# Mahtab Husain v. Iiird Addl Dist. Judge Kheri & Ors

- **Citation:** (2021) 10 ILRA 201
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2021-10-04
- **Case number:** Rent Control No. 7699 of 2019
- **Bench:** Vivek Chaudhary
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mahtab-husain-v-iiird-addl-dist-judge-kheri-ors-46245
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Tenancy Law - UP Urban Building
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Ss. 16 and 21(1)(c) - Release
application u/s 21 filed, while process u/s
16 was pending - Maintainability - Held,
since there is no bar under law upon the
landlord in filing the release application,
for which he is not even required to serve
a notice under Section 21 of the Act of
1972 upon the tenant, merely because he
has given notice and thereafter taken time
in filing the release application would not
bar the same - There is no force in the
submission that proceedings u/s 21 of the
Act of 1972 are not maintainable as
proceedings u/s 16 are pending. (Para 15
and 18)
B. Pleading - Writ proceeding - No
counter filed - Effect - Finding of both the
Court below challenged - Petitioner failed
to prove from the record that any material
illegality or irregularity is committed by
202 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the courts below or the finding in
impugned orders are perverse - High
Court rejected the argument to allow the
writ petition merely on the ground of
uncontroverted pleading of writ. (Para 28
and 29)
Writ petitioner dismissed. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-

## Text

10 All. Mahtab Husain Vs. Iiird Addl Dist. Judge Kheri & Ors.
201
SC 1414; (vi) The Ramjas Foundation &
Ors vs Union of India & Ors: AIR 1993 SC
852; (vii) Ram Chand Vs Union of India :
(1994) 1 SCC 852 (viii) State of
Maharashtra vs Digambar, AIR 1995 SC
1991;(ix) Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay
vs
Industrial
(Development
Investment Co. (P) Ltd. & Ors,, (1996) 11
SCC 501;(x) Padma vs Dy Secy. To the
Govt. of TamilNadu (1997) 2 SCC 627;
(xi) Hindustan Petrolium Corp. Ltd., vs.
Dolly Das: (1999) 4 SCC 450; (xii) Life
Insurance Corporation of India vs Jyotish
Chandra Biswas: (2000) 6 SCC 562; (xiii)
L. Muthu Kumar & Anr vs State of Tamil
Nadu & Ors: (2000) 7 SCC 618; (xiv)
Municipal Council, Ahmadnagar & Anr vs
Shah Hyder Beig & Ors AIR 2000 SC 671;
and (xv) Inder Jit Gupta vs Union of India
& Ors: (2001) 6 SCC 637]

6. CONCLUSIONS: -

(a) In view of the aforesaid
discussion, it is held that if the appointment
to the post of Assistant Commissioner
Commercial Tax is made through direct
recruitment and promotion in the same year
of recruitment, their seniority must be
determined applying the provisions of Rule
8(3) of the Rules, 1991.

(b) In the present case, since the
appointment on the post of Assistant
Commissioner was made through direct
recruitment and by promotion in the
recruitment year 2008-09, their seniority
was rightly determined applying the
principle of Rule 8(3) while publishing the
seniority list dated 09.08.2012. Rule 8(1)
cannot be applied for determining inter se
seniority of direct recruits and promotees, if
the selection and appointments are made in
the same recruitment year through direct
recruitment and promotion. Thus, it is held
that the impugned seniority list is correctly
prepared and settled seniority position
should not and cannot be reopened after 8-9
years.

Thus, the writ petitions fail and
are hereby dismissed.
----------
(2021)10ILR A201
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 04.10.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Rent Control No. 7699 of 2019

Mahtab Husain ...Petitioner
Versus
Iiird Addl Dist. Judge Kheri & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Mohammad Aslam Khan

Counsel for the Respondents:
Upendra Kumar, S. Saxena

A. Tenancy Law - UP Urban Building
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 - Ss. 16 and 21(1)(c) - Release
application u/s 21 filed, while process u/s
16 was pending - Maintainability - Held,
since there is no bar under law upon the
landlord in filing the release application,
for which he is not even required to serve
a notice under Section 21 of the Act of
1972 upon the tenant, merely because he
has given notice and thereafter taken time
in filing the release application would not
bar the same - There is no force in the
submission that proceedings u/s 21 of the
Act of 1972 are not maintainable as
proceedings u/s 16 are pending. (Para 15
and 18)
B. Pleading - Writ proceeding - No
counter filed - Effect - Finding of both the
Court below challenged - Petitioner failed
to prove from the record that any material
illegality or irregularity is committed by
202 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the courts below or the finding in
impugned orders are perverse - High
Court rejected the argument to allow the
writ petition merely on the ground of
uncontroverted pleading of writ. (Para 28
and 29)
Writ petitioner dismissed. (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. Ravi Shanker Vs A.D.J. - II, Kanpur & ors.;
1979 ARC 273
2. Smt. Suman Lata Vs Prescribed Authority
(Munsif), Etawah & ors.; 1985(2) ARC 454
3. Smt. Ganga Devi Vs D.J., Ghaziabad; 1980
ARC 335
4. T.C. Rekhi Vs Prescribed Authority, Nainital;
1983 (2) ARC 223
5. Munni Lal Vs Prescribed Authority, Agra; 1992
ACJ 789
6. Buddu Lal alias Budh Ram Vs D.J., Allahabad;
1998 (1) ARC
597
7. Lakshmi Traders, Akbarpur Mandi & ors. Vs
Navin Rastogi & anr.; (2019) 132 ALR 652
8. Vijay Sethi Vs Anil Kumar Gupta & ors.; 2015
(3) ARC 24

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vivek
Chaudhary, J.)

1. Present writ petition is filed by the
petitioner-tenant against the judgment and
order dated 20.8.2014 passed by the
Prescribed Authority as well as order dated
3.1.2019 passed by the appellate authority,
whereby
the
release
application
of
respondent no.3-landlord is allowed and the
order dated 20.8.2014 is affirmed.

2. The dispute is with regard to a shop
under tenancy of the petitioner for which, a
release application was filed by respondent
no.3-landlord, claiming that both his sons
are not having any job and are at the age of
marriage, therefore, in the said shop, he
intends to engage his sons for carrying on
business of computer, mobile phones and
other related equipment and materials.

3. Both the courts below have found
the need of respondent no.3-landlord bona
fide and genuine and directed for eviction
of of the petitioner from the shop.

4. I have heard for the petitioner Sri
Mohd.
Arif
Khan,
learned
Senior
Advocate, assisted by Sri Mohd. Aslam
Khan and for respondent no.3, Sri Samarth
Saxena, learned Advocate and perused the
record.

5. The first submission, challenging
the impugned orders, raised by learned
Senior counsel for the petitioner, is that
before moving of application under Section
21(1)(c) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 (for
short ''the Act of 1972'), respondent no.3
had moved an application under Section 16
of the Act of 1972, claiming that petitioner
is an unauthorized occupant and, therefore,
the
landlord
cannot
raise
both
the
arguments simultaneously, that, petitioner
is a tenant as well as, that, he is an
unauthorized occupant. Thus, both the
proceedings simultaneously cannot be held
and, therefore, the application under
Section 21 of the Act of 1972, is liable to
be rejected. For the said purpose, learned
counsel for the petitioner has relied upon
the judgment in the case of Ravi Shanker
vs. Additional District Judge II, Kanpur
and others, reported in 1979 ARC 273 and
Smt. Suman Lata vs. Prescribed Authority
(Munsif), Etawah and others, reported in
1985(2) ARC 454.

6. I have gone through the said
judgment and I find that the fact of the case
10 All. Mahtab Husain Vs. Iiird Addl Dist. Judge Kheri & Ors.
203
of Ravi Shanker (supra) are entirely
different from the facts of the present case.
Paragraph-2 of the said judgment notes the
facts, which reads:

"2. In this case, the dispute is
about one shop of the aforesaid building
which had been let out to one Sant Saran.
The petitioner filed suit No.1046 of 1976
against Sant Saran and another for
ejectment on the ground that as Sant Saran
had illegally sub-let the shop to Maiku, he
was liable to ejectment. During the
pendency of the suit before the Civil Court,
Respondent No.3 Ram Shankar Shukla
made an application for the allotment of
the shop under Section 16 of the U.P. Act
No.13 of 1972, on the ground of deemed
vacancy. His case was also that as Sant
Saran allowed the shop to be occupied by a
person, who was not a member of his
family, the shop was to be treated as
vacated."

7. Therefore, in the said case, there
was no application filed under Section 21
of the Act of 1972 for release of the
property along with an application under
Section 16. Thus, the said judgment is not
applicable to the facts of the present case.

8. So far as the judgment in the case
of Smt. Suman Lata (supra) on which
reliance is placed by learned counsel for the
petitioner, is concerned, the same is only a
judgment running in three paragraphs,
which reads as follows:

"1. Notice of this petition was
accepted on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to
8 by Sri V.N.L. Katiyar, Advocate.

2. This petition is directed against
the order dated 11-7-1984 passed by the
Prescribed
Authority,
Etawah.
The
landlords respondents No.2 to 8, who are
the owners of the premises in dispute, filed
an application under Section 21(1)(a) of
Act No. 13 of 1972. It was averred in the
application that the tenant Hulas Rai
Bhagan Dass has closed their business and
vacated the premises after subletting the
premises to respondent No.10 Smt. Jagrani.
It was further averred in the application
that the landlords do not accept Smt.
Jagrani as subtenant and she is in
unauthorised occupation. Since there was
no relationship of landlord and tenant, the
application under Section 21 is not
maintainable. The landlords in such
circumstances have alternative remedy
under the Act. The impugned order passed
by the Prescribed Authority therefore
deserves to be quashed.

3. The writ petition is allowed.
The impugned order dated 11-7-1984 is set
aside but there will be no order as to costs.
It would be open to the landlords to take
such proceeding which is permissible under
the law."

9. There is no law discussed or
declared by the Court, therefore, same is
not a judgment in the eyes of law and
merely an observation of the Court.

10. The issue as to whether the
proceedings
can
be
simultaneously
proceeded with, i.e., under Section 21 as
well as under Section 16 of the Act of
1972, is considered at length in number of
judgments. Reference can be made to the
case of Smt. Ganga Devi vs. District
Judge,
Ghaziabad,
1980
ARC
335,
wherein the Court has made the following
observations:

"Having heard learned counsel
for the parties, I am of opinion that the
contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioner is well founded and has to be
204 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
accepted. The learned District Judge is of
the view that once the jurisdiction of the
Rent Control and Eviction Officer is
invoked under Section 16 of the aforesaid
Act, and the matter becomes pending
before him, the Prescribed Authority would
have no jurisdiction thereafter to proceed
under Section 21 of the Act. I do not agree
with this broad and sweeping statement of
the law. There is no warrant for such a
conclusion either on the plain language of
Sections 21 and 16 of the aforesaid Act or
even in the scheme underlying the Act.
Section 21 of the Act, in my judgment is
available so long as the tenant is holding
on the to the building in question and is in
lawful occupation thereof. The provisions
of Section 21 of the Act are applicable
against who may be described as a sitting
tenant. The mere fact that the matter
relating to declaration of vacancy and
allotment of the building in question
happens to be pending for adjudication
before the Rent control and Eviction
Officer does not automatically deprive the
Prescribed Authority of the jurisdiction to
deal with an application under Section 21
of the Act. The position would, however, be
different if after final adjudication of
vacancy, the building is allotted to some
one. Section 21 will have no application in
that contingency, for in that eventuality the
continued occupation of the tenant wold be
unlawfull and the tenant would be deemed
to have ceased to occupy the building by
virtue of Section 13 of the aforesaid Act
which provides that after a building is
allotted or released under Section 16, no
person shall occupy the same, and if he
does so in contravention of the order of
allotment or release, he would be deemed
to be an unauthorised occupant of such
building. In such a case, it is obvious that
there would be no question or necessity of
a landlord seeking an order of eviction
against a tenant under Section 21 of the
aforesaid Act. Nor can the tenant be
characterised, in that eventuality, as a
sitting tenant."

11. In T.C. Rekhi vs. Prescribed
Authority, Nainital, 1983 (2) ARC 223, the
landlord filed a release application under
Section 21(1)(a) during pendency of a writ
petition whereunder he had challenged the
order of the Rent Control and Eviction
Officer, setting aside the release order
passed in his favour under Section 16(1)(b)
and remitting the matter for a fresh
consideration. The tenant challenged the
maintainability of release application filed
by the landlord under Section 21 exactly on
the same ground. The

".................The
argument
of
learned
counsel
for
petitioner
that
permitting the landlord to take proceedings
u/s. 21(1)(a) and Section 16(b) amounts to
abuse of process of law cannot be
accepted. There is no specific bar in the Act
prohibiting a landlord from filing an
application u/s. 21(1)(a) if he has already
filed an application u/s. 16(1)(b). True in a
case where order declaring vacancy has
become final probably it might not be
possible to file an application u/s. 21(1)(a)
as the person against whom it is filed
ceased to be tenant by operation of law.
But it would not be the same in a case
where the application has been filed when
the matter is still pending adjudication. As
has been seen above Section 16(1)(b)
application has not been decided on merits
as yet. To say in the circumstances that
application u/s. 21 was not maintainable is
not correct."

12. In Munni Lal vs. Prescribed
Authority, Agra, 1992 ACJ 789, this Court
explained the difference in causes of action
10 All. Mahtab Husain Vs. Iiird Addl Dist. Judge Kheri & Ors.
205
for initiating proceedings under Section
16(1)(b), Section 21(1) and Section 20 in
the following words:

"6. A close scrutiny of the
provisions of the Act would show that the
causes of action for initiating proceedings
under Section 16(1)(b) or under Section
21(1) or for instituting a suit for eviction of a
tenant are entirely different. In proceedings
under Section 21(1) the tenant asserts that he
is in occupation of the building and the
landlord also admits the said fact. In
proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) though
the tenant says that he is continuing in
occupation of the building and is in lawful
occupation thereof the landlord asserts that
on account of one of the acts enumerated in
sub-section (1), (2) or (3) or Section 12 of the
Act, done by the tenant he shall be deemed to
have vacated the building within the meaning
of sub-section (4) thereof. Thus in such a
proceeding the landlord seeks to rely upon
the legal fiction created by sub-section (4) of
Section 12 of the Act. Therefore, there can be
no confliction the facts which have to be
alleged and proved by a landlord for getting
an order in his favour while initiating
proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) for under
Section 21(1) of the Act."

13. Similar view has been taken by this
Court in Buddu Lal alias Budh Ram vs.
District Judge, Allahabad, 1998 (1) ARC
597, by holding that there is no provision in
the Act, which bars moving of an application
under Section 21(1)(a) even where a deemed
vacancy under Section 12 of the Act may
have occurred. The considerations which
weighed with the Court while coming to such
a conclusion are contained in paragraph 6,
which reads:

"6. The main argument of the
learned Counsel for the petitioner is that
once the landlord himself came with the case
that the petitioner-tenant was not residing in
the tenanted accommodation and was
actually residing at 60, Akhara Man Khan
accommodation, there occurred a deemed
vacancy as per his own admission and,
therefore, the only course open for him was
to move an application under Section 16 of
the Act and application under section
21(1)(a) of the Act was not legally
maintainable. This argument of the learned
counsel for the petitioner must be rejected out
rightly as not tenable. It may be relevant to
mention here that in his application under
Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, the landlord
made an averment that the tenant-petitioner
was
not
in
need
of
the
disputed
accommodation as he has started residing at
60, Akhara Man Khan, Allahabad. From this
averment it cannot be inferred either on fact
or in law that the petitioner no longer
remained the tenant of the landlord. So long
as tenancy subsists it is always open for the
landlord to more an application under
Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. It was also open
for the landlord to have approached the Rent
Control & Eviction Officer under Section 16
of the Act for the release on the ground that
the accommodation should be deemed to be
vacant by legal fiction under the provisions of
Section 12 of the Act. It is true that a different
consideration weigh with the authorities
while considering an application under
Section 21(1)(a) and an application under
Section 16 of the Act. In an application
moved under Section 21(1)(a) besides
providing bona fide need, the landlord has
also to show that he will suffer a greater
hardship than that of the tenant. Such a
comparison of hardship is not at all required
to be gone into in an application under
Section 16 of the Act."

14. Taking into consideration all the
aforesaid judgments in the case of Lakshmi
206 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Traders, Akbarpur Mandi and others vs.
Navin Rastogi and another, (2019) 132
ALR 652, this Court again reaffirmed the
long settled law that both the proceedings
can be simultaneously held.

15.

Further,
admittedly,
the
proceedings which were initiated under
Section 16 of the Act of 1972 were
dismissed and even the revision against the
same was also dismissed. Learned counsel
for the petitioner has argued that the same
are pending before the High Court, being
Writ Petition No.82 (RC) of 1992.

16. Learned counsel for respondent
no.3
has
placed
before
this
Court
documents to show that the said writ
petition itself stands decided on 8.12.2004.
He has informed the Court that the said
writ petition stands dismissed. Therefore, it
is wrong to suggest that there are any
proceedings under Section 16 of the Act of
1972 pending before this Court at this
stage. Thus, even otherwise, there is no
force in the submission of learned counsel
for the petitioner and the proceedings under
Section 21 of the Act of 1972 are not
maintainable as proceedings under Section
16 are pending.

17. The next submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner is that on
28.2.2005, a notice was given by the
landlord
and
thereafter,
the
release
application was filed on 16.10.2008,
therefore, for around three years after
giving notice, he did not proceed with the
filing of the release application and thus,
his need is neither bona fide nor genuine.

18. It is incorrect to make any such
presumption merely because after giving
notice, for certain period, the landlord did
not file the release application. So far as the
notice is concerned, the same is not filed by
the petitioner before this Court. There is
only a vague averment made in Para-8 of
the writ petition. No such ground was
raised before the courts below. Even
presuming that after giving the notice,
landlord took some time in filing the
release application, the same would not put
any bar on his right to file release
application. There could be so many
reasons; he may be trying to settle his sons
otherwise, may be presuming the tenant
would vacate the property, may be looking
for some alternative livelihood or any such
other reasons. Since there is no bar under
law upon the landlord in filing the release
application, for which he is not even
required to serve a notice under Section 21
of the Act of 1972 upon the tenant, merely
because he has given notice and thereafter
taken time in filing the release application
would not bar the same. There is no force
in the said submission of learned counsel
for the petitioner.

19. The next submission of learned
counsel for the petitioner is that both the
courts below were required to look into the
aspect that the shop in question could be
bifurcated and divided in a manner that
need of both the parties may be fulfilled.

20. The said right is being claimed by
the petitioner on the basis of Rule 16(1)(d)
read with Rule 16(2) of U.P. Urban
Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and
Eviction) Rules, 1972.

21. A bare perusal of Rule 16(1)
shows that it provides for part release in
respect
of
residential
premises.
For
residential premises, the said Rule makes it
mandatory for the Prescribed Authority to
decide the issue of part release. But no such
provision is made under Rule 16(2), which
10 All. Mahtab Husain Vs. Iiird Addl Dist. Judge Kheri & Ors.
207
is in respect of commercial building. The
said Rules are again considered in number
of judgments of this Court. One such case
is reported in 2015 (3) ARC 24: Vijay Sethi
vs. Anil Kumar Gupta and others, wherein
this Court has taken into consideration the
said Rules as well as law settled by this
Court and held:

"4. It is clear from the rule that
there is a distinction made by the
Legislature in framing the two sets of the
Rules,
Rule
16(1)
is
applicable
to
residential premises, whereas, Rule 16(2) is
applicable to non-residential premises. The
application in the present case is for
release
of
the
non-residential
accommodation, therefore, Rule 16(2)
would apply. A perusal of Rule 16(2) will
demonstrate that there is nothing like Sub
rule (1)(d) of Rule 16. In this view of the
matter, the argument is not available to the
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner,
therefore, this Court declines to entertain
the argument for the reason that the
argument was not raised either before the
Prescribed
Authority,
or
before
the
appellate authority, therefore, it cannot be
raised for the first time before the writ
court."

22. Thus, the aforesaid ground raised
by learned counsel for the petitioner has no
force and is rejected.

23. It is further submitted by learned
counsel for the petitioner that before the
appellate court, a submission was made by
the petitioner-tenant that he is looking for
an alternative accommodation, but he is not
getting the same. The said statement is
wrongly treated by the appellate court to be
an admission of the petitioner with regard
to bona fide need of the landlord. Thus, the
appellate court has committed an illegality
in making such a presumption.

24. I have perused the order passed by
the trial court as well as order passed by the
appellate court. There are detailed findings
of fact with regard to bona fide need of
respondent no.3 with regard to his sons as
well as on hardship. The said observation is
only one of the observations made by the
appellate court, other than that, there are
detailed discussions made by both the
courts below. Therefore, there is no force in
this submission also of the learned counsel
for the petitioner.

25. Learned counsel for the petitioner
further submits that the court below has
wrongly rejected the applications moved by
the petitioner with regard to interrogatory
and cross-examination by different orders,
which ought to have been allowed.

26. No doubt, any interim order by
which, applications are decided, which may
impact the rights of a party to a case, can be
challenged by him while challenging the
final order. But while filing a writ petition,
record of the courts below is not summoned
in normal course, like in an appeal,
therefore, it is incumbent upon the parties
challenging the said interim orders, to file
the same before the Court. None of the said
orders, by which applications of the
petitioner were rejected by the court below,
are filed along with the writ petition. There
is also no ground raised for challenging the
said orders or such relief sought. Therefore,
during course of argument before this
Court, the petitioner cannot be now
permitted to say that he is challenging the
said orders. Therefore, I do not find any
force in the submission of learned counsel
for the petitioner.
208 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

27. Lastly, a feeble attempt is made
by learned counsel for the petitioner that
since no counter affidavit is filed by
respondent no.3, therefore, his writ petition
should be allowed.

28. No doubt, there are judgments,
which
provide
that
uncontroverted
pleadings in a plaint can be taken to be
correct. However, in the present case, the
petitioner is required to challenge findings
of both the courts below. Merely his
statement that the findings are bad, would
not make them bad. He is required to prove
from the record that any material illegality
or irregularity is committed by the courts
below or the finding in impugned orders
are perverse. The petitioner has failed to do
the same.

29. In view thereof, even the aforesaid
submission of learned counsel for the
petitioner is bound to be rejected and is
rejected.

30. In view of the aforesaid
discussions, I find no force in the present
writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.

[Vivek Chaudhary,J.]

Dated: October 04, 2021

Sachin

After the aforesaid order was passed,
learned Senior Advocate Sri Mohd. Arif
Khan assisted by Sri Mohd. Aslam Khan,
learned counsel for petitioner, appeared and
prays that the petitioner may be granted
some time to vacate the premises.

Learned counsel for respondent no.3
has no objection in case a reasonable time
is granted to the petitioner provided, he
files an undertaking before the court below
by way of an affidavit that he shall vacate
the premises within the time granted by this
Court.

In view thereof, nine months time is
granted to the petitioner to vacate the
premises provided, he files an affidavit
before the Prescribed Authority to the
effect that he shall vacate the premises
without causing any hindrance before
expiry of nine months from this date and he
shall also pay rent to respondent no.3
regularly every month. In case of violation
of said condition, the same shall be
amongst other things, treated to be a
violation of undertaking given by him to
this Court.
----------
(2021)10ILR A208
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 30.09.2021

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJAN ROY, J.
THE HON'BLE RAVI NATH TILHARI, J.

First Appeal No. 70 of 2020

Vishal Prajapati ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Monika Prajapati ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellant:
Manoj Kumar Dubey

Counsel for the Respondent:
Rakesh Kumar Agarwal, Saksham Agarwal

A. Civil Law -Family Courts Act,1984Section
19-challenge
to-issue
of
overlapping jurisdiction- application u/s
24 of H.M. Act, 1955 allowed-interim
maintenance
u/s
125
deserves
no
adjustment or set off as the wife has no
source of income and two minor daughterthus, she deserves total amount granted