# Mahaveer Prasad Verma v. Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow and others

- **Citation:** (2013) 1 ILRA 3
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-01-17
- **Bench:** Devi Prasad Singh, Dr. Satish Chandra
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mahaveer-prasad-verma-v-central-administrative-tribunal-lucknow-and-others-42490
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226petition against the order passed by
Central
Administrative
Tribunal
on
ground
after
transfer
of
the
successor/contemnor-new authority not
brought
on
record-contempt
not
maintainable-application to recall the
order rejected on ground of absence of
provisions
for
review-held-Tribunal
committed great error apparent on the
face of record itself-the purpose of
contempt is to punish the contemnor at
the same time ensure the compliance of
the
direction
also-if
contemnor
transferred-can not be discharged but
shall be triable simultaneously with new
successor-held-order passed by Tribunal
quashed-necessary direction issued to
consider
the
contempt
application
according with law.

Held: Para-9

In view of the above, the order dated
10.1.2012,
seems
to
suffer
from
substantial illegality. The observations
made by the Tribunal that contempt
4 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
proceeding cannot proceed against the
incumbent
who
has
already
been
transferred, is not sustainable.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1966 SC 641; 1988 (14) ALR 706; 1995
(26) ALR 627; 1979 (5) ALR 168; 1998 (33)
ALR 456; 1997 (88) RD 562; AIR 1970 SC
1273; 1987 (13) ALR 680; AIR 1964 SC 436;
AIR 1965 SC 1457; AIR 1971 SC 1447; AIR
1975 SC 2277; 1997 SCC (L&S) 88; AIR 1999
SC 449; (2002) 10 SCC 471; JT 2010 (4) SC
35; 2010 (4) SCC 785

## Text

1 All] Mahaveer Prasad Verma V. Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow and others
3
about the High Courts and watch
meticulously over all their orders, the
System will break down as its morale will
crack up. A psychic communicable
disease of suspicion, skepticism and
servility cannot make for the health of the
judicial system. If the Supreme Court has
a super-Supreme Court above it, it is
doubtful whether many of its verdicts will
survive, judging by the frequency with
which it differs from itself."

7. Recently, in Gurdev Kaur &
others v. Kaki & others, AIR 2006 SC
1975, the Hon'ble Apex Court has given a
note of caution to such orders which are
stigmatic on the justice delivery system in
the mind of the public at large and has
held; "Judges must administer law
according to the provisions of law. It is
the bounden duty of Judges to discern
legislative intention in the process of
adjudication.
Justice
administered
according to individual's whim, desire
inclination and notice of justice would
lead to confusion, disorder and chaos."

8. Accordingly, writ petition is
disposed of with a direction to the
opposite parties to implement the order
passed in Revenue Appeal No.82 of 1976
by
District
Judge,
Gonda
dated
20.12.1976 with thirty days from the date
of production of a certified copy of this
order.
Learned
District
Magistrate
concerned is further directed to hold an
enquiry and find out as to why the
petitioners were compelled to knock the
door of this Court and he shall take
effective action against the guilty and
shall report to this Court within thirty
days from the receipt of the copy of this
order. The District Magistrate shall be
officially
answerable
and
personally
responsible
to
this
court
for
implementation of this order.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.01.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DEVI PRASAD SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. SATISH CHANDRA, J.

Service Bench No. - 66 of 2013

Mahaveer Prasad Verma
 ...Petitioner
Versus
Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow
and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Anoop Srivastava Ii

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.

Constitution
of
India,
Article
226petition against the order passed by
Central
Administrative
Tribunal
on
ground
after
transfer
of
the
successor/contemnor-new authority not
brought
on
record-contempt
not
maintainable-application to recall the
order rejected on ground of absence of
provisions
for
review-held-Tribunal
committed great error apparent on the
face of record itself-the purpose of
contempt is to punish the contemnor at
the same time ensure the compliance of
the
direction
also-if
contemnor
transferred-can not be discharged but
shall be triable simultaneously with new
successor-held-order passed by Tribunal
quashed-necessary direction issued to
consider
the
contempt
application
according with law.

Held: Para-9

In view of the above, the order dated
10.1.2012,
seems
to
suffer
from
substantial illegality. The observations
made by the Tribunal that contempt
4 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
proceeding cannot proceed against the
incumbent
who
has
already
been
transferred, is not sustainable.
Case Law discussed:
AIR 1966 SC 641; 1988 (14) ALR 706; 1995
(26) ALR 627; 1979 (5) ALR 168; 1998 (33)
ALR 456; 1997 (88) RD 562; AIR 1970 SC
1273; 1987 (13) ALR 680; AIR 1964 SC 436;
AIR 1965 SC 1457; AIR 1971 SC 1447; AIR
1975 SC 2277; 1997 SCC (L&S) 88; AIR 1999
SC 449; (2002) 10 SCC 471; JT 2010 (4) SC
35; 2010 (4) SCC 785

(Delivered by Hon'ble Devi Prasad Singh, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner Sri Anoop Srivastava, Sri I.H.
Farooqui, learned counsel for Union of India.

2. Since pure question of law is
involved, Sri I. H. Farooqui, does not intend
to file counter affidavit. Hence with the
consent of parties counsel, we proceed to
decide the writ petition at the admission
stage.

3. Instant writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, has been
preferred against the impugned order passed
by Central Administrative Tribunal, rejecting
the petitioner's application for review/recall
of order dated 10.1.2012, passed in Civil
Contempt Petition No.22/2009.

4. By the order dated 10.1.2012, the
contempt petition filed by the petitioner, was
dismissed in his absence on the ground that
the petitioner respondent has not moved any
application to bring on record the successor
since the contemner was transferred.
Tribunal noted that an application for recall
of an order passed in a contempt proceeding,
is not maintainable. So far as the finding of
Tribunal that recall/review application is not
maintainable, seems to be correct. Virtually,
recalling of the order dated 10.1.2012, will
amount to review of earlier decision was was
passed with the finding on merit to the extent
that successor officer has not been brought
on record. Review/recall or appeal are the
statutory remedies, vide AIR 1966 SC 641,
Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh and
others, 1988 (14) ALR 706, Vijai Bahadur
Vs. State of U.P., 1995 (26) ALR 627, Ram
Jiwan Singh and others Vs. The District
Inspector of Schools, Kanpur and others,
1979 (5) ALR 168, 1998 (33) ALR 456,
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt.
Bimla Devi and others, 1997 (88) RD 562,
Smt. Shivraji and others Vs. Dy. Director
of Consolidation, Allahabad and others,
AIR
1970
SC
1273,
Patel
Narshi
Thakershi
and
others
Vs.
Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsinghji,
1987
(13) ALR 680, Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta
Vs. Mgt. of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya,
Sitapur etc., AIR 1964 SC 436, Laxman
Purushottam Pimputkar Vs. The State of
Bombay and others, and AIR 1965 SC
1457, Patel Chunibhai Dajibha etc. Vs.
Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and
another. Unless provided under the Act, no
application for review/recall may be moved.
The contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not
contain any provision for review of a
judgment. Hence the impugned order dated
13.9.2012 does not seem to suffer from any
impropriety or illegality.

5. However, the original order dated
10.1.2012, seems to suffer from substantial
illegality.
The
proceeding
under
the
contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (in short the
Act), deals with the individual liability with
regard to compliance of court's order. A
person is accountable for non-compliance of
a court's order, may be punished under
Section 12 of the Act. Section 2 (b) defines
civil contempt and Section 2 (c) defines
criminal contempt. For convenience, Section
2 (b) and 2 (c) of the Act, are reproduced as
under:-
1 All] Mahaveer Prasad Verma V. Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow and others
5

Section 2 (b) and (c) of the Act:-

(b) "civil contempt" means wilful
disobedience to any judgement, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a
court or wilful breach of an undertaking
given to a court;

(c) "criminal contempt" means the
publication (whether by words, spoken or
written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise) of any matter or
the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
-

(i) scandalizes or tends to scandalise, or
lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any
court, or

(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to
interfere with the due course of any judicial
proceeding , or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with,
or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the
administration of justice in any other
manner."

6. For civil contempt, a person may be
liable to be punished under Section 12 of the
Act. For convenience, Section 12 of the Act
is reproduced as under:-

"12. Punishment for contempt of
court-

(1) Save
as otherwise expressly
provided in this Act or in any other law, a
contempt of court may be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may
extend to six months, or with fine which may
extend to two thousand rupees, or with both;

Provided that the accused may be
discharged or the punishment awarded may
be remitted on apology being made to the
satisfaction of the court.

Explanation - An apology shall not be
rejected merely on the ground that it is
qualified or conditional if the accused makes
it bona fide.

 (2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in any law for the time being in
force, no court shall impose a sentence in
excess of that specified in sub section for any
contempt either in respect of itself or of a
court subordinate to it.

 (3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in this section, where a person is
found guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if
it considers that a fine will not meet the ends
of
justice
and
that
a
sentence
of
imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of
sentencing him to simple imprisonment,
direct that the he be detained in a civil prison
for such period not exceeding six months as
it may think fit.

 (4) Where the person found guilty of
contempt of court in respect of any
undertaking given to a court is a company,
every person who, at the time the contempt
was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to, the company for the conduct
of business of the company, as well as the
company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the
contempt and the punishment may be
enforced, with the leave of the court, by the
detention in civil prison of each such person.

Provided that nothing contained in this
sub section shall render any such person
liable to such punishment if he proves that
the contempt was committed without his
knowledge or that he exercised all due
diligence to prevent its commission.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained
in sub section (4) where the contempt of
6 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
court referred to therein has been committed
by a company and it is provided that the
contempt has been committed with the
consent or connivance of, or is attributable to
any neglect on the part of, any director,
manger, secretary or other officer of the
company, such director, manager, secretary
or other officer shall also be deemed to be
guilty of the be contempt and the punishment
may be enforced, with the leave of the court,
by the detention in civil prison of such
director, manager, secretary or other officer.

Explanation - For the purpose of sub
sections (4) and (5)-

(a) "company "means any body
corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals, and

(b) "director" in relation to a firm,
means a partner in the firm."

7. Legislature to their wisdom, has
provided that accused may be punished or
may be exonerated by the court subject to
establishment of charges on tendering
apology to the satisfaction of the court. The
definition clause (supra) as well as provisions
contained under Section 12 of the Act,
indicate the initiation of proceeding against a
person who may be held liable for contempt
of courts. In case prima facie a case is made
out, appropriate court may issue notice to
contemner and may be summoned. In case a
notice is issued, then contemner shall not be
deemed to be discharged from the contempt
proceeding unless, he or she is held to be not
guilty or otherwise discharged. Merely
because an officer has been transferred
during the pendency of contempt proceeding,
he or she shall not be deemed to be
discharged under the Act. Accordingly, only
because the contemner was transferred, he
shall not be deemed to be discharged. In case
successor officer has not been brought on
record, the contempt petition shall not
become infructuous. The court should
proceed against the original contemner who
has been summoned on account of violation
of order of the court. In case the contemner is
found guilty, he may be punished.

8. The successor officer or the officer
who has joined in place of the contemner,
may be summoned in case sufficient material
is brought on record and it is pointed out by
the aggrieved person that the order of the
court was brought to the notice of the
successor officer and he or she, has also not
complied with the court's order. Mere joining
at the place of contemner, shall not prima
facie make out a case to summon an officer.
As held, in case attention of the successor
officer is brought to the order passed by the
court and he or she fails to comply with it,
then court may summon and prosecute for
contempt of court. In any case, the successor
officer shall not substitute the original
contemner but he or she shall be additionally
tried under the Act for committing contempt
of court along with original contemner.

9. In view of the above, the order dated
10.1.2012, seems to suffer from substantial
illegality. The observations made by the
Tribunal that contempt proceeding cannot
proceed against the incumbent who has
already been transferred, is not sustainable.

10. It is further added that while
adjudicating the controversy under the Act,
ordinarily, court has to look into the matter
keeping in view the letter and spirit of the
order which a litigant had prayed for
compliance. In case court feels that order has
been complied with, then while deciding a
contempt proceeding, the finding should be
recorded as to how and in what manner the
contemner has complied with the order
1 All] Mahaveer Prasad Verma V. Central Administrative Tribunal Lucknow and others
7
passed by the court. Mere a statement that
the
order
has
been
complied
with
substantially or otherwise, shall not be
sufficient to fulfil the obligation under the
Act. The order must the speaking and
reasoned and not vague and non-speaking.
From the order, litigant must understand as
to how and on what ground, the court has
dropped the contempt proceeding. The
observations made by the Tribunal that the
order has been sufficiently complied with,
seems to be not sufficient being vague in
nature.

11. Now, it is well settled principle of
law that every order passed by quasi-judicial
authority, must be speaking and reasoned
vide, K.R. Deb Vs. The Collector of
Central Excise, Shillong, AIR 1971 SC
1447; State of Assam & Anr. Vs. J.N. Roy
Biswas, AIR 1975 SC 2277; State of
Punjab Vs. Kashmir Singh, 1997 SCC
(L&S) 88; Union of India & Ors. Vs. P.
Thayagarajan, AIR 1999 SC 449; and
Union of India Vs. K.D. Pandey & Anr.,
(2002) 10 SCC 471; (JT 2010(4) SC 35,
Assistant Commissioner, Commercial,
Tax Department, Works, Contract and
Leasing, Quota Vs. Shukla and Brothers,
2010 (4) SCC 785, CCT Vs. Shukla and
Brothers.

12. In the case of Shukla and Brothers
(supra), their lordships held that the reason is
the very life of law. When the reason of a
law once ceases, the law itself generally
ceases. Such is the significance of reasoning
in any rule of law. Giving reasons furthers
the cause of justice as well as avoids
uncertainty, to quote:-

"Reasons are the soul of orders. Nonrecording of reasons could lead to dual
infirmities; firstly, it may cause prejudice to
the affected party and secondly, more
particularly,
hamper
the
proper
administration of justice. These principle are
not only applicable to administrative or
executive actions, but they apply with equal
force and, in fact, with a greater degree of
precision to judicial pronouncements."

The concept of reasoned judgement has
become an indispensable part of the basic
rule of law ans , in fact, is a mandatory
requirement of the procedural law."

13. In one other case, reported in JT
(2010 (4) SC 35: Assistant Commissioner,
Commercial, Tax Department, Works,
Contract and Leasing, Quota. Vs. Shukla
and Brothers, their lordships of Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that it shall be
obligatory on the part of the judicial or quasi
judicial authority to pass a reasoned order
while
exercising
statutory
jurisdiction.
Relevant portion from the judgment of
Assistant
Commissioner
(supra)
is
reproduced as under:-

"The principle of natural justice has
twin ingredients; firstly, the person who is
likely to be adversely affected by the action
of the authorities should be given notice to
show cause thereof and
granted an
opportunity of hearing and secondly, the
orders so passed by the authorities should
give reason for arriving at any conclusion
showing
proper
application
of
mind.
Violation of either of them could in the given
facts and circumstances of the case, vitiate
the order itself. Such rule being applicable to
the
administrative
authorities
certainly
requires that the judgment of the Court
should meet with this requirement with high
degree of satisfaction. The order of an
administrative authority may not provide
reasons like a judgment but the order
must be supported by the reasons of
rationality. The distinction between passing
8 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2013
of an order by an administrative or quasijudicial authority has practically extinguished
and both are required to pass reasoned
orders."

14. Thus, it is well settled proposition
of law that not only judicial or quasi-judicial
order but even the administrative order
affecting the civil rights of the citizens,
should be reasoned one to cope with the
requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Unreasoned order creates unstability and
distrust in people's mind towards the
administration or the authority who has
passed such order. In democratic polity, there
is no scope to pass an order affecting civil
rights of the citizens which may be
unreasoned. It is constitutional obligation and
right of the citizens to know the reasons in
the decision making process affecting their
right or cause.

15. Accordingly, the writ petition is
partly allowed. A writ in the nature of
certiorari is issued quashing the impugned
order dated 10.1.2012, passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal in Civil Contempt
Petition No.22/2009 with consequential
benefit. Tribunal is further commanded to
restore
the
Civil
Contempt
Petition
No.22/2009 to its original number and decide
the same afresh. In case any application is
moved to bring on record the successor
officer and case is made out against him,
then Tribunal shall consider such application
in accordance with law.

No order as to costs.
---------

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 16.01.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VIJAY PRAKASH PATHAK, J.

Application U/S 482 No. - 183 of 2013

Dinesh Kumar Gupta

 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. and another ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Ashok Kumar Rai
Sri Ravindra Nath Rai

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

Criminal Procedure Code, Section 482cognizance taken without application of
mind-without going through the charge
sheet as well as the case diary-held-such
order can not be sustained-quashedapplication allowed.

Held: Para-8

A perusal of the aforesaid order it is
revealed that the learned Magistrate has
no where mentioned in the order that he
has perused the charge sheet and
material filed in support thereof nor he
disclosed the fact that the materials
were sufficient to proceed with the case.
The
manner
in
which
the
learned
Magistrate
has
passed
the
order
impugned cannot be said that he had
applied his mind to the facts contained in
the charge sheet and other materials
filed in support thereof. Therefore, the
aforesaid order cannot be described as
an order "taking of cognizance of the
offences" disclosed in the charge sheet
against the petitioner,hence the order
dated 3.10.2012 cannot be sustained.
Case Law discussed:
[2012 (76) ACC 103]; 2009 (64) ACC 774