# Maan Singh v. L.I.C., Agra

- **Citation:** (2026) 1 ILRA 569
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-01-22
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 202 of 2026
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/maan-singh-v-l-i-c-agra-54078
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

1 All. Maan Singh Vs. L.I.C., Agra
569
dispute. The land was previously owned by Late Abdul Bari, who was the father of the plaintiff
nos.2, 3 and 4 and father-in-law of the plaintiff no.1. He had executed a registered will in favour of
the plaintiffs and their names were mutated in the revenue records by means of an order dated
18.07.2011 passed by the Tehsildar Nighasan. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants tried to
take possession of the property in dispute on 20.01.2014 claiming that Late Abdul Bari had
executed a registered sale deed dated 04.07.1988 in favour of Ram Kishun, father of the defendant
nos.1 and 2. The plaintiffs sought cancellation of the sale deed stating that the sale deed is forged, it
has not been executed by Late Abdul Bari, it does not make a mention of plot number and it was
executed on 04.07.1988 during pendency of consolidation proceedings, no mutation was effected
during the consolidation proceedings and, therefore, the defendants cannot get their names mutated
now. It was further stated that no consideration was paid for execution of the sale deed. The
defendants have pleaded in the written statement that the names of the defendants have been
mutated on the basis of the sale deed in question as co-tenure holder of the land in question by
means of an order dated 04.06.2014 passed by Tehsildar Nighasan. It is evident that initially the
land in question was owned by the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest and after his death, the
plaintiffs' names had been recorded in the revenue records. The plaintiffs' claim is solely for
cancellation of the sale deed allegedly executed by their predecessor-in-interest in favour of the
defendants and for a consequential injunction. In case the sale deed is canceled, the plaintiffs would
not need a separate relief of declaration as the obvious consequence of cancellation of the sale deed
would be restoration of the plaintiffs' names recorded in the revenue records. The revenue Courts
have no jurisdiction to entertain a suit for cancellation of a sale deed. Therefore, there is no bar
against the jurisdiction of the Civil Court for entertaining the suit for cancellation of sale deed filed
by the plaintiffs / opposite parties.

23. In view of the foregoing discussion, there appears to be no illegality or infirmity in the
impugned order dated 14.11.2025, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No.5,
Lakhimpur Kheri in Civil Revision No.19 of 2024: Hazirulnisha and others Vs. Ram Bahadur and
others. The petition lacks merit and the same is accordingly dismissed.
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(2026) 1 ILRA 569
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 22.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 202 of 2026

Maan Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
L.I.C., Agra ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
570 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Whether The National Commission has rightly interfered with such an order in exercise of its revisional
jurisdiction and has corrected the apparent error committed by the District Commission and upheld by the
State Commission by setting aside the orders and dismissing the complaint.

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Insurance Act, 1938- Section 64-VB-All the
parties in the proceedings from which a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
arises, are necessary parties to the petition- Section 64-VB of the Insurance Act provides that an
insurer shall not be liable for any loss in respect of any insurance business until the premium
payable is received by him, but it does not provide that the insurance company would be liable to
pay the insurance benefit merely because it has received the premium, even if the risk coverage
has not commenced under the contract of insurance-Section 64- VB of the Insurance Act does
not come to the aid of the petitioner for claiming benefit of the insurance policy consequent to
the death of his son prior to the commencement of risk coverage under the policy.
Held- The order passed by the District Commission allowing the complaint without dealing with the defence of
the Insurance Company and not accepting the valid defence based on the terms of the contract insurance
without assigning any reason, is an order which suffers from illegality and material irregularity. The National
Commission has rightly interfered with such an order in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction and has corrected
the apparent error committed by the District Commission and upheld by the State Commission by setting
aside the orders and dismissing the complaint- Petition dismissed. (Para 4, 10 & 15) (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan: (2010) 9 SCC 496

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Insurance Act, 1938

List of Keywords
Pacta sunt servanda; Section 64- VB of the Insurance Act; Risk coverage not commenced under the contract
of insurance; Death prior to the scheduled date of commencement of the policy

Case Arising From
Order dated 28.04.2025, passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in
Revision Petition No.239 of 2024.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Brijendra Chaudhary, Neeraj Kumar Singh
Counsel for Respondent(s): Sanjeev Singh

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Ms. Anu Kumari, Advocate holding brief of Sri Neeraj Kumar Singh, the learned
counsel for the petitioner, Sri Sanjeev Singh, the learned counsel for the opposite party and perused
the records.

2. By means of the instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India the
petitioner has challenged the validity of an order dated 28.04.2025, passed by the National
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Revision Petition No.239 of 2024.
1 All. Maan Singh Vs. L.I.C., Agra
571

3. The petitioner had filed a Consumer Complaint No.330 of 2012 before the District
Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-I Agra against- (i) Deputy Manager, Life Insurance
Corporation of India, Sanjay Place, Agra, and (ii) Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India,
Branch Office at III Sanjay Place, Agra, whereas those parties have not been impleaded in the
petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein the only opposite party is
"Life Insurance Corporation of India".

4. When the complaint was regarding non payment of benefits under an insurance policy
issued by the Life Insurance Corporation of India, the Corporation was a necessary party to the
complaint and as it was not impleaded, the complaint was bad for non-joinder of a necessary party.
Moreover, the complaint had been filed against (i) Deputy Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of
India, Sanjay Place, Agra, and (ii) Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Branch Office at
III Sanjay Place, Agra, and they have not been impleaded. This petition suffers from the defect of
non-joinder of necessary parties. Although this defect is a curable defect and the Life Insurance
Corporation of India having been impleaded, no prejudice would be caused to the opposite party,
this defect is being pointed out as the Court is frequently experiencing that the petitions are being
filed in a casual manner without taking care of impleadment of necessary parties. Therefore this
Court reiterates the settled principle of law that all the parties in the proceedings from which a
petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India arises, are necessary parties to the petition.

5. It was stated in the complainant that the complainant had taken a life insurance policy in the
name of his son Ajay Kumar, aged 14 years on 28.05.2009. He had paid the first installment of the
policy premium on 28.07.2009 and the second installment was paid on 29.11.2009. The petitioner's
son Ajay Kumar died due to electrocution on 13.05.2010. The opposite party did not pay insurance
amount to the petitioner but the amount paid towards premiums was refunded to the complainant.

6. A copy of the reply filed by the opposite party has not been annexed with the petition. The
District Commission allowed the complaint by means of an order dated 05.09.2014, wherein it is
mentioned that the opposite parties had pleaded that it was a deferred policy which had to
commence with effect from 24.05.2010, whereas the petitioner's son died before the aforesaid date.
Although, the District Commission has taken note of this plea taken by the opposite parties in
defence, it has allowed the complaint and directed the opposite parties to pay Rs.3,20,000/- along
with 7% interest to the petitioner-claimant, without dealing with the defence of the opposite parties.

7. The opposite parties challenged the award of the District Commission by filing Appeal
No.2081 of 2014. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, U.P. Lucknow, dismissed
the appeal by means of a judgment and order dated 05.12.2023. The opposite parties then filed
Revision Petition No.239 of 2024 which has been allowed by the National Consumer Disputes
Redressal Commission, New Delhi by means of the impugned judgment and order dated
28.04.2025.

8. The National Commission held that the undisputed facts are that the complainant-petitioner
had taken a life insurance policy for his son Ajay Kumar on 28.05.2009. He had paid two
installments of the policy premium. The complainant's son Ajay Kumar died on 13.05.2010 due to
electrocution. The policy reveals that it was a policy with a deferred date of commencement of risk
572 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cover with effect from 28.05.2010. Admittedly, the petitioner's son died due to electrocution on
13.05.2010, i.e., before commencement of the policy. The National Commission held that the
insurance contracts are governed by the principles of "Pacta sunt servanda" (agreements must be
kept). The terms and conditions of a policy form the basis of the contractual relationship between
the parties. As the petitioner's son died on 13.05.2010, prior to the scheduled date of
commencement of the policy on 28.05.2010, as per the terms of the policy the complainant is not
entitled to get any claim under the policy, except refund of the premiums paid, which has already
been done by the opposite parties.

9. The counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as per the provision contained in Section
64-VB of the Insurance Act 1938, having paid two installments of the policy premium, the
petitioner was entitled to get the benefits under the insurance policy. Section 64-VB of the
Insurance Act provides as follows: -

"64VB. No risk to be assumed unless premium is received in advance.-
(1)
No
insurer shall assume any risk in India in respect of any insurance business on which premium is
not ordinarily payable outside India unless and until the premium payable is received by him or is
guaranteed to be paid by such person in such manner and within such time as may be prescribed or
unless and until deposit of such amount as may be prescribed, is made in advance in the prescribed
manner.

(2) For the purposes of this section, in the case of risks for which premium can be
ascertained in advance, the risk may be assumed not earlier than the date on which the premium
has been paid in cash or by cheque to the insurer.

Explanation. ?Where the premium is tendered by postal money order or cheque sent by post, the
risk may be assumed on the date on which the money order is booked or the cheque is posted, as
the case may be.

(3) Any refund of premium which may become due to an insured on account of the
cancellation of a policy or alteration in its terms and conditions or otherwise shall be paid by the
insurer directly to the insured by a crossed or order cheque or by postal money order and a proper
receipt shall be obtained by the insurer from the insured, and such refund shall in no case be
credited to the account of the agent.

(4) Where an insurance agent collects a premium on a policy of insurance on behalf of an
insurer, he shall deposit with, or dispatch by post to, the insurer, the premium so collected in full
without deduction of his commission within twenty-four hours of the collection excluding bank and
postal holidays.

(5) The Central Government may, by rules, relax the requirements of sub-section (1) in
respect of particular categories in insurance policies.

(6) The Authority may, from time to time, specify, by the regulations made by it, the
manner of receipt of premium by the insurer."
1 All. Maan Singh Vs. L.I.C., Agra
573

10. Section 64-VB of the Insurance Act provides that an insurer shall not be liable for any loss
in respect of any insurance business until the premium payable is received by him, but it does not
provide that the insurance company would be liable to pay the insurance benefit merely because it
has received the premium, even if the risk coverage has not commenced under the contract of
insurance. I am of the considered view that Section 64-VB of the Insurance Act does not come to
the aid of the petitioner for claiming benefit of the insurance policy consequent to the death of his
son prior to the commencement of risk coverage under the policy. Therefore, I find no force in the
submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

11. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the District Commission had allowed
the complaint, the State Commission had upheld the order of the District Commission and there
was no jurisdictional error in the orders of the District Commission and the State Commission
warranting any interference by the National Commission in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.

12. The jurisdiction of the National Commission was provided in Section 21 of the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 (which has since been repealed but which would apply to present case), which
provided as follows: -

"21. Jurisdiction of the National Commission. - Subject to the other provisions of this
Act, the National Commission shall have jurisdiction,?

(a) to entertain,?

(i) complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed
exceeds rupees 87[one crore]; and

(ii) appeals against the orders of any State Commission; and

(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate orders in any consumer dispute which is
pending before or has been decided by any State Commission where it appears to the National
Commission that such State Commission has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction
illegally or with material irregularity."

13. It is apparent from the facts mentioned above that the District Commission had allowed the
complaint after merely noting the defense of the opposite parties that the petitioner's son had died
on 13.05.2010, prior to the commencement of the policy on 28.05.2010, but without dealing with it.
When a plea is raised in defence before any judicial forum, it has to be considered and it can be
rejected only by a reasoned order.

14. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan: (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred to numerous precedents on the point and summarised the principles (in
paragraph 47 of the judgment) as follows: -
574 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in
administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that
justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary
exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on
relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making
process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by
administrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and
constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is
virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul
of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges
and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to
demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important
for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and
transparency.

(k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decisionmaking process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine
of precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of
reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of
judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers
less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in
Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731-37] .)
1 All. Surya Narayan Vs. Board of Revenue & Ors.
575

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of
fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights
and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR
553] EHRR, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] ,
wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which
requires,

"adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions".

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents
for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is
of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process".

15. The order passed by the District Commission allowing the complaint without dealing with
the defence of the Insurance Company and not accepting the valid defence based on the terms of
the contract insurance without assigning any reason, is an order which suffers from illegality and
material irregularity. The National Commission has rightly interfered with such an order in exercise
of its revisional jurisdiction and has corrected the apparent error committed by the District
Commission and upheld by the State Commission by setting aside the orders and dismissing the
complaint.

16. In view of the foregoing discussion, I find no error or illegality in the impugned order
passed by the National Commission. The petition lacks merit and the same is dismissed.
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(2026) 1 ILRA 575
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 16.01.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 7018 of 2025

Surya Narayan ...Petitioner
Versus
Board of Revenue & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Board of Revenue has concluded the hearing and reserved the matter for judgment on 15.09.2025 AND even
after expiry of four months from the date of reserving the judgment, the judgment has not been pronounced
and therefore in the present writ petition prayer has been made for direction to the Board of Revenue to
pronounce the judgment in the said case with expedition.

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006-Sections
24(4) & 210- The Apex Court in the case of Ravindra Pratap Sahi Vs. State of U.P. and Others,