# Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd v. M/S Shashi Cable

- **Citation:** (2023) 10 ILRA 509
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-10-13
- **Case number:** Matter Under Article 227 No. 3384 of 2023
- **Bench:** Pankaj Bhatia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/madhyanchal-vidyut-vitran-nigam-ltd-v-m-s-shashi-cable-49469
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

(A) The Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction - The
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 - Section 19 -
Application
for
setting
aside
decree,
award or order , The Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 -
Application
for
setting
aside
arbitral
award - the enforcement of an award
through its execution can be initiated
anywhere in the country where the decree
can
be
executed
and
there
is
no
requirement of obtaining a transfer of the
decree from the court which would have
jurisdiction
over
the
arbitral
proceedings.(Para -9,7)

Petitioner challenged an award under the MSME
Act and Arbitration and Conciliation Act -
application was rejected by Commercial Court,
Kanpur - not paying a Rs.75% predeposit -
petitioner filed an application for recall -
rejected - respondent filed an application for
510 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
execution - before Commercial Court, Lucknow -
challenged by petitioner -Commercial Court
rejected petitioner's objections - prompted
petitioner to file current petition - Dispute
relating to - territorial jurisdiction of court for
execution of an award.(Para -2,4)

HELD:- Executing Court having jurisdiction to
execute the award can be any court anywhere
in the Country, where the decree can be
executed. Court rejected petitioner's objection
that Lucknow Court had no jurisdiction, stating
that there was no error or infirmity in the order
passed by the Commercial Court, Lucknow.
Directions to expeditiously conclude execution
proceedings. (Para -12, 13)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

LIST OF CASES CITED:-

## Text

10 All. Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs. M/s Shashi Cable
509
no permit is required to transport cow and
its progeny within the state of Uttar
Pradesh. In above circumstances, the
impugned order dated 18.08.2021 passed
by District Magistrate, Varanasi is without
jurisdiction and the same is liable to be setaside. Likewise, the revisional court has not
considered the relevant provisions of
Section 5A of Cow Slaughter Act while
dismissing the criminal revision of the
applicant, therefore, the impugned order
dated 13.10.2021 passed by Special Judge
(SC/ST Act), Chandauli is also against the
provisions of law and is liable to be setaside. "

Supreme Court in Sunderbhai
Ambalal Desai and C.M. Mudaliar
versus State of Gujarat [AIR 2003 SC
638] has deprecated the practice of police
authorities by keeping the seized vehicles
at the police station and has set out time
limit for release of such vehicles within
a maximum period of one month. It is
said that the articles are not kept for a
long time at the police station, in any
case for not more than fifteen days to
one month.

13. In the case in hand, it is
evident that the cow and its progeny
were not being transported from within
the State to outside State, therefore, the
provisions of section 5-A of the Act are
not attracted. Consequently, the show
cause notice dated 13.12.2022 (supra)
issued
by
the
District
Magistrate,
confiscation
order
dated
14.3.2023
(supra) and the appellate order dated
15.6.2023 (supra) are bad in law, and
liable to be and are set aside.

The opposite parties are directed
to
release
the
vehicle
forthwith
in
accordance with law on such terms which
are deemed appropriate.

14. The petition is allowed in above
terms.
----------
(2023) 10 ILRA 509
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 13.10.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Matter Under Article 227 No. 3384 of 2023

Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd.
 ...Petitioner
Versus
M/S Shashi Cable ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Manish Jauhari

Counsel for the Respondent:
Amit Kumar Singh, Utkarsh Srivastava

(A) The Constitution of India, 1950 -
Article 227 - Supervisory jurisdiction - The
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 - Section 19 -
Application
for
setting
aside
decree,
award or order , The Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 -
Application
for
setting
aside
arbitral
award - the enforcement of an award
through its execution can be initiated
anywhere in the country where the decree
can
be
executed
and
there
is
no
requirement of obtaining a transfer of the
decree from the court which would have
jurisdiction
over
the
arbitral
proceedings.(Para -9,7)

Petitioner challenged an award under the MSME
Act and Arbitration and Conciliation Act -
application was rejected by Commercial Court,
Kanpur - not paying a Rs.75% predeposit -
petitioner filed an application for recall -
rejected - respondent filed an application for
510 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
execution - before Commercial Court, Lucknow -
challenged by petitioner -Commercial Court
rejected petitioner's objections - prompted
petitioner to file current petition - Dispute
relating to - territorial jurisdiction of court for
execution of an award.(Para -2,4)

HELD:- Executing Court having jurisdiction to
execute the award can be any court anywhere
in the Country, where the decree can be
executed. Court rejected petitioner's objection
that Lucknow Court had no jurisdiction, stating
that there was no error or infirmity in the order
passed by the Commercial Court, Lucknow.
Directions to expeditiously conclude execution
proceedings. (Para -12, 13)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

LIST OF CASES CITED:-

1. St. of W.B. & ors. Vs Associated Contractors,
(2015) 1 SCC 32

2. Sundaram Finance Ltd. Vs Abdul Samad &
anr., (2018) 3 SCC 622

3. Cheran Properties Ltd. Vs Kasturi & Sons Ltd.
& ors., (2018) 16 SCC 413

4. Cox & Kings Ltd. Vs SAP India Pvt. Ltd. &
ors., (2022) 8 SCC 1

(Delivered by Hon'ble Pankaj Bhatia, J.)

1. Heard Sri Manish Jauhari, learned
Counsel for the petitioner and Sri J.N.
Mathur, learned Senior Counsel assisted by
Sri Amit Kumar Singh and Sri Utkarsh
Srivastava, learned Counsel for the sole
respondent.

2. The short question involved in the
present petition pertains to the territorial
jurisdiction of the court for execution of an
award.

3. The facts in brief are that the
petitioner and the respondent entered into
an agreement on 29.12.2016 for supply of
Conductor
through
Purchased
Order
No.3366 and thereafter, in pursuance to the
said order, an agreement dated 02.07.2018
was also entered into. In terms of the said
agreement, certain payments are to be made
on the basis of supply made by the
respondent to the petitioner. The dispute
occurred with regard to the payment of the
pending bill raised by the respondent. An
application was moved by the respondent
on 18.02.2020 claiming an amount of
Rs.15,27,30,879/-
along
with
interest
thereupon quantified at Rs.4,88,82,916/-
through an application before the U.P. State
Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation
Council, Kanpur (in short 'the Council').
The petitioner herein put his appearance
before the Council situate at Kanpur, Uttar
Pradesh and contested the claim. The
Council proceeded to pass an award/order
vide order dated 27.01.2022 against the
petitioner directing to deposit total amount
of Rs.9,97,58,764/- in favour of the
respondent, which was directed to be paid
as per the provisions of the "Act 27/2006"
on the delayed payment. The said award is
on record as Annexure-5 to the writ
petition.

4. It appears that challenging the said
award, the petitioner filed an application
under Section 19 of The Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises Development Act,
2006 (in short 'the MSMED Act') read
with Section 34 of The Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, which was registered as
Misc. Case No.24 of 2023. The said
application was rejected by the learned
Judge, Commercial Court, Kanpur vide
order dated 18.02.2022 mainly on the
ground that predeposit of Rs.75%, , which
was required under Section 19 of the
MSMED Act, was not paid. Thereafter, the
petitioner also filed an application for recall
10 All. Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs. M/s Shashi Cable
511
of
the
order
dated
18.08.2022
and
ultimately, the same was rejected vide order
dated 31.01.2023. The said order dated
31.01.2023 was challenged by filing a
petition
under
Article
227
of
the
Constitution of India before this Court at
Allahabad being Matters Under Article 227
No.3552 of 2023, in which no interim order
was passed in favour of the petitioner. In
the meanwhile, the respondent filed an
application for execution of the award
dated 27.01.2022 before the Commercial
Court, Lucknow, which was registered as
Execution Case No.321 of 2022. The
petitioner put in appearance and filed its
objection. The said objections were rejected
by the Commercial Court, vide order dated
10.03.2023, which has been challenged by
the petitioner by filing the instant petition.

5. The contention of the Counsel for
the petitioner is that once the award was
delivered at Kanpur, in view of the bar
created by virtue of Section 42 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, it is only
the Court at Kanpur, which could have
entertained the execution application and,
the Court at Lucknow has no territorial
jurisdiction. The Counsel for the petitioner
places reliance on the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State
of West Bengal and others vs Associated
Contractors; (2015) 1 SCC 32, wherein,
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:

"11. It will be noticed that Section 42
is in almost the same terms as its
predecessor section except that the words
"in any reference" are substituted with the
wider expression "with respect to an
arbitration agreement". It will also be
noticed that the expression "has been made
in a court competent to entertain it", is no
longer there in Section 42. These two
changes are of some significance as will be
pointed out later. Section 42 starts with a
non obstante clause which does away with
anything which may be inconsistent with
the section either in Part I of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 or in any other law
for the time being in force. The expression
"with respect to an arbitration agreement"
widens the scope of Section 42 to include
all matters which directly or indirectly
pertain to an arbitration agreement.
Applications made to courts which are
before, during or after arbitral proceedings
made under Part I of the Act are all
covered by Section 42. But an essential
ingredient of the section is that an
application under Part I must be made in a
court.

21. One other question that may arise
is as to whether Section 42 applies after the
arbitral proceedings come to an end. It has
already been held by us that the expression
"with respect to an arbitration agreement"
are words of wide import and would take in
all applications made before during or
after the arbitral proceedings are over. In
an earlier judgment, Kumbha Mawji v.
Dominion of India [1953 SCR 878 : AIR
1953 SC 313], the question which arose
before the Supreme Court was whether the
expression used in Section 31(4) of the
1940 Act "in any reference" would include
matters
that
are
after
the
arbitral
proceedings are over and have culminated
in an award. It was held that the words "in
any reference" cannot be taken to mean "in
the course of a reference", but mean "in
the matter of a reference" and that such
phrase is wide enough and comprehensive
enough to cover an application made after
the arbitration is completed and the final
award is made (see SCR pp. 891-93 : AIR
pp. 317-18, paras 13-16). As has been
noticed above, the expression used in
Section 42 is wider being "with respect to
512 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
an arbitration agreement" and would
certainly include such applications.

25. Our conclusions therefore on
Section 2(1)(e) and Section 42 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 are as follows:

(a)
Section
2(1)(e)
contains
an
exhaustive definition marking out only the
Principal
Civil
Court
of
Original
Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court
having original civil jurisdiction in the
State, and no other court as "court" for the
purpose of Part I of the Arbitration Act,
1996.

(b) The expression "with respect to an
arbitration agreement" makes it clear that
Section 42 will apply to all applications
made whether before or during arbitral
proceedings
or
after
an
award
is
pronounced under Part I of the 1996 Act.

(c) However, Section 42 only applies
to applications made under Part I if they
are made to a court as defined. Since
applications made under Section 8 are
made to judicial authorities and since
applications under Section 11 are made to
the Chief Justice or his designate, the
judicial authority and the Chief Justice or
his designate not being court as defined,
such applications would be outside Section
42.

(d) Section 9 applications being
applications made to a court and Section
34 applications to set aside arbitral awards
are applications which are within Section
42.

(e) In no circumstances can the
Supreme Court be "court" for the purposes
of Section 2(1)(e), and whether the
Supreme Court does or does not retain
seisin after appointing an arbitrator,
applications will follow the first application
made before either a High Court having
original jurisdiction in the State or a
Principal Civil Court having original
jurisdiction in the district, as the case may
be.

(f)
Section
42
will
apply
to
applications
made
after
the
arbitral
proceedings have come to an end provided
they are made under Part I.

(g) If a first application is made to a
court which is neither a Principal Court of
Original Jurisdiction in a district or a High
Court exercising original jurisdiction in a
State, such application not being to a court
as defined would be outside Section 42.
Also, an application made to a court
without subject-matter jurisdiction would
be outside Section 42.

The
reference
is
answered
accordingly."

6. In the light of the aforesaid, the
Counsel for the petitioner argues that the
writ petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India deserves to be
allowed and the order impugned rejecting
the application of the petitioner deserves to
be quashed.

7. Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, on the other hand, argues that
law with regard to the jurisdiction, where
the execution can be entertained, came up
for consideration before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Sundaram
Finance Limited vs Abdul Samad and
another; (2018) 3 SCC 622 wherein the
Hon'ble Court had the occasion to consider
the mandatory provisions contained in
Section
42
of
the
Arbitration
and
Conciliation Act and it was held that the
mandatory provisions contained in Section
42 have to be read in the light of Section 32
of the said Act. The conclusions recorded
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court are as
under:
10 All. Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs. M/s Shashi Cable
513

"Conclusion

20. We are, thus, unhesitatingly of the
view that the enforcement of an award
through its execution can be filed anywhere
in the country where such decree can be
executed and there is no requirement for
obtaining a transfer of the decree from the
court, which would have jurisdiction over
the arbitral proceedings."

8. In response to the said judgment
cited by the Counsel for the respondent, the
Counsel for the petitioner argues that in the
case of Sundaram Finance Limited (supra),
the Hon'ble Supreme Court did not
consider the judgment rendered in the case
of State of West Bengal (supra) and thus,
the judgment of State of West Bengal
(Supra) being delivered by three Judges
Bench would be applicable and to that
extent, the judgment in the case of
Sundaram Finance Limited (Supra) would
be per incuriam.

9. Sri J.N. Mathur, learned Senior
Counsel draws my attention to the
subsequent judgment rendered in the case
of Cheran Properties Limited vs Kasturi
and Sons Limited and others; (2018) 16
SCC 413, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme
Court had the occasion to consider the
issues in the light of the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State
of West Bengal (Supra) as well as the
judgment of Sundaram Finance Limited
(Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court after
considering both the judgments held as
under:

"39. The reliance which has been
sought to be placed on the provisions of
Section 42 of the 1996 Act is inapposite. Dr
Singhvi relied on the decision in State of
W.B. v. Associated Contractors [State of
W.B. v. Associated Contractors, (2015) 1
SCC 32 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 1] . The
principle which was enunciated in the
judgment of this Court was as follows :
(SCC p. 46, para 24)

"24. If an application were to be
preferred to a court which is not a
Principal
Civil
Court
of
Original
Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court
exercising original jurisdiction to decide
questions forming the subject-matter of an
arbitration if the same had been the
subject-matter of a suit, then obviously
such application would be outside the four
corners of Section 42. If, for example, an
application were to be filed in a court
inferior to a Principal Civil Court, or to a
High
Court
which
has
no
original
jurisdiction, or if an application were to be
made to a court which has no subjectmatter jurisdiction, such application would
be outside Section 42 and would not debar
subsequent applications from being filed in
a court other than such court."

The conclusion of the Court is in the
following terms : (SCC pp. 46-47, para 25)

"25. ... (a) Section 2(1)(e) contains an
exhaustive definition marking out only the
Principal
Civil
Court
of
Original
Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court
having original civil jurisdiction in the
State, and no other court as "court" for the
purpose of Part I of the Arbitration Act,
1996.

(b) The expression "with respect to an
arbitration agreement" makes it clear that
Section 42 will apply to all applications
made whether before or during arbitral
proceedings
or
after
an
award
is
pronounced under Part I of the 1996 Act.

(c) However, Section 42 only applies
to applications made under Part I if they
are made to a court as defined. Since
applications made under Section 8 are
made to judicial authorities and since
applications under Section 11 are made to
514 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the Chief Justice or his designate, the
judicial authority and the Chief Justice or
his designate not being court as defined,
such applications would be outside Section
42.

(d) Section 9 applications being
applications made to a court and Section
34 applications to set aside arbitral awards
are applications which are within Section
42.

(e) In no circumstances can the
Supreme Court be "court" for the purposes
of Section 2(1)(e), and whether the
Supreme Court does or does not retain
seisin after appointing an arbitrator,
applications will follow the first application
made before either a High Court having
original jurisdiction in the State or a
Principal Civil Court having original
jurisdiction in the district, as the case may
be.

(f)
Section
42
will
apply
to
applications
made
after
the
arbitral
proceedings have come to an end provided
they are made under Part I.

(g) If a first application is made to a
court which is neither a Principal Court of
Original Jurisdiction in a district or a High
Court exercising original jurisdiction in a
State, such application not being to a court
as defined would be outside Section 42.
Also, an application made to a court
without subject-matter jurisdiction would
be outside Section 42."

40. More recently in Sundaram
Finance Ltd. v. Abdul Samad [Sundaram
Finance Ltd. v. Abdul Samad, (2018) 3
SCC 622 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 593 :
(2018) 2 Scale 467] , this Court
considered
the
divergence
of
legal
opinion in the High Courts on the
question as to whether an award under
the 1996 Act is required to be first filed in
the court having jurisdiction over the
arbitral proceedings for execution, to be
followed by a transfer of the decree or
whether the award could be filed and
executed straightaway in the court where
the assets are located. Dealing with the
provisions of Section 36, Sanjay Kishan
Kaul, J. observed thus : (SCC p. 632,
para 14)

"14. ... The aforesaid provision
would show that an award is to be
enforced
in
accordance
with
the
provisions of the said code in the same
manner as if it were a decree. It is, thus,
the enforcement mechanism, which is
akin to the enforcement of a decree but
the award itself is not a decree of the civil
court as no decree whatsoever is passed
by the civil court. It is the Arbitral
Tribunal, which renders an award and the
tribunal does not have the power of
execution of a decree. For the purposes
of execution of a decree the award is to
be enforced in the same manner as if it
was a decree under the said Code."

Explaining the provisions of Section
42 the Court held that : (SCC pp. 632-33,
paras 16-17)

"16. ... The aforesaid provision,
however, applies with respect to an
application being filed in court under
Part I. The jurisdiction is over the
arbitral proceedings. The subsequent
application arising from that agreement
and the arbitral proceedings are to be
made in that court alone.

17. However, what has been lost
sight of is Section 32 of the said Act,
which reads as under:

'32. Termination of proceedings.-
(1) The arbitral proceedings shall be
terminated by the final arbitral award or
by an order of the Arbitral Tribunal under
sub-section (2).

(2) The Arbitral Tribunal shall issue
an order for the termination of the arbitral
proceedings where-
10 All. Madhyanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs. M/s Shashi Cable
515

(a) the claimant withdraws his claim,
unless the respondent objects to the order
and the Arbitral Tribunal recognises a
legitimate interest on his part in obtaining
a final settlement of the dispute,

(b)
the
parties
agree
on
the
termination of the proceedings, or

(c) the Arbitral Tribunal finds
that
the
continuation
of
the
proceedings has for any other reason
become unnecessary or impossible.

(3) Subject to Section 33 and subsection (4) of Section 34, the mandate
of
the
Arbitral
Tribunal
shall
terminate with the termination of the
arbitral proceedings.' "

The aforesaid provision provides
for
arbitral
proceedings
to
be
terminated by the final arbitral award.
Thus, when an award is already made,
of which execution is sought, the
arbitral proceedings already stand
terminated on the making of the final
award. Thus, it is not appreciated how
Section 42 of the said Act, which deals
with the jurisdiction issue in respect
of arbitral proceedings, would have
any relevance. ..."

Consequently, in the view of the
Court, the enforcement of an award
through its execution can be initiated
anywhere in the country where the
decree can be executed and there is
no
requirement
of
obtaining
a
transfer of the decree from the court
which would have jurisdiction over
the arbitral proceedings."

10. Although the said judgment
Cheran Properties Limited (Supra)
was referred by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court to Larger Bench in the case of
Cox and Kings Limited vs SAP India
Private Limited and others; (2022) 8
SCC 1, on the following issues:

"104. In view of the above
discussion, respectfully, I am of the
opinion that the questions that are
sought to be referred to a larger
Bench deserve further elaboration.
With all the humility at my command,
the following substantial questions of
law
also
arise
for
authoritative
determination by a larger Bench in
addition and in conjunction with those
formulated by Hon'ble the Chief Justice:

104.1. (A) Whether the Group of
Companies doctrine should be read into
Section 8 of the Act or whether it can exist
in Indian jurisprudence independent of any
statutory provision?

104.2. (B) Whether the Group of
Companies doctrine should continue to be
invoked on the basis of the principle of
"single economic reality"?

104.3. (C) Whether the Group of
Companies doctrine should be construed as
a means of interpreting the implied consent
or intent to arbitrate between the parties?

104.4. (D) Whether the principles of
alter ego and/or piercing the corporate veil
can alone justify pressing the Group of
Companies doctrine into operation even in
the absence of implied consent?"

11. The issue with regard to the
jurisdiction of the executing court was
neither doubted nor was referred.

12. From the judgments delivered by
the Counsel for the parties and referred
above,
the
Executing
Court
having
jurisdiction to execute the award can be any
court anywhere in the Country, where the
decree can be executed and thus in view of
the law expounded in the case of Cheran
Properties Limited (Supra), I have no
hesitation in holding that the objection of
the petitioner that the Court at Lucknow
had no jurisdiction loses its relevance and
516 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is worthy of rejection. Thus, on the ground
of jurisdiction, the argument of the Counsel
for the petitioner cannot be sustained as
there is no error or infirmity in the order
impugned dated 10.03.2023 passed by the
Commercial Court, Lucknow and the same
is upheld.

13. In view of above, the writ petition
is
dismissed
with
directions to
the
Commercial
Court-Ist,
Lucknow
to
expeditiously
conclude
the
execution
proceedings, in accordance with law.
----------
(2023) 10 ILRA 516
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.10.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR SINGH, J.

Application u/s 482 No. 25636 of 2023

Vaibhav Jaiswal ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Ram Raj Pandey, Sri Shubham Pandey

Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A., Sri Bipin Kumar Tripathi, Sri Shubham, Sri
Ajay Singh

(A) Criminal Law - The Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 - Inherent
power - Section 200 - statements of
complainant, Section 202 - statements
witnesses, Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 323, 325, 504, 506, 452 - at the
stage of summoning the accused under
Section 204 Cr.P.C., Magistrate is not
required to go into the merit and demerit
of the case - Genuineness or otherwise of
the allegations cannot be even determined
at the stage of summoning the accused -
Only prima facie satisfaction of the
learned Magistrate about the existence of
sufficient ground to proceed in the matter
is required - honesty, fairness, purity of
mind should be of the highest order to
approach the court.(Para -10,14)

Misuse of Law Process in Criminal Revision Case
- Accused parties misused law by filing criminal
revision -
Suppressed material facts and documents
indicating their application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. was dismissed - Despite objections, the
revisional court did not mention the dismissal of
the High Court application. (Para -10,14)

HELD:- After dismissal of an application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. against the summoning
order by the High Court, the criminal revision
under Section 397 and 399 Cr.P.C. against the
same summoning order before the Additional
Sessions Judge is not maintainable. Order
passed by District and Sessions Judge, not
sustainable in the eye of law. Impugned order
passed by Sessions Judge quashed. Summoning
order passed by Magistrate upheld. (Para -
14,15,16)

Application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. allowed. (E-7)

LIST OF CASES CITED:-

1. K.D Sharma Vs SAIL & ors., (2008) 12 SCC
481

2. Dalip Singh Vs St. of U.P. & ors., (2010) 2
SCC 114

3. K. Jayaram & ors. Vs B.D.A. & ors., (2022) 12
SCC 816

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sanjay Kumar
Singh, J.)

1- Heard Mr. Ram Raj Pandey,
learned counsel for the applicant, Mr.
Deepak
Mishra,
learned
Additional
Government Advocate assisted by Mr.
Ajay
Singh,
learned
Brief
Holder
representing the State, Mr. Shubham,
learned counsel for accused (opposite party
nos.
2,
3
and
4).