ
petition. Sri A.K. Misra has submitted
that award in the case was given in the
year 1991 and the reference made vide
impugned orders (of different dates
separately stated in all the petitions
aforestated and the order dated 6.1.2002
being the impugned order in writ petition
no. 7299 of 2002) being barred by time, is
without jurisdiction. The application for
reference, it appears, was filed on
9.9.1991, but the order of reference was
made on 16.1.2001 (in writ petition no.
7299 of 2002). The question that surfaces
for consideration is whether any limit is
prescribed for making reference under
section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
Placing reliance on the decisions of the
Supreme Court in Karala State Electricity
Board v. T.P. Kunhallunima, and Addl.
Spl.
Land
Acquisition
Officer
v.
Thakoredas, Sri A.K. Misra has submitted
that though section 18 by itself prescribes
limitation for making an application for
reference and does not prescribe any time
limit within which the Collector or for
that
purpose,
the
Special
Land
Acquisition
Officer
should make a
reference, the provisions of Article 137 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 could be
attracted and, therefore, proceeds the
2 All] Ghaziabad Development Authority, Ghaziabad Vs. Umesh Chand and others
331
submission, the reference made by the
Special Land Acquisition Officer in the
instant case, beyond the period of three
years was obviously barred by time and
hence the referring orders impugned
herein are without jurisdiction. The
Standing counsel representing the State
and the Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Ghaziabad in opposition has submitted
that proviso to Section 18 of the Land
Acquisition
Act,
1894
prescribes
limitation for the purposes of moving an
application and does not prescribe a
limitation within which the collector, or
for that purpose the Special Land
Acquisition Officer should pass an order
making a reference under the section.
Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963, it
has been submitted by the Standing
Counsel, could be invoked for the purpose
of making an application and not for the
purpose of making an order of reference
under section 18 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. The learned Standing Counsel
also submits that the decision in Addl.
Special Acquisition Officer Bangalore
(supra) and the one in Kerala State
Electricity Board (supra) relied upon by
Sri A.K. Misra were rendered while
interpreting the provisions of section 18
(3) (b) of the Karnataka Act 17 of 1961
and Sec. 16 (3) of the Telegraphic Act,
1885 respectively and are not intended for
application to the constructions of Sec. 18
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as is
applicable to the State of U.P. In the
rejoinder, it was submitted by Sri A.K.
Misra that the plea sought to be raised
herein could be raised by the petitioner
even before the Court.

3. We have given our anxious
consideration to the submissions made
across the bar. In Mohd. Hasnuddin v.
State of Maharashtra the Supreme Court
has held that the power of Collector to
make reference under section 18 is
circumscribed by the condition laid down
therein and making of an application for
reference within the time prescribed by
the proviso to Sec. 18 (2) is a sine qua
non for a valid reference by the Collector.
In fact, there is no quarrel with the
proposition that the power of the
Collector to make a reference under
section 18 is circumscribed by the
condition
laid
down
therein
and,
therefore, it necessarily follows that the
application for reference must be filed
within the period prescribed by the
proviso to Sec. 18 (2) of the Land
Acquisition Act but what has been
submitted by Sri A.K. Misra appearing for
the petitioner, is that referring order
should be made within the period
prescribed by Article 137 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1963 for no time limit is
prescribed for that purpose under the
provisions of the L.A. Act 1894.

4. In Mohd. Hasnuddin (supra), it
has been held that even if the reference is
wrongly made by the Collector, the Court
will still have to determine its validity for
the very jurisdiction of the Court to hear
reference, depends on a proper reference
being made under section 189 and if
reference is not proper, the court will have
no jurisdiction to hear the reference. We,
therefore, feel persuaded to the view that
in
case
any
objection
regarding
competence
or
maintainability
of
reference is preferred on behalf of the
petitioners before the court hearing the
reference, the court will decide such
objection as a preliminary issue. It goes
without saying that in case the court
converges to the conclusion that reference
should have been made by the Special
Land Acquisition Officer within the
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2002
332
period of three years prescribed by Article
137 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 it
would decline to answer the reference. In
case, it is held by the civil court that
Article 137 prescribes limitation for
making
application
for
which
no
limitation is prescribed and is not
intended to lay down a limitation for
making an order of reference, it would
proceed to answer the reference in
accordance with law.

5. The petitions are dismissed
without prejudice to the rights of the
petitioners
to
raise
the
plea
of
maintainability of reference before the
civil court and subject to the direction that
if any such plea is raised by the
petitioners, the civil court will examine
and decide the same in accordance with
law. It may however, be clarified that any
observation made in this order will not
impinge upon the aspects required to be
decided by the civil court on merits of the
issues involved in the case.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 21 MARCH, 2002

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE J.C. GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE K.K. MISRA, J.

Criminal Misc. Habeas Corpus Writ
Petition No. 23183 of 2001

Mohammad Suleman

...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. through Principal Secretary
and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Daya Shanker Misra
Sri M.A. Qadeer
Sri Chandrakesh Misra

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Mahendra Pratap
A.G.A.

Under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution
of India - Detention under section 3(2)
of N.S.A. (National Security Act) In the
absence of copies of petitioner's bail
application and the comments of police
thereon the petitioner was certainly
denied the right of making an effective
representation and accordingly Article 22
(5) of the Constitution of India has been
violated.

The impugned order of detention is not
sustainable on account of vital and
relevant material having been not placed
before the detaining authority viz-a viz
each of the five grounds on the basis of
which the impugned detention order was
made. The continued detention of the
petitioner
also
stands
vitiated
on
account of the fact that even if each
ground of detention is taken as a
separate
order
of
detention,
the
petitioner was not supplied with the
relevant documents to enable him to
make an effective representation against
each of the grounds of detention and
thereby the right conferred upon him
under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution
of India has been infringed.
Case law discussed:
1985 SCC (Criminal) 125,
2001 (42) ACC 995, 2000 (40) ACC 729,
1988 SCC (Crl.) 107, 1990 SCC (Crl.) 258,
2002 (2) JT SC 365

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.C. Gupta, J.)

1. The petitioner- Mohd. Suleman
has been detained under section 3 (2) of
the
National
Security
Act,
1980,
hereinafter referred to as 'NSA' on the
basis of order dated 8.4.2001 passed by
Sri B.S. Bhullar, the then District
Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar which was
served upon the petitioner alongwith the
grounds of detention. The grounds of