# Mahipal Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 10 ILRA 490
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-05-13
- **Case number:** WRIT - B No. 70097 of 2011
- **Bench:** Prakash Padia
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mahipal-singh-v-board-of-revenue-u-p-at-allahabad-ors-45360
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

Civil Law - Limitation Act (36 of 1963) -
Section 5 - Condonation of delay -
"sufficient cause" - should receive liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice - in the absence of formal written
application for condonation of delay -
court should give an opportunity to
remove the defect & to file an explanation
for delay - moreover an application for
condonation of delay may be oral also - If
the explanation does not smack of mala
fides or it is not put-forth as part of a
dilatory strategy the court, delay may be
condoned - filing of the application for
condonation of delay is in the realm of
procedure - cannot be interpreted in such
a way so as to take away the right of the
parties (Para 23, 22)

Revision dismissed in default - Restoration
application filed after 10 months - recall
10 All. Mahipal Singh Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad & Ors.
491
application rejected on the ground that no
separate application u/s 5 of Limitation Act filed
for condonation of delay - Held - If the
restoration application was defective - authority
should have given an opportunity to the
petitioner to remove the defect and to file an
explanation for delay. (Para 28)

Partly allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

490 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
meeting of the said Larger Committee held
on 18.01.2019 and these minutes of the
meeting held on 18.01.2019 are under
challenge in this writ petition. Merely
because formal prayer for quashing of the
order dated 25.05.2019, passed by the
District Magistrate has not been made, will
not come in the way of the petitioners
being granted relief to which they are
otherwise entitled to. Moreover the court in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India can always
mold the relief in the interest of justice.
Thus, the said objection is overruled.

30. Resultantly, the writ petition is
allowed. The order dated 25.05.2019,
passed by the District Magistrate, minutes
of the meeting dated 18.01.2019, minutes
of the meeting dated 30.11.2018 and the
minutes of the meeting dated 03.11.2011
are hereby quashed.

31. The Selection Committee/District
Magistrate,
Sultanpur
is
directed
to
consider the case of the petitioner Nos. 1
and 2 for their regular appointment in terms
of Rule 5 of the Service Rules as amended,
vide Notification dated 26.05.2011 taking
into consideration the observations made
and the principles laid down hereinabove.
The consideration for regular appointment
of the petitioners shall be made within a
period of two months from the date of
production of a copy of this order. The
District
Magistrate/Members
of
the
Selection Committee is/are also directed to
be mindful of the fact that it is the third
round of litigation which has arisen out of
denial of rightful claim of the petitioners
and dispute is now to be given quietus.

32. The Court expects and hopes that
District
Magistrate/Members
of
the
Selection Committee shall abide by the
observations made in this judgment and
take a lawful decision within the time
which has been stipulated herein above.

33. In the facts of the case, there will
be no orders as to costs.
----------
(2020)10ILR A490
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13.05.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH PADIA, J.

WRIT - B No. 70097 of 2011

Mahipal Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad &
Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.S. Shukla, Sri Santosh Kumar Tiwari,
Sri Rajendra Kumar Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Dr. M. Tandon

Civil Law - Limitation Act (36 of 1963) -
Section 5 - Condonation of delay -
"sufficient cause" - should receive liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice - in the absence of formal written
application for condonation of delay -
court should give an opportunity to
remove the defect & to file an explanation
for delay - moreover an application for
condonation of delay may be oral also - If
the explanation does not smack of mala
fides or it is not put-forth as part of a
dilatory strategy the court, delay may be
condoned - filing of the application for
condonation of delay is in the realm of
procedure - cannot be interpreted in such
a way so as to take away the right of the
parties (Para 23, 22)

Revision dismissed in default - Restoration
application filed after 10 months - recall
10 All. Mahipal Singh Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad & Ors.
491
application rejected on the ground that no
separate application u/s 5 of Limitation Act filed
for condonation of delay - Held - If the
restoration application was defective - authority
should have given an opportunity to the
petitioner to remove the defect and to file an
explanation for delay. (Para 28)

Partly allowed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Meghraj Vs Jesraj Kasturjee AIR 1975 Mad
137

2. Firm Kaura Mal Bishan Dass Vs Firm Mathra
Dass Atma Ram AIR 1959 PUN 646

3. M/s Markland Pvt. Ltd. & ors. Vs St. of Guj
AIR 1989 GUJ 44

4. Indrasani Devi Vs D.D.C., Varanasi 1981 ALJ
637

5. Muneshwari Devi Vs Jitan Singh 1993 AWC
792

6. Smt. Shakuntala Devi Vs Banwari Lal & ors.
1997 AWC 622

7. N. Balakrishnan Vs M. Krishnamurthy JT
(1998) 6 SC 242

8. Shakuntala Devi Vs Kuntal Kumari AIR 1969
SC 575

9. St. of WB Vs The Administrator, Howrah
Municipality AIR 1972 SC 749

10. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & anr.
Vs Mst. Katiji & ors. AIR 1987, S.C. 1353

11. Sukhdeo Singh & anr. Vs Customs, Excise &
Service Tax & ors. Central Excise Appeal No.76
of 2010

(Delivered by Hon'ble Prakash Padia, J.)

1. Heard Sri S.S. Shukla and Sri
Santosh Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Smt. Praveen Shukla,
learned Standing Counsel for the respondentState.

2. The petitioner has preferred the
present writ petition inter-alia with the
following prayers :-

"I. Issue a writ, order or direction
in the nature of certiorari by quashing the
dated 21.12.2009 contained in (Annexure -
No.6) passed by Collector Finance and
Revenue, Ghaziabad in Case No.8 of 2008-09
under Section 157-AA State Versus Mahipal
Singh, order dated 26.5.2010, 4.5.2011
passed by Additional Commissioner Meerut
in Revision No.39 of 2009-10 contained in
(Annexure-No.7 and 9), and order dated
10.8.2011 signed on 30.8.11 passed by
Member Board of Revenue Circuit Court
Meerut in Revision No.68 of 2010-11
Mahipal Singh Versus State of U.P.
contained in (Annexure- No.11) to this writ
petition.

II. Issue a writ, order or direction
in the nature of mandamus commanding the
respondent No.3 to pass a reasoned and
speaking order in mutation proceeding of
mutation case No.421 of 2008-09 Mahipal
Singh Versus Tara Chand in regard to saledeed dated 5.3.2009 in accordance with law."

3. The facts in brief as contained in
the writ petition are that the petitioner
belongs to the caste of Jatav, which is a
scheduled caste. One Tara Chand son of
Jaggan Singh also belongs to caste of Jatav.
One Jaichand son of Ram Dhan was tenure
holder of the Arazi Khata No.568 Khasra
No.1136 area 2 bigha situated in village
Bhanaida Pargana Loni Tehsil and District
Ghaziabad, executed a sale deed dated
1.1.2002 in favour of the Tara Chand. The
aforesaid sale deed was duly registered in
favour of Tara Chand.
492 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

4. Tara Chand applied for mutation
under Section 34 of U.P. Land Revenue
Act on the basis of sale deed in question.
The Revenue Officers passed mutation
order in favour of Tara Chand and the
name of Tara Chand was duly recorded in
the revenue records as well as in the
Khatauni as bhumidar with transferable
rights.
The
petitioner
purchased
the
aforesaid arazi from Tara Chand by way of
registered sale deed dated 5.3.2009 on
consideration
of
Rs.8,75,000/-.
The
aforesaid sale deed was duly registered in
the office of Sub Registrar, Ghaziabad.
Subsequently,
petitioner
moved
an
application for mutation of the land in
question in his name. On the said
application report was submitted by the
Tehsildar,
Ghaziabad,
on
09.06.2009
before the Sub Divisional Magistrate. On
the basis of the said report the Sub
Divisional
Magistrate,
Ghaziabad,
submitted a report on 15.6.2009 before the
Collector
to
initiate
proceedings
as
provided under Section 161/167 of the The
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land
Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred as
U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act). Subsequent to the
aforesaid a notice was issued to the
petitioner stating therein that the vendor
belongs to schedule caste but the land in
question was obtained by way of patta and
he has not taken permission from the
Collector prior to execution of the sale deed
as per the provisions contained in Section
157-AA of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. A
detailed reply was submitted by the
petitioner in response to the aforesaid show
cause notice. It is stated in the reply that
there was no need to get the permission
from the Collector prior to execution of the
sale deed thus there is no violation of the
provisions of Section 157-AA of the
provisions and none of the provisions
contained in the act were violated.
Ultimately an order dated 21.12.2009 was
passed
by
the
Additional
Collector
(Finance and Revenue), Ghaziabad against
the petitioner.

5. Aggrieved against the aforesaid
order petitioner preferred a revision being
Revision
No.39/10
in
the
court
of
Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut.
The aforesaid revision was dismissed in
default by the Additional Commissioner,
Meerut Division, Meerut vide its order
dated 26.5.2010. An application was filed
by the petitioner to recall the order dated
26.5.2010 on 29.3.2011. The aforesaid
recall application was rejected by the
Additional
Commissioner,
Meerut
Division, Meerut vide its order dated
4.5.2011. The recall application was
rejected on the ground that no separate
application was filed by the petitioner for
condonation of delay.

6. Against the aforesaid order dated
4.5.2011
passed
by
the
Additional
Commissioner
petitioner
preferred
a
revision
being
Revision
No.68/10-11
before Board of Revenue, Circuit Bench,
Meerut. The aforesaid revision was also
rejected by the Board of Revenue vide its
order dated 10.8.2011. Challenging the
aforesaid
orders,
the
petitioner
has
preferred the present writ petition.

7. It is argued by the learned counsel
for the petitioner that the order passed by
the Additional Collector (Finance and
Revenue), Ghaziabad dated 21.12.2009 is
absolutely illegal. It is further argued that
the provisions of Section 157-AA (5) of the
Act was introduced w.e.f. 26.6.2002 and
would not be applicable to sale deed
executed on 1.1.2002 and as such sale deed
could not have been declared void under
Section 167 of the Act.
10 All. Mahipal Singh Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad & Ors.
493

8. It is further argued by the learned
counsel for the petitioner that though
statutory revision was preferred by him
before the Commissioner, Meerut Division,
Meerut, which was dismissed in default
vide its order dated 26.5.2010. In order to
recall
the
aforesaid
order,
a
recall
application was filed by the petitioner
before the Additional Commissioner on
29.3.2011.
The
said
application
was
rejected by him vide its order dated 4.5.
2011 on the ground that (i) the restoration
application is highly time barred (ii) no
separate application for condonation of
delay has been filed.

9. The order passed by the Additional
Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut
dated 4.5.2011 was challenged by the
petitioner by filing a revision before the
Board of Revenue as provided under
Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act,
the same was also dismissed by the Board
of Revenue, Circuit Bench, Meerut vide its
order dated 30.8.2011.

10. It is further argued that even in the
absence of a written application for
condonation of delay, the oral application
was also liable to be entertained. It is
further argued that there were no inordinate
delay in filing the restoration application
since the same was filed only after 10
months. It is further argued that cogent
reasons were given in the restoration
application to condone the delay but the
same was not taken into consideration
while rejecting the same. The cogent
reasons were given in the restoration
application for delay in filing the same.

11. On the other hand it is argued by
the learned Standing Counsel that since the
sale deed, which was executed in favour of
the petitioner was void in law and hit by the
provisions of Section 157-A and 157-AA
of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. The orders
passed
by
the
Additional
Collector
(Finance and Revenue), Ghaziabad are
absolutely perfect and valid orders. It is
further argued that the revision filed by the
petitioner before the Board of Revenue was
also rightly dismissed. In view of the same,
it is argued that the petitioner is not entitled
for any relief as claimed by him in the
present writ petition.

12. Counter and rejoinder affidavits
have been exchanged between the parties.

13. With the consent of learned
counsel for the parties, present writ petition
is being disposed of.

14. From perusal of the record, it is
clear that the revision preferred by the
petitioner before the Commissioner was
dismissed in default on 26.5.2010. A
restoration application was filed to recall
the aforesaid order. The said application
was rejected by him on 4.5.2011 on the
ground that the recall application was filed
after 10 months but no application for
condonation of delay was filed as provided
under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation
Act.

15. In this view of the matter, the
recall application was rejected being highly
time barred though a revision was preferred
by the petitioner against the aforesaid order
dated 4.5.2011 before the Board of
Revenue but the Board of Revenue also
rejected the same without application of
mind and by a non speaking order on
30.8.2011. From perusal of the aforesaid
order, it is absolutely clear that there is no
application of mind whatsoever while
passing the aforesaid orders. The basic
grounds
taken
while
rejecting
the
494 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
application for restoration was that no
separate application was filed by the
petitioner for condonation of delay.

16. In the case of Meghraj Vs. Jesraj
Kasturjee reported in AIR 1975 Mad 137 it
was observed that in the absence of formal
written application for condonation of
delay,
the
court
should
circumvent
technicality
and
afford
a
reasonable
opportunity to the aggrieved party to mend
matters. Otherwise it would lead to
miscarriage of justice. Paragraph 4 of the
aforesaid judgement reads as follows :-

"The
consensus,
therefore,
appears to be this. If under explainable
circumstances an appeal or an application
is filed in Court, but without a formal
application or a written application for
excusing the delay in the presentation of
the same, then the Court should circumvent
technicality and afford a reasonable
opportunity to the aggrieved party to mend
matters. Otherwise, it would lead to
miscarriage of justice."

17. A bare perusal of the order of the
revisional authority would show that the
restoration application was dismissed as
barred by time as it did not accompany
with an application for condonation of
delay when it was filed. It does not appear
from the said order that any opportunity
was given by the revisional authority to the
petitioner to move an application for
condonation of delay. If the restoration
application was defective the revisional
authority should have given an opportunity
to the petitioner to remove the defect,
moreover an application for condonation of
delay may be oral also.

18. In the case of Firm Kaura Mal
Bishan Dass vs. Firm Mathra Dass Atma
Ram reported in AIR 1959 PUNJAB 646 it
was held that merely because there was no
written application filed by the appellant is
hardly a sufficient ground for refusing him
the relief, if he is otherwise entitled to it.

19. A similar observations were made
by the Gujarat High Court in the case of
M/s Markland Pvt. Ltd. and others vs
State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1989
GUJARAT 44. It has been held that in the
absence
of
written
application
for
condonation of delay, the delay in filing the
appeal can be condoned.

20. Identical view was taken by this
Court in Indrasani Devi vs. D.D.C.,
Varanasi reported in 1981 ALJ 637, which
was followed by another Single Judge of
this Court in the case of Muneshwari Devi
vs. Jitan Singh reported in 1993 AWC 792.

21. More or less, the same view has
been taken in the case of Smt. Shakuntala
Devi vs. Banwari Lal and others, reported
in 1997 AWC 622.

22. The filing of the application for
condonation of delay is in the realm of
procedure. The procedure as far as possible
cannot and should be interpreted in such a
way so as to take away the right of the
parties.

23. The Apex Court with a reference
to Section 5 of the Limitation Act in N.
Balakrishnan
vs.
M.
Krishnamurthy
reported in JT 1998 (6) SC 242 has laid
down that the primary function of a court is
to adjudicate the dispute between the
parties and to advance substantial justice.
Time limit fixed for approaching the court
in different situations is not because on the
expiry of such time a bad cause would
transform into a good cause. In the
10 All. Mahipal Singh Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad & Ors.
495
judgement, it has been held that rules of
limitation are not meant to destroy the right
of parties. They are meant to see that
parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but
seek their remedy promptly. The object of
providing a legal remedy is to repair the
damage caused by reason of legal injury.
Law of limitation fixes a life-span for such
legal remedy for the redress of the legal
injury so suffered. Ultimately, in para 14, it
has been stated that it must be remembered
that in every case of delay there can be
some lapse on the part of the litigant
concerned. That alone is not enough to turn
down his plea and to shut the door against
him. If the explanation does not smack of
mala fides or it is not put-forth as part of a
dilatory strategy the court must show
utmost consideration to the suitor. It has
been laid down that in such matters,
approach of the court should be justice
oriented. The paragraph 14 of the aforesaid
judgement is reproduced hereinbelow :-

"14. It must be remembered that in
every case of delay there can be some lapse
on the part of the litigant concerned. That
alone is not enough to turn down his plea and
to shut the door against him. If the
explanation does not smack of mala fides or
it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy
the court must show utmost consideration to
the suitor. But when there is reasonable
ground to think that the delay was occasioned
by the party deliberately to gain time then the
court should lean against acceptance of the
explanation. While condoning delay the
Could should not forget the opposite party
altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is
a looser and he too would have incurred
quiet a large litigation expenses. It would be
a salutary guideline that when courts
condone the delay due to laches on the part
of the applicant the court shall compensate
the opposite party for his loss."

24. The words "sufficient cause" should
receive a liberal construction so as to advance
substantial justice. The Supreme Court in the
case of Shakuntala Devi vs. Kuntal Kumari
reported in AIR 1969 SC 575 held that the
word "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence nor inaction nor
want of bona fides is imputable to the
appellant. If the appellant makes out
sufficient cause for the delay, the Court may
in its discretion condone the delay in filing an
appeal. The relevant paragraph 7 in this
regard is reproduced hereinbelow :-

"7. The next question is whether
the delay in filing the certified copy or, to
put it differently, the delay in re-filing the
appeal with the certified copy should be
condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, If the appellant makes out sufficient
cause for the delay, the Court may in its
discretion condone the delay. As laid down
in Krishna v. Chathappan (4) "Section 5
gives the Courts a discretion which in
respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in
the way in which judicial power and
discretion ought to be exercised upon
principles which are well understood; the
words "sufficient cause" receiving a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence nor inaction
nor want of bonafides is importable to the
appellant."

25. Similar view was again taken by
the Supreme Court in the case of State of
West Bengal vs. The Administrator,
Howrah Municipality reported in AIR
1972 SC 749. It was held in the aforesaid
case by the Supreme Court that the words
"sufficient cause" should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial
justice when no negligence or inaction or
want of bona fide is imputable to a party.
496 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
The relevant paragraph 30 is reproduced
hereinbelow :-

"From the above observations it
is clear that the words "sufficient cause"
should receive a liberal construction so, as
to advance substantial justice when no
negligence nor inaction nor is, imputable to
a party."

26. In the case of Collector, Land
Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs.
Mst. Katiji and others reported in AIR
1987, S.C. 1353, it was held by the
Supreme Court that the Court should adopt
liberal approach for condonation of delay.
Certain observations were made by the
Sureme Court in paragraph 3 of the
aforesaid judgement, which is reproduced
hereinbelow :-

"The legislature has conferred
the power to condone delay by enacting
Section 51 of the Indian Limitation Act of
1963 in order to enable the Courts to do
substantial justice to parties by disposing
of matters on 'merits'. The expression
"sufficient
cause"
employed
by
the
legislature is adequately elastic to enable
the courts to apply the law in a meaningful
manner which subserves the ends of
justice--that being the life-purpose for the
existence of the institution of Courts. It is
common knowledge that this Court has
been making a justifiably liberal approach
in matters instituted in this Court. But the
message
does
not
appear
to
have
percolated down to all the other Courts in
the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach
is adopted on principle as it is realized
that:-

"Any appeal or any application,
other than an application under any of the
provisions of Order XXI of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908. may be admitted
after the prescribed period if the appellant
or the applicant satisfies the court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal or making the application within
such period."

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can
result in a meritorious matter being thrown
out at the very threshold and cause of
justice being defeated. As against this when
delay is con- doned the highest that can
happen is that a cause would be decided on
merits after hearing the parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be
explained" does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every
hour's delay, every second's delay? The
doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against
each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that
delay is occasioned deliberately, or on
account of culpable negligence, or on
account of mala fides. A litigant does not
stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In
fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that
judiciary is respected not on account of its
power to legalize injustice on technical
grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do
so."

27. In so far as the reliefs claimed in
the present writ petition are concerned, the
petitioner has challenged the order dated
21.12.2019 passed by the Additional
Collector
(Finance
and
Revenue),
10 All. Mahipal Singh Vs. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad & Ors.
497
Ghaziabad
by
which
the
mutation
application filed by him was rejected. The
said order was passed by the Additional
Commissioner is on merit. Against the
aforesaid order statutory remedies were
available to the petitioner and the same
were duly availed by him by filing a
revision before the Commissioner, Meerut
Division, Meerut. Though initially the
revision was dismissed in default by the
Additional
Commissioner,
Meerut
Division, Meerut vide its order dated
26.5.2010, a recall application was filed in
order to recall the aforesaid order but since
the same was not supported by a separate
application for condonation of delay, the
same was rejected by him on 04.05.2011.
Against the order dated 04.05.2011 though
a statutory revision was preferred by the
petitioner as provided under Section 333 of
the Act, 1950, the same was also rejected
by the Board of Revenue, Circuit Court,
Meerut without providing opportunity to
the petitioner to file an application for
condonation of delay.

28. Taking into consideration what
has been stated hereinabove, in my opinion
the order passed by the Commissioner
dated 4.5.2011 (annexure 9 to the writ
petition)
rejecting
the
restoration
application as well as the order dated
30.8.2011 passed by the Board of Revenue,
Circuit Bench, Meerut, (annexure 11 to the
writ petition), were passed without giving
an opportunity to the petitioner to file an
explanation for condonation of delay hence
not sustainable and are liable to be
quashed.

29. Learned counsel for the petitioner
also
relied
upon
a
Division
Bench
judgement of this Court in Central Excise
Appeal No.76 of 2010 (Sukhdeo Singh &
another Vs. Customs, Excise & Service
Tax & Others) decided on 15.4.2011. The
relevant
paragraph
of
the
aforesaid
judgement is reproduced hereinbelow :-

"Taking into consideration what
has been stated above, in our considered
view, the Commissioner (Appeals) was not
justified in rejecting the appeal as barred
by time without giving an opportunity to the
appellant to file an application explaining
the delay.

In normal circumstances, we
would have referred the matter back to the
authority concerned for consideration of
the application for condonation of delay.
But looking to the fact that the sufficient
time has elapsed, it is not desirable to
restore the matter back for consideration of
delay condonation application.

....................

Considering that the grounds
disclosed by the appellants are sufficient
cause, we, therefore, condone the delay in
filing the appeal before the Commissioner
(Appeals), Customs & Central Excise,
Allahabad."

30. Taking into consideration the law
laid down by a Division Bench of this
Court in the aforesaid case, since the
sufficient time has lapsed it is not desirable
to restore the matter back for consideration
of
delay
condonation
application
considering that the grounds disclosed by
the petitioner are sufficient cause. In view
of the above I hold that the Commissioner,
Meerut Division, Meerut should have
condoned the delay as he was not justified
in rejecting the restoration application as
barred by time.

31. The petitioner has already availed
a statutory remedy by filing a revision
against the order passed by the Additional
Collector
(Finance
and
Revenue),
498 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Ghaziabad. In this view of the matter,
without interfering in the order dated
21.12.2009 passed by the Additional
Collector
(Finance
and
Revenue),
Ghaziabad, a mandamus is issued to the
revisional authorities to decide the revision
on merits.

32. The matter is restored back to the
Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut to
hear and decide the Revision No.39/10 on
merits.

33. In the facts and circumstances of
the case, the Court is of the view that the
orders 26.5.2010 and 04.05.2011 passed by
Additional Commissioner Meerut and the
order dated 10.8.2011 passed by Member
Board of Revenue Circuit Court Meerut are
liable to be set aside and they are hereby set
aside. The Commissioner Meerut Division
Meerut is directed to decide the revision
preferred by the petitioner being Revision
No.39 of 2009-10 (Mahipal Vs. State of
U.P. and others) on merits.

34. In the result the writ petition
succeeds and is partly allowed.

35. No order as to costs.
----------
(2020)10ILR A498
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.04.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J.

Application U/S 482 No. 5939 of 2006

Prof. Ramesh Chandra ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri Rakesh Kumar, Sri W.H. Khan, Sri R.P.
Tiwari

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A., Sri P.K. Rao, Sri V.B. Rao

Criminal
Law
-
Code
of
Criminal
Procedure,1973 - Section 482 Cr.P.C. has
been filed for quashing the charge sheet
(under section 295, 298, 203, 504 IPC) -
Section 197 (2) Cr.P.C. - Sanction provision
- Applicable for taking cognizance - For
conducting investigation and submission of
charge sheet - No sanction required under
section 195, 196, 197 Cr.P.C. (Para - 20)

Since applicant / accused is no more "public
servant" issue of section 197 is redundant and
could not vitiate proceedings since in such
matters sanction not required. (Para - 22)
There is no merit in the application. (Para - 27)

Application dismissed. (E-2)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Priyanka Srivastava & anr. Vs St. of U.P. &
ors. (2015) 6 SCC 287.

2.
Manharibhai
Muljibhai
Kakadia
Vs
Shaileshbhai Mohanbhai Patel, (2012) 10 SCC
517.

3. P.Sundarrajan Vs R. Vidhya Sekar, (2004) 13
SCC 472.

4. Raghu Raj Singh Rousha Vs Shivam
Sundaram Promoters (P) Ltd., (2009) 2 SCC
363.

5. A.N. Santhanam Vs E. Elangovan, (2012) 12
SCC 321.

6. Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy Vs
Narayana Reddy, (1976) 3 SCC 252.

7. Anil Kumar Vs M.K. Aiyappa, (2013) 10 SCC
705.

8. Dilawar Singh Vs St.of Delhi, (2007) 12 SCC
641.