# Mahesh Chandra & Anr v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 530
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-08
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 1986
- **Bench:** Sanjay Kumar Pachori
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mahesh-chandra-anr-v-state-of-u-p-52697
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

dacoity Section 395/397 of the IPC.

Headnotes
Criminal law-Indian Penal Code,1860 -
Sections 395 r/w 397-Criminal Procedure
Code,1973-Section 374(2)-Challenge toConviction-unexplained
delay
in
FIRMaterial contradictions between the PW-
10 All. Mahesh Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
531
1 and PW-2 such as whether the house
doors were broken, create a serious doubt
about the truthfulness of the witnessesIdentification of the appellants from a
distance at night by witnesses PW-1 and
PW-3 when the source of light (torch,
dibiya) has not been proved, coupled with
the fact that other dacoits had covered
faces, renders the identification suspect
and improbable-Absence of corroborative
evidence for the sole testimony of an
injured witness and lack of recovery of
any looted articles, weapons or empty
cartridges
at
the
instance
of
the
appellants weakens the prosecution caseThe appeal allowed.

Held
The court held that the delay of about 10 hours
in lodging the FIR and delay in the medical
examination of the injured persons without a
plausible explanation raised serious doubts.
There was a material contradictions between
PW-1( who stated no doors were broken) and
PW-2 (who stated the doors of the kotha were
broken by the dacoits). The identification of the
appellants who were local villagers, from a
distance of 40-50 paces at night was suspect,
especially since the source of light was not
produced or proved and most of the dacoits had
covered their faces. The court concluded that
the contrary view taken by the trial court was
against the weight of evidence. The court
emphasized
that
for
a
conviction,
the
prosecution must prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt. (Para 12 to 29) (E-6)

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860 , Criminal Procedure
Code,1973.

List of Keywords
Dacoity, IPC Section 395/397, Unexplained
Delay
in
FIR,
Material
Contradiction,
Identification, Corroboration, Benefit of Doubt,
Acquittal, Robbery, weapons, cartridges, injured
witness, medical examination.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.-664of 1986
Mahesh Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2025
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Sri T.N. Hukka, Sri Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Sri
S.K. Dubey
Adv. for the Respondent:
A.G.A.

Case law cited:
Thulia Kali Vs The State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3
SCC 393, Meharaj Singh & Ors. Vs State of U.P.
& Ors (1994) 5 SCC 188, Satpal Singh Vs State
of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714, Yogesh Singh Vs
Mahabeer Singh & Ors, (2017) 11 SCC 195referred to.

## Text

530 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
cannot
be
termed
as
disciplinary
proceeding, therefore, in continuance of the
same and consequences thereof, lodging of
FIR does not come within the purview of
disciplinary proceeding resulting into the
wilful disobedience. Therefore, in light of
law laid down by the Courts as well as facts
of the case, no case of wilful disobedience
is made out against the opposite party.

21. Another issue was what would the
consequence of contempt proceeding in
case interim order is vacated or relief in the
main proceeding is not granted. This was
considered by the Apex Court in the matter
of Prithawi Nath Ram (Supra). Relevant
paragraph is being quoted below;

"In a given case, even if
ultimately the interim order is vacated or
relief in the main proceeding is not granted
to a party, the other side cannot take that
as a ground for disobedience of any interim
order passed by the Court."

22. This issue was again before the
Apex Court in the matter of Prem
Chandra Agarwal (Supra). Relevant
paragraphs are being quoted below;

"4. It is a well-settled principle
that once a final order is passed, all earlier
interim orders merge into the final order,
and the interim orders cease to exist.

.......

7. In view of the aforesaid
decision, Contempt Petition is dismissed."

23. Apex Court in both the matters
have taken the specific view that once,
interim order is vacated or relief in the
main proceeding is not granted, at this
stage, other side cannot take ground for
disobedience of any interim order passed
by the Court. Court has further held that
once, final order is passed, all earlier
interim orders merge into the final order
and the interim orders cease to exist.

24. So far as present case is concerned,
there is no dispute on the point that vide
order dated 12.05.2025, petition was
disposed of and interim order stands
vacated, therefore, in light of law laid down
by the Apex Court, no case of contempt is
made out against the opposite party.

25. Therefore, in light of facts of the
case as well as law discussed herein above,
no case of contempt is made out.

26. Accordingly, application lacks
merit and is dismissed.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 530
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: 08.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SANJAY KUMAR PACHORI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 664 of 1986

Mahesh Chandra & Anr. ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:

Counsel for the Respondent:

Issue for consideration
The appellant no. 1 died, while appellant no. 2
challenged the conviction for the offense of
dacoity Section 395/397 of the IPC.

Headnotes
Criminal law-Indian Penal Code,1860 -
Sections 395 r/w 397-Criminal Procedure
Code,1973-Section 374(2)-Challenge toConviction-unexplained
delay
in
FIRMaterial contradictions between the PW-
10 All. Mahesh Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
531
1 and PW-2 such as whether the house
doors were broken, create a serious doubt
about the truthfulness of the witnessesIdentification of the appellants from a
distance at night by witnesses PW-1 and
PW-3 when the source of light (torch,
dibiya) has not been proved, coupled with
the fact that other dacoits had covered
faces, renders the identification suspect
and improbable-Absence of corroborative
evidence for the sole testimony of an
injured witness and lack of recovery of
any looted articles, weapons or empty
cartridges
at
the
instance
of
the
appellants weakens the prosecution caseThe appeal allowed.

Held
The court held that the delay of about 10 hours
in lodging the FIR and delay in the medical
examination of the injured persons without a
plausible explanation raised serious doubts.
There was a material contradictions between
PW-1( who stated no doors were broken) and
PW-2 (who stated the doors of the kotha were
broken by the dacoits). The identification of the
appellants who were local villagers, from a
distance of 40-50 paces at night was suspect,
especially since the source of light was not
produced or proved and most of the dacoits had
covered their faces. The court concluded that
the contrary view taken by the trial court was
against the weight of evidence. The court
emphasized
that
for
a
conviction,
the
prosecution must prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt. (Para 12 to 29) (E-6)

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860 , Criminal Procedure
Code,1973.

List of Keywords
Dacoity, IPC Section 395/397, Unexplained
Delay
in
FIR,
Material
Contradiction,
Identification, Corroboration, Benefit of Doubt,
Acquittal, Robbery, weapons, cartridges, injured
witness, medical examination.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL
APPELLATE
JURISDICTION:
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.-664of 1986
Mahesh Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2025
of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellants:
Sri T.N. Hukka, Sri Sanjay Kumar Mishra, Sri
S.K. Dubey
Adv. for the Respondent:
A.G.A.

Case law cited:
Thulia Kali Vs The State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3
SCC 393, Meharaj Singh & Ors. Vs State of U.P.
& Ors (1994) 5 SCC 188, Satpal Singh Vs State
of Haryana, (2010) 8 SCC 714, Yogesh Singh Vs
Mahabeer Singh & Ors, (2017) 11 SCC 195referred to.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Sanjay Kumar
Pachori, J.)

1. The present Criminal Appeal under
Section 374 Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred as "Cr.P.C.") has
been filed against the judgment and order
dated 24.2.1986 and 25.2.1986 passed by
Special
Judge
(Anti
Dacoity)/IIIrd
Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, in
Special Case No. 349 of 1984, whereby the
appellants have been convicted under
Sections 395 read with Section 397 of
I.P.C. and sentenced them to undergo seven
years of rigorous imprisonment.

2. Brief facts of the case, as per first
informant report (Ext. Ka-1) dated 6.3.1984
which was registered by Ranveer Singh
(PW-1) against the appellants and 6-7
unknown dacoits under Sections 395, 397
of I.P.C., are that at about 11:30 pm in the
intervening night of 5/6 March, 1984
offence of dacoity had been committed in
his house by appellants and 7-8 unknown
dacoits. Appellant no. 1 Mahesh Chandra
was armed with single barrel gun .12 bore
and appellant no. 2 Raj Bahadur was armed
with country made pistol and other
532 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
unknown assailants were armed with guns,
countrymade pistol, axe and sticks. Family
members (mother, younger brother, wife,
sister-in-law along with children) were
trapped inside the house at the time of
incident. There was sufficient light of
dibbi. On hue and cry of first informant and
villagers came for the rescue.

2(i) After lodging of the F.I.R.,
investigation has been started by S.I. Ram
Roop Sharma (PW-7) on 6.3.1984 and
recorded the statement of prosecution
witnesses and prapared sketch plan of the
place of incident (Ex. Ka-7) and taken into
possession the tickli and empty cartridge
from the place of incident (Ex. Ka-8), torch
(Ex. Ka-10), dibia (Ext. Ka-9) and prepared
recvoery memo respectively. He has also
collected the medical examination report of
injured Sanjawati and Narayani Devi (Ex.
Ka-2, Ex. Ka-3). After completing the
investigation S.I. Jagmohan (PW-6/IInd
Investigating Officer) submitted charge
sheet (Ex. Ka-6) against the appellants
under Sections 395, 397 of I.P.C. before the
Special Judge. The trial court framed the
charges against the appellants under
Section 395 of I.P.C. on 2.5.1985, whereby
appellants denied the charge and they
demanded trial.

3. To prove the charges against
appellants prosecution examined as many
as 7 witnesses namely; PW-1 Ranveer
Singh
(first
informant),
PW-2,
Smt.
Sanjawati (injured witness), PW-3, Vijay
Singh (brother of the first informant), PW4, Dr. V.S. Yadav (Medical Officer who
examined the PW-3 and Narayani Devi),
PW-5 H.C. Devendra Pal Singh (Scriber),
PW-6
S.I.
Jag
Mohan
Singh
(Ist
Investigating Officer) and PW-7 S.I. Ram
Roop Sharma (IInd Investigating Officer).

4. After examining the prosecution
witnesses, statement of appellants had been
recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C.
wherein they stated that prosecution has
produced false evidence due to enmity.
However, appellants had not produced any
evidence either oral or documentary in their
defence.

5. Before the trial court, it had been
argued on behalf of appellants that PW-1
Ranveer Singh, PW-2 Smt. Sanjawati and
PW-3 Vijay Singh had no opportunity to
identify the appellants and other dacoits
because according to the evidence on
record, unknown dacoits were covered their
faces by cloth and were resorting to
indiscrimate firing causing scare and the
canal wherefrom Ranveer Singh (PW-1)
and Vijay Singh (PW-3) claims to have
seen the appellants coming out from their
house from distance of 100 or 125 paces.
Prosecution
has
not
produced
any
indepenent witness of the incident.

6. The trial court held that the
prosecution has successfully proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt against the
appellants without taking notice of the
arguments of learned counsel for the
appellants and after referring the evidence
of PW-1 Ranveer Singh and PW-2 Smt.
Sanjawati (who sustained bodily injury), it
was observed that F.I.R. of the case was
promptly lodged against the appellants and
the appellants have not shown any reason
of their false implication. Appellants have
stated vague statement under Section 313
of Cr.P.C. wherein they stated that they
have been implicated due to enmity without
giving any details about the alleged enmity.
Trial court convicted and sentenced the
appellants. Hence the present appeal.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants
submits that first information report has
been lodged after about 10 hours of the
incident which took place at 11:30 pm,
10 All. Mahesh Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
533
however, F.I.R. had been lodged at 9:30 am
wherein the distance between the place of
incident and polcie station is only 6 km. It
is
further
submitted
that
medical
examination report of the injured persons
including PW-2 Sanjawati was conducted
on 6.3.1984 after lodging of the F.I.R.
There is no explanation in causing delay in
lodging the F.I.R. as well as conducting the
medical examination of PW-2. It is further
submitted that as per prosecution evidence,
present appellant no. 2 Raj Bahadur and
appellant no. 1 Mahesh Chand (now
deceased) had not covered their faces at the
time of incident and they did not hide their
identity, whereas they were resident of
same village. It is further submitted that no
efforts have been made by the prosecution
to identity 8-9 unknown dacoits. It is
further submitted that Ranveer Singh (PW1) and Vijay Singh (PW-3) were not eyewitnesses of the incident. There is material
contradictions between the testimony of
Ranveer Singh (PW-1), Smt. Sanjawati
(PW-2) and Vijay Singh (PW-3). It is
further submitted that impugned judgment
and order has been passed without
appreciating
the
evidence
in
right
perspective as well as against the weight of
evidence. The prosecution has failed to
prove the case against the appellants
beyond reasonable doubt.

8. It is further submitted that no looted
article has been recovered on pointing out
of present appellants. As per prosecution
case, the present case is based on solitary
evidence of Smt. Sanjawati because PW-1
and PW-3 identified the present appellant
from behind in the night on a distance of 40
to 50 paces. There is no other corroborative
evidence to corroborate the sole testimony
of Smt. Sanjawati. Therefore, the present
appeal is liable to be allowed.

9.
Learned
A.G.A.
vehemently
opposed the arguments of learned counsel
for the appellant no. 2 and supported the
judgment and order passed by trial court
and submits that there is no illegality
committed by the trial court while
appreciating the evidence and has rightly
held that proseuction has successfully
proved its case beyond reasonable doubt
against the appellants. The present appeal is
liable to be dismissed.

10. Heard Sri S.K. Dubey, learned
counsel for the appellant no. 2 and Sri
Kamleshwar Singh, learned A.G.A. for the
State and perused the material available on
record.

11. Appellant no. 1 Mahesh Chand
had died during the pendency of present
criminal appeal and present appeal had
already been dismissed as abated for
appellant no. 1 vide order dated 16.1.2017.

12. Learned counsel for the appellant
no. 2 argued that the fact witnesses (PW-1,
PW-2 and PW-3) have not identified the
appellants and 6 unknown dacoits which is
emerged from the following evidence:

(a) First Information Report has
been lodged after about 10 hours of the
incident where distance between the place
of incident and police station is only 6 km.
Offence is alleged to have been committed
at 11:30 pm on 5.3.1984 and the F.I.R. of
the incident had been lodged by alleged eye
witness Ranveer Singh (PW-1) at 9:30 am
on 6.3.1984.

(b) The medical examination of
Sanjawati (PW-1) (mother of the first
informant) and one Narayani Devi (wife of
Ranveer Singh) was conducted after
lodging of F.I.R. at 10:00 am on 6.3.1984
and at 12:20 pm on 7.3.2024. Prosecution
has not explained causing the delay in
534 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
lodging the F.I.R. as well as conducting
medical examination of injured persons.

(c). As per testimony of PW-2
Smt. Sanjawati (injured witnesses), it has
been stated that she identified the present
appellant no. 2 Raj Bahadur and appellant
no. 1 Mahesh Chand (deceased) who had
not covered their faces whereas other
assailants covered their faces. It is
significant that the present appellant no. 2
Raj Bahadur and appellant no. 1 Mahesh
Chand who is/was resident of same village,
(i.e. village of the incident), whereas
Ranveer Singh (PW-1) and Vijay Singh
(PW-3), saw the assailants from behind
from a distance of 40 to 50 paces.

(d) Prosecution has not produced
or proved the source of light before trial
court.

(e) There is no recovery of looted
article from the instance of the appellant
no. 2.

13. Before considering the arguments
of learned counsel for the appellants, it is
appropriate
to
go
through
entire
prosecution evidence.

14. As per cross-examination of PW-1
(Ranveer Singh), he was present at his
Baithak at the time of incident which is 40
to 50 paces away from the place of
incident. He identified present appellant no.
2 and deceased-appellant no. 1 (Mahesh
Chand) from the side of lane of bamba and
at the same time when he reached near lane
of bamba, assailants left his house after
committing offence and further stated that
no door was broken in the incident. At the
time of leaving house, some assailants had
covered their faces but some had left open.

15. It has been suggested by the
defence to this witness that it is wrong to
say that deceased-appellant No. 1 Mahesh
Chand had company with Ram Beti and
due to this reason, he has been implicated.
It is wrong to say that distance between the
house of first informant and bamba is one
furlong, 50 to 60 paces.

After analyzing the evidence of
Ranveer Singh (PW-1), it appears that he
saw the assailants from side of lane of
bamba which is 40 to 50 paces far from his
house. He had seen the appellants and other
unknown dacoits when they were leaving
the place of incident (house of first
informant) after committing dacoity. No
door of the house was broken by the
dacoits in the incident. He was not present
at the place of incident. In the house of first
informant, there were three constructed
rooms and thereupon lying a thatch outside.
Younger brother of the first informant
Ravindra (who has not been produced in
evidence), who was sleeping by the side of
Smt. Sanjawati (PW-2) and wife of first
informant and his younger brother were
sleeping in the constructed room. It is
significant to note that younger brother
Ravindra who was sleeping nearby PW-2
but he had not sustained any injury.
16. PW-2- Sanjawati (mother of PW-1
Ranveer Singh) stated in her crossexamination that dacoits committed dacoity
after breaking the door of Kotha. She was
sleeping near his son Raveendra in
courtyard while her daughter-in-laws were
sleeping in other Kotha. She was beaten
with butt of gun by deceased-appellant no.
1 Mahesh Chand on her back. There were
two constructed rooms in the house.
Ranveer Singh (PW-1) reached after the
incident. She had admitted that her baithak
is 50 feet away far from her house and
canal is 20 feet away.

17. It has been suggested from the
evidence of this witness that appellant no. 2
10 All. Mahesh Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
535
has been implicated due to enmity of field
and for deceased-appellant, it has been
suggested that Ram Beti was her relative
and due to this reason, he had been falsely
implicated.

After
having
gone
through
the
evidence of PW-2 Sanjawati, offence of
dacoity was committed after breaking the
door of constructed room and deceasedappellant no. 1 Mahesh Chand beaten her
on her back with butt of gun while she was
sleeping in thatch in front of constructed
room. Her son Ranveer Singh (PW-1) and
Vijay Singh (PW-2) were present at baithak
which was 50 feet away from the place of
incident. She identified the assailants and
informed her sons Ranveer Singh and Vijay
Singh about the incident.

18. PW-3, Vijay Singh stated in his
chief examination that he and his brother
Ranveer Singh (PW-1) were sleeping in
baithak and he heard noise of shot fire from
the side of his house, then they rushed to
the house and identified the appellants in
the light of torch.

19. He further stated in his crossexamination that he identified the appellant
no. 2 and deceased appellant no. 1 Mahesh
Chand in light of torch and he and his
brother Ranveer Singh (PW-1) identified
the assailants from same place when
dacoits were leaving the house. After
identifying the appellants he and his
brother Ranveer Singh (PW-1) reached
their house. He further stated that there
were two constructed rooms having thatch
and window in which one Dibiya was
enlightened. He identified the appellants
from behind who had covered their faces.

20. It has been suggested by defence
from this witness that appellants have been
implicated due to enmity.

After close scrutiny of evidence of
Vijay Singh (PW-3), it appears that PW-3
Vijay Singh and Ranveer Singh (PW-1)
identified the appellants from same place
and baithak of the first informant was at a
distance of 40 to 50 paces away in the light
of torch. In the house of first informant two
rooms were constructed and the mother and
other ladies of the house also told about the
identity of appellants.

21. PW-4 Dr. B.S. Yadav, who
medically examined Sanjawati (PW-2) on
6.3.1984, wherein he found following
injuries:

(i) An incised circular wound
over right lower eye-lid medialy 1.3 x 1
c.m. x muscle deep clotted blood present
spairing eye ball.

(ii) Multiple contusions crossing
each other measuring 2.5 c.m. in breadth
over an area 14 c.m. x 10 c.m. over left
shoulder to scapular region. Colour red.

(iii) Contusion over left outer
upper thigh 9 x 6 cm, colour red.

(iv) Complaint of pain on the left
wrist joint without evidence of external
injuries."

22. PW-4 Dr. B.S. Yadav medically
examined Narayani Devi (wife of PW-1)
on 7.3.1984. She sustained following
injuries:

(i) Contusion 10 x 2 cm on the left
thigh outer spect.

(ii) Contusion 9 x 2 cm on the
right shoulder

(iii) Abrasion on the left side of
the fore-head 1.5 x 1 cm.

(iv) Abrasion on the left buttock.

23.
Before
appreciating
the
prosecution evidence, it is helpful to re-
536 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
visit the position of law related to the delay
in lodging of the F.I.R. by which the
prosecution has not putforth the real
genesis of the case

24. It is well-settled position of law
that delay in lodging the FIR does not make
prosecution case improbable when such
delay is properly explained, but a deliberate
delay in lodging the FIR may prove fatal.
In cases where there is delay in lodging the
FIR, the court has to look for a plausible
explanation for such delay. [Thulia Kali v.
The State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC
393 (SCC p. 397, para 12), Meharaj
Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors,
(1994) 5 SCC 188 (SCC p. 195-96, para
12), Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2010) 8 SCC 714 (SCC p. 397, para 12)].
It is settled position of law that there is no
rule of law that corroboration is necessary
to prove the testimony of solitary witness.

25. In Yogesh Singh Vs. Mahabeer
Singh & Ors., (2017) 11 SCC 195, the
Supreme Court observed in paragraph No.
15, 16, 17, 18 and 29 which are reproudced
as under:-

"15. It is a cardinal principle of
criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond all
reasonable doubts. However, the burden on
the prosecution is only to establish its case
beyond all reasonable doubt and not all
doubts. Here, it is worthwhile to reproduce
the observations made by Venkatachaliah,
J., in State of U.P. v. Krishna Gopal,
(1988) 4 SCC 302: (SCC pp. 313-14, paras
25-26)

"25. ... Doubts would be called
reasonable if they are free from a zest for
abstract speculation. Law cannot afford
any favourite other than truth. To constitute
reasonable doubt, it must be free from an
overemotional response. Doubts must be
actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt
of the accused person arising from the
evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed
to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable
doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a
merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt
based upon reason and common sense. It
must grow out of the evidence in the case.

26. The concept of probability,
and the degrees of it, cannot obviously be
expressed in terms of units to be
mathematically enumerated as to how
many of such units constitute proof beyond
reasonable doubt. There is an unmistakable
subjective element in the evaluation of the
degrees of probability and the quantum of
proof. Forensic probability must, in the last
analysis, rest on a robust common sense
and, ultimately on the trained intuitions of
the judge. While the protection given by the
criminal process to the accused persons is
not to be eroded, at the same time,
uninformed legitimization of trivialities
would make a mockery of administration of
criminal justice."

[See also Krishnan v. State,
(2003) 7 SCC 56; Valson v. State of
Kerala, (2008) 12 SCC 24 and Bhaskar
Ramappa Madar and Ors. v. State of
Karnataka, (2009) 11 SCC 690].

16. Another golden thread which
runs through the web of the administration
of justice in criminal cases is that if two
views are possible on the evidence adduced
in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the
view which is favourable to the accused
should be adopted. (Vide Kali Ram v. State
of H.P., (1973) 2 SCC 808; State of
Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180;
Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007)
4 SCC 415; Upendra Pradhan v. State of
Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 and Golbar
10 All. Mahesh Chandra & Anr. Vs. State of U.P.
537
Hussain v. State of Assam and Anr., (2015)
11 SCC 242).

17.However, the rule regarding
the benefit of doubt does not warrant
acquittal of the accused by resorting to
surmises,
conjectures
or
fanciful
considerations, as has been held by this
Court in the case of State of Punjab v.
Jagir Singh, (1974) 3 SCC 277: (SCC pp.
285-86, para 23)

"23. A criminal trial is not like a
fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight
to one's imagination and fantasy. It
concerns itself with the question as to
whether the accused arraigned at the trial
is guilty of the offence with which he is
charged. Crime is an event in real life and
is the product of interplay of different
human emotions. In arriving at the
conclusion about the guilt of the accused
charged with the commission of a crime,
the court has to judge, the evidence by the
yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic
worth and the animus of witnesses. Every
case in the final analysis would have to
depend upon its own facts. Although the
benefit of every reasonable doubt should be
given to the accused, the courts should not
at the same time reject evidence which is ex
facie trustworthy, on grounds which are
fanciful or in the nature of conjectures."

18. Similarly, in Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2
SCC 793, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., stated thus:
(SCC p. 799, para 6)

"6... The cherished principles or
golden thread of proof beyond reasonable
doubt which runs through the web of our
law should not be stretched morbidly to
embrace every hunch, hesitancy and degree
of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected
in the attitude that a thousand guilty men
may go but one innocent martyr shall not
suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable
doubts belong to the accused. Otherwise
any practical system of justice will then
break down and lose credibility with the
community."

29. It is well settled in law that
the minor discrepancies are not to be given
undue emphasis and the evidence is to be
considered from the point of view of
trustworthiness. The test is whether the
same inspires confidence in the mind of the
Court. If the evidence is incredible and
cannot be accepted by the test of prudence,
then it may create a dent in the prosecution
version. If an omission or discrepancy goes
to the root of the matter and ushers in
incongruities,
the
defence
can
take
advantage of such inconsistencies. It needs
no special emphasis to state that every
omission cannot take place of a material
omission
and,
therefore,
minor
contradictions,
inconsistencies
or
insignificant embellishments do not affect
the core of the prosecution case and should
not be taken to be a ground to reject the
prosecution evidence. The omission should
create
a
serious
doubt
about
the
truthfulness or creditworthiness of a
witness. It is only the serious contradictions
and omissions which materially affect the
case of the prosecution but not every
contradiction or omission. (See Rammi Vs.
State of M.P., (1999) 8 SCC 649; Leela
Ram Vs. State of Haryana and Another,
(1999) 9 SCC 525; Bihari Nath Goswami
Vs. Shiv Kumar Singh (2004) 9 SCC 186;
Vijay Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010)
8 SCC 191; Sampath Kumar Vs. Inspector
of Police, (2012) 4 SCC 124; Shyamal
Ghosh Vs. State of West Bengal, (2012) 7
SCC 646 and Mritunjoy Biswas Vs.
Pranab, (2013) 12 SCC 796).

26. On the basis of above discussion
and after keeping in mind the position of
law following facts clearly emerged:
538 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(i) F.I.R. had been lodged after
about 10 hours of the incident without any
explaination.

(ii)
There
is
a
material
contradiction between the evidence of
Ranveer Singh (PW-1) and Smt. Sanjawati
(PW-2); PW-1 stated that the dacoits had
not broken the doors of the constructed
room whereas PW-2 stated that dacoits had
broken the doors of the house.

(iii) Except the appellants, other
unknown dacoits covered their faces at the
time
of
incident,
which
is
highly
improbable in the circumstances that the
witnesses and the appellants are/were
resident of same village.

(iv) Torch, dibia have not been
produced and proved by the prosecution as
source of light to identify the appellants at
the time of incident.

(v) PW-1 and PW-3, idenfied the
present appellant from the distance of 40 to
50 paces in the night whereas source of
light has not been proved by the
prosecution.

(vi) The younger son of Smt.
Sanjawati, who was sleeping near by PW2, had not sustained any injury in the
incident.

(vii) Besides above, there is
neither recovery of any looted article nor
any
country
made
pistol
or
empty
cartridges have been recovered from the
appellants or at his instance to connect the
link connecting the appellants in the
incident.

27. On the basis of the facts and
circumstances
discussed
above,
an
inference can easily be drawn that the
prosecution has not proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The contrary view taken
by the trial court is against the weight of
evidence.

28. For all the reasons recorded and
discussed above, I am of the considered
view that the prosecution has failed to
prove
the
charges
for
the
offence
punishable under Section 395 I.P.C. read
with Section 397 of I.P.C. against the
appellant no. 2 beyond reasonable doubt as
the evidence on record does not bring home
the guilt of the appellant no. 2 beyond the
pale of doubt, the appellant no. 2 is entitled
to the benefit of doubt. Consequently, the
appellant no.2 is entitled to be acquitted of
the charges for which he was tried.

29. As a result, present criminal appeal
is allowed. The impugned judgment and
order of conviction as well as sentence
recorded by the trial court is set aside. The
appellant no. 2 Raj Bahadur, is acquitted of
the charges for which he has been tried.
The appellant no. 2 Raj Bahadur, is on bail,
therefore, his personal bonds and sureties
are, hereby, discharged. The appellant no. 2
will fulfill the requirement of Section 437A, Cr.P.C. to the satisfaction of the trial
court at the earliest.

30. The trial court records be returned
forthwith with a certified copy of this
judgment for compliance.
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(2025) 10 ILRA 538
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: 16.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.
THE HON'BLE TEJ PRATAP TIWARI, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 1054 of 2016

Ram Singh Alias Ram Singha Alias Ram
Singhwa & Anr. ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondent