# Mahendra Kumar Gautam v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 2 ILRA 761
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021
- **Case number:** Service Single No. 2842 of 2021
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mahendra-kumar-gautam-v-state-of-u-p-ors-46804
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

Law
-
U.P.
Recruitment
of
Dependents of Government Servant Dying
in Harness Rules, 1974 - Hindu Adoption
and Maintenance Act, 1956 - Sections 5 and
16 - Registration Act, 1908 - S. 17(1)(f) -
Compassionate appointment - Adoption
deed claimed is not registered - Effect -
After 01.01.1977 any adoption in theSt. of
U.P. can take place by way of a registered
deed only and not otherwise - Held,
Adoption set up by the petitioner is in
violation of Chapter-2 of the Act of 1956 -
Heydons' Principle applied. (Para 10, 11 and
13)
B. Civil Law - Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 -
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956
- Sections 8 and 12 - Compassionate
appointment - Adoption by the widow, not
by the deceased employee - Effect - Widow
alone
has
signed
the
adoption
deed
accepting the petitioner in adoption - Held,
the petitioner would at best become an
adopted child of his adoptive mother, not of
the deceased employee - Petitioner would
not succeed to claim appointment under
Rules of 1974. (Para 15)
C. Interpretation of statute - Heydons'
Principle - Court is duty-bound to give an
interpretation to the provisions which would
promote the purpose for which amendments
in the Acts were brought and not one that
would make the amendments redundant.
(Para 11)
Writ Petition dismissed .(E-1)
Cases relied on :-

## Text

2 All. Mahendra Kumar Gautam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
761
the DBEO in this regard is perverse in
nature and cannot be sustained.

32. The second objection that Ramesh
Chandra who was candidate of earlier selection
proceeding was not informed in regard to
interview scheduled to be held on 30.12.2009.
This objection is also wholly irrelevant and in
this regard sufficient reasons have been
assigned in the above referred paragraphs of the
judgment.

33. On perusal of next objection, it is
evident that the DBEO appears to be interested
in selection of Ramesh Chandra, therefore,
without going through the earlier order of
cancellation of advertisement and to make fresh
selection against the scheduled caste vacancy,
has proceeded to record perverse and illegal
finding that Ramesh Chandra was entitled for
consideration for selection in the fresh selection
proceeding although he did not apply in
pursuance to the second advertisement.

34. In regard to last objection, it reveals
that similar reasons have been assigned that the
petitioner - Santram was not liable to be issued
appointment letter by Manager of the institution
on 08.03.2010. In this regard, I have perused
the contents of the writ petition made in
paragraph-11, which recites that the committee
of
management
submitted
papers
on
18.01.2010. Reply to the same has been given
in paragraph-11 of the counter affidavit and in
paragraph-10 of the supplementary counter
affidavit, which admits that papers were
received in the office of DBEO on 18.01.2010
but without any material on record it has been
stated that same were returned to the Manager
of the institution without disclosing any date.

35. To meet out ends of justice, I have
perused the order, which was passed earlier on
24.02.2010, annexed at page-58, wherein it
has been admitted that letter dated 18.01.2010
was made available to the office of DBEO on
27.02.2010. It clearly demonstrates that the
statement made in paragraph-11 of the counter
affidavit and page - 10 of supplementary
counter affidavit do not corroborate with the
letter dated 24.02.2010 and it appears that only
to dislodge the claim of the petitioner of
deemed approval, a concocted story has been
framed by the DBEO. If this was the position,
then clear cut statement of fact would have
been made in the statement given along with
counter affidavits. Thus, the claim setup by the
DBEO in the counter affidavits is not
acceptable in law.

36. Accordingly, the impugned order
dated 04.03.2013 suffers from apparent
illegality and cannot be sustained and is hereby
quashed.

37. The writ petition succeeds and is
allowed.

38. The DBEO, District Unnao is directed
to pay the petitioner regular monthly salary
month by month forthwith as well as arrears of
salary w.e.f. 12.03.2010 till date within a period
of three months from the date of production of a
certified copy of this order.
----------
(2021)02ILR A761
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.02.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Service Single No. 2842 of 2021

Mahendra Kumar Gautam ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sameer Kalia, Abhishek Yadav
762 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

A.
Civil
Law
-
U.P.
Recruitment
of
Dependents of Government Servant Dying
in Harness Rules, 1974 - Hindu Adoption
and Maintenance Act, 1956 - Sections 5 and
16 - Registration Act, 1908 - S. 17(1)(f) -
Compassionate appointment - Adoption
deed claimed is not registered - Effect -
After 01.01.1977 any adoption in theSt. of
U.P. can take place by way of a registered
deed only and not otherwise - Held,
Adoption set up by the petitioner is in
violation of Chapter-2 of the Act of 1956 -
Heydons' Principle applied. (Para 10, 11 and
13)
B. Civil Law - Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 -
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956
- Sections 8 and 12 - Compassionate
appointment - Adoption by the widow, not
by the deceased employee - Effect - Widow
alone
has
signed
the
adoption
deed
accepting the petitioner in adoption - Held,
the petitioner would at best become an
adopted child of his adoptive mother, not of
the deceased employee - Petitioner would
not succeed to claim appointment under
Rules of 1974. (Para 15)
C. Interpretation of statute - Heydons'
Principle - Court is duty-bound to give an
interpretation to the provisions which would
promote the purpose for which amendments
in the Acts were brought and not one that
would make the amendments redundant.
(Para 11)
Writ Petition dismissed .(E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. Vijay Shankar Pandey Vs St. of U.P. & ors.,
2006 SCC online All 1142
2. Jainendra Pratap Singh Vs St. of UP & ors.,
2010 SCC online All 2508
3. Bijender & anr.Vs Ramesh Chand & ors.,
(2016) 12 SCC 483
4. Laxmibai (Dead) through LRS & anr. Vs
Bhagwantbuva (Dead) through Lrs. & ors.,
(2013) 4 SCC 97
5. Baru (Since deceased) & anr. Vs Tej Pal &
ors., 1997 SCC Online All 739
6. Lal Behari (Minor) Vs Gyanchand (Minor) &
anr., 2007 SCC Online All 527
7.
Rajendra
Vs
Assistant
Director
of
Consolidation, 2018 SCC Online All 5606
8. Heydons' Case, [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER
637],
9. R.B.I. Vs Peerless General Finance and
Investment Co. Ltd. & ors., (1987) 1 SCC 424.
10. Utkal Contractors and Joinery Pvt. Ltd. &
ors. Vs St. of Orissa a& ors., (1987) 3 SCC 279.
11. Novartis Ag. Vs U.O.I. & ors., (2013) 6 SCC
1.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek Chaudhary, J.)

1. Heard Sri Sameer Kalia and Sri
Abhishek Yadav, learned counsels for the
petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for
the State.

2. Petitioner has filed the present writ
petition for quashing of the order dated
05.12.2020 passed by the Superintendent of
Police, Rai Bareilly, respondent no.3, and
for
a
mandamus
commanding
the
respondents to reconsider the case of the
petitioner for grant of a compassionate
appointment on the post of Sub Inspector
(Civil Police).

3. By the impugned order the
respondent no.3 has rejected the application
of the petitioner for appointment under
Dying in Harness Rules, 1974 (Rules of
1974) on the ground that late Parsuram
expired on 15.11.2018, while in service,
and Mahendra Kumar Gautam, petitioner,
was not a member of his family during his
lifetime or at the time of his death. The
petitioner was never an adopted son and
dependent of late Parsuram. The document
of adoption was not executed in the lifetime
of late Parsuram and is executed by the
2 All. Mahendra Kumar Gautam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
763
widow of late Parsuram. Therefore, the
petitioner is not entitled to an appointment
under the Rules of 1974.

4. The facts of the case are that Sri
Parsuram was working on the post of Head
Constable under respondent no.3 and
expired in harness, due to heart failure, on
15.11.2018. Petitioner, on 08.08.2019,
applied before respondent no.3 seeking a
compassionate appointment on the post of
Sub Inspector of police, claiming that he is
an adopted son of the deceased employee.
The adoption was set up on two different
dates. The first adoption set up is on the
day of Basant Panchami of the year 2002 in
front of the entire village and the second is
claimed on 27.04.2011 in presence of the
gram pradhan and some other villagers. So
far as the first adoption of the year 2002 is
concerned, there is no adoption deed of the
year 2002. There is an adoption deed
concerning the second adoption dated
27.4.2011, but, the same is not a registered
document. The only registered document is
an
adoption
deed
dated
20.12.2019
presented for registration on 21.12.2019
and
registered
on
24.12.2019.
This
registered deed is executed by the natural
parents of the petitioner, claiming to have
given him in adoption, and by Smt. Prema
Devi wife of late Parsuram, claiming to
have accepted petitioner in adoption. The
said adoption deed states that on Basant
Panchami of the year 2002, when petitioner
was aged around 5 years, after conducting
hawan, puja, etc. in presence of everyone,
the adoption took place by both the natural
parents and both the adopting parents, i.e.,
by Smt. Prema Devi as well late Parsuram,
who then was alive. The deed further states
that the document of adoption could not be
registered at that time and, hence, now
earlier executed adoption deed with the
consent of parties is being presented for
registration. The said document at the
bottom notes its' date of drafting as
20.12.2019 and not of the year 2002. It
does not even contain any signatures of late
Parsuram.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner,
based on the aforesaid facts, submits that
once there is a duly registered adoption
deed, it was incumbent upon the authorities
to accept the same. They cannot deny a
valid adoption in the existence of a duly
registered adoption deed. Reliance is
placed upon the U.P. amendment to Section
16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance
Act, 1956 (Adoption Act, 1956). Further,
reliance is also placed upon the succession
certificate dated 12.06.2020 issued by the
office of District Magistrate, Sitapur, which
notes the two heirs of late Parsuram as Smt.
Prema Devi, his widow, and Sri Mahendra
Kumar Gautam, his adopted son. Based on
these documents, counsel for the petitioner
states that the petitioner is a duly adopted
son of late Parsuram and, therefore, he is
entitled to appointment under Dying in
Harness Rules, 1974. Reliance is also
placed by the petitioner upon the following
judgments:-

(i) Vijay Shankar Pandey vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh Through its Secretary,
Irrigation Department, Lucknow and
others 2006 SCC online All 1142

(ii) Jainendra Pratap Singh vs. State
of Up. And ORS 2010 SCC online All
2508

(iii) Bijender and another vs. Ramesh
Chand and others (2016) 12 SCC 483

(iv) Laxmibai (Dead) Through LRS
and Another vs. Bhagwantbuva (Dead)
Through Lrs. And others (2013) 4 SCC 97

(v)
Baru
(Since
deceased)
and
another vs. Tej Pal and others 1997 SCC
Online All 739
764 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(vi)
Lal
Behari
(Minor)
vs.
Gyanchand (Minor) And another 2007
SCC Online All 527

(vii) Rajendra vs. Assistant Director
of Consolidation 2018 SCC Online All
5606

6. On the other hand, learned
Standing Counsel submits that the adoption
deed dated 20-12-2019 is executed after the
death of late Parsuram and, therefore, the
same can not confer any right upon the
petitioner to claim appointment as the son
of late Parsuram. He further states that even
at best, the adoption can be said to have
taken place in the year 2019, and
admittedly at that time petitioner was a
major, a fact not disputed by the petitioner,
and thus could neither be given nor taken in
adoption. He further argues that succession
certificate is a collusive act on part of
family members of the petitioner and has
no binding force upon the respondents who
are to act as per Rules of 1974.

7. By U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and
Amendments) Act, 1976 ('Amending Act
of 1976'), amendments were brought in
several laws in the State of U.P., including
in the Registration Act, 1908 and the
Adoption Act, 1956. The said amendments
were made operative with effect from
01.01.1977. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons, for introducing the bill, in
paragraph-5 states:-

"5. A deed of adoption of a child, a
sale deed of immovable property of the
value below Rs. 100 and an agreement to
sell immovable property, are not required
compulsorily to be registered at present.
Playing upon the element of chance
involved in oral evidence, fictitious antedated deeds of such nature are set up with
view to usurp the property of a rightful
transferee of legatee, and on the other hand
genuine transactions of these categories
are challenged. Suitable amendments are
proposed in the Transfer of Property Act,
1882, The Registration Act, 1908, and the
Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act 1956
to make compulsory the registration of the
adoption deeds, all agreements to sell
immovable property and all transfers of
immovable property irrespective of the
value or consideration."

8. By Section 35 of the Amending
Act of 1976, Section 16 of the Act of 1956
was amended and relevant amended
Section 16 reads:-

"Uttar Pradesh- Renumber Section 16
as sub-section (1)thereof and after subsection (1) as so renumbered, insert the
following sub-section (2) namely:--

"(2) In case of an adoption made on or
after the 1st day of January, 1977 no court
in Uttar Pradesh shall accept any evidence
in proof of the giving and taking of the
child in adoption, except a document
recording an adoption, made and signed by
the person giving and the person taking the
child in adoption, and registered under any
law for the time being in force:

Provided that secondary evidence of
such document shall be admissible in the
circumstances and the manner laid down in
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872."

9. Similarly, by Section 32 of the
Amending Act of 1976, Section 17 of the
Registration Act, 1908 was also amended
and the relevant amendment for our case is
the addition of sub-clause (f) in SubSection 17(1). After amendment Section
17(1)(f) reads:-

"17. Documents of which registration
is
compulsory.--(l)
The
following
2 All. Mahendra Kumar Gautam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
765
documents shall be registered, if the
property to which they relate is situate in a
district in which, and if they have been
executed on or after the date on which, Act
No. XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration
Act, 1866, or the Indian Registration Act,
1871, or the Indian Registration Act, 1877,
or this Act came or comes into force,
namely:--,

...................................................

(f) any other instrument required by
any law for the time being in force, to be
registered,"

10. A reading of amended Section
16(2) of the Adoption Act, 1956 and
Section 17(1)(f) of the Registration Act,
1908 makes it clear that after 01.01.1977
any adoption in the State of U.P. can take
place by way of a registered deed only and
not otherwise. The period within which a
document can be presented for registration
is provided under Section 23 of the
Registration Act, 1908. The same reads:-

"23 Time for presenting documents.--
Subject to the provisions contained in
sections 24, 25 and 26, no document other
than a will shall be accepted for
registration unless presented for that
purpose to the proper officer within four
months from the date of its execution:

Provided that a copy of a decree or
order may be presented within four months
from the day on which the decree or order
was made, or, where it is appealable,
within four months from the day on which it
becomes final."

11. A perusal of the Statement of
Objects and Reasons quoted above shows
that the amendments in law were brought
so that oral evidence or fictitious anti-dated
deed may not be set up to claim any
wrongful right or usurp the rights of a
rightful person. If a contrary interpretation
is
accepted
and
this
Court
permits
registration of an adoption deed beyond the
period of four months, as provided under
Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908,
the very mischief which is sought to be
corrected by the U.P. Act of 1976 would be
frustrated and the fraud and fictitious
activities would go on unabated. This Court
is duty-bound to give an interpretation to
the provisions which would promote the
purpose for which amendments in the Acts
were brought and not one that would make
the amendments redundant. This principle
of interpreting a statute finds mention for
the first time in Heydons' Case, [(1584) 3
Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637], (thus also known
as Heydon's Principle), which states:-

"that
for
the
sure
and
true
interpretation of all statutes in general (be
they penal or beneficial restrictive or
enlarging of the common law) four things
are to be discerned and considered: (1st)
What was the common law before the
making of the Act. (2nd) What was the
mischief and defect for which the common
law did not provide. (3rd) What remedy
Parliament has resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth.
And, (4th) The true reason of the remedy;
and then the office of all the Judges is
always to make such construction as shall:
(a) suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, (b) suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for continuance of the mischief,
and pro private commodo, (c) add force
and life to the cure and remedy, according
to the true intent of the makers of the Act,
pro bono publico."

(ii) Maxwell on the Interpretation of
Statutes, 12th edition; Chapter-6, page
137, states:-

"I NEVER understand," said Lord
Cranworth L.C. (at p.89), "what is meant
766 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
by evading an Act of Parliament. Either
you are within the Act or you are not; if
your are not within it, you are right; if you
are within it, the course is clear, and it
cannot be said that you are not within it
because the very words of the Act may not
have been violated." On the other hand,
there is no doubt that "the office of the
Judge is, to make such constructions as will
suppress the mischief, and advance the
remedy, and to suppress all evasions for
the continuance of the mischief." To carry
out effectually the object of a statute, it
must be so construed as to defeat all
attempts to do, or avoid doing, in an
indirect or circuitous manner that which it
has prohibited or enjoined: quando aliquid
prohibetur, prohibitur et omne per quod
denenitur ad illud;

This manner of construction has two
aspects. One is that the courts, mindful of
the mischief rule, will not be astute to
narrow the language of a statute so as to
allow persons within its purview to escape
its net. The other is that the statute may be
applied to the substance rather than the
mere form of transactions, thus defeating
any shifts and contrivances which parties
may have devised in the hope of thereby
falling outside the Act. When the courts
find an attempt at concealment, they will, in
the words of Wilmot C.J., "brush away the
cobweb varnish, and shew the transactions
in their true light."

(iii) In Halsbury's Laws of England,
Vol. 44(1), 4th Reissue, para 1474, pp.
906-07, it is stated:

"Parliament intends that an enactment
shall remedy a particular mischief and it is
therefore presumed that Parliament intends
that the court, when considering, in
relation to the facts of the instant case,
which of the opposing constructions of the
enactment
corresponds
to
its
legal
meaning, should find a construction which
applies the remedy provided by it in such a
way as to suppress that mischief. The
doctrine originates in Heydon's case
[(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] where
the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that
for the sure and true interpretation of all
statutes in general (be they penal or
beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the
common law), four things are to be
discerned and considered:

(1) what was the common law before
the making of the Act;

(2) what was the mischief and defect
for which the common law did not provide;

(3) what remedy Parliament has
resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the commonwealth; and

(4) the true reason of the remedy;and
then the office of all the judges is always to
make such construction as shall:

(a) suppress the mischief and advance
the remedy; and

(b) suppress subtle inventions and
evasions for the continuance of the mischief
pro privato commodo (for private benefit);
and

(c) add force and life to the cure and
remedy according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act pro publico (for the
public good)."

The Supreme Court has also followed
the said principle in a large number of
cases, some of which are:-

(i) Reserve Bank of India Vs.
Peerless General Finance and Investment
Co. Ltd. and Others1 Paragraph 33 of the
said judgment reads:-

"33. Interpretation must depend on the
text and the context. They are the basis of
interpretation. One may well say if the text
is the texture, context is what gives the
colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are
important. That interpretation is best
which makes the textual interpretation
2 All. Mahendra Kumar Gautam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
767
match the contextual. A statute is best
interpreted when we know why it was
enacted. With this knowledge, the statute
must be read, first as a whole and then
section by section, clause by clause, phrase
by phrase and word by word. If a statute is
looked at, in the context of its enactment,
with the glasses of the statute maker,
provided by such context, its scheme, the
sections, clauses, phrases and words may
take colour and appear different than
when the statute is looked at without the
glasses provided by the context. With these
glasses we must look at the Act as a whole
and discover what each section, each
clause, each phrase and each word is
meant and designed to say as to fit into the
scheme of the entire Act. No part of a
statute and no word of a statute can be
construed in isolation. Statutes have to be
construed so that every word has a place
and everything is in its place. It is by
looking at the definition as a whole in the
setting of the entire Act and by reference to
what preceded the enactment and the
reasons for it that the Court construed the
expression 'Prize Chit' in Srinivasa and we
find no reason to depart from the Court's
construction." (emphasis added)

(ii) Utkal Contractors and Joinery
Pvt. Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Orissa
and Others2 In paragraph-9, the Supreme
Court held:-

"9.
In
considering
the
rival
submissions of the learned counsel and in
defining and construing the area and the
content of the Act and its provisions, it is
necessary
to
make
certain
general
observations regarding the interpretation
of statutes. A statute is best understood if
we know the reason for it. The reason for
a statute is the safest guide to its
interpretation. The words of a statute take
their colour from the reason for it. How
do we discover the reason for a statute?
There are external and internal aids. The
external aids are Statement of Objects and
Reasons when the Bill is presented to
Parliament, the reports of Committees
which preceded the Bill and the reports of
Parliamentary Committees. Occasional
excursions into the debates of Parliament
are permitted. Internal aids are the
preamble, the scheme and the provisions of
the Act. Having discovered the reason for
the statute and so having set the sail to the
wind, the interpreter may proceed ahead.
No provision in the statute and no word of
the statute may be construed in isolation.
Every provision and every word must be
looked at generally before any provision or
word is attempted to be construed. The
setting and the pattern are important. It is
again
important
to
remember
that
Parliament does not waste its breath
unnecessarily. Just as Parliament is not
expected to use unnecessary expressions,
Parliament is also not expected to express
itself unnecessarily. Even as Parliament
does not use any word without meaning
something, Parliament does not legislate
where
no
legislation
is
called
for.
Parliament cannot be assumed to legislate
for the sake of legislation; nor can it be
assumed to make pointless legislation.
Parliament does not indulge in legislation
merely to state what is unnecessary to state
or to do what is already validly done.
Parliament may not be assumed to legislate
unnecessarily. Again, while the words of
an enactment are important, the context is
no less important. For instance, "the fact
that general words are used in a statute is
not in itself a conclusive reason why every
case falling literally within them should be
governed by that statute, and the context
of an Act may well indicate that wide or
general words should be given a restrictive
meaning" (see Halsbury, 4th edn. Vol. 44
para 874)." (emphasis added)
768 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(iii) Novartis Ag. Vs. Union of India
and Others3. In paragraph 28, the Court
held:-

"28. In order to understand what the
law really is, it is essential to know the
"why" and "how" of the law. Why the law
is what it is and how it came to its present
form? The adage is more true in case of the
law of patents in India than perhaps any
other law. Therefore, in order to correctly
understand the present law it would be
necessary
to
briefly
delve
into
the
legislative history of the law of patents in
the country." (emphasis added)

12. Thus, from the reading of Section
16 of Adoption Act, 1956 and Section
17(1)(f)
read
with
Section
23
of
Registration Act, 1908 and, applying the
Heydons' Principle, it is clear that the
registered adoption deed set up by the
petitioner is not a valid adoption deed.
Even its' registration could not have taken
place.

13. From the aforesaid discussion, it
is clear that the adoption set up by the
petitioner is in violation of Chapter-2 of
Adoption Act of 1956. Section 5 of the said
Act provides that any adoption made in
contravention of Chapter-2 shall be void.
Since, the adoption set up by the petitioner
is in violation of provisions of Chapter-2 of
the Adoption Act of 1956 the same is a
void document.

14. Now, lets also consider the
judgments relied upon by the counsels for the
petitioner. In the case of Vijay Shankar
Pandey (supra), the petitioner was granted an
appointment under Dying in Harness Rules,
1974 after looking into the correctness and
validity of the adoption deed. After his
continuing in the job for around a year his
appointment was canceled without giving
him any opportunity of hearing and on a note
of the Chief Minister on a complaint filed by
the persons who were involved in the murder
of his father, the deceased employee. The
Court allowed the said writ petition on the
ground that the order cancelling the
appointment only refers to there being some
doubt created by the High School mark-sheet
of the petitioner. There was no conclusive
proof that the adoption was invalid. The
impugned order was passed without giving
any notice or opportunity of hearing to the
petitioner and without any finding of fact that
adoption was invalid. The Court also noted
that there was an earlier satisfaction of a valid
adoption recorded at the time of the
petitioner's appointment. The argument under
consideration in the present writ petition was
neither raised in the said writ petition nor
decided. In Jainendra Pratap Singh (supra)
case, Section 16 of the Adoption Act, 1956 as
well as provisions of Registration Act, 1908
were not taken into consideration by the
Court and, therefore, the same has no
application to the present case. In Bijender
and another (supra) case, a registered
adoption deed was challenged on the ground
that though, seven-eight persons have signed
the adoption deed but the natural guardians
had not signed the adoption deed at the place
provided for natural guardians but they had
signed it along with witnesses. The Court
refused to go into the hyper-technicalities and
believed the adoption deed. Therefore, the
same also has no applicability to the facts of
the present case. In Laxmibai (Dead)
Through LRS and Another (supra) case, in
paragraph-4 it is specifically noted that
adoption took place on 11.05.1971 in
presence of all, and on the same day the
adoption deed was executed and registered.
Therefore, the facts of the said case are
entirely different and not applicable to the
present case. Even the question involved in
the present writ petition was not raised in the
2 All. Mahendra Kumar Gautam Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
769
said case. In Baru (Since deceased) and
another (supra) case, the grounds raised in
the present writ petition were not raised. The
two questions considered in the said case by
the Court were (i) as to whether the appellant
had a right to sue and (ii) whether the
requisite
ceremony
of
adoption
was
performed or not. While considering the
second ground, the Court said that the
requisite
ceremony
for
adoption
was
performed.
The
due
execution
and
registration of adoption deed was proved and
evidence given by the defendants has to be
presumed to be correct under Section 16 of
the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956. Therefore, the law settled in the said
case is also not applicable to the facts of the
present case as due execution of the adoption
deed is not proved in the present case. In Lal
Behri (Minor) (supra) case the factual
controversy was considered and the argument
raised in the present writ petition or the
provisions referred were also not considered
and, thus, said judgment does not apply to the
present case. In Rajendra (supra) case also
the deed was duly registered on 26.06.1981
and was duly filed before the consolidation
authorities. The Court, therefore, relied upon
the same under Section 16 of the Hindu
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The
question raised in the present writ petition i.e.
impact of Section 17(f) read with Section 23
of the Registration Act, 1908 was neither
raised nor considered in the said judgment.
Therefore, the same is also not applicable to
the facts of the present case. Thus, none of
the judgments relied upon by the counsel for
the petitioner have any bearing on the present
case.

15. Though in the year 2019
petitioner was major and could not be
adopted but still even accepting for the sake
of arguments, the submission made by
counsels for the petitioner, that, the
adoption deed executed on 20.12.2019 is a
valid adoption deed duly registered and
thus must be accepted under Section 16 of
the Adoption Act, 1956, still, petitioner
would not succeed to claim appointment
under Rules of 1974. The reason is that
Section 8 of the Adoption Act, 1956
describes the capacity of a female to take in
adoption. It provides that "any female
Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a
minor has the capacity to take a son or
daughter in adoption." The proviso to the
same provided that if she has a husband
living then the adoption shall be with the
consent of her husband. Section 12
provides the effects of adoption. It says
"An adopted child shall be deemed to be
the child of his or her adoptive father or
mother for all purposes with effect from
the date of the adoption.....................". In
the present case, admittedly in the year
2019 Smt. Prema Devi did not have a
husband, but she was competent enough to
adopt alone. She alone has signed the
adoption deed accepting the petitioner in
adoption. Therefore, under Section 8 read
with Section 12 of the Adoption Act,1956
the petitioner would at best become an
adopted child of his adoptive mother, i.e.,
Smt. Prema Devi only and not an adoptive
child of late Parsuram.

16. So far as the succession certificate
dated 12.06.2020 issued by the office of
District Magistrate, Sitapur is concerned
the same also is a document issued on the
basis of stand taken by the family
members. The same has no binding effect
upon
respondents.
The
respondents
department can individually look into the
entire matter and take a stand in accordance
with law. The said document is not
sufficient to accept the claim of the
petitioner for appointment under the Rules
of 1974.
770 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

17. Thus, this Court does not find any
force in the present writ petition filed by
the petitioner and the same is dismissed.
----------
(2021)02ILR A770
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 25.01.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.

Service Single No. 6063 of 2017

Sunder Singh Solanki ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Maneesh Sahdev, Shailendra Singh Rajawat

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Abhinav N Trivedi, K. Chandra

A. Constitution of India - Article 21 -
Right to life and personal liberty - Right
to good health - Right to life enshrined in
Article
21
has
been
held
to
mean
something more than survival or animal
existence - This right include right to live
with human dignity - It include all those
aspects of life, which go to make a man's
life meaningful, complete and worth living
- Held, right of the petitioner to seek
reimbursement
of
medical
expenses
incurred by him to ensure his right to
health would fall within the ambit of right
to life. (Para 12)
B. Civil Law - U.P. Government Servants
(Medical Attendance), Rules, 2011 -
Accident during discharging of Official
duties
-
Injury
sustained
-Medical
reimbursement - Claim - Genuineness
of Medical bill undisputed - Meager
amount - Validity - Held, once the
accident
and
the
medical
bills
are
undisputed, the medical reimbursement
cannot be denied on technical grounds,
the
respondents
have
clearly
misdirected themselves by disallowing
the petitioner's reimbursement of his
medical bills under the pretext of Rules.
(Para 13)
C. Interpretation of statute - Objective
interpretation
-
Medical
Attendance
Rules providing for reimbursement of
the medical expenses to the Government
servant and retired pensioners, is a
beneficial and welfare legislation meant
for the welfare of the Government
servants - A liberal, sympathetic and
objective
interpretation
for
the
applicability of these Rules, has to be
made by the Courts and not a pedantic
or narrow approach of the matter would
subserve the interest of justice. (Para
17)
Writ Petition allowed. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1.St. of Punj. & ors. Vs Ram Labhaya Bagga &
ors., (1198) 4 SCC 117
2.St. of Punj. Vs Mohan Lal Jindal, 2001 (9)SCC
217
3.Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity Vs St. of
W.B., (1996) 4 SCC 37
4. Surjit Singh Vs St. of Punj. & ors., (1996) 2
SCC 336
5. Menika Gandhi Vs U.O.I., AIR 1978 Supreme
Court 597

(Delivered by Hon'ble Chandra Dhari Singh, J.)

1. In effect, the present petition has
been filed with the prayer to quash the
order dated 29.09.2016 passed by Senior
Superintendent of Police, Lucknow and
also to command the respondents to pay the
remaining
amount
of
medical
reimbursement of Rs.8,84,879.60 against
the
expenses
at
Apollo
Indraprasth
Hospital, New Delhi and Rs.53,027/-
against the expenses at KGMU, Lucknow
along with 18% interest including the