# Mahendra Pal v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 8 ILRA 1421
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-07-28
- **Case number:** Writ A No.5351 of 2023
- **Bench:** Abdul Moin
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mahendra-pal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50543
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

1422 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
C.S.C., Gaurav Mehrotra

A. Service Law - Constitution of India -
Article 226 - Writ - Laches - Pendency of
review, how far give fresh cause of action
- Impugned punishment order was passed
on 23.05.2007, against which statutory
appeal was rejected on 15.02.2008 on the
ground of laches - Review was filed which
was rejected on 18.04.2023 on the ground
that it is not maintainable - Punishment
order
and
consequential
order
was
challenged - Held, merely because the
authorities
informed
about
the
non
maintainability of the review through an
order dated 18.04.2023 the same would
not entail revival of a stale claim as in the
instant
writ
petition
-
High
Court
dismissed the writ petition on the ground
of laches. (Para 17 and 23)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:

## Text

8 All. Mahendra Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1421
Bench to deal with the following question of
law:

"Whether a teacher of Intermediate
College who has already been appointed as
officiating principal of the Institution by virtue
of his seniority on attaining the age of
superannuation in the extended period of his
service shall continue as officiating principal or
simply as a teacher?"

9. Coming back to the judgment cited by
and annexed as part of the personal affidavit
filed by Mr. Mukesh Chandra, the Deputy
Director of Education, Agra Region, Agra, with
great respect, I would submit that the
concurrent Bench did not notice the earlier
judgment of earlier concurrent Bench in the
case of Narsingh Rai (supra) and the reference
answered by the Full Bench as quoted above in
the case of Surendra Prasad Agnihotri (supra).

10. As far back as in 1982 the
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of
D.S Nakara v. Union of India: 1983 AIR 130
had very clearly interpreted that the pensionary
benefit rules have to be construed so as to
ensure that the object with which rules are
made, is achieved and the benefit reaches to the
last man in queue. It would be sufficient enough
in my considered view and in the light of the
judgments cited above, only for holding a post
which is substantive in nature and not holding a
post substantively would make also the one
entitled to pension provided he/ she has
qualifying service to his/ her credit. It has
rightly been said that a Judge while interpreting
the provisions must bear in mind as to whether
the interpretation he is putting forth is going to
benefit the last man in the queue.

11. Since the concurrent Bench in the
case of Virsh Bhan Sharma (supra) has not
noticed either the Narisingh Rai's case or the
reference answered by the Full Bench (supra), it
can not be taken as a binding precedent and so I
am not bound by the view taken in Virsh Bhan's
case.

12. In the present case it is not disputed
that the petitioner had held the position of
officiating principal of the institution which was
a substantive post and with the approval of the
District Inspector of Schools he was also paid
salary as his signatures were attested as such,
and accordingly, I hold him to be entitled to
pension as would be admissible in law
otherwise, on the basis of last pay drawn by the
petitioner as principal of the institution.

13. In view of the above, therefore, the
writ petition succeeds and is allowed as above.

14. The Deputy Director of Education,
Secondary Agra Region Agra is directed to
calculate the pension of petitioner on the basis
of last pay drawn as principal of the institution,
and shall release the same within next three
months' time.

15. In the circumstances, therefore, there
will be no order as to cost.
----------
(2023) 8 ILRA 1421
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 28.07.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.

Writ A No.5351 of 2023

Mahendra Pal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for thePetitioner:
Vaibhav Srivatava

Counsel for the Respondents:
1422 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
C.S.C., Gaurav Mehrotra

A. Service Law - Constitution of India -
Article 226 - Writ - Laches - Pendency of
review, how far give fresh cause of action
- Impugned punishment order was passed
on 23.05.2007, against which statutory
appeal was rejected on 15.02.2008 on the
ground of laches - Review was filed which
was rejected on 18.04.2023 on the ground
that it is not maintainable - Punishment
order
and
consequential
order
was
challenged - Held, merely because the
authorities
informed
about
the
non
maintainability of the review through an
order dated 18.04.2023 the same would
not entail revival of a stale claim as in the
instant
writ
petition
-
High
Court
dismissed the writ petition on the ground
of laches. (Para 17 and 23)
Writ petition dismissed. (E-1)
List of Cases cited:
1. M. R. Gupta Vs U.O.I. & ors.; 1995 (5) SCC
628
2. U.O.I. & anr. Vs Tarsem Singh; 2008 (8) SCC
648
3. St. of Tripura & ors. Vs Arabinda Chakraborty
& ors.; (2014) 6 SCC 460
4. Naresh Kumar & ors. Vs Government (NCT of
Delhi); (2019) 9 SCC 416
5. U.O.I. & ors. Vs M. K. Sarkar; (2010) 2 SCC
59
6. St. of Uttar Pradesh & ors. Vs Rajmati Singh;
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1785
(Delivered by Hon'ble Abdul Moin, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned Standing Counsel for the
respondent
no.
1
and
Shri
Gaurav
Mehrotra,
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents no. 2 to 6.

2. The instant writ petition has been
filed praying for the following main reliefs:

"(i) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari
quashing
the
impugned
order
dated
18.04.2023 passed by opposite party no. 4
contained as Annexure No. 1 to the writ
petition.

(ii) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari
quashing
the
impugned
order
dated
15.02.2008 passed by opposite party no. 5
contained as Annexure No. 2 to the writ
petition.

(iii) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of certiorari
quashing
the
impugned
order
dated
23.05.2007 (so far as it relates to the
imposition of punishments) passed by
opposite party no. 3 contained as Annexure
no. 3 to the writ petition.

(iv) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the opposite parties to remove
/ delete the censure entry given to the
petitioner
in
his
service
book
vide
impugned
order
dated
23/05/2007
(Annexure No. 3 to the writ petition), within
specified time.

(v) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding the opposite parties to grant
full arrears of salary and other allowances
due during the period of suspension with
interest as applicable till the date of actual
payment, within specified time.

(vi) Issue a writ, order or
direction in the nature of mandamus
commanding
the
opposite
parties
to
provide / grant one increment with all
consequential benefits due to the petitioner
which was held back vide impugned order
8 All. Mahendra Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1423
dated 23.05.2007 (Annexure No. 3 to the
writ petition), within specified time."

3. The case set forth by the petitioner
is that the petitioner is an employee of
respondent no. 2 Bank. The petitioner had
been proceeded against departmentally and
a punishment order dated 23.05.2007, a
copy of which is annexure 3 to the petition,
had
been
passed
whereby
following
punishments were awarded namely:

(a) an adverse entry and

(b) stoppage of one increment
cumulatively.

4. Being aggrieved, the petitioner
filed an appeal which was rejected vide the
order dated 15.02.2008, a copy of which is
annexure 2 to the petition, on the ground of
the same having been filed beyond time.
The petitioner claims that subsequent
thereto he continued to represent to the
respondents and also claims to have filed a
review on 12.03.2008. After repeated
representations, the said review has been
decided vide the impugned order dated
18.04.2023, a copy of which is annexure 1
to the petition. The review has been
rejected on the ground that there is no
provision in the service rules for filing of a
review after the appeal has been decided.

5. Raising a challenge to all three
orders namely the order dated 18.04.2023,
the order dated 15.02.2008 as well as the
punishment order dated 23.05.2007, the
instant writ petition has been filed.

6. A preliminary objection has been
taken by Shri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned
counsel appearing for the respondent Bank
that the writ petition is barred by laches and
delay in as much as simply because the
authorities have proceeded to pass an order
dated 18.04.2023 whereby it has been
indicated that there is no power of review
under the service rules for entertaining of a
review and the said review filed by the
petitioner has been rejected, the same
would not give rise to a fresh cause of
action to the petitioner to challenge the
stale orders of the years 2007 and 2008 and
thus the writ petition deserves to be
dismissed on this ground alone.

7. Replying to the aforesaid, the
argument of Sri Vaibhav Srivastava,
learned counsel for the petitioner is that
keeping in view the law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.
R. Gupta vs Union of India and others
reported in 1995 (5) SCC 628 and the
judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Union of India and another vs
Tarsem Singh reported in 2008 (8) SCC
648 there is continuing cause of action to
the petitioner to file the writ petition in as
much as one of the punishment that has
been imposed to the petitioner is stoppage
of one increment cumulatively which
continues to affect him even as of date and
hence there being a continuing cause of
action, he is perfectly entitled to file a writ
petition as and when the respondents pass
an order, even on the review which was not
maintainable at the first instance.

8. Responding to that, the argument of
Sri Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for
the respondents is that admittedly a
punishment order was passed against the
petitioner on 23.05.2007. The petitioner
filed a belated appeal against the same
which has been rejected vide the order
dated 15.02.2008 on the ground that the
same has been filed beyond time. Even
though the petitioner has filed a review,
which was not maintainable under the
1424 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
service rules and under the rules governing
the disciplinary proceedings pertaining to
the respondent Bank, yet the Bank in its
wisdom has proceeded to reject the review
of the petitioner by means of the impugned
order dated 18.04.2023 on the ground that
the said review itself is not maintainable.
Consequently the same would not give rise
to any fresh cause of action to the petitioner
in as much as once review itself was not
maintainable, even if the petitioner might
have filed the same and would have
continued to represent to the respondents
for a decision on his review application, the
same would not give rise to any fresh cause
of action in as much as the orders under
challenge are deemed to be those orders
which have been passed after disciplinary
proceedings against the petitioner i.e. the
punishment order dated 23.05.2007 and the
appellate order dated 15.2.2008 and the
writ petition having been filed after a lapse
of 15 years merits to be dismissed on this
ground alone.

9. In this regard reliance has been
placed on the judgments of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the cases of State of
Tripura
and
others
vs
Arabinda
Chakraborty and others reported in
(2014) 6 SCC 460, Naresh Kumar and
others vs Government (NCT of Delhi)
reported in (2019) 9 SCC 416, Union of
India and others vs M. K. Sarkar
reported in (2010) 2 SCC 59 and State of
Uttar Pradesh and others vs Rajmati
Singh reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1785.

10. Placing reliance on the aforesaid
judgments, the argument of Shri Gaurav
Mehrotra is that even when an order has
been passed on the basis of a representation
preferred by an employee, the same would
not give life to a stale claim and
consequently once the instant writ petition
has been filed primarily against the
punishment order and the appellate order
passed way back in the years 2007 and
2008,
consequently
the
writ petition
deserves to be dismissed on this ground
alone.

11. Heard learned counsel for the
parties and perused the record.

12. From perusal of record it emerge
that after disciplinary proceedings were
initiated
against
the
petitioner,
a
punishment order dated 23.05.2007 was
passed against him whereby he was
awarded with an adverse entry and a
punishment
of
withholding
of
one
increment on cumulative basis. Initially the
petitioner was not aggrieved by the said
order in as much as the appeal was not filed
by him within the stipulated time as per
rules. He filed a belated appeal against the
punishment order which was rejected by
the appellate authority vide order dated
15.02.2008 on the ground of it having been
filed beyond the time specified under the
rules. The petitioner appears to have sat
silent in the matter and did not challenge it
before the competent court of law. It is
contended that he filed a review against
both, the punishment order and the
appellate order on 12.03.2008. It is alleged
that the said review remained pending with
the
respondents
and
the
petitioner
continued to represent for a decision to be
passed on his review. An order in this
regard has only been passed by the
competent
authority
on
18.04.2023
whereby the review filed by the petitioner
has been rejected by contending that there
is no power in the service rules for filing of
review. Now challenging all three orders
i.e. punishment order, the appellate order as
well as the order passed on review, which
8 All. Mahendra Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1425
itself was not maintainable, the instant
petition has been filed.

13. In order to explain laches, reliance
has been placed on judgements of Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the cases of M. R.
Gupta (supra) as well as Tarsem Singh
(supra).

14. The Court proceeds to consider
the judgments of Tarsem Singh (supra)
wherein the earlier judgement of M. R.
Gupta (supra) has been considered.

15. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Tarsem Singh (supra) has held as under:"

"5. To summarise, normally, a
belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches
(where remedy is sought by filing a writ
petition) or limitation (where remedy is
sought
by
an
application
to
the
Administrative Tribunal). One of the
exceptions to the said rule is cases relating
to a continuing wrong. Where a service
related claim is based on a continuing
wrong, relief can be granted even if there
is a long delay in seeking remedy, with
reference to the date on which the
continuing wrong commenced, if such
continuing wrong creates a continuing
source of injury. But there is an exception
to the exception. If the grievance is in
respect of any order or administrative
decision which related to or affected
several others also, and if the re-opening of
the issue would affect the settled rights of
third parties, then the claim will not be
entertained. For example, if the issue
relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or
pension, relief may be granted in spite of
delay as it does not affect the rights of third
parties. But if the claim involved issues
relating to seniority or promotion etc.,
affecting others, delay would render the
claim
stale
and
doctrine
of
laches/limitation will be applied. In so far
as the consequential relief of recovery of
arrears for a past period, the principles
relating to recurring/successive wrongs
will apply. As a consequence, High Courts
will
restrict
the
consequential
relief
relating to arrears normally to a period of
three years prior to the date of filing of the
writ petition. "

16. A perusal of judgement of Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Tarsem Singh
(supra) would indicate that Hon'ble Apex
Court has held that a belated service claim
can be rejected on the ground of delay and
laches where remedy is sought by filing of
writ petition or limitation where a remedy
is
sought
by
application
to
the
administrative tribunal but one of the
exception to the said rule would be relating
to a continuing wrong where the service
related claim is based on a continuing
wrong. Relief can be granted even if there
is long delay in seeking remedy with
reference to the date on which continuing
wrong commenced, if such continuing
wrong creates a continuing source of
injury. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has
carved out certain exceptions to the
principle of 'continuing wrong' of which
one of the exception which has been argued
by learned counsel for the petitioner is that
if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation
of pay and pension then the relief may be
granted in spite of delay as it does not
affect the right of third parties.

17. At the first blush, the argument of
learned counsel for the petitioner appears to
have some force in as much as the
punishment
of
withholding
of
one
increment with cumulative effect continues
to have effect even after lapse of several
1426 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
years, consequently he may be entitled to
prefer the instant petition even after a
period of 15 years. However a careful
perusal of the judgement of Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra)
would indicate that the exemptions carved
out, so far as the instant case is concerned,
is where there has been wrong fixation of
pay or pension on account of certain
administrative decisions. In the instant case
it is not on account of administrative
decisions that the pay of the petitioner may
have been fixed wrongly, rather it was after
disciplinary proceedings that a punishment
order was consciously and deliberately
passed against the petitioner whereby the
punishment
of
withholding
of
one
increment with cumulative effect was
passed. The petitioner, in his own wisdom,
filed a belated appeal which was rejected
way back in the year 2008 and thereafter
pursued
a
remedy
which
was
not
permissible under the service rules i.e. the
remedy of review. Even when the review
was filed in the year 2008, it could have
been a case that in the year 2008 the
petitioner may have approached this Court
praying for a decision being taken on a
review (which itself was not maintainable)
but the petitioner continued to sit over the
matter and it is only when the authorities
themselves indicated to the petitioner vide
the order dated 18.04.2023 that the review
itself is not maintainable as there is no
provision
under
the
Rules
that
the
petitioner has woken up and chosen to
challenge all the three orders.

18.

Considering
the
aforesaid
discussion, the principles of law laid down
in Tarsem Singh (supra) would not be
applicable.

19. So far as the judgment as cited on
behalf of the respondents are concerned
namely
in
the
case
of
Arabinda
Chakraborty (supra) Hon'ble Apex Court
has held as under:

"15. In our opinion, the suit was
hopelessly barred by law of limitation.
Simply by making a representation, when
there is no statutory provision or there is
no statutory appeal provided, the period of
limitation would not get extended. The law
does not permit extension of period of
limitation
by
mere
filing
of
a
representation. A person may go on
making representations for years and in
such an event the period of limitation
would not commence from the date on
which the last representation is decided. In
the instant case, it is a fact that the
respondent was given a fresh appointment
order on 22.11.1967, which is on record.
The said appointment order gave a fresh
appointment
to
the
respondent
and
therefore, there could not have been any
question with regard to continuity of
service
with
effect
from
the
first
employment of the respondent.

18. It is a settled legal position
that the period of limitation would
commence from the date on which the
cause of action takes place. Had there been
any statute giving right of appeal to the
respondent and if the respondent had filed
such a statutory appeal, the period of
limitation would have commenced from the
date when the statutory appeal was
decided. In the instant case, there was no
provision with regard to any statutory
appeal. The respondent kept on making
representations one after another and all
the representations had been rejected.
Submission of the respondent to the effect
that the period of limitation would
commence from the date on which his last
representation was rejected cannot be
8 All. Mahendra Pal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1427
accepted. If accepted, it would be nothing
but travesty of the law of limitation. One
can go on making representations for 25
years and in that event one cannot say
that the period of limitation would
commence when the last representation
was decided. On this legal issue, we feel
that the courts below committed an error
by considering the date of rejection of the
last representation as the date on which the
cause of action had arisen. This could not
have been done."

(emphasis by Court)

20. Likewise Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of Naresh Kumar (supra) has held
as under:

"13. It is settled law that the
power of Review can be exercised only
when the statute provides for the same. In
the absence of any such provision in the
concerned statute, such power of Review
cannot be exercised by the authority
concerned. This Court in the case of
Kalabharati
Advertising
vs
Hemant
Vimalnath Narichania (2010) 9 SCC 437,
has held as under:

"...12.
It
is
settled
legal
proposition that unless the statute/rules so
permit, the review application is not
maintainable in case of judicial/quasijudicial orders. In the absence of any
provision in the Act granting an express
power of review, it is manifest that a review
could not be made and the order in review,
if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without
jurisdiction.

(Vide Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v.
Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [AIR
1965 SC 1457] and Haribhajan Singh v.
Karam Singh [AIR 1966 SC 641] .)

13. In Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji [(1971) 3
SCC 844 :AIR 1970 SC 1273], Major
Chandra Bhan Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan
[(1979) 1 SCC 321], Kuntesh Gupta (Dr.)
v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya [(1987) 4
SCC 525 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 491 : AIR
1987 SC 2186], State of Orissa v. Commr.
of Land Records and Settlement [(1998) 7
SCC 162] and Sunita Jain v. Pawan Kumar
Jain [(2008) 2 SCC 705 : (2008) 1 SCC
(Cri) 537] this Court held that the power to
review is not an inherent power. It must be
conferred
by
law
either
expressly/specifically
or
by
necessary
implication and in the absence of any
provision in the Act/Rules, review of an
earlier order is impermissible as review is
a creation of statute. Jurisdiction of review
can be derived only from the statute and
thus, any order of review in the absence of
any statutory provision for the same is a
nullity, being without jurisdiction.

14. Therefore, in view of the
above, the law on the point can be
summarised to the effect that in the
absence
of
any
statutory
provision
providing for review, entertaining an
application for review or under the garb of
clarification /modification/ correction is
not permissible.

(emphasis supplied)"

21. Similarly Hon'ble Apex Court in
the case of M. K. Sarkar (supra) has held
as under:

"14. The order of the Tribunal
allowing the first application of respondent
without examining the merits, and directing
appellants to consider his representation
has given rise to unnecessary litigation and
avoidable complications. The ill-effects of
such directions have been considered by
1428 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
this Court in C. Jacob vs Director of
Geology and Mining & Anr - 2009 (10)
SCC 115 :

"The courts/tribunals proceed on
the assumption, that every citizen deserves
a reply to his representation. Secondly they
assume that a mere direction to consider
and dispose of the representation does not
involve any `decision' on rights and
obligations of parties. Little do they realize
the consequences of such a direction to
`consider'.
If
the
representation
is
considered and accepted, the ex-employee
gets a relief, which he would not have got
on account of the long delay, all by reason
of the direction to `consider'. If the
representation is considered and rejected,
the ex-employee files an application/writ
petition, not with reference to the original
cause of action of 1982, but by treating the
rejection of the representation given in
2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is
made for quashing the rejection of
representation and for grant of the relief
claimed
in
the
representation.
The
Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain
such applications/petitions ignoring the
huge delay preceding the representation,
and proceed to examine the claim on merits
and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of
limitation or the laches gets obliterated or
ignored."

15. When a belated representation
in regard to a `stale' or `dead' issue/dispute
is considered and decided, in compliance
with a direction by the Court/Tribunal to do
so, the date of such decision can not be
considered as furnishing a fresh cause of
action for reviving the `dead' issue or timebarred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and laches should be considered with
reference to the original cause of action and
not with reference to the date on which an
order is passed in compliance with a court's
direction. Neither a court's direction to
consider a representation issued without
examining the merits, nor a decision given
in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, or erase the delay and
laches."

(emphasis by Court)

22. Likewise Hon'ble Apex court in the
case of Rajmati Singh (supra) has held
under:

"19. Close to the facts of this case,
in "C. Jacob versus Director of Geology and
Mining And Other" (2008) 10 SCC 115, this
Court, having found that the employee
suddenly brought up a challenge to the order
of termination of his services after 20 years
and claimed all consequential benefits, held
that the relief sought for was inadmissible.
The legal position in this regard was laid out
in the following terms:

"10. Every representation of the
Government for relief, may not be applied on
merits. Representations relating to matters
which have become stale or barred by
limitation, can be rejected on that ground
alone, without examining the merits of the
claim. In regard to representations unrelated
to the Department, the reply may be only to
inform that the matter did not concern the
Department or to inform the appropriate
Department. Representations with incomplete
particulars may be replied by seeking
relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh
cause of action or revive a stale or dead
claim.

11. When a decision is issued by
a court/tribunal to consider or deal with
the representation, usually the directee
8 All. Kulbhaskar Ashram Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1429
(person directed) examines the matter on
merits, being under the impression that
failure
to
do
so
may
amount
to
disobedience. When an order is passed
considering and rejecting the claim or
representation,
in
compliance
with
direction of the court or tribunal, such an
order does not revive the stale claim, nor
amount
to
some
kind
of
"acknowledgement
of
a
jural
relationship" to give rise to a fresh cause
of action."

23.

From
careful
perusal
of
judgements of Hon'ble Apex Court as
referred to above, it clearly emerges that
merely because representations have been
submitted by an employee which came to
be decided, the decision would not entail
revival of stale claim. Even otherwise, in
the instant case, the petitioner, as per his
own accord, has filed a review which was
not itself maintainable as per the service
rules in the year 2008 and it is only when
the authorities informed him in the year
2023 that the review is not maintainable as
per service rules that the petitioner has
challenged all the orders including the
punishment order of the year 2007 and the
appellate order of the year 2008. Thus
merely because the authorities informed
about the non maintainability of the review
through an order dated 18.04.2023 the
same would not entail revival of a stale
claim as in the instant writ petition.

24. Considering the aforesaid, the
preliminary objection as raised by Shri
Gaurav Mehrotra, learned counsel for the
respondents is upheld and the writ petition
is dismissed on the ground of laches.
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(2023) 8 ILRA 1429
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.05.2023
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ-A No. 6057 of 2023

Kulbhaskar Ashram ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Chandan Sharma, Sri Ravi Kumar Bhatia

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Pratik Chandra

A. Service Law - Appointment - Post of
Animal Catcher in the laboratory of
Zoology - Nature of post - Technical or
non-technical post - Appointment to be
made through outsourcing - Permissibility
- GO dated 06.02.2011 require that all
Class-IV posts will be filled up through
outsourcing
except
technical
post
-
Applicability - Held, a post of Animal
Catcher is necessarily required to be a
technical post as person must possess
with the technical hand to catch animal
safely for the purposes of research - It
cannot be taken to be a general Class-IV
post - The institution is entitled to make
regular appointment against sanctioned
post of Animal Catcher in the laboratory of
Zoology of the institution. (Para 2, 10, 18
and 19)
Writ petition allowed. (E-1)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Chandan Sharma,
learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
Standing Counsel for the State-respondents
and Shri Kavish Suhail, learned Advocate,
holding brief of Shri Pratik Chandra,
learned counsel for the State-University.

2. Petitioner before this Court is a
Postgraduate, aided and recognized degree
college affiliated to Prof.Rajendra Singh