# Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh Husainganj, Lucknow v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 2 ILRA 63
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-02-08
- **Case number:** Writ A No. 3479 of 2015
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/madhyan-bhojan-rasoiya-mazdoor-sangh-husainganj-lucknow-v-u-o-i-ors-49722
- **Pages:** 16

## Headnote

Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 226, 23
& 24 - Code on Wages, 2019- Section 2(y)
& 67 - Code on Wages (Central) Rules,
2019 Honorarium to Cooks, engaged for
preparing Mid Day Meal in the institutions
run & aided by the government - Cooks
paid Rs.2,000/- per month which below
the minimum wages - Held - Considering
the fact that the amount called as
''honorarium' is paid to the Cooks on a
regular basis for a regular work being
done, it is nothing but wages as defined
under Section 2(y) of the Code on Wages,
2019 - payment of honorarium at rates far
below minimum wages, to the Cooks cum
Helpers who are engaged in providing Mid
Day Meal is another form of forced labour,
which is prohibited under Article 23 and
24 of the Constitution of India - G.O.
dated 28.01.2014 & 20.09.2022 - Cooks ,
semi skilled workers - State Government
kept the Cooks making Mid Day Meal in
the institutions, classified at Serial No.22,
as semi skilled workers and prescribed
minimum wages for them at the rate of
Rs.6,325/- per month through G.O. dated
28.01.2014 and which was subsequently
enhanced to Rs.10,483/- in terms of G.O.
dated 20.09.2022 - there is no reason why
the petitioners who are performing the
same job should not be extended the
benefit of minimum wages as has been
extended
to
the
persons
performing
similar jobs but engaged by different
employers - mandamus issued to ensure
payment of minimum wages to the Cooks
cum Helpers employed and preparing the
Mid Day Meal (Para 31, 37, 38, 41)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:
64 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

## Text

_Characters 0–39,811 of 55,412. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39811 for what follows._

2 All. Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh Husainganj, Lucknow Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
63
possession, should there be ever in future a
threat to his peaceful possession of the suit
property at the hands of the defendants or
anyone else claiming through or under
them.

40. The substantial question of law
framed in this appeal is answered in the
manner that in the face of averments in the
written statement by the defendants that
they were owners of the suit property on
the basis of the Will and had possession too
as against the plaintiff's case of title and
possession, the Lower Appellate Court
should not have dismissed the suit on the
ground of absence of cause of action, but
dismissed it for the plaintiff's failure to
prove his case by evidence regarding the
threat to his peaceful possession.

41. Thus, for reasons slightly different
than those that have weighed with the
Lower Appellate Court, this Court concurs
in the conclusion.

42. In the result, this second appeal
fails and is dismissed. In the circumstances
of the case, parties shall bear their own
costs in all Courts.

43. Let a decree be drawn up
accordingly.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 63
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 08.02.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Writ A No. 3479 of 2015

Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh
Husainganj, Lucknow ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Mrinal Chandra, Pradeep Saran

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., A.S.G., Archana Singh Tomar, G.M.
Kamil, Neeraj Chaurasia

Constitution of India, 1950 - Art. 226, 23
& 24 - Code on Wages, 2019- Section 2(y)
& 67 - Code on Wages (Central) Rules,
2019 Honorarium to Cooks, engaged for
preparing Mid Day Meal in the institutions
run & aided by the government - Cooks
paid Rs.2,000/- per month which below
the minimum wages - Held - Considering
the fact that the amount called as
''honorarium' is paid to the Cooks on a
regular basis for a regular work being
done, it is nothing but wages as defined
under Section 2(y) of the Code on Wages,
2019 - payment of honorarium at rates far
below minimum wages, to the Cooks cum
Helpers who are engaged in providing Mid
Day Meal is another form of forced labour,
which is prohibited under Article 23 and
24 of the Constitution of India - G.O.
dated 28.01.2014 & 20.09.2022 - Cooks ,
semi skilled workers - State Government
kept the Cooks making Mid Day Meal in
the institutions, classified at Serial No.22,
as semi skilled workers and prescribed
minimum wages for them at the rate of
Rs.6,325/- per month through G.O. dated
28.01.2014 and which was subsequently
enhanced to Rs.10,483/- in terms of G.O.
dated 20.09.2022 - there is no reason why
the petitioners who are performing the
same job should not be extended the
benefit of minimum wages as has been
extended
to
the
persons
performing
similar jobs but engaged by different
employers - mandamus issued to ensure
payment of minimum wages to the Cooks
cum Helpers employed and preparing the
Mid Day Meal (Para 31, 37, 38, 41)

Allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:
64 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1. People's Union for Civil Liberties Vs U.O.I. &
ors. (Writ Petition (C) No.196 of 2001)

2. People's Union for Democratic Rights & ors.
Vs U.O.I. & ors.; (1982) 3 SCC 235

3.Chandrawati Devi Vs St. of U.P. & ors. Writ - A
No.9927 of 2020

4. Karbhari Bhimaji Rohamare Vs Shanker Rao
Genuji Kolhe; (1975) 1 SCC 252

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Heard Shri Mrinal Chandra,
learned counsel for the petitioner; Shri Dev
Rishi
Kumar,
learned
counsel
for
respondent/Union
of
India
and
Shri
Mukund Madhav Asthana, learned counsel
appearing for the Mid Day Meal Authority.

2. Present petition has been filed
highlighting the plight of workers who are
engaged in preparing the mid day meals
across
various
government
run
and
government aided schools.

3. Contention of learned counsel for the
petitioner is, that the petitioner is a union
representing the persons who are employed
as Cooks for preparing Mid Day Meal in the
institutions run and aided by the government.
The petitioner Union is a registered trade
union. It is stated that with an aim of
providing nutrition to the children in various
schools of the District of Uttar Pradesh,
Central Government and State Government,
on cost sharing basis run a programme
known as 'Mid Day Meal Programme' under
the National Programme of Nutritional
Support to Primary Education.

4. It is informed that the decision for
providing nutritional support to the children
initially flowed from the orders dated
28.11.2001 and 20.04.2004 passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
People's Union for Civil Liberties v.
Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition (C)
No.196 of 2001) (hereinafter referred to
'PUCL').

5. In terms of the directions given by
the Supreme Court, Government Order
dated 25.06.2004 (Annexure - 5) was
issued wherein a decision was taken for
providing Mid Day Meal to the students for
a minimum period of 200 days in a
calendar year. It was also provided that
25% of the expenses incurred for the said
purpose shall be borne by the State through
PMGY scheme, another 25% shall be
provided by the State out of its own funds
and the balance 50%, which includes the
cost of grains,etc shall be provided by
Union of India free of cost. The said
Government Order also provided for
constitution
of
a
committee
in
the
respective schools and at the Nagar Nigam
levels.

6. In terms of the said Government
Order, Cooks cum Helpers were to be
appointed for a period of one year in
different
primary
schools/junior
high
schools.

7. It is stated that Ministry of Human
Resource Development, Government of
India issued a letter dated 24.11.2009
whereby
it
was
provided
that
the
Cooks/Helpers preparing the Mid Day
Meal in terms of the scheme would be
entitled to an ''honorarium' of Rs.1,000/-
per month.

8. It is also argued by learned counsel
for the petitioner that Government Order
dated 24.04.2010 (Annexure - 8) was
issued for providing Mid Day Meal to
various educational institutions managed
2 All. Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh Husainganj, Lucknow Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
65
by
the
State/local
bodies,
the
non
government aided colleges and Madarsas
etc., and similar stipulation with regard to
payment of honorarium of Rs.1,000/- per
month was provided therein. In the said
Government Order, it was further provided
that the selection of the Cooks in respect of
aided institutions, Madarsas, Self Help
Groups and NGOs shall be done by them,
however, in respect of the other institutions
managed by the State and local bodies, the
selection is to be done by the State. Thus,
for the purpose of payment of quantum of
honorarium, the institutions run by private
management/madrasas on one hand and
institutions run by Government/run under
aid from government/managed by local
bodies, on the other hand were treated on
similar footing.

9. The quantum of honorarium was
fixed through circular dated 29.07.10 at
Rs.1,000/- per months to be paid by the
Central
Government
and
the
State
Government in the share as decided and
recorded above.

10. Subsequently, by means of the
order dated 09.07.2014 it was provided that
the honorarium to the Cook cum Helper,
shall be paid only for 220 working days
and/or for a period of 10 months in a
calendar year.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner
also places reliance on the Government
Order dated 12.01.2015 wherein a similar
stipulation has been made with regard to
payment of honorarium for a period of 10
months. It is informed that subsequently the
honorarium was increased from Rs.1,000/-
per month to Rs.1,500/- per month and
lastly
vide
Government
Order
dated
28.04.2022, the State Government took a
decision to enhance the honorarium by a
further amount of Rs.500/- to Rs.2,000/-
per month, to be paid for a period of 10
months in a calendar year. Apart from the
said amount of honorarium, a provision
was made to pay the amount of Rs.500/-
towards the dress allowance twice a year.

12. Contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner is that while the petitioner are
performing the job of Mid Day Meal,a semi
skilled job, the honorarium paid to them is
highly inadequate and also not even in
consonance with the minimum wages
which are being paid to similar persons
who are performing semi skilled jobs.

13. To press the said submission,
learned counsel for the petitioner places
reliance on the Government Order dated
28.01.2014 wherein the State Government
in exercise of powers under Section 3(1)(b)
read with Section 3(2) of the Minimum
Wages Act and in exercise of powers under
Section 5(1)(b) of Minimum Wages Act
after
considering
the
various
representations and after consulting the
board re-evaluated the minimum wages in
respect of the employement within various
sectors and with a view to crystallize
minimum wages across various sectors had
taken a decision, categorizing the industries
in groups from serial no 1 to 58 of the said
order and rates of minimum wages payable
to unskilled labour, semi skilled labour and
skilled labour in respect of each of
industries mentioned at Serial No.1 to 58 at
the rate specified was provided for in the
said Government Order.

14. He also draws my attention to
entry at Serial No.22 of the said list, which
includes Madarsas run by the Muslim
Community where no fees is being taken,
the private institutions run by religious
institutions where no fees or minimum fees
66 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is being charged private coaching centres,
private schools etc are clubbed together.

15. In respect of institutions included
at Serial No.22, the Cooks have been
placed
as
"semi
skilled
labourers",
Specified institutions at entry no. 22 and
the categorization of workers is quoted
herein under:

पररकिष्ट - 1
पररकिष्ट - 1 के (क्रमाोंक
22)
के
सम्मुख
उक्तिक्तखत कनयोजन के
सम्बन्ध में श्रेणीकरण -
22 - (क) मुस्िम सम्प्रिाय द्वारा
सांचादलि
दकसी
मिरसा,
जहाँ
दवद्यादथषयोां से कोई फीस नहीां ली जा
रही है या नाममात्र की फीस ली जा
रही है;
(ख) दकसी धादमषक या पूिष सांस्था
द्वारा
सांचादलि
दकसी
प्राइवेट
दवद्यालय, जहाँ दवद्यादथषयोां से फीस
नहीां ली जा रही है या नाममात्र की
फीस ली जा रही है;
(ग) उ०प्र० बाल कल्याण पररर्ि
द्वारा सांचादलि बाल वादडयोां; और
(घ) मान्यिा प्राप्त दकसी प्राइवेट
दवद्यालय, दजसे सरकार से सहायिा
दमल रही है, से दभन्न प्राइवेट कोदचांग
कक्षाओां, प्राइवेट दवद्यालयोां, दजनमें
नसषरी स्कूल और दनजी प्रादवदधक
सांस्थाएां भी सस्िदलि हैं, में दनयोजन
।
अकुिल
-
चपरासी,
चौकीिार,
ररक्शाचालक,
माली, क्लीनर, बेलिार,
मसालची. आया, बेयरा,
केयर टेकर और इसी
प्रकार का कायष करने वाला
कोई अन्य कमषचारी चाहे
उसे दकसी भी नाम से
पुकारा जाये।

अर्द्धकुिल
-िफ्तरी,
राजगीर (मैसन) रसोईया
और इसी प्रकार का कायष
करने वाला
कोई अन्य कमषचारी चाहे
उसे दकसी भी नाम से
पुकारा जाये।

कुिल- बस / टरक डराईवर,
बढ़ई,
प्लम्बर,
इलेक्ट्रीदशयन,
लैब
अदसस्टेन्ट,
टेलर,
नसष,
कम्पाउण्डर,
दलदपक/टांकक, लाईब्रेररयन
/
कॅदशयर,
कदनष्ठ
लेखाकार, ज्येष्ठ लेखाकार,
प्रधान
दलदपक,
हेड
कैदशयर और इसी प्रकार
का कायष करने वाला कोई
अन्य कमषचारी चाहे उसे
दकसी भी नाम से पुकारा
जाये।

16. In the light of the same, the
submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner is that for the persons working as
Cooks
in
Madarsas,
the
institutions
managed by various religious institutions
and the institutions managed by private
bodies, they have been classified as semi
skilled and the minimum wages have been
fixed at Rs.6,325/- per month vide
Governemnt Order dated 28.01.2014.

17. It is further informed that on
20.09.2022, the State Government has
revised the minimum wages in respect of
various categories specified in Government
Order dated 28.01.2014 and the wages for
the semi skilled labourers have been
increased from Rs.6,325/- per month to
Rs.10,483/- per month with a further
provision
for
increase
of
dearness
allowance every six months.

18. In the light of the said, the twofold submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner are firstly, that the charges being
paid to the Cooks in pursuance to the
scheme of the Union of India and the State
Government being Rs.1,000/- per month
enhanced to Rs.1,500/- per month and
subsequently to Rs.2,000/- per month is
nothing but 'another form of forced labour',
which is prohibited under Article 23 of the
Constitution of India and secondly,that the
Union and the State are discriminating in
paying wages to the petitioners members
far less than what have been prescribed by
the state for payment to cooks performing
the
same
functions
but
employed
elsewhere.

19. It is contended at the Bar that the
Central Government itself in pursuance to
the directions given by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has framed rules known as
'Code of Wages (Central) Rules, 2019'
wherein
certain
norms
have
been
prescribed for fixing the minimum wages.
It is informed that the said Code of Wages
2 All. Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh Husainganj, Lucknow Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
67
(Central) Rules, 2019 received the assent
and was notified in the Gazette on
08.08.2019. In the light of the said, he
argues that non-providing the minimum
wages
as
notified
is
nothing
but
''exploitation' which is also prohibited
under Article 23 of the Constitution of
India.

20. He also argues that even the State
Government has issued direction for
payment of minimum wages to Cooks who
are doing similar jobs but are employed by
the Madarsas, other religious institutions,
private educational institutions etc., and
thus, there is no reason why the State
Government and the Central Government
should not extend the said benefit to the
Cooks preparing Mid Day Meals in the
government institutions.

21. He further argues that there is no
rationale for fixing the limit of honorarium
only for a period of 10 months in a
particular calendar year.

22. He further argues that some of the
Cooks making Mid Day Meals are
employed on contract for a year and
although in most of the cases the contracts
are extended on yearly basis but in some
cases the contracts are not extended
without there being any remedy available
to the poor cooks. In some cases the cooks
making mid day meals have been employed
for as long as 15 years on paltry amount of
honorarium without any social security
benefits being extended to them and the
poor cooks,on account of their poverty are
unable to make any grievance He argues
that the Cooks of the Mid Day Meals are
neither being given any financial security
nor any social security and the Union and
the State are exploiting the said Cooks.

23. He informs that this Court,
noticing the plight of mid day meal cooks
had passed an order in Writ - A No.9927 of
2020 (Chandrawati Devi v. State of U.P. &
Ors.) wherein a similar issue ,with regard to
payment of wages at the rate of Rs.1,000/-
per month to the Cooks preparing Mid Day
meal, was held to be other form of forced
labour prohibited under Article 23 of the
Constitution of India.The Court placing
reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of People's
Union for Democratic Rights and Others
v. Union of India and Others; (1982) 3
SCC 235 had allowed the writ petition and
gave directions for payment of minimum
wages to the Cooks across the State of
Uttar
Pradesh
vide
judgment
dated
15.12.2020. He further argues that the said
order was set aside in Special Appeal
Defective No.123 of 2021 mainly on the
ground that the relief granted by the Court
was beyond what was prayed for in the said
writ petition.

24. The Counsel appearing for
respondents tried to justify the payment of
honorarium at the rates specified by
arguing that the Union Government with a
view to improve health care in the school
going children and with a view to impart
education to the less priviledged class of
the society, promoted the scheme for
providing mid day meals to children, with a
view to increase the reach of the scheme,
fixed the honorarium, keeping in view the
paucity of funds and need for maximising
and achieving the laudible objective of the
scheme.

25. It is further argued that the
honorarium paid to cooks in terms of the
scheme cannot be equated with wages, as is
being argued by the petitioners.
68 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

26. In the light of rival submissions
this court is to decide whether the
honorarium paid to the cooks employed
under the mid day meal scheme is adequate
and whether they are facing discrimination
vis a vis minimum wages being paid to
cooks performing similar functions but in
institutions other than government schools.

27. The issue as raised in the present
writ petition has to be adjudged by
adopting a social context judging technique
while interpreting the rights of the
members of the petitioner's association who
are the disadvantaged section of the society
being paid meagre honorarium for the jobs
which they are performing in terms of the
scheme.

28. The word ''honorarium' as defined
in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is ''an
honorary reward, a fee for professional
service rendered' and is used often
mistakenly for the remuneration being paid
on regular basis which are generally
referred as ''salary' or ''wages'. The word
''honorarium' is generally a referable to the
payments made for a performance which is
for compensating some particular act.

29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Karbhari Bhimaji Rohamare v.
Shanker Rao Genuji Kolhe; (1975) 1 SCC
252 explained that for determining the
payments made, it is the substance rendering
the form of the essence of payment rather
than its nomenclature which should be the
guiding factor for determining the nature of
payments made irrespective of the use of
word ''honorarium' or ''salary' or ''allowance'.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court recorded in Para
- 6 as under:

"6. The whole controversy centres
around the honorarium payable to the
members of the Wage Board. It is
contended on behalf of the appellant that
Item 11 specifically lays down that the
compensatory allowance shall mean the
travelling allowance, the daily allowance
or such other allowance which is paid to
the holder of the office for the purpose of
meeting
the
personal
expenditure
in
attending the meeting of the committee or
body or in performing any other function as
the holder of the said office, and
honorarium which is not mentioned there
cannot be brought within the meaning of
the words "such other allowance" found in
that item as it is not an allowance.
Reference is made to the dictionary
meaning of the word "honorarium" and it is
said that while the daily allowance is
expected to meet the expenses of the
member concerned while attending the
meeting of the Board, the honorarium is in
the form of a fee for performing his duties
on those days. The Shorter Oxford
Dictionary gives the meaning of the word
"honorarium" as an honorary reward, a fee
for professional service rendered, while one
of the meanings of the word "salary" is,
fixed payment made periodically to a
person as compensation for regular work,
remuneration for services rendered, fee,
honorarium.
Thus,
in
one
aspect
honorarium and fee are used almost as
though they are interchangeable terms
Even so, what was paid to the first
respondent cannot be said to be a salary. It
was not a fixed payment made periodically
as compensation for regular work. We do
not think that the dictionary meaning is of
much help here. We are of opinion that the
matter must be considered as a matter of
substance rather than of form, of the
essence of payment rather than its
nomenclature. Even so, it is urged on
behalf of the appellant that the payment of
honorarium in this case could not have
2 All. Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh Husainganj, Lucknow Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
69
been for any purpose other than payment
for services rendered on particular days
on which the meetings of the Wage Board
were held. We are not able to accept this
contention."

30. The Code on Wages, 2019 defines
the ''wages' in Section 2(y) as under:

"2. In this Code, unless the
context otherwise requires.-

(y)
"wages"
means
all
remuneration whether by way of salaries,
allowances or otherwise, expressed in
terms of money or capable of being so
expressed which would, if the terms of
employment, express or implied, were
fulfilled, be payable to a person employed
in respect of his employment or of work
done in such employment, and includes,--

(i) basic pay;

(ii) dearness allowance; and

(iii) retaining allowance, if any,
but does not include--

(a) any bonus payable under any
law for the time being in force, which does
not form part of the remuneration payable
under the terms of employment;

(b) the value of any houseaccommodation, or of the supply of light,
water, medical attendance or other amenity
or of any service excluded from the
computation of wages by a general or
special
order
of
the
appropriate
Government;

(c) any contribution paid by the
employer to any pension or provident fund,
and the interest which may have accrued
thereon;

(d) any conveyance allowance or
the value of any travelling concession;

(e) any sum paid to the employed
person to defray special expenses entailed
on him by the nature of his employment;

(f) house rent allowance;

(g) remuneration payable under
any award or settlement between the
parties or order of a court or Tribunal;

(h) any overtime allowance;

(i) any commission payable to the
employee;

(j) any gratuity payable on the
termination of employment;

(k)
any
retrenchment
compensation or other retirement benefit
payable to the employee or any ex gratia
payment made to him on the termination of
employment:

Provided that, for calculating the
wages under this clause, if payments made
by the employer to the employee under
clauses (a) to (i) exceeds one-half, or such
other per cent. as may be notified by the
Central
Government,
of
the
all
remuneration calculated under this clause,
the amount which exceeds such one-half, or
the per cent. so notified, shall be deemed as
remuneration and shall be accordingly
added in wages under this clause:

Provided further that for the
purpose of equal wages to all genders and
for the purpose of payment of wages, the
emoluments specified in clauses (d), (f), (g)
and (h) shall be taken for computation of
wage.

Explanation.--Where an employee
is given in lieu of the whole or part of the
wages payable to him, any remuneration in
kind by his employer, the value of such
remuneration in kind which does not
exceed fifteen per cent. of the total wages
payable to him, shall be deemed to form
part of the wages of such employee;"

31. Considering the fact that the
amount called as ''honorarium' is paid to
the Cooks on a regular basis for a regular
work being done, it is nothing but wages as
defined under Section 2(y) of the Code on
Wages, 2019.
70 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

32. The Central Government in
exercise of powers conferred by Section 67
of the Code on Wages, 2019 read with
Section 24 of the General Clauses Act has
notified the rules known as the Code on
Wages (Central) Rules, 2019 and have been
made applicable to the whole of India.

33. To test the other argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner that the
honorarium as being paid is nothing but
other form of forced labour, it is relevant to
notice the judgment of the Supreme Court
in the case of People's Union for
Democratic Rights (supra) wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

12. Article 23 enacts a very
important
fundamental
right
in
the
following terms:

"23.Prohibition
of
traffic
in
human beings and forced labour.--(1)
Traffic in human beings and begar and
other similar forms of forced labour are
prohibited and any contravention of this
provision shall be an offence punishable in
accordance with law.

(2) Nothing in this article shall
prevent
the
State
from
imposing
compulsory service for public purposes,
and in imposing such service the State shall
not make any discrimination on grounds
only of religion, race, caste or class or any
of them."

Now many of the fundamental
rights enacted in Part III operate as
limitations on the power of the State and
impose negative obligations on the State
not to encroach on individual liberty and
they are enforceable only against the State.
But there are certain fundamental rights
conferred by the Constitution which are
enforceable against the whole world and
they are to be found inter alia in Articles
17, 23 and 24. We have already discussed
the true scope and ambit of Article 24 in an
earlier portion of this judgment and hence
we do not propose to say anything more
about it. So also we need not expatiate on
the proper meaning and effect of the
fundamental right enshrined in Article 17
since we are not concerned with that article
in the present writ petition. It is Article 23
with which we are concerned and that
article is clearly designed to protect the
individual not only against the State but
also against other private citizens. Article
23 is not limited in its application against
the State but it prohibits "traffic in human
being and begar and other similar forms of
forced labour" practised by anyone else.
The sweep of Article 23 is wide and
unlimited and it strikes at "traffic in human
beings and begar and other similar forms
of forced labour" wherever they are found.
The reason for enacting this provision in
the Chapter on Fundamental Rights is to be
found in the socio-economic condition of
the
people
at
the
time
when
the
Constitution came to be enacted. The
Constitution-makers, when they set out to
frame the Constitution, found that they had
the enormous task before them of changing
the socio-economic structure of the country
and
bringing
about
socio-economic
regeneration with a view to reaching social
and economic justice to the common man.
Large masses of people, bled white by
wellnigh two centuries of foreign rule, were
living in abject poverty and destitution,
with ignorance and illiteracy accentuating
their helplessness and despair. The society
had degenerated into a status-oriented
hierarchical society with little respect for
the dignity of the individual who was in the
lower rungs of the social ladder or in an
economically impoverished condition. The
political revolution was completed and it
had succeeded in bringing freedom to the
country but freedom was not an end in
2 All. Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh Husainganj, Lucknow Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
71
itself, it was only a means to an end, the
end being the raising of the people to
higher levels of achievement and bringing
about their total advancement and welfare.
Political freedom had no meaning unless it
was accompanied by social and economic
freedom and it was therefore necessary to
carry forward the social and economic
revolution with a view to creating socioeconomic conditions in which every one
would be able to enjoy basic human rights
and participate in the fruits of freedom and
liberty in an egalitarian social and
economic framework. It was with this end
in view that the Constitution-makers
enacted the directive principles of state
policy in Part IV of the Constitution setting
out the constitutional goal of a new socioeconomic order. Now there was one feature
of our national life which was ugly and
shameful and which cried for urgent
attention and that was the existence of
bonded or forced labour in large parts of
the country. This evil was the relic of a
feudal exploitative society and it was
totally
incompatible
with
the
new
egalitarian socio-economic order which
"we the people of India" were determined
to build and constituted a gross and most
revolting denial of basic human dignity. It
was therefore necessary to eradicate this
pernicious practice and wipe it out
altogether from the national scene and this
had to be done immediately because with
the advent of freedom, such practice could
not be allowed to continue to blight the
national life any longer. Obviously, it would
not have been enough merely to include
abolition of forced labour in the directive
principles of state policy, because then the
outlawing of this practice would not have
been legally enforceable and it would have
continued to plague our national life in
violation of the basic constitutional norms
and
values
until
some
appropriate
legislation could be brought by the
legislature forbidding such practice. The
Constitution-makers therefore decided to
give teeth to their resolve to obliterate and
wipe out this evil practice by enacting
constitutional prohibition against it in the
Chapter on Fundamental Rights, so that the
abolition of such practice may become
enforceable and effective as soon as the
Constitution came into force. This is the
reason why the provision enacted in Article
23 was included in the Chapter on
Fundamental
Rights.
The
prohibition
against "traffic in human beings and begar
and other similar forms of forced labour" is
clearly
intended
to
be
a
general
prohibition, total in its effect and all
pervasive in its range and it is enforceable
not only against the State but also against
any other person indulging in any such
practice.

13. The question then is as to
what is the true scope and meaning of the
expression "traffic in human beings and
begar and other similar forms of forced
labour" in Article 23? What are the forms
of "forced labour" prohibited by that article
and what kind of labour provided by a
person can be regarded as "forced labour"
so as to fall within this prohibition? When
the Constitution-makers enacted Article 23
they had before them Article 4 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights but
they
deliberately
departed
from
its
language and employed words which would
make the reach and content of Article 23
much wider than that of Article 4 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
They banned "traffic in human beings"
which is an expression of much larger
amplitude than "slave trade" and they also
interdicted "begar and other similar forms
of forced labour". The question is what is
the scope and ambit of the expression
"begar" and other similar forms of forced
72 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
labour'? Is this expression wide enough to
include every conceivable form of forced
labour and what is the true scope and
meaning of the words "forced labour"? The
word "begar" in this article is not a word of
common use in English language. It is a
word of Indian origin which like many
other words has found its way in the
English vocabulary. It is very difficult to
formulate a precise definition of the word
"begar", but there can be no doubt that it is
a form of forced labour under which a
person is compelled to work without
receiving any remuneration. Molesworth
describes ''begar' as "labour or service
exacted by a Government or person in
power without giving remuneration for it".
Wilson's Glossary of Judicial and Revenue
Terms gives the following meaning of the
word "begar":"a forced labourer, one
pressed to carry burthens for individuals or
the public. Under the old system, when
pressed for public service, no pay was
given. The begari, though still liable to be
pressed for public objects, now receives
pay. Forced labour for private service is,
prohibited." "Begar" may therefore be
loosely described as labour or service
which a person is forced to give without
receiving any remuneration for it. That was
the meaning of the word "begar" accepted
by a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court in S. Vasudevan v. S.D. Mital [AIR
1962 Bom 53 : 63 Bom LR 774 : (1961-62)
21 FJR 441] . "Begar" is thus clearly a
form of forced labour. Now it is not merely
"begar" which is unconstitutionally (sic)
prohibited by Article 23 but also all other
similar forms of forced labour. This Article
strikes at forced labour in whatever form it
may manifest itself, because it is violative
of human dignity and is contrary to basic
human values. The practice of forced
labour is condemned in almost every
international
instrument
dealing
with
human rights. It is interesting to find that
as far back as 1930 long before the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
came into being, International Labour
Organisation adopted Convention No. 29
laying down that every member of the
International Labour Organisation which
ratifies this convention shall "suppress the
use of forced or compulsory labour in all
its forms" and this prohibition was
elaborated in Convention No. 105 adopted
by the International Labour Organisation
in 1957. The words "forced or compulsory
labour" in Convention No. 29 had of course
a limited meaning but that was so on
account of the restricted definition of these
words given in Article 2 of the Convention.
Article 4 of the European Convention of
Human Rights and Article 8 of the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights also prohibit forced or
compulsory labour. Article 23 is in the
same strain and it enacts a prohibition
against forced labour in whatever form it
may be found. The learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents laid
some emphasis on the word "similar" and
contended that it is not every form of forced
labour which is prohibited by Article 23 but
only such form of forced labour as is
similar to "begar" and since "begar" means
labour or service which a person is forced
to give without receiving any remuneration
for it, the interdict of Article 23 is limited
only to those forms of forced labour where
labour or service is exacted from a person
without paying any remuneration at all and
if some remuneration is paid, though it be
inadequate, it would not fall within the
words "other similar forms of forced
labour". This contention seeks to unduly
restrict the amplitude of the prohibition
against forced labour enacted in Article 23
and is in our opinion not well founded. It
does not accord with the principle
2 All. Madhyan Bhojan Rasoiya Mazdoor Sangh Husainganj, Lucknow Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
73
enunciated by this Court in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC
248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : (1978) 2 SCR
621] that when interpreting the provisions
of the Constitution conferring fundamental
rights, the attempt of the court should be to
expand the reach and ambit of the
fundamental rights rather than to attenuate
their meaning and content. It is difficult to
imagine
that
the
Constitution-makers
should have intended to strike only at
certain forms of forced labour leaving it
open to the socially or economically
powerful sections of the community to
exploit the poor and weaker sections by
resorting to other forms of forced labour.
Could there be any logic or reason in
enacting that if a person is forced to give
labour or service to another without
receiving any remuneration at all, it should
be regarded as a pernicious practice
sufficient to attract the condemnation of
Article 23, but if some remuneration is paid
for it, then it should be outside the
inhibition of that article? If this were the
true interpretation, Article 23 would be
reduced to a mere rope of sand, for it would
then be the easiest thing in an exploitative
society for a person belonging to a socially
or economically dominant class to exact
labour or service from a person belonging
to the deprived and vulnerable section of
the community by paying a negligible
amount of remuneration and thus escape
the rigour of Article 23. We do not think it
would be right to place on the language of
Article 23 an interpretation which would
emasculate its beneficent provisions and
defeat the very purpose of enacting them.
We are clearly of the view that Article 23 is
intended to abolish every form of forced
labour. The words "other similar forms of
forced labour" are used in Article 23 not
with a view to importing the particular
characteristic of "begar" that labour or
service should be exacted without payment
of any remuneration but with a view to
bringing within the scope and ambit of that
article all other forms of forced labour and
since "begar" is one form of forced labour,
the Constitution-makers used the words
"other similar forms of forced labour". If
the requirement that labour or work should
be exacted without any remuneration were
imported in other forms of forced labour,
they would straightaway come within the
meaning of the word "begar" and in that
event there would be no need to have the
additional words "other similar forms of
forced labour". These words would be
rendered futile and meaningless and it is a
well-recognised rule of interpretation that
the court should avoid a construction
which has the effect of rendering any words
used by the legislature superfluous or
redundant. The object of adding these
words was clearly to expand the reach and
content of Article 23 by including, in
addition to "begar", other forms of forced
labour within the prohibition of that article.
Every form of forced labour, "begar" or
otherwise, is within the inhibition of Article
23 and it makes no difference whether the
person who is forced to give his labour or
service to another is remunerated or not.
Even if remuneration is paid, labour
supplied by a person would be hit by this
article if it is forced labour, that is, labour
supplied not willingly but as a result of
force or compulsion. Take for example a
case where a person has entered into a
contract of service with another for a
period of three years and he wishes to
discontinue serving such other person
before the expiration of the period of three
years. If a law were to provide that in such
a case the contract shall be specifically
enforced and he shall be compelled to serve
for the full period of three years, it would
clearly amount to forced labour and such a
74 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
law would be void as offending Article 23.
That is why specific performance of a
contract of service cannot be enforced
against an employee and the employee
cannot be forced by compulsion of law to
continue to serve the employer. Of course,
if there is a breach of the contract of
service, the employee would be liable to
pay damages to the employer but he cannot
be forced to continue to serve the employer
without breaching the injunction of Article
23. This was precisely the view taken by the
Supreme Court of United States in Baily v.
Alabama [219 US 219 : 55 L Ed 191] while
dealing with a similar provision in the
Thirteenth Amendment. There, a legislation
enacted by the Alabama State providing
that when a person with intent to injure or
defraud his employer enters into a contract
in writing for the purpose of any service
and obtains money or other property from
the employer and without refunding the
money or the property refuses or fails to
perform such service, he will be punished
with a fine. The constitutional validity of
this legislation was challenged on the
ground that it violated the Thirteenth
Amendment
which
inter
alia
provides:"Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude ...... shall exist within the United
States or any place subject to their
jurisdiction." This challenge was upheld by
a majority of the Court and Mr Justice
Hughes delivering the majority opinion
said:

"We cannot escape the conclusion
that although the statute in terms is to
punish fraud, still its natural and inevitable
effect is to expose to conviction for crime
those who simply fail or refuse to perform
contracts
for
personal
service
in
liquidation of a debt, and judging its
purpose by its effect that it seeks in this way
to provide the means of compulsion through
which performance of such service may be
secured. The question is whether such a
statute is constitutional."

The learned Judge proceeded to
explain the scope and ambit of the
expression "involuntary servitude" in the
following words: