# M/s Virola International v. Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 4 ILRA 1667
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-04-29
- **Case number:** Transfer Application (Civil) No. 140 of 2026
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/m-s-virola-international-v-smt-sunita-sachdeva-ors-54416
- **Pages:** 16

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4 All. M/s Virola International Vs. Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors.
1667
----------
(2026) 4 ILRA 1667
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 29.04.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Transfer Application (Civil) No. 140 of 2026

M/s Virola International ...Applicant
Versus
Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Issue for Consideration
Whether continuation of the proceedings before the same forum has become impracticable from the
standpoint of maintaining confidence in the adjudicatory process

Head Notes
The Code of Civil Procedure,1908-Section 24; The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996- Section
37(2)(b)-That transfer of a case on the ground of bias, particularly when directed against a
Presiding Officer, is a matter of serious consequence. Such an order, if passed without adequate
basis, has the potential to cast unwarranted aspersions on the integrity and independence of the
judicial officer concerned. The power under Section 24 CPC, though wide, is to be exercised with
circumspection and only in cases where the ends of justice so demand on the basis of cogent and
compelling circumstances. Allegations touching upon the impartiality of a judicial officer are
required to be made with due care and circumspection, and must be founded on cogent material.
Such pleas, if resting on vague or unsubstantiated assertions, carry the potential to undermine
confidence in the judicial process and ought not to be lightly entertained.

Accepting allegations of the present nature, which are neither supported by material nor
demonstrative of any real prejudice, would open the door to litigants seeking transfer on
tenuous grounds, thereby encouraging forum shopping and impeding the orderly administration
of justice. The Court cannot permit its process to be invoked in a manner that undermines the
confidence in the institutional framework of the judiciary.

Held- Applicant have failed to make out any case warranting transfer of the proceedings. The apprehension
expressed by them is neither reasonable nor substantiated so as to justify exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 24 CPC.
 Application dismissed. (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Ram Jethmalani (1979) 4 SCC 167; P.K. Ghosh v. J.G. Rajput (1995) 6 SCC 744;
State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak (1998) 5 SCC 513; Kulwinder Kaur v. Kandi Friends Education
Trust (2008) 3 SCC 659; Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611; State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna
(2001) 2 SCC 330; Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration (1894) 1 QB 750;
Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577; (2000) 7 SCC129 R. Balakrishna Pillai v.
State of Kerala; Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant (2001) 1 SCC 182; R v. Sussex
Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256; Porter v. Magill (2002) 2 AC 357 (HL); Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v.
Bayfield Properties Ltd (2000) QB 451; Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration
1668 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(1894) 1 QB 750; Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon (1969) 1 QB 577; Liteky v. United States
510 US 540 (1994); Ebner v. Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Polsen v Harrison (2021)
NSWCA 23; BW v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (2024) NSWSC 1354; Isbester v Knox
City Council (2015) 255 CLR

List of Acts
The Code of Civil Procedure,1908- The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

List of Keywords
Transfer on ground of "Bias": Against Presiding Officer: Must be founded on cogent material; Vague or
unsubstantiated assertions; Carry the potential to undermine confidence in the judicial process

Case Arising From
Transfer application has been preferred by the applicant/appellant under Section 24 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 19081 , seeking transfer of proceedings arising out of Arbitration Appeal No.15 of 2025, instituted
under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, presently pending before the Court of
Presiding Officer, Commercial Court No. 1, Agra

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Applicant(s) : Rishabh Agarwal
Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : Ajay Kumar Pandey

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Anil Tiwari, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Sri Rishabh Agarwal,
for the applicant and Sri Rakesh Pande, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Sri Ajay
Kumar Pandey, for the opposite parties.

2. The present transfer application has been preferred by the applicant/appellant under Section
24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19081, seeking transfer of proceedings arising out of Arbitration
Appeal No.15 of 2025, instituted under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, presently pending before the Court of Presiding Officer, Commercial Court No. 1, Agra. The
principal relief sought is for transfer of the said proceedings to the Court of Commercial Court No.
2, Agra, or to any other court of competent jurisdiction, in order to secure a fair, impartial and
unbiased adjudication of the dispute.

3. A supplementary affidavit has also been filed on behalf of the applicant bringing on record
certain additional facts. Counsel for respondent no.1 has filed a short counter affidavit placing on
record the order-sheets of the case in question. Counsel for the applicant has stated that no rejoinder
affidavit was required, inasmuch as only order-sheets were being brought on record.

4. The dispute arises out of a commercial transaction between M/s Virola International
(applicant/appellant) and Smt. Sunita Sachdeva (respondent). The respondent invoked arbitration
by instituting Arbitration Case No. 06 of 2023 before a learned Sole Arbitrator, seeking recovery of
substantial amounts towards alleged capital balance and unsecured loans. Along with the statement
of claim dated 28.11.2023, an application under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 was also filed seeking interim directions for payment of approximately Rs.15.85 crores along
with interest.
4 All. M/s Virola International Vs. Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors.
1669

5. The applicant entered appearance before the learned Arbitral Tribunal and contested the
proceedings, including filing objections to the application under Section 17. The learned Arbitral
Tribunal, by order dated 06.07.2024, partly allowed the said application and directed the applicant
to pay a sum of Rs.8,88,75,863/- towards capital balance and Rs.5,95,99,772/- towards unsecured
loans.

6. Aggrieved thereby, the applicant preferred an appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Commercial Court at Agra, which was registered
as Arbitration Appeal No. 15 of 2025. Along with the appeal, an application for interim stay of the
impugned arbitral order was also filed. The respondent entered appearance and filed objections, to
which the applicant filed a rejoinder.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the case has been listed on several dates
before the Court of Presiding Officer, Commercial Court No. 1, Agra. It is contended that on earlier
dates, i.e., 09.12.2025 and 20.12.2025, despite the presence of the applicant's counsel, arguments
were not advanced on behalf of the respondent. It is further submitted that the case was thereafter
fixed for 11.02.2026, on which date the applicant's counsel sought a short adjournment on account
of personal difficulty. According to the applicant, notwithstanding the said request, the learned
court proceeded to hear the respondent and fixed the proceedings for further hearing on behalf of
the applicant.

8. It is further stated that, while fixing the next date, an oral observation was made by the
learned Presiding Officer to the applicant's representative (pairokar) to the effect that arrangements
be made for payment to the respondent. According to the applicant, such observation, in the
backdrop of the ongoing adjudication of the stay application and appeal, has given rise to a
reasonable apprehension in their mind that the matter may not receive an impartial consideration.

9. In the aforesaid circumstances, the applicant submits that the cumulative effect of the
proceedings, particularly the sequence of hearings coupled with the aforesaid observation, has led
to a bona fide and reasonable apprehension regarding the neutrality of the forum. It is, therefore, in
the interest of justice that the proceedings be transferred to another competent court to ensure that
justice is not only done but is manifestly seen to be done.

10. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the present transfer application is not an
attempt to seek a forum of choice, but is necessitated to preserve the fairness and integrity of the
judicial process. It is submitted that, in the circumstances aforesaid, continuation of proceedings
before the same forum has become impracticable from the standpoint of maintaining confidence in
the adjudicatory process.

11. The principal ground urged by the applicant is that the aforesaid oral observation, made
during the pendency of the stay application and the appeal, has created an impression in the mind
of the applicant that the issues involved may stand prejudged. The apprehension, it is contended, is
not founded on mere conjecture but on a tangible circumstance which bears upon the perception of
impartial adjudication.
1670 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

12. Relying upon the decision in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Ram Jethmalani, it is urged that
assurance of a fair trial is an integral facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, and any circumstance
giving rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a litigant would warrant transfer of
proceedings. It is submitted that the test is not whether actual bias exists, but whether the situation
is such as would lead a reasonable person to apprehend that justice may not be done.

13. Learned counsel further submits that the settled legal position is that even an appearance of
bias or a perceived predisposition is sufficient to erode the confidence of a litigant in the judicial
process. In this regard, reliance is placed upon P.K. Ghosh v. J.G. Rajput and State of West
Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak, to contend that the test is not whether bias has in fact influenced
the decision, but whether there exists a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a party that justice
may not be done. It is, therefore, submitted that where circumstances give rise to such
apprehension, the Court ought to exercise its power of transfer to preserve the fairness and
credibility of the adjudicatory process.

14. Reliance is placed upon Kulwinder Kaur v. Kandi Friends Education Trust to submit
that the power of transfer under Section 24 CPC is wide and is to be exercised wherever it is
expedient in the interest of justice. It is urged that, in the facts of the present case, the sequence of
proceedings coupled with the alleged observation has given rise to a bona fide and reasonable
apprehension in the minds of the applicant, warranting transfer to another competent court so as to
ensure that justice is both done and seen to be done.

15. Drawing support from Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, it is contended that the
governing test is that of "real likelihood of bias", namely, whether a reasonable person would
apprehend a predisposition in the mind of the adjudicating authority. Impartiality, it is submitted,
constitutes the very foundation of adjudication, and even an appearance of bias is sufficient to
vitiate the proceedings.

16. Reference is also made to State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna to contend that fairness in
adjudicatory or administrative action is synonymous with reasonableness, and that bias, being a
facet of mala fides, vitiates such action. While mala fides must ordinarily be supported by cogent
material, it is urged that a predetermined approach or failure to apply an independent mind may
itself indicate bias.

17. In addition, reliance is placed upon Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education
and Registration to submit that in cases of non-pecuniary bias, the relevant test is whether a
reasonable and informed person would apprehend bias, and that a substantial likelihood of
partiality is sufficient to vitiate the decision.

`18. Lastly, Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon is cited to contend that
justice must not only be done but must also appear to be done, and that even the appearance of bias,
judged from the standpoint of reasonable persons, is sufficient to invalidate the proceedings.

19. Opposing the present transfer application, learned counsel for the respondent submits that
the same is wholly misconceived and has been instituted with the sole object of delaying the
4 All. M/s Virola International Vs. Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors.
1671
proceedings in the pending arbitration appeal. It is contended that no legally sustainable ground has
been made out for exercise of powers under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as
there is no material on record to indicate any real likelihood of bias on the part of the Presiding
Officer.

20. Referring to the order-sheets forming part of the record, it is urged that the conduct of the
applicant reflects a consistent pattern of seeking repeated adjournments on varying and untenable
grounds, thereby delaying the proceedings. The learned Commercial Court has recorded that on
multiple dates, including 17.10.2025, 31.10.2025, 21.11.2025, 09.12.2025 and thereafter on
17.02.2026, adjournments were sought by the applicant on different pretexts, despite sufficient
opportunity having been granted to address arguments. It is submitted that such repeated requests,
often coupled with absence of counsel or authorized representatives, indicate a lack of diligence in
prosecuting the appeal.

21. It is further pointed out that even after imposition of costs and grant of last opportunity on
17.02.2026, the applicant continued to adopt dilatory tactics by filing successive adjournment
applications on 25.02.2026, 06.03.2026, 07.04.2026 and 16.04.2026, including on grounds such as
personal inconvenience, non-preparation of the case, or pendency of transfer proceedings before
this Court. The record, it is submitted, reflects that the respondent had already concluded
arguments, whereas the applicant failed to complete their submissions despite repeated directions.
In such circumstances, the present application is asserted to be a calculated attempt to delay
adjudication and avoid conclusion of proceedings.

22. The allegation regarding the oral observation attributed to the court is stated to be vague,
unsubstantiated, and taken out of context. It is contended that stray or casual observations, even if
assumed to have been made, cannot form the basis for alleging bias or seeking transfer, unless
supported by cogent material demonstrating a real and reasonable apprehension of prejudice.

23. It is also urged that the present application amounts to an abuse of the process of law and,
in substance, constitutes forum shopping under the guise of alleging apprehension of bias. The
applicant, it is submitted, cannot be permitted to seek transfer merely because the proceedings are
not progressing in a manner convenient to them or on account of any perceived adversity arising
from the arbitral proceedings.

24. In view of the aforesaid, it is contended that the apprehension expressed by the applicant is
neither reasonable nor bona fide and does not satisfy the settled parameters governing transfer of
cases. The application, therefore, deserves to be dismissed with costs.

25. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. The controversy is examined in the
backdrop of Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which confers discretionary powers
upon the High Court and the District Court to transfer or withdraw any suit, appeal, or other
proceeding at any stage.
1672 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

26. The object of the aforesaid provision is to ensure that the ends of justice are effectively
subserved by enabling transfer in appropriate cases. While the power is broad in its amplitude, it is
required to be exercised judiciously and with due circumspection.

27. It is well settled that such power is not to be invoked for mere convenience of a party or on
account of subjective apprehensions. The jurisdiction is to be exercised only where there exist
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable and bona fide apprehension that justice may not be done,
or where transfer becomes necessary to preserve the fairness and credibility of the adjudicatory
process.

28. In continuation of the discussion on the scope of power under Section 24 CPC, it becomes
necessary to examine the concept of bias, particularly when urged as a ground for transfer. Bias, in
its ordinary connotation, denotes a predisposition or pre-judgment which detracts from the
requirement of even-handed justice. A judicial authority is expected to approach every matter with
an independent and impartial mind, uninfluenced by any inclination towards either party, and any
deviation from this standard strikes at the very foundation of the adjudicatory process.

29. The determination of bias does not rest upon the actual state of mind of the Presiding
Officer, but upon the impression which the surrounding circumstances are capable of creating in
the mind of a reasonable and informed observer. The applicable test is whether there exists a real
likelihood or real danger of bias. Such apprehension must be founded on tangible material and
objective circumstances; mere surmise, conjecture, or fanciful suspicion cannot constitute a valid
basis. The Court is, therefore, required to adopt an objective standard and assess whether the facts
on record would lead a reasonable person to apprehend that the matter may not be decided with an
open and unbiased mind.

30. At the same time, the concept of bias cannot be confined within a rigid or straitjacket
formula and must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Not every
observation made in the course of proceedings, nor every instance of active judicial engagement in
regulating the hearing, can be construed as indicative of pre-judgment. A Judge is not expected to
remain a silent spectator, and observations made for the purpose of clarifying issues, testing
submissions, or managing proceedings cannot, by themselves, be treated as evidence of bias. A
careful distinction must, therefore, be maintained between legitimate judicial conduct and
circumstances which genuinely give rise to an apprehension of prejudice.

31. In the context of exercise of power under Section 24 CPC, these principles assume added
significance, as allegations of bias are often invoked as a ground for transfer. While the power of
transfer is undoubtedly wide, it is to be exercised with circumspection, particularly where
imputations are directed against a Presiding Officer. Such allegations, if accepted lightly, have the
potential to erode institutional confidence in the judicial process. The paramount consideration,
therefore, remains the ends of justice, and the Court must be satisfied that the apprehension
expressed is reasonable, bona fide, and founded on cogent material indicating that a fair
adjudication may not be possible before the concerned forum.
4 All. M/s Virola International Vs. Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors.
1673

32. Ultimately, while assurance of a fair trial is of paramount importance, a plea for transfer
on the ground of bias cannot be founded on mere hypersensitivity, convenience, or trivial
grievances. The Court must be satisfied that there exists something more substantial and
compelling which justifies such transfer. The test is whether the apprehension is reasonable and
bona fide, supported by objective circumstances, and not based on conjecture or subjective
perception. In this regard, the importance of a fair trial as the governing consideration in matters of
transfer has been succinctly emphasised in Maneka Sanjay Gandhi v. Rani Jethmalani. The
Supreme Court held that the foremost imperative in the dispensation of justice is the assurance of a
fair trial. While considering a motion for transfer, the Court is not guided by the hypersensitivity of
a party, comparative convenience, ease of access to legal services, or similar minor grievances.
What is required is something substantially more compelling and of such gravity as to imperil
public justice or the fairness of the adjudicatory environment. It is only upon disclosure of such
weighty circumstances that the extraordinary power of transfer is to be exercised.

33. Equally, the law recognises that observations or expressions made by a Presiding Officer
during the course of hearing cannot lightly be construed as indicative of bias. During the hearing of
a case, a judicial officer may express tentative views or put forth opinions for the purpose of
eliciting further clarification, testing rival submissions, or enabling counsel to address the concerns
of the Court. Such exchanges are part of the ordinary process of adjudication and do not imply that
the Court has predetermined the issues involved. Judges cannot be expected to remain silent
throughout the hearing; reasoned interventions and comments on the merits, when made in the
course of argument, are intended to clarify disputed issues and ought not to be mistaken as a final
expression of decision.

34. While considering such a plea, the Court must adopt a cautious and balanced approach.
Mere observations made during the course of hearing, or regulation of proceedings in exercise of
judicial discretion, cannot be construed as indicative of bias or pre-judgment. A Judge is expected
to actively engage with the matter, and such engagement cannot be mistaken as an expression of a
concluded opinion. Stray remarks or dissatisfaction with the manner in which proceedings are
conducted would not, by themselves, justify transfer.

35. At the same time, the Court cannot be oblivious to the principle that where circumstances
exist giving rise to a reasonable apprehension in the mind of a litigant that justice may not be done,
it becomes not only the power but the duty of the Court to order transfer so as to uphold the
sanctity of the judicial process. The paramount factor remains the ends of justice, and each case
must be examined on its own facts, keeping in view whether the apprehension is genuine and
whether denial of transfer would result in miscarriage of justice.

36. Guidance on the test of reasonable apprehension in transfer matters is furnished by R.
Balakrishna Pillai v. State of Kerala. It was held that while one of the foundational principles of
administration of justice is that justice must not only be done but must also appear to have been
done, a mere allegation or assertion that justice may not be done is by itself insufficient. Before
directing transfer, the Court must satisfy itself that the apprehension projected is reasonable,
genuine and justifiable, and not founded upon conjecture or subjective suspicion.
1674 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

37. Similar principles stand reiterated in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja
Shankar Pant, where the governing test was further elucidated. The enquiry is not whether there
exists a mere apprehension of bias, but whether the surrounding circumstances, when objectively
assessed, disclose a real danger or reasonable likelihood of bias. For that purpose, all relevant facts
and attendant circumstances are required to be collated and carefully examined. Where the
conclusion of real likelihood of bias is inescapable, appropriate corrective action would follow.
Conversely, where allegations are fanciful, speculative, or advanced merely to avoid a particular
court, tribunal or authority, such pleas merit rejection.

38. These authorities firmly establish that the doctrine of bias is anchored in public perception
of fairness, rather than proof of actual prejudice. The emphasis is on maintaining confidence in the
administration of justice by ensuring that adjudication is free not only from actual bias but also
from circumstances which reasonably give rise to its appearance.

39. At the same time, the standard of "reasonable apprehension" must be applied with care and
restraint. The apprehension must be that of a reasonable, informed and objective person, and not
that of a litigant who is overly sensitive or inclined to read into routine judicial conduct an element
of prejudice. The test strikes a balance between preserving public confidence in the judiciary and
preventing misuse of the doctrine as a tool to seek transfer on untenable grounds.

40. The concept of judicial bias has also been extensively examined in comparative
jurisprudence and authoritative legal writings, which reinforce the principles governing the present
issue. One of the most frequently cited formulations is found in R v. Sussex Justices, ex parte
McCarthy, where Lord Hewart, C.J., famously observed:

"It is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.

........................... Nothing is to be done which creates even a suspicion that there has been
an improper interference with the course of justice."

Few judicial aphorisms have been quoted more often than the celebrated dictum that justice
must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. The principle underscores that the
legitimacy of the judicial process rests not merely on actual impartiality, but equally on the
perception of fairness in the eyes of the public.

41. The modern test for bias has been articulated in Porter v. Magill, wherein the House of
Lords reformulated the standard in the following terms:

"The question is whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the
facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the tribunal was biased.

"This formulation has been widely accepted across common law jurisdictions and aligns
closely with the "reasonable apprehension" test applied by Indian courts.
4 All. M/s Virola International Vs. Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors.
1675

42. Similarly, in Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd., the Court of Appeal
emphasized the contextual nature of bias and cautioned against overextension of the doctrine:

It would be dangerous and futile to attempt to define or list the factors which may or may
not give rise to a real danger of bias. Everything will depend on the facts, which may include the
nature of the issue to be decided.... By contrast, a real danger of bias might well be thought to arise
if there were personal friendship or animosity between the judge and any member of the public
involved in the case; or if the judge were closely acquainted with any member of the public
involved in the case.... or if.... the judge had expressed views.... in such extreme and unbalanced
terms as to throw doubt on his ability to try the issue with an objective judicial mind.... The mere
fact that a judge.... had commented adversely on a party or witness.... would not without more
found a sustainable objection.

43. The law, however, also recognizes the practical limits of the doctrine of bias. In re
Linahan, 138 F.2d 650, Jerome Frank, speaking for the Court, made a significant observation on
the human element in adjudication:

"If, however, 'bias' and 'partiality' be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions
in the mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one will. The human mind,
even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with predispositions.... Much harm is done
by the myth that, merely by taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and
strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine."

44. The above exposition highlights an important distinction between predisposition and
disqualifying bias. While impartiality is an essential attribute of judicial adjudication, the law does
not demand the impossible standard of a mind entirely devoid of all prior impressions. What is
required is not the absence of all predispositions, but the capacity of the Judge to decide the matter
on the basis of the record and the law, uninfluenced by extraneous considerations.

45. Thus, the test is not whether a Judge has any initial impressions or engages actively with
the matter, but whether there exists such a degree of pre-judgment or predisposition that it renders
the adjudicatory process unfair. The emphasis remains on the ability to bring an open and receptive
mind to bear upon the issues in controversy.

46. The standard for determining likelihood of bias has consistently been held to be an
objective one, resting on the reasonableness of the apprehension in the mind of a party. The proper
approach is not for the Judge to introspect upon his own state of mind and enquire whether he is in
fact biased, but to consider whether the circumstances are such as would give rise to a reasonable
apprehension in the mind of a litigant.

47. This principle was articulated early in Allinson v. General Council of Medical
Education and Registration, where Lord Esher observed:
1676 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"The question is not whether in fact he was or was not biased. The Court cannot inquire
into that.... In the administration of justice.... public policy requires that.... any person who is to
take part in it should not be in such a position that he might be suspected of being biased.

48. The same principle was reiterated with greater clarity in Metropolitan Properties Co.
(F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon, where Lord Denning, M.R., observed:

"...in considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias, the court does not look at
the mind of the justice himself... It does not look to see if there was a real likelihood that he would,
or did, in fact favour one side... The court looks at the impression which would be given to other
people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think
that... there was a real likelihood of bias... then he should not sit..."

49. These authorities collectively establish two complementary propositions: first, that public
confidence in the judiciary requires that justice must appear to be done; and second, that this
principle cannot be stretched to treat every judicial observation or procedural order as indicative of
bias. The doctrine is intended to safeguard fairness, not to obstruct adjudication or enable litigants
to avoid an inconvenient forum.

50. It is equally well settled that the law does not require a Judge to remain a silent spectator
during the course of proceedings. Expression of tentative views or prima facie observations, with a
view to test the submissions of counsel or to elicit clarification, is a normal and integral part of the
adjudicatory process and does not, by itself, establish bias. Judicial engagement in the course of
hearing is both permissible and necessary for effective adjudication.

51. Equally, the mere expression of prima facie or tentative views during the course of hearing
does not, by itself, establish bias or prejudgment. In Liteky v. United States, it was authoritatively
held that judicial remarks made during proceedings ordinarily do not support a challenge of bias
unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism rendering fair adjudication impossible.
Thus, judicial engagement through questioning and tentative observations is a normal and
necessary facet of adjudication and cannot, without more, be construed as indicative of bias.

52. The distinction, however, lies between a tentative view and a concluded opinion. A
tentative expression is in the nature of a working hypothesis, amenable to persuasion and subject to
reconsideration upon hearing the parties, whereas bias, in its legal sense, implies a closed mind
incapable of being influenced by further submissions. The determinative question, therefore, is not
whether the Court has indicated a prima facie view, but whether such indication discloses a predetermined approach rendering the hearing an empty formality.

53. The test for determining whether a judge should be disqualified on the ground of
apprehended bias is whether a fair-minded and informed observer might reasonably apprehend that
the judge might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question
required to be decided. This test of bias has been authoritatively explained in Ebner v. Official
Trustee in Bankruptcy, wherein it was held that the assessment is to be made not with the benefit
of hindsight but in the light of the facts as they existed at the time the alleged circumstances arose.
4 All. M/s Virola International Vs. Smt. Sunita Sachdeva & Ors.
1677
Its application involves two steps: first, the identification of the circumstance which is said might
lead the judge to decide the case otherwise than on its legal and factual merits; and second, the
articulation of a logical connection between that circumstance and the apprehended deviation from
a decision on merits.

54. The "fair-minded lay observer", who forms the fulcrum of the test for apprehended bias, is
a hypothetical construct grounded in the necessity of maintaining public confidence in the
administration of justice. Such an observer is neither unduly sensitive or suspicious, nor
complacent, but is informed of the legal, statutory and factual context in which the decision arises.
The observer is taken to recognise ordinary human frailty and would not readily infer bias from
stray or isolated exchanges, particularly where such remarks are taken out of context or divorced
from the overall conduct of proceedings. The observer would also appreciate that interventionist
questions or comments by a judge are often motivated by a legitimate desire to clarify issues,
understand the evidence, and facilitate the adjudicatory process. These principles find articulation
in Polsen v Harrison and BW v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice, the latter
also reiterating, with reference to Isbester v Knox City Council, that the fair-minded observer is to
be attributed knowledge of the surrounding legal and factual framework.

55. The governing standard in this regard remains that of a reasonable apprehension of bias,
namely, whether a fair-minded and informed observer would, in the given circumstances, conclude
that there exists a real likelihood of predisposition.

56. The law, however, also recognises the practical limits of the doctrine of bias and the
inescapable human element in adjudication. If bias or partiality were to be understood as requiring
the total absence of all preconceptions or prior impressions in the mind of a Judge, no person could
ever be said to receive a fair trial. The human mind is not a blank slate, nor does a Judge, merely by
assuming judicial office, cease to be human or become a passionless thinking machine divested of
all predispositions. What the law requires is not the impossible standard of complete mental
neutrality in the abstract, but the capacity to decide the controversy fairly, with an open mind, on
the basis of the record and the law.

57. It follows that a trial judge is not required to remain in stony silence or refrain from
indicating tentative views for fear of attracting allegations of bias. The expression of prima facie
views during the course of hearing, on matters where parties are afforded full opportunity to
address the Court, is a recognised and legitimate feature of judicial process and does not, by itself,
evince partiality. Whether judicial interventions or observations transgress the bounds of propriety
must be assessed in the totality of circumstances of the case. The articulation of tentative views in
the course of argument does not manifest bias. Further, the assessment cannot be founded upon
selective extraction or "cherry-picking" of isolated portions of the record; the entirety of the
proceedings must be considered in context. Judicial engagement, including robust exchange and
probing of issues, is not impermissible; indeed, genuine debate on critical questions is an accepted
facet of adjudication. Even critical, strong or candid observations, viewed in their proper setting, do
not necessarily lead to an inference of bias.
1678 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

58. Active participation by the Court, including posing questions, expressing doubts, or
indicating tentative views, cannot be construed as bias unless it is shown that the Court has
foreclosed consideration of the issues or is unwilling to be persuaded by legitimate argument. To
hold otherwise would render the adjudicatory process sterile and impede effective judicial
functioning.

59. Thus, while the principle that justice must not only be done but must also appear to be
done remains fundamental, it cannot be extended to equate every judicial observation with prejudgment. The apprehension of bias must be real, reasonable, and based on cogent circumstances,
and not on isolated remarks or subjective perceptions of a litigant.

60. The caution required while entertaining allegations against a Presiding Officer has
repeatedly been emphasised. An application seeking transfer of proceedings on such grounds
cannot be dealt with in a casual or light-hearted manner. Transfer of a case from one court to
another, particularly when founded on allegations directed against the Presiding Officer, inevitably
carries implications touching upon the integrity, competence and reputation of the judicial officer
concerned. For that reason, such relief cannot be granted on fanciful apprehensions or mere
dissatisfaction of a litigant, but only where sufficiently cogent, substantial and credible grounds are
disclosed.

61. The enquiry of the Court, while examining a plea of bias, is not whether any earlier order
passed by the Presiding Officer may be erroneous, adverse, or even legally vulnerable, since such
matters are amenable to challenge in appropriate appellate or supervisory proceedings. The real
question is whether the conduct complained of discloses a demonstrable manifestation of prejudice,
partiality, or a reasonable apprehension that the matter would not receive fair consideration.

62. Equally, transfer of a case from one Judge to another cannot be ordered merely on a party's
perceived notion of bias. Judicial orders, by their very nature, may operate to the advantage of one
party and to the detriment of the other. The fact that an order is adverse to a litigant, or that the
court has not accepted a party's submissions, does not by itself reflect any bias on the part of the
Presiding Officer. To hold otherwise would permit every unsuccessful party to seek transfer on the
basis of dissatisfaction with the course or outcome of proceedings, a consequence plainly
impermissible in law.

63. It must be emphasised that judges are duty-bound to discharge their functions unless
disqualified in accordance with law, and ought not to accede lightly to recusal or transfer requests,
lest litigants be permitted, in effect, to choose the forum of their preference. The mere fact that
adverse orders have been passed against a party does not furnish a ground for disqualification.