# Managing Director, U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd., Lucknow & Ors v. Prabhat Kumar Jha

- **Citation:** (2023) 5 ILRA 372
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-04-19
- **Case number:** THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR. J. Special Appeal No. 225 of 2023
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/managing-director-u-p-state-bridge-corporation-ltd-lucknow-ors-v-prabhat-kumar-50209
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings
- Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies
Employees Service Regulations, 1975 - In
service
jurisprudence
disciplinary
proceedings commence on the date when
the charge-sheet is issued and not earlier.
All other transactions in contemplation of
disciplinary proceedings, such as the
preliminary inquiry, a show cause and the
like,
do
not
constitute
initiation
of
disciplinary proceedings. (Para 14)

Assuming that the charge-sheet was approved
by the Managing Director in the month of
February, 2012, whilst the writ petitioner retired
from service on 31.12.2013, the Inquiry Officer
issued the charge-sheet on 02.12.2014, a fact
about which the parties are ad idem. We notice
the
oddity
that
the
Managing
Director's
endorsement on the charge-sheet approving it,
does not mention the date below his signatures,
but merely mentions the month and the year.
This kind of an endorsement in someway
derogates from the sanctity of something as
solemn as the approval of a charge-sheet.
It is almost impossible to accept the contention
of
the
learned
Counsel
for
the
Bridge
Corporation that the charge-sheet having been
approved in the month of February, 2012, while
the
writ
petitioner
was
still
in
service,
disciplinary proceedings ought to be regarded as
initiated against him in the year 2012. (Para 13,
14)

B. All laws affecting substantive rights are
prospective in operation unless expressly
made retrospective.

The writ petitioner retired from service on
31.12.2013 and the charge-sheet was issued on
02.12.2014.
Disciplinary
proceedings
were
initiated
against
the
writ
petitioner
on
02.12.2014 and not in the month of February,
2012, while the writ petitioner was still in
service. There is nothing in the amended rules
notified on 27.10.2018 and framed in the
meeting of the Board of Directors of the Bridge
Corporation to show that these rules would have
retrospective operation. There is no hint about it
in the amended Rule 50 or 51 added to the
Model Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules for
the Service of U.P. State Enterprises. The
amended Rules confer a substantive
right on the Bridge Corporation to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against
a retired employee about matters that
fall within four years when disciplinary
proceedings are initiated. It likewise
affects the substantive right of an
employee to be insulated from initiation
of departmental proceedings once he
has retired and no longer in the employ
of the Bridge Corporation. Therefore,
there is no basis to hold that the amended
Rules that have come into effect from
27.10.2018,
would
have
retrospective
operation and govern the rights of the Bridge
Corporation, vis-à-vis the writ petitioner. (Para
15, 17)

Disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
writ petitioner by the Bridge Corporation on the
basis of the impugned charge-sheet are without
jurisdiction. (Para 18)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:
5 All. Managing Director, U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Prabhat Kumar
 Jha
373

## Text

372 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 372
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 19.04.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PRITINKER DIWAKER, C.J.
THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR. J.

Special Appeal No. 225 of 2023

Managing Director, U.P. State Bridge
Corporation Ltd., Lucknow & Ors.
 ...Appellants
Versus
Prabhat Kumar Jha ...Respondent

Counsel for the Appellants:
Sri Pranjal Mehrotra

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Binod Kumar Tripathi, Sri Ashish Kumar
Singh, Sri Binod Kumar Tripathi

A. Service Law - Disciplinary proceedings
- Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies
Employees Service Regulations, 1975 - In
service
jurisprudence
disciplinary
proceedings commence on the date when
the charge-sheet is issued and not earlier.
All other transactions in contemplation of
disciplinary proceedings, such as the
preliminary inquiry, a show cause and the
like,
do
not
constitute
initiation
of
disciplinary proceedings. (Para 14)

Assuming that the charge-sheet was approved
by the Managing Director in the month of
February, 2012, whilst the writ petitioner retired
from service on 31.12.2013, the Inquiry Officer
issued the charge-sheet on 02.12.2014, a fact
about which the parties are ad idem. We notice
the
oddity
that
the
Managing
Director's
endorsement on the charge-sheet approving it,
does not mention the date below his signatures,
but merely mentions the month and the year.
This kind of an endorsement in someway
derogates from the sanctity of something as
solemn as the approval of a charge-sheet.
It is almost impossible to accept the contention
of
the
learned
Counsel
for
the
Bridge
Corporation that the charge-sheet having been
approved in the month of February, 2012, while
the
writ
petitioner
was
still
in
service,
disciplinary proceedings ought to be regarded as
initiated against him in the year 2012. (Para 13,
14)

B. All laws affecting substantive rights are
prospective in operation unless expressly
made retrospective.

The writ petitioner retired from service on
31.12.2013 and the charge-sheet was issued on
02.12.2014.
Disciplinary
proceedings
were
initiated
against
the
writ
petitioner
on
02.12.2014 and not in the month of February,
2012, while the writ petitioner was still in
service. There is nothing in the amended rules
notified on 27.10.2018 and framed in the
meeting of the Board of Directors of the Bridge
Corporation to show that these rules would have
retrospective operation. There is no hint about it
in the amended Rule 50 or 51 added to the
Model Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules for
the Service of U.P. State Enterprises. The
amended Rules confer a substantive
right on the Bridge Corporation to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against
a retired employee about matters that
fall within four years when disciplinary
proceedings are initiated. It likewise
affects the substantive right of an
employee to be insulated from initiation
of departmental proceedings once he
has retired and no longer in the employ
of the Bridge Corporation. Therefore,
there is no basis to hold that the amended
Rules that have come into effect from
27.10.2018,
would
have
retrospective
operation and govern the rights of the Bridge
Corporation, vis-à-vis the writ petitioner. (Para
15, 17)

Disciplinary proceedings initiated against the
writ petitioner by the Bridge Corporation on the
basis of the impugned charge-sheet are without
jurisdiction. (Para 18)

Special appeal dismissed. (E-4)

Precedent followed:
5 All. Managing Director, U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Prabhat Kumar
 Jha
373
1. Bhagirathi Jena Vs Board of Directors,
O.S.F.C., & ors., (1999) 3 SCC 666 (Para 10)

2. Dev Prakash Tewari Vs Uttar Pradesh
Cooperative
Institutional
Service
Board,
Lucknow & ors., (2014) 7 SCC 260 (Para 11)

3. UCO Bank & anr. Vs Rajinder Lal Capoor,
(2007) 6 SCC 694 (Para 14)

Present
special
appeal
challenges
judgment and order dated 31.03.2022,
passed in Civil Misc. WP No. 1920 of 2015.

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This is a respondent's appeal,
arising out of a judgment and order of the
learned Single Judge dated 31.03.2022,
allowing Writ-A No.1920 of 2015.

2. The writ petitioner-respondent,
Prabhat Kumar Jha, who shall hereinafter
be referred to as 'the writ petitioner', is an
ex-employee of the Uttar Pradesh State
Bridge Corporation Limited (for short, 'the
Bridge Corporation'). He was in their
employ since the year 1977. He retired
from service upon attaining the age of
superannuation
on
31.12.2013.
The
Manager
Personnel-I
of
the
Bridge
Corporation forwarded the writ petitioner's
claim for payment of gratuity to the
General Manager, Headquarters. The writ
petitioner's claim for leave encashment was
similarly recommended. There was inaction
in the payment of the writ petitioner's
gratuity, leave encashment, family pension
and group insurance, aggregating a sum of
Rs.25 lacs. The writ petitioner pursued his
claim with the various officials of the
Bridge Corporation, but to no avail.

3. The writ petitioner preferred a writ
petition before this Court being Writ-A
No.35132 of 2014, which was heard and
disposed of vide order dated 10.07.2014,
relegating the writ petitioner to represent
his case before the competent authority of
the Bridge Corporation, who was directed
to pass a speaking order within the shortest
possible period of time, preferably within
two months of the date of receipt of his
representation. The writ petitioner faced
continued inaction and filed a contempt
application
before
this
Court
being
Contempt Application (Civil) No.5762 of
2014, which was disposed of vide order
dated 15.10.2014, directing the officers of
the Bridge Corporation that in case a
decision
on
the
writ
petitioner's
representation is not taken within two
months of the receipt of Contempt Court's
order, without reasonable cause, the Court
would have no option but to proceed
against the officers in contempt.

4. At this juncture, the Bridge
Corporation issued a charge-sheet dated
02.12.2014 framing two charges against the
writ petitioner. The charge-sheet was issued
approximately a year after the writ
petitioner's retirement. Accordingly, the
writ petitioner instituted the writ petition,
giving rise to this appeal, where he prayed
that the charge-sheet be quashed as one
without jurisdiction. He further sought a
mandamus against the Bridge Corporation
and its various authorities ordering them to
pay his entire post retiral dues. The writ
petition, after exchange of affidavits, was
heard by the learned Single Judge, who has
allowed it by the judgment and order
impugned. The learned Judge has quashed
the charge-sheet and further ordered the
Bridge
Corporation
and
its
various
authorities to release the entire post retiral
dues payable to the writ petitioner, along
with 8% interest from the date of his
retirement, until realization.
374 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

5. Aggrieved, the Bridge Corporation
and five of its officers have preferred this
appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the
Rules of Court.

6. Heard Mr. Pranjal Mehrotra, learned
Counsel for the Bridge Corporation and Mr.
Ashish Kumar Singh, learned Counsel
appearing for the writ petitioner.

7. The question involved in this appeal
is whether departmental proceedings could
be initiated against the writ petitioner after
he had retired from service and if those
proceedings are ultra vires. The general
principle is that once an employee retires or
the relationship of employer and employee
otherwise comes to a terminus, the
employer loses all disciplinary jurisdiction
over the employee. The corollary is that
generally speaking once an employee
retires
from
service,
disciplinary
proceedings cannot be initiated against
him; also, pending disciplinary proceedings
cannot
be
continued
after
his
superannuation. This general principle is,
however, subject to the reputed exception
that where by statutory service conditions
or statutory service rules, a provision is
made
for
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings
post
retirement
or
the
continuance of disciplinary proceedings
pending on the date retirement, disciplinary
proceedings can be validly initiated or
continued, as the case may be.

8.
The
two
situations,
above
mentioned, are different in law and are
definitive exceptions to the rule that post
retirement, there can be no initiation of
disciplinary proceedings or continuance of
pending disciplinary proceedings. These
two situations are different, in the sense
that
continuance
of
disciplinary
proceedings pending on the date of
retirement is one thing, and the initiation of
disciplinary proceedings post retirement
another. A statutory rule has to be
specifically there to permit the employer in
one
case
to
continue
disciplinary
proceedings pending on the date of
retirement, post retirement, and, in the
other, initiate disciplinary proceedings, that
were never there during service, after the
employee's retirement. Sanction of the right
to
continue
disciplinary
proceedings,
pending on the date of retirement under the
statutory service rules, would not invest the
employer with jurisdiction to initiate or
institute disciplinary proceedings against a
retired employee. The right to initiate
disciplinary proceedings post retirement,
like
the
right
to
continue
pending
disciplinary proceedings, would have to
flow from a definitive statutory provision
and the statutory service rules empowering
the employer in this regard.

9. It is also to be remembered that the
right to initiate disciplinary proceedings in
cases where the statutory service rules
confer that kind of a jurisdiction upon the
employer
may
be
hedged
in
with
restrictions in the statute itself. As for
example, in the case of government
servants in the State of Uttar Pradesh,
proceedings against a retired government
servant
cannot
be
initiated
by
the
Government or the competent Disciplinary
Authority, except with the sanction of the
Governor, as envisaged by the proviso to
Regulation 351-A of the Civil Services
Regulations.
There
could
be
further
restrictions, such as the period of time
when the event about which disciplinary
proceedings against a retired government
servant are initiated took place. In the case
of Civil Service Regulations for a retired
government servant in the State of Uttar
Pradesh, the event inviting action should
5 All. Managing Director, U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Prabhat Kumar
 Jha
375
not have taken place more than four years
before
the
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings.
Again,
there
can
be
restrictions about the kind of punishment
that may be imposed, once disciplinary
proceedings are initiated against a retired
government servant. Statutory Service
Rules can provide for punishment of
dismissal or removal from service, even if
the government servant has retired, but all
these rights come to the employer sourced
from statutory service rules. Else, the
employer has no jurisdiction or right to
proceed against a retired employee in their
disciplinary jurisdiction.

10. This issue was considered by the
Supreme Court in Bhagirathi Jena v.
Board of Directors, O.S.F.C., and others,
(1999) 3 SCC 666 in the context of the
right to proceed against an employee of
Orissa State Financial Corporation, whose
conditions of service were government by
the Orissa Financial State Corporation Staff
Regulations, 1975. The regulations in that
case did not provide for continuance of
pending disciplinary proceedings against an
employee who had superannuated. In
Bhagirathi Jena (supra), proceedings
against the employee were initiated by the
issue of a charge-sheet while he was in
service, but could not be concluded until
his retirement. The question was whether
proceedings could be continued after
retirement. It was in that context that it was
held by their Lordships in Bhagirathi Jena
thus:

"7. In view of the absence of such
a provision in the abovesaid regulations, it
must be held that the Corporation had no
legal authority to make any reduction in the
retiral benefits of the appellant. There is
also no provision for conducting a
disciplinary enquiry after retirement of the
appellant and nor any provision stating that
in case misconduct is established, a
deduction could be made from retiral
benefits. Once the appellant had retired
from service on 30-6-1995, there was no
authority vested in the Corporation for
continuing the departmental enquiry even
for the purpose of imposing any reduction
in the retiral benefits payable to the
appellant. In the absence of such an
authority, it must be held that the enquiry
had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to
full retiral benefits on retirement.

8. Learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent placed reliance on the judgment
of this Court in Takhatray Shivadattray
Mankad v. State of Gujarat [1989 Supp (2)
SCC 110 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 927 : (1990)
12 ATC 692] . It is true that that was a case
of imposing a reduction in the pension and
gratuity on account of unsatisfactory
service of the employee as determined in an
enquiry which was extended beyond the
date of superannuation. But the above
decision
cannot
help
the
respondent
inasmuch as in that case there was a
specific rule namely Rule 241-A of the
Junagadh State Pension and Parwashi
Allowance Rules, 1932 which enabled the
imposition of a reduction in the pension or
gratuity of a person after retirement.
Further, there were rules in that case which
enabled
the
continuance
of
the
departmental
enquiry
even
after
superannuation for the purpose of finding
out
whether
any
misconduct
was
established which could be taken into
account for the purpose of Rule 241-A. In
the absence of a similar provision with the
regulations of the respondent-Corporation,
the above judgment of Mankad case [1989
Supp (2) SCC 110 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 927 :
(1990) 12 ATC 692] cannot help the
respondent.

(emphasis by Court)
376 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. The question again fell for
consideration of the Supreme Court in Dev
Prakash
Tewari
v.
Uttar
Pradesh
Cooperative Institutional Service Board,
Lucknow and others, (2014) 7 SCC 260,
where
the
employee
concerned
was
governed by the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative
Societies Employees' Service Regulations,
1975.
Disciplinary
proceedings
were
initiated while the employee was still in
service, but on account of a plea of denial
of opportunity, the order of dismissal from
service was quashed by this Court on the
ground of violation of principles of natural
justice. Liberty was given to the employer
to proceed afresh. While disciplinary
proceedings were resumed and pending, the
employee
retired.
The
question
was
whether proceedings against him could
continue in the absence of a provision in
the statutory service rules enabling the
employer in this behalf. It was in that
context that their Lordships held in Dev
Prakash Tewari (supra):

"5. We have carefully considered
the rival submissions. The facts are not in
dispute. The High Court while quashing the
earlier disciplinary proceedings on the
ground of violation of principles of natural
justice in its order dated 10-1-2006 [D.P.
Tewari v. U.P. Coop. Institutional Service
Board, Writ Petition (S/B) No. 4328 of
1988, order dated 10-1-2006 (All)] granted
liberty to initiate the fresh inquiry in
accordance with the Regulations. The
appellant who was reinstated in service on
26-4-2006
and
fresh
disciplinary
proceeding was initiated on 7-7-2006 and
while that was pending, the appellant
attained the age of superannuation and
retired on 31-3-2009. There is no provision
in the Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Societies
Employees' Service Regulations, 1975, for
initiation or continuation of disciplinary
proceeding after retirement of the appellant
nor is there any provision stating that in
case misconduct is established a deduction
could be made from his retiral benefits.

7. In a subsequent decision of this
Court in U.P. Coop. Federation case [U.P.
Coop. Federation Ltd. v. L.P. Rai, (2007) 7
SCC 81 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 598] on
facts, the disciplinary proceeding against
employee was quashed by the High Court
since no opportunity of hearing was given
to him in the inquiry and the management
in its appeal before this Court sought for
grant of liberty to hold a fresh inquiry and
this Court held that charges levelled against
the employee were not minor in nature, and
therefore, it would not be proper to
foreclose the right of the employer to hold
a fresh inquiry only on the ground that the
employee has since retired from the service
and accordingly granted the liberty sought
for by the management. While dealing with
the above case, the earlier decision in
Bhagirathi Jena case [Bhagirathi Jena v.
Orissa State Financial Corpn., (1999) 3
SCC 666 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 804] was not
brought to the notice of this Court and no
contention was raised pertaining to the
provisions under which the disciplinary
proceeding was initiated and as such no
ratio came to be laid down. In our view the
said decision cannot help the respondents
herein.

8. Once the appellant had retired
from service on 31-3-2009, there was no
authority vested with the respondents for
continuing the disciplinary proceeding even
for the purpose of imposing any reduction
in the retiral benefits payable to the
appellant. In the absence of such an
authority it must be held that the enquiry
had lapsed and the appellant was entitled to
get full retiral benefits."

(emphasis by Court)
5 All. Managing Director, U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd., Lucknow & Ors. Vs. Prabhat Kumar
 Jha
377

12. Here, it is not in dispute that the
rules, as these stood at the time when the
writ petitioner retired, had no provision for
the
continuation
of
disciplinary
proceedings againstan employee of the
Bridge
Corporation,
or
initiation
of
proceedings against a retired employee.
The power to do so was introduced through
an amendment by the Bridge Corporation
w.e.f. 27.10.2018 to the Model Conduct
Discipline and Appeal Rules for Service of
U.P. State Enterprises, that govern the
service conditions of the writ petitioner.

13. The Bridge Corporation has raised
an issue that the amended Rules have
retrospective operation and would apply to
govern the writ petitioner's case. This
contention will be dealt with shortly. For
the present, we assume that on the date
disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against the writ petitioner, that is to say,
02.12.2014, he was a retired employee and
out of the employer's jurisdiction for eleven
months past. Learned Counsel for the
Bridge Corporation has taken us through
the charge-sheet dated 02.12.2014 and
pointed out that it was approved by the
Managing Director in the month of
February, 2012 whilst the writ petitioner
retired from service on 31.12.2013. He
submits that the charge-sheet having been
approved by the Managing Director in the
month of February, 2012, while the writ
petitioner was in service, the proceedings
must be held to have been initiated against
the writ petitioner while in service. We
notice the oddity that the Managing
Director's endorsement on the charge-sheet
approving it, does not mention the date
below his signatures, but merely mentions
the month and the year. This kind of an
endorsement in someway derogates from
the sanctity of something as solemn as the
approval of a charge-sheet.

14. Assuming that the charge-sheet
was approved by the Managing Director in
the month of February, 2012, the Inquiry
Officer
issued
the
charge-sheet
on
02.12.2014, a fact about which the parties
are ad idem. It is almost impossible to
accept the contention of the learned
Counsel for the Bridge Corporation that the
charge-sheet having been approved in the
month of February, 2012, while the writ
petitioner was still in service, disciplinary
proceedings ought to be regarded as
initiated against him in the year 2012. It is
an acknowledged principle in service
jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings
commence on the date when the chargesheet is issued and not earlier. All other
transactions
in
contemplation
of
disciplinary proceedings, such as the
preliminary inquiry, a show cause and the
like,
do not
constitute
initiation
of
disciplinary
proceedings.
In
this
connection, reference may be made to the
guidance of the Supreme Court in UCO
Bank and another v. Rajinder Lal
Capoor, (2007) 6 SCC 694, where the
position of the law has been stated thus:

"21.
The
aforementioned
Regulation, however, could be invoked
only when the disciplinary proceedings had
clearly
been
initiated
prior
to
the
respondent's ceasing to be in service. The
terminologies used therein are of seminal
importance. Only when a disciplinary
proceeding has been initiated against an
officer of the bank despite his attaining the
age of superannuation, can the disciplinary
proceeding be allowed on the basis of the
legal
fiction
created
thereunder
i.e.
continue "as if he was in service". Thus,
only when a valid departmental proceeding
is initiated by reason of the legal fiction
raised in terms of the said provision, the
delinquent officer would be deemed to be
378 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in service although he has reached his age
of
superannuation.
The
departmental
proceeding, it is trite law, is not initiated
merely by issuance of a show-cause notice.
It is initiated only when a charge-sheet is
issued (see Union of India v. K.V.
Jankiraman [(1991) 4 SCC 109 : 1991 SCC
(L&S) 387 : (1993) 23 ATC 322 : AIR 1991
SC 2010] ). This aspect of the matter has
also been considered by this Court recently
in Coal India Ltd. v. Saroj Kumar Mishra
[(2007) 9 SCC 625 : (2007) 5 Scale 724]
wherein it was held that date of application
of mind on the allegations levelled against
an officer by the competent authority as a
result whereof a charge-sheet is issued
would be the date on which the disciplinary
proceedings are said to have been initiated
and not prior thereto. Pendency of a
preliminary enquiry, therefore, by itself
cannot be a ground for invoking Clause 20
of the Regulations. Albeit in a different fact
situation but involving a similar question of
law in Coal India Ltd.[(2007) 9 SCC 625 :
(2007) 5 Scale 724] this Court held : (SCC
p. 631, paras 12-13)

"12[13]. It is not the case of the
appellants that pursuant to or in furtherance
of the complaint received by the Vigilance
Department, the competent authority had
arrived at a satisfaction as is required in
terms of the said circulars that a chargesheet was likely to be issued on the basis of
a preliminary enquiry held in that behalf or
otherwise.

13[14]. The circular letters issued
by the appellants put restrictions on a
valuable right of an employee. They,
therefore, are required to be construed
strictly. So construed, there cannot be any
doubt whatsoever that the conditions
precedent contained therein must be
satisfied before any action can be taken in
that regard."

It was furthermore observed that :
(SCC p. 632, para 18)

"18[20].
A
departmental
proceeding is ordinarily said to be initiated
only when a charge-sheet is issued."

(See also Union of India v.
Sangram Keshari Nayak [(2007) 6 SCC
704 : (2007) 6 Scale 348] .)"

15. It has, therefore, to be held in this
case that disciplinary proceedings were
initiated against the writ petitioner on
02.12.2014 and not in the month of
February, 2012, while the writ petitioner
was still in service. The position of the law,
that we have noticed above, leaves us in no
manner of doubt about the fact that the date
on which the charge-sheet was issued to the
writ petitioner, he had superannuated and
the disciplinary proceedings were initiated
against him while he was a superannuated
employee of the Bridge Corporation,
distanced by eleven months of rupture of
the
employer-employee
relationship.
Nothing has been shown to us on the
existing state of rules, either when the writ
petitioner retired or the time when the
impugned charge-sheet was issued, that
may
have
empowered
the
Bridge
Corporation
to
initiate
disciplinary
proceedings against a retired employee of
theirs. In our considered opinion, therefore,
on
this
state
of
rules,
the
Bridge
Corporation would have no jurisdiction to
initiate disciplinary proceedings against the
writ petitioner by means of the impugned
charge-sheet.

16. Now, the only question that
remains to be addressed, which Mr.
Mehrotra
has
pressed
with
much
vehemence is whether the amended Rules
introduced
w.e.f.
27.10.2018,
have
retrospective operation allowing them to
govern the Bridge Corporation's rights to
5 All. Annapurna Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
379
take disciplinary action against the writ
petitioner. The rules that have been brought
in by amendment through a resolution of
the Board of Directors passed in their 177th
Meeting and notified by the Managing
Director of the Bridge Corporation through
his memo dated 27.10.2018, read:

"जनदेशक मण्डल की जदनांक 03/10-2018 को
सम्पन्न हुई 177वीं बैठक में शासकीय सेवकों के संबंध में
शासनादेश संख्या-01/2015/13/9/98/सा-1-2015 जद0
22-04-2015 के पैिा 19 एवं 20 लागू व्यवस्था के अनुसाि
सेतु जनगम में लागू आदशश आििण, अनुशासन एवं अपील
जनयमावली के अजन्तम जनयम 49 के उपिान्त 2 नये जनयमों का
जनम्नानुसाि प्राजवधान जनयम 50 एवं 51 को जोडे जाने की
स्वीकृजत प्रदान की गयी है:-

सेतु जनगम के काजमशकों के द्वािा
सेवाकाल
में
की
गयी
अजनयजमतता/कदािाि के जलए
उनकी सेवाजनवृजि के उपिान्त
अनुशासजनक कायशवाही के सम्बन्ध
में।
50-यजद जवभागीय जॉि की कायशवाही लजम्बत िहते
हुए आिोजपत काजमशक अजधवर्शता आयु प्राप्त कि
सेवाजनवृि हो जाता है को लजम्बत जॉब को इस
जनयमावली के तहत उसके सेवाजनवृि देयकों से जविीय
क्षजत की वसूली के जलए जािी िखा जा सकता है, पिन्तु
सेवाजनवृि काजमशक को दण्ड नहीं जदया जा सकता औि
न ही उक्त दण्ड के उद्देश्य से कायशवाही प्रािम्भ/ जािी
िखी जा सकती है।

51- यजद सेवाजनवृजि के उपिान्त कोई तथ्य सामने
आये तो सेवाजनवृजि के पश्चात् भी इस जनयमावली के
तहत कायशवाही की जा सकती है बशते जक जजस घटना
के संबंध में जॉि प्रािम्भ की जाय, जााँि किने की जतजथ
को उस घटना को 4 वर्श से अजधक समय न बीत िुका
हो।"

17. The writ petitioner retired from
service on 31.12.2013 and the charge-sheet
was issued on 02.12.2014. There is nothing in
the amended rules notified on 27.10.2018 and
framed in the meeting of the Board of
Directors of the Bridge Corporation to show
that these rules would have retrospective
operation. There is no hint about it in the
amended Rule 50 or 51 added to the Model
Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules for the
Service of U.P. State Enterprises. The well
established cannon of statutory interpretation
is that all laws affecting substantive rights are
prospective in operation unless expressly
made retrospective. The amended Rules
confer a substantive right on the Bridge
Corporation
to
initiate
disciplinary
proceedings against a retired employee about
matters that fall within four years when
disciplinary proceedings are initiated. It
likewise affects the substantive right of an
employee to be insulated from initiation of
departmental proceedings once he has retired
and no longer in the employ of the Bridge
Corporation. Therefore, there is no basis to
hold that the amended Rules that have come
into effect from 27.10.2018, would have
retrospective operation and govern the rights
of the Bridge Corporation, vis-a-vis the writ
petitioner.

18. In the circumstances, we are of
opinion that disciplinary proceedings initiated
against the writ petitioner by the Bridge
Corporation on the basis of the impugned
charge-sheet are without jurisdiction.

19. For reasons added and slightly
different from those that have weighed with
the learned Single Judge, we concur in the
conclusions.

20. In the result, this appeal fails and is
dismissed. Costs easy.
----------
(2023) 5 ILRA 379
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 01.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ABDUL MOIN, J.

Writ A No. 23192 of 2016

Annapurna ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents