# Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No. 041742918 v. The Union of India & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 6 ILRA 710
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-05-01
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2071 of 2017
- **Bench:** Mrs. Sunita Agarwal, Anjani Kumar Mishra, Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/manish-kumar-mishra-constable-no-041742918-v-the-union-of-india-ors-45790
- **Pages:** 18

## Headnote

A. Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Writ - Cause of Action - Meaning - 'Cause
of action' implies a right to sue. The
material facts which are imperative for the
suitor to allege and prove constitutes the
cause of action - It has been interpreted to
mean that every fact which would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to
the judgment of the Court - Each and every
fact pleaded in the writ petition cannot by
itself constitute a cause of action - Facts
which have no bearing on the lis or the
dispute involved in the case, do not give rise
to a cause of action so as to confer
territorial
jurisdiction
on
the
Court
concerned - Integral facts pleaded must
have nexus or relevance with the lis so as to
constitute a cause of action. (Para 12 and
20)
B. Constitution of India
- Article
226(2) - Writ - Territorial Jurisdiction -
Seat of Government or Authority - In view
of the expression used in clause (2) of
Article 226, even if a small fraction of cause
of action accrues within the jurisdiction of
the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in
the matter - To establish that the cause of
action wholly or in part has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of any High Court, the
petitioner has to show that a legal right
claimed by him has been infringed or is
threatened
to
be
infringed
by
the
respondent within the territorial limits of the
Court's jurisdiction and such infringement
may take place by causing him actual injury
or threat thereof - If the cause of action
wholly or in part had arisen within the
territory in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, it can entertain the writ petition
to pass orders or directions notwithstanding
that the seat of the Government or authority
or the residence of the person against
whom the direction, order or writ is issued
is not within its territories. (Para 12, 18 and
19)
C.

Practice
and
Procedure
-
Determination
of
Ratio
Decidendi
-
Doctrine of Precedent - The enunciation of
the reason or principle upon which a
question before a Court has been decided
is alone a precedent - The ratio decidendi
is the underlying principle, namely, the
general reasons or the general grounds
upon which the decision is based on the
test
or
abstract
from
the
specific
peculiarities of the particular case which
gives rise to the decision - The ratio
decidendi has to be ascertained by an
analysis of the facts of the case and the
process of reasoning involving the major
premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of
law, either statutory or judge-made and a
minor premise consi

## Text

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6. Since illegal occupation of
residential quarters and other illegal
encroachment
in
the
premises
of
Government Inter College, Prayagraj are
stated to have been removed by the State
respondents, therefore, I do not find any
good reason to proceed further in this writ
petition. Therefore, this writ petition is
disposed
off
with
the
following
directions:-

(i) All the concerned officers of the
State Government shall ensure strict
compliance
of
the
aforequoted
Government Order dated 25.2.2020.

(ii) In terms of the aforequoted
Government
Order,
no
officer
or
employee shall be allowed to overstay in
a Government accommodation after his
retirement / transfer / dismissal from
service / resignation etc., beyond the
period prescribed in the aforequoted
Government Order dated 25.2.2020.

(iii) The State Government shall call
for information from all the District level
Authorities of all departments in the State
of Uttar Pradesh within two months from
today about the Officers and Employees
who are unauthorisedly over staying or
illegally
occupying
or
retaining
Government accommodation. Within next
one month, the State Government shall
ensure
that
all
such
Government
accommodation
being
illegally
or
unauthorisedly occupied, are vacated. In
the event, any inaction is shown by any
officer
or
employee,
the
State
Government shall ensure that necessary
action is also taken against such officer or
employee.

(iv) The respondent no. 3 shall take
all steps to provide good educational
atmosphere and quality education in the
Government Inter College, Prayagraj to
restore the old glory of the said College.

7. Let a copy of this order be sent by
the Registrar General of this Court to the
Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar
Pradesh, Lucknow and to the Additional
Chief Secretary / Principal Secretary,
Secondary Education, Government of
Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, for necessary
action.
----------
(2020)06ILR A710
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.05.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. SUNITA AGARWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE ANJANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 2071 of 2017
Connected with
Writ A Nos. 2073 of 2017, 2074 of 2017, 2075
of 2017, 5634 of 2011, Special Appeal No. 22
of 2019 and Special Appeal No. 23 of 2019

Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No.
041742918 ...Petitioner
Versus
The Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents
6 All. Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No. 041742918 Vs. The Union of India & Ors. 711
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Vijay Gautam, Sri Amrish Chaterji, Sri
Vinod Kumar Mishra, Sri D.K. Mishra, Ms.
Atipriya Gautam

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri A.K. Mehrotra, U.O.I., Sri
Manoj Kumar Singh, Sri Nand Lal, Sri
Raghuraj Kishore Mishra, Sri Purnendu
Kumar Singh, Sri Satish Kumar Rai.

A. Constitution of India - Article 226 -
Writ - Cause of Action - Meaning - 'Cause
of action' implies a right to sue. The
material facts which are imperative for the
suitor to allege and prove constitutes the
cause of action - It has been interpreted to
mean that every fact which would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to
the judgment of the Court - Each and every
fact pleaded in the writ petition cannot by
itself constitute a cause of action - Facts
which have no bearing on the lis or the
dispute involved in the case, do not give rise
to a cause of action so as to confer
territorial
jurisdiction
on
the
Court
concerned - Integral facts pleaded must
have nexus or relevance with the lis so as to
constitute a cause of action. (Para 12 and
20)
B. Constitution of India
- Article
226(2) - Writ - Territorial Jurisdiction -
Seat of Government or Authority - In view
of the expression used in clause (2) of
Article 226, even if a small fraction of cause
of action accrues within the jurisdiction of
the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in
the matter - To establish that the cause of
action wholly or in part has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of any High Court, the
petitioner has to show that a legal right
claimed by him has been infringed or is
threatened
to
be
infringed
by
the
respondent within the territorial limits of the
Court's jurisdiction and such infringement
may take place by causing him actual injury
or threat thereof - If the cause of action
wholly or in part had arisen within the
territory in relation to which it exercises
jurisdiction, it can entertain the writ petition
to pass orders or directions notwithstanding
that the seat of the Government or authority
or the residence of the person against
whom the direction, order or writ is issued
is not within its territories. (Para 12, 18 and
19)
C.

Practice
and
Procedure
-
Determination
of
Ratio
Decidendi
-
Doctrine of Precedent - The enunciation of
the reason or principle upon which a
question before a Court has been decided
is alone a precedent - The ratio decidendi
is the underlying principle, namely, the
general reasons or the general grounds
upon which the decision is based on the
test
or
abstract
from
the
specific
peculiarities of the particular case which
gives rise to the decision - The ratio
decidendi has to be ascertained by an
analysis of the facts of the case and the
process of reasoning involving the major
premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of
law, either statutory or judge-made and a
minor premise consisting of the material
facts
of
the
case
under
immediate
consideration. (Para 30)
D. Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952
- Chapter V, Rule 6 - Practice and
Procedure - Reference to Larger Bench -
Reference to a Larger Bench can only be
made when there are conflicting views of
the Coordinate Bench or the Larger Bench
facing
his
Lordship
on
a
subject/controversy before him making it
difficult for him to take one or other view -
Reference cannot be made merely to
create
a
precedent
or
to
get
an
authoritative pronouncement by the Larger
Bench on any assumed conflict - Held -
Reference itself is not merited as there is
no conflict of opinion in the decisions
referred by the learned Single Judge. (Para
15 and 31)
Reference stands answered (E-1)
Cases relied on :-
1. Rajendra Kumar Mishra Vs U.O.I. reported
in (2005) 1 UPLBEC 108
712 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
2. Special Appeal No. 342 of 2010 D.G. CRPF,
New Delhi Vs Constable Lalji Pandey
3. Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs U.O.I. & ors.
reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329
4. Special Appeal Defective No. 785 of 2014;
Bibhuti Narain Singh F.C.I. & ors.
5. Special Appeal No 158 of 2016 Har Govind
Singh Vs U.O.I. & ors.
6. Saroj Mahanta (Mrs.), LT. Colonel Vs U.O.I.
(2003) 3 ESC 1419
7. Special Appeal No. 997 of 1995; Kailash
Nath Tiwari Vs U.O.I.
8. Dinesh Chandra Gahtori Vs C.O.A.S. (2001)
2 UPLBEC 12
9. St.of Raj. & ors. Vs M/s Swaika Properties
& anr. (1985) 3 SCC 217
10. O.N.G.C. Vs Utpal Kumar Basu & ors.
(1994) 4 SCC 711
11. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. Vs U.I.O. &
anr. (2004) 6 SCC 254
12. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Adani Exports Ltd. & ors.
(2002) 1 SCC 567
13. Om Prakash Srivastava Vs U.I.O. & anr.
(2006) 6 SCC 207
14. Rajendran Chingaravelu Vs R.K. Mishra,
Addl. Comm. Income Tax & ors. 14 (2010) 1
SCC 457
15. Writ-C No. 53941 of 2015; Suresh Jaiswal
Vs St. of U.P. . & anr.
16. Chabi Nath Rai Vs U.O.I. & ors. (1997) 1
UPLBEC 236
17. Daya Shankar Bharadwaj Vs Chief of Air
Staff, New Delhi & ors. AIR (1988) Allahabad
36
18. Collector of Customs, Calcutta Vs East
India Commercial Company Calcutta & ors.
AIR (1963) SC 1124
19. Special Appeal (Defective) No. 622 of
2008; Ex-Naik Ram Sharan Vs U.O.I. & ors.
20. Vishnu Kumar Bhargawa & ors. Vs
Metropolitan Magistrate, Bombay & ors. 1986
ALJ 1093
21. Krishna Kumar Vs U.O.I. AIR (1990) SC
1782
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Sunita
Agarwal, J., Hon'ble Anjani Kumar
Mishra, J. & Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Sri Vijay Gautam learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Amrish
Chaterjee, Sri D.K. Mishra and Ms.
Atipriya Gautam, learned advocates for
the petitioners and Sri Satish Kumar Rai,
Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, Sri Nand Lal,
Sri Raghuraj Kishore Mishra and Sri
Purnendu
Kumar
Singh,
learned
advocates appearing on behalf of the
respondents.

2. This Larger Bench has been
constituted under the orders of Hon'ble
the Chief Justice on a reference made by
the learned Single Judge vide judgment
and order dated 25th January, 2017. In the
writ petitions challenging the dismissal
order and the order passed by the
appellate and the revisional authority
under the provisions of 11(1) of CRPF
Act, 1949 readwith Rule 27 of Central
Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, a
preliminary objection was raised with
regard to the territorial jurisdiction of this
Court. It was argued that no cause of
action or part of cause of action has
accrued to the petitioners within the State
of U.P. and merely because the appellate
and the revisional order had been
communicated to them at their respective
home districts in the State of Uttar
Pradesh,
same
would
not
confer
jurisdiction upon this Court to entertain
the writ petitions.

3. The submission was that since the
dismissal order has been passed by the
6 All. Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No. 041742918 Vs. The Union of India & Ors. 713
Commandant, 129th Battalion, CRPF at
Bhotgaon, Kokarajhar, Assam and was
communicated to the petitioners there
itself and further that the departmental
appeal and revision have been rejected by
the competent authorities at Bhopal, the
remedy before the petitioners is to either
approach the Gauhati High Court or
Jabalpur High Court, whichever they
choose. The writ petitions challenging the
dismissal, appellate and revisional orders
cannot be maintained in this Court.

4. The learned Single Judge in the
referral order noted the arguments of
Advocates for both sides in the following
words:-

"In support of their contention the
respondents have relied upon a Full
Bench decision of this Court in the case of
Rajendra Kumar Mishra Vs. Union of
India reported in 2005 (1) UPLBEC 108
as well as a Division Bench judgement of
this Court passed in Special Appeal No.
342 of 2010 The Director General CRPF,
New Delhi Vs. Constable Lalji Pandey.
The Division Bench in Lalji Pandey
(supra) has relied upon the Full Bench
decision of this Court in the case of
Rajendra Kumar Mishra (supra) and held
that mere communication of the order of
dismissal, appellate and revisional orders
at
the
residential
address
of
the
respondents (therein) at district Bhadohi
would not confer territorial jurisdiction
on this Court.

Shri Vijay Gautam, learned counsel
for the petitioners, on the other hand, has
placed reliance upon a judgment of the
Supreme Court in the case of Nawal
Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India and
others reported in (2014) 9 SCC 329.
Paragraph 20 of the said judgment reads
as under:

"17. We have perused the facts
pleaded in the writ petition and the
documents relied upon by the appellant.
Indisputably,
the
appellant
reported
sickness on account of various ailments
including difficulty in breathing. He was
referred to hospital. Consequently, he
was signed off for further medical
treatment.
Finally,
the
respondent
permanently declared the appellant unfit
for
sea
service
due
to
dilated
cardiomyopathy (heart muscles disease).
As a result, the Shipping Department of
the Government of India issued an order
on 12.4.2011 cancelling the registration
of the appellant as a seaman. A copy of
the letter was sent to the appellant at his
native place in Bihar where he was
staying after he was found medically
unfit. It further appears that the appellant
sent a representation from his home in the
State of Bihar to the respondent claiming
disability
compensation.
The
said
representation
was
replied
by
the
respondent, which was addressed to him
on his home address in Gaya, Bihar
rejecting
his
claim
for
disability
compensation. It is further evident that
when the appellant was signed off and
declared medically unfit, he returned
back to his home in the District of Gaya,
Bihar and, thereafter, he made all claims
an filed representation from his home
address at Gaya and those letters and
representations were entertained by the
respondents and replied and a decision
on
those
representations
were
communicated to him on his home
address in Bihar. Admittedly, appellant
was suffering from serious heart muscles
disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy) and
breathing problem which forced him to
stay in native place, wherefrom he had
been making all correspondence with
regard to his disability compensation.
714 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Prima facie, therefore, considering all the
facts together, a part or fraction of cause
of action arose within the jurisdiction of
the Patna High Court where he received
a letter of refusal disentitling him from
disability compensation."

Shri Vijay Gautam has further
placed reliance upon two Division Bench
judgments of this Court passed in Special
Appeal Defective No. 785 of 2014 Bibhuti
Narain Singh Vs. Food Corporation of
India and others and Special Appeal No
158 of 2016 Har Govind Singh Vs. Union
of India and others. In both the
judgments, the two Division Benches have
relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of Nawal Kishore
Sharma (supra). In the case of Bibhuti
Narain Singh (supra) the Court has held
that in view of the judgment of Nawal
Kishore
Sharma
(supra),
the
communication of the penalty order to the
appellants at Faizabad would confer
jurisdiction on this Court (Lucknow
Bench) to maintain the special appeal. In
the case of Har Govind Singh, the
Division Bench has considered the
judgment of Nawal Kishore Sharma
(supra) and Full Bench judgment in the
case of Rajendra Kumar Mishra (supra)
as
well
as
the
judgment
of
the
Constitution Bench in AIR 1961 SC 532,
Lieutenant Col. Khajoor Singh Vs. Union
of India and others and thereafter
referring to the judgment of Nawal
Kishore Sharma (supra) with approval,
has entertained the special appeal and
directed the Union of India to file its
response.

Learned counsel for the respondents
on the other hand submitted that
paragraph 17 of Nawal Kishore Sharma
(supra) cannot be read in isolation but
must be read alongwith the observations
made
by
the
Supreme
Court
in
paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said
judgment. It is submitted by them that the
plea of jurisdiction was never taken
before the High Court (therein). The High
Court had issued notice in response to
which parties appeared and participated
in the proceedings before the High Court.
The High Court had also passed an
interim order directing the Shipping
Corporation of India to pay a sum of
Rs.2.75 lacs to the petitioner. However,
when the writ petition was taken up for
hearing the High Court took a view that
no cause of action, not even a fraction of
cause of action had arisen within its
territorial jurisdiction. The submission is
that it is in this context that the Supreme
Court in paragraph 19 of the Nawal
Kishore Sharma (supra) held that the
petition ought not to have been dismissed
for want of territorial jurisdiction.

The submission further is that in
Bibhuti
Narain
Singh
(supra),
the
Division Bench of the High Court has
noticed that the appellant (employee
therein) was posted at Faizabad where
the penalty order of stoppage of annual
increments was served upon him. It is,
therefore, contended that this fact of the
appellants posting at Faizabad, U.P., in
any case would confer jurisdiction on the
Lucknow Bench of the High Court even
without the aid of Naval Kishore Sharma
(supra) and therefore, the order/judgment
in
Bibhuti
Narain
Singh
has
no
application to the facts of the present
case. "

The conflict noticed by the learned
Single Judge for reference to the Larger
Bench is in the following words:-

"Having considered the judgments
and orders referred to above, I am of the
view that there is a conflict of opinion
6 All. Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No. 041742918 Vs. The Union of India & Ors. 715
between the Full Bench judgment of this
Court in the case of Rajendra Kumar
Mishra (supra) and Constable Lalji
Pandey (supra) on one hand and the
orders passed by the two Division
Benches of this Court in the case of
Bibhuti Narain Singh (supra) and Har
Govind Singh (supra) in the light of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra)
and this dispute, therefore, needs to be
resolved by a larger Bench on the
question with regard as to whether the
observations of the Supreme Court in the
case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) in
paragraph 17 can be said to be a binding
precedent on this Court to entertain the
above writ petitions or whether the
observations of paragraph 17 were in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case of Nawal Kishore Sharma (supra) in
view of paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said
judgment.

OR

In
the
alternative
whether
the
judgment of the Full Bench in Rajendra
Kumar Mishra (supra) and Constable Lalji
Pandey (supra) can be said to still lay down
the correct law in view of the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Nawal Kishore
Sharma (supra).

Therefore,
in
my
opinion
this
controversy needs to be resolved by a
larger Bench of this Court. Let the records
of these cases be placed before the Hon'ble
Chief Justice for constitution of a larger
Bench to resolve the above conflict in the
several decisions of this Court. "

5. Firstly we think it proper to reformulate
the
questions
referred
for
convenience:-

(i) Whether the judgments of the Full
Bench in Rajendra Kumar Mishra Vs.
Union of India1 and the Division Bench in
The Director General CRPF, New Delhi
Vs. Constable Lalji Pandey2 are still good
law in view of the decision of the Supreme
Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union
of India and others3?

(ii) Whether the decisions of the
Division Bench in Bibhuti Narain Singh
Vs. Food Corporation of India and others4
and Har Govind Singh Vs. Union of India
and others5 are good law on the subject in
the light of judgment of the Supreme Court
in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma3?

(iii) Whether there is any conflict of
opinion in the decisions of the Full Bench in
Rajendra Kumar Mishra1 and Division
Bench in Constable Lalji Pandey2 on one
hand and in Bibhuti Narain Singh4 and Har
Govind Singh5 on the other in the matter of
exercise of territorial jurisdiction by the
High Court in view of clause (2) of Article
226 of the Constitution of India and the
issue needs to be resolved by the
authoritative decision of the Larger Bench?

6. To answer the above questions,
firstly we would be required to go
through the above decisions of this Court
referred for our consideration one by one.

(a) The Full Bench in Rajendra
Kumar Mishra was constituted on a
reference made by a learned Single Judge,
wherein he had referred two contradictory
Division Bench judgments of this Court
in Saroj Mahanta (Mrs.), LT. Colonel
v. Union of India6 and in Kailash Nath
Tiwari v. Union of India, decided on
9.1.2002. The short question before the
Full Bench was whether this Court had
jurisdiction to decide the writ petition
challenging the Court martial proceedings
716 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and the sentence awarded to the petitioner
who was serving in Indian Army.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner
therein had urged that in view of the
decision of the Apex Court in Dinesh
Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army
Staff, a writ petition challenging the
impugned sentence can be filed in any
High Court in India as the Chief of Army
Staff has been made respondent in that
case. It was further urged that since the
petitioner (therein) was resident of
District Ballia within the State of Uttar
Pradesh, the writ petition can be filed in
the High Court at Allahabad.

Considering the law propounded by
the Apex Court, referring to the various
decisions, it was held by the Full Bench
in paragraphs '39', '40' '41' and '42' as
under:-

"39.
Therefore,
in
order
to
understand and appreciate the binding
force of a decision it is always necessary
to see what were the facts in the case in
which the decision was given and what
was the point which had to be decided.
No judgment can be read as if it is a
statute. A word or a clause or a sentence
in the judgment cannot be regarded as a
full exposition of law.

40. For the reasons given above we
arc of the opinion that the Chief of Army
Staff can only be sued either at Delhi
where he is located or at a place where
the cause of action, wholly or in part,
arises.

41. We may mention that a "cause of
action" is the bundle of facts which, taken
with the law applicable., gives the
plaintiff a right to relief against the
defendant. However, it must include some
act done by the defendant, since in the
.absence of an act, ho cause of action can
possibly
occur.
[Vide
Radhakrishnamurithy v. Chandrasekhara
Rao, AIR 1966 A.P. 334; Ram Awalamb
v. Jata Shankar, AIR 1969 All. 526 (FB),
and Salik Ram Adya Prasad v. Ram
hakhem and others, AIR 1973 All. 1071.

42. In the present case no part of the
cause of action has arisen in U.P. Hence
in our opinion the writ petition is not
maintainable
in
this
Court.
It
is
accordingly dismissed. The decision of
the Division Bench in Kailash Nath
Tiwari v. Union of India (supra) in our
opinion does not lay down the correct law
and is overruled."

It can, thus, be seen that the question
whether the writ petition challenging the
Court martial proceedings and the order
of the Chief of Army Staff was
maintainable in this Court, was decided in
the facts of that case, it was held that
since no part of cause of action had arisen
in the State of U.P., hence the writ
petition was not maintainable in this
Court.

We may record that after referring
decisions of the Apex Court, the Full
Bench has held that the Chief of Army
Staff can only be sued either at Delhi or at
a place where the cause of action, wholly
or in part, arises.

Limited issue as to whether the writ
petition challenging the order of the Chief
of Army Staff can be maintained in this
Court was answered by the Full Bench
repelling the plea of the petitioner that in
view of decision of the Apex Court in
Dinesh Chandra Gahtori8, the Chief of
Army Staff may be sued anywhere in the
Country. It was held that the said
observation cannot be construed to mean
that the Supreme Court had laid down any
6 All. Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No. 041742918 Vs. The Union of India & Ors. 717
absolute proposition that it is open to the
petitioner to file a writ petition in any
High Court in India. It was held that the
said observation is only a laconic
observation and cannot override the
Larger Bench decisions of the Supreme
Court, wherein it had laid down the
principle that the place where whole or
part of cause of action has arisen gives
jurisdiction to the Court within whose
territory such place is situate. Whether the
cause of action has arisen within the
territory of the particular Court will have
to be determined in each case on its own
facts in the context of the subject matter
of the litigation, and relief claimed.

The Full Bench in Rajendra Kumar
Mishra1, in principle has approved the
decision of the Division Bench of this
Court in Saroj Mahanta (Mrs.), LT.
Colonel6, wherein it was stated that in
order to determine as to whether the
Court has a jurisdiction to entertain a
petition, the pleadings in the petition have
to be examined to form an opinion as to
whether a cause of action partly or fully
has
arisen
within
the
territorial
jurisdiction of the Court. The Division
Benches in Saroj Mahanta (Mrs.), LT.
Colonel6, in the facts situation of that
cases had concluded that this Court did
not have territorial jurisdiction.

(b) In Constable Lalji Pandey2, the
challenge before the Division Bench was to
the punishment order dated 17.3.1994 of
dismissal from service on the charge of
unauthorized absence from duty. The writ
petition was filed by the delinquent after
exhausting departmental remedy of appeal
as well as revision before the competent
authorities which were also rejected. On a
preliminary
objection
raised
by
the
respondent
with
regard
to
the
maintainability of the writ petition, the
Division Bench has relied upon the view
taken by the Full Bench in the case of
Rajendra Kumar Mishra1 to hold that mere
communication of dismissal, appellate and
revisional orders at the residential address
of the delinquent employee at District
Bhadohi would not confer territorial
jurisdiction to this Court. Mere residence of
the petitioner within the territory of this
Court would not confer jurisdiction to
entertain the writ petition.

We may note here again that the
Division Bench in Constable Lalji Pandey2
had decided the question of jurisdiction in
the facts and circumstances of that case. It
was noted that the delinquent employee
who was a member of Central Reserve
Police
Force
(C.R.P.F.)
deliberately
absented himself from duty for considerable
long period without permission and due
intimation to the department and without
sending any medical certificate and proper
application within time. He had not
admitted himself in any of the C.R.P.F.
Hospital and, therefore, his plea that he had
fallen ill and could not join his duty, raised
doubts about his conduct. The departmental
authorities having considered various pleas
raised by the petitioner in appeal and
revision affirmed the punishment order. It
can, thus, be clearly seen that the Division
Bench had refused to entertain the writ
petition rejecting on the plea that service of
the dismissal, appellate and revisional
orders upon the employee at his place of
residence at Bhadohi would give rise to
cause of action within the State of U.P. It
was concluded that mere communication of
the decisions at the residential address of a
member of a disciplined force would not
confer jurisdiction on this Court as the same
cannot be said to be an integral fact to the
bundle of facts which constitute cause of
action in that case.

(c) Har Govind Singh5 is the
decision where the Division Bench has
718 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relied upon the decision of the Apex
Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma3 to set
aside the order of the learned Single
Judge in dismissing the writ petition. The
matter was remitted to the writ Court to
decide afresh keeping in view of the
observation of the Apex Court in Nawal
Kishore Sharma3.

With due respect to their lordships,
in the order dated 26.11.2019 of the
Division Bench, we do not find any
reasoning given by it to reach at the
conclusion as to how the order of learned
Single Judge was wrong and why in their
opinion,
the
issue
required
reconsideration by the Single Bench.

We, however, may note that the
same issue in Har Govind Singh had
been remitted twice. In an earlier decision
dated 27.4.2016, it was observed by the
earlier Division Bench that the writ
petition filed in the year 2004 had
wrongly been dismissed after 12 years of
its institution on the ground of want of
territorial jurisdiction.

Be that as it may, in our considered
opinion, the conclusion drawn by the
Division Bench in Har Govind Singh5 is
not the law laid down as a binding
precedent which merited this reference.
The reference to the decision of the
Division Bench in Har Govind Singh5 in
the referral order is, thus, wholly
irrelevant.

(d) In Bibhuti Narain Singh4, the
Division Bench of this Court placing
reliance on the judgment of the Apex
Court in Nawal Kishore Sharma3 has held
that the part of cause of action had arisen
within the jurisdiction of this Court,
inasmuch as, the petitioner (therein) was
posted in Faizabad, a District in the State
of U.P. when the order of penalty of
stoppage of annual increment was served
upon him. It was held that though whole
departmental proceedings concluded at
the
place
beyond
the
territorial
jurisdiction of the Court but since the
order of punishment was served at the
place of posting of the petitioner, within
the State of U.P., part of cause of action
would lie within the territorial jurisdiction
of this Court.

We may note here that the issue as to
whether the whole or part of cause of
action would lie within the jurisdiction of
a Court or not is a question to be decided
in each case on its own facts in the
context of the subject matter of litigation
and relief claimed as the expression
"cause of action" constitutes bundle of
facts which the petitioner must prove, if
traversed, to entitle to him to a judgment
in his favour by the Court. In determining
the objection of lack of territorial
jurisdiction, the court must take into
consideration the facts pleaded in support
of
cause
of
action
albeit
without
embarking upon an enquiry as to the
correctness or otherwise of the said facts.
Thus,
the
question
of
territorial
jurisdiction must be decided on the facts
pleaded in the petition and, thus, would
depend on the facts of the case.

(e) In Nawal Kishore Sharma3, the
issue before the Supreme Court was
regarding validity of the order passed by
the Patna High Court dismissing the
appellant's writ petition for want of
territorial
jurisdiction.
The
Supreme
Court has discussed the law on exercise
of jurisdiction (territorial) by the writ
Court prior to and subsequent to the
Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act,
1976, whereby clause (2) was inserted in
6 All. Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No. 041742918 Vs. The Union of India & Ors. 719
Article 226 of the Constitution of India
which reads as under:-

Clause (2):- The power conferred by
Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or
writs to any Government, authority or
person may also be exercised by any High
Court exercising jurisdiction in relation
to the territories within which the cause
of action, wholly or in part, arises for the
exercise of such power, notwithstanding
that the seat of such Government or
authority or the residence of such person
is not within those territories. (3) xxxxx
(4) xxxxx"

While tracing the law holding the
field, the judgment of the Apex Court in
State of Rajasthan and Others vs. M/s
Swaika Properties and Another9, was
noted, wherein the expression "cause of
action" was considered to hold as under:-

"8. The expression "cause of action"
is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil
Procedure:

"The ''cause of action' means every
fact which, if traversed, it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove in
order to support his right to a judgment of
the court."

In other words, it is a bundle of facts
which taken with the law applicable to
them gives the plaintiff a right to relief
against the defendant. The mere service
of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act
on the respondents at their registered
office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta
i.e. within the territorial limits of the State
of West Bengal, could not give rise to a
cause of action within that territory
unless the service of such notice was an
integral part of the cause of action. The
entire cause of action culminating in the
acquisition of the land under Section
52(1) of the Act arose within the State of
Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court
at the Jaipur Bench. The answer to the
question whether service of notice is an
integral part of the cause of action within
the meaning of Article 226(2) of the
Constitution must depend upon the nature
of the impugned order giving rise to a
cause of action. .......xxxxxxxxxxx"

The expression "cause of action"
considered in the case of Oil and Natural
Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu
and others10, was noted :-

"6. Therefore, in determining the
objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction
the court must take all the facts pleaded
in support of the cause of action into
consideration albeit without embarking
upon an enquiry as to the correctness or
otherwise of the said facts. In other words
the question whether a High Court has
territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ
petition must be answered on the basis of
the averments made in the petition, the
truth
or
otherwise
whereof
being
immaterial. To put it differently, the
question of territorial jurisdiction must be
decided on the facts pleaded in the
petition."

It was considered that in Kusum
Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India
and
Another11,
the
Apex
Court
elaborately discussed Clause (2) of
Article
226
of
the
Constitution,
particularly the meaning of the word
'cause of action' with reference to Section
20(c) and Section 141 of the Code of
Civil Procedure to hold that the entire
bundle
of
facts
pleaded
need
not
constitute a cause of action as what is
necessary to be proved before the
720 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner can obtain a decree is the
material facts. The expression material
facts is also known as integral facts.

It was further observed that :-

"10. Keeping in view the expressions
used in clause (2) of Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, indisputably even if
a small fraction of cause of action
accrues within the jurisdiction of the
Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in
the matter."

It was noted that in Union of India
and others vs. Adani Exports Ltd. and
another12, the Apex Court has held that
in order to confer jurisdiction on a High
Court to entertain a writ petition, it must
disclose that the integral facts pleaded in
support of the cause of action do
constitute a cause so as to empower the
court to decide the dispute and the entire
or a part of it arose within its jurisdiction.
Each and every fact pleaded by the
respondents in their application does not
ipso facto lead to the conclusion that
those facts give rise to a cause of action
within the Court's territorial jurisdiction
unless those facts are such which have a
nexus or relevance with the lis i.e. the
dispute involved in the case. Facts which
have no bearing with the lis or the dispute
involved in the case, do not give rise to a
cause of action so as to confer territorial
jurisdiction on the court concerned.

In Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union
of India and another13, it was observed
that writ petitioners have to establish that
a legal right claimed by them has prima
facie either been infringed or is threatened
to be infringed by the respondent within
the territorial limits of the Court's
jurisdiction and such infringement may
take place by causing him actual injury or
threat thereof.

In Rajendran Chingaravelu vs. R.K.
Mishra, Additional Commissioner of
Income Tax and Others14, the Apex
Court while considering the scope of
Article
226
of
the
Constitution,
particularly the cause of action in
maintaining a writ petition, held that
clause (2) of Article 226 makes it clear
that the High Court exercising jurisdiction
in relation to the territories within which
the cause of action arises wholly or in
part, will have jurisdiction. This would
mean that even if a small fraction of the
cause of action (that bundle of facts
which gives a petitioner, a right to sue)
accrued within the territory of a State, the
High Court of that State will have
jurisdiction. .

Having
considered
the
above
decisions of the Apex Court, it was
concluded in paragraph '16' in Nawal
Kishore Sharma3 as under:-

"16. .......there cannot be any doubt
that the question whether or not cause of
action wholly or in part for filing a writ
petition has arisen within the territorial
limit of any High Court has to be decided
in the light of the nature and character of
the proceedings under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In order to maintain a writ
petition, the petitioner has to establish
that a legal right claimed by him has been
infringed by the respondents within the
territorial
limit
of
the
Court's
jurisdiction."

7. It was thus held that in order to
maintain the writ petition, the petitioner
has to establish that a legal right claimed
by him has been infringed by the
6 All. Manish Kumar Mishra, Constable No. 041742918 Vs. The Union of India & Ors. 721
respondents within the territorial limit of
the Court's jurisdiction.

8. Considering the above legal
position, in the facts of that case in Nawal
Kishore Sharma3, it was held by the Apex
Court that the writ petition ought not to
have been dismissed for want of territorial
jurisdiction. The facts of the case noticed
by the Apex Court were that the appellant
while on duty reported sickness including
difficulty in breathing and was referred to
the hospital. Later, he was signed off for
further medical treatment. Finally, the
respondent permanently declared the
appellant unfit for Sea services due to
dilated Cardiomyopathy (heart muscles
disease). As a result, the Shipping
Department of the Government of India
issued an order cancelling the registration
of the appellant as a Seaman. A copy of
the letter was sent to the appellant at his
native place in Bihar, where he was
staying after he was found medically
unfit. Faced with this, the appellant sent a
representation from his home in the State
of Bihar to the respondent claiming
disability
compensation.
The
said
representation
was
replied
by
the
respondent, which was addressed to him
at his home address in Gaya, Bihar,
rejecting
his
claim
for
disability
compensation.

9. Noticing the above facts, it was
observed therein that admittedly, the
appellant was suffering from serious heart
muscles
disease
(Dilated
Cardiomyopathy) and breathing problem
which forced him to stay in his native
place, wherefrom he had been making all
correspondence
with
regard
to
his
disability
compensation.
It
was
considered
that
all
claims
and
representations filed by the appellant
(therein)
were
entertained
by
the
respondent and replied and decision on
those representations were communicated
to him at his home address in Bihar.
Considering these facts together, it was
held in Nawal Kishore Sharma3 that
prima facie a part or a fraction of cause of
action arose within the jurisdiction of the
Patna High Court where he received the
letter of refusal disentitling him from
disability compensation. It was clearly
observed by the Apex Court that the order
of dismissal of writ petition on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction cannot be sustained
in the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case.

10. From an exhaustive reading of
the decision in Nawal Kishore Sharma3,
it is evident that the question of
maintainability of the writ petition in
Patna High Court was decided in the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case considering the nature and character
of the proceedings under Article 226 of
the Constitution. It was found that legal
right claimed by the appellant (therein) to
disability
compensation
had
been
infringed by the respondent with rejection
of his representations communication
from the home address of the employee
and orders were communicated to him at
the same address. On account of suffering
from disease, the appellant having been
permanently declared unfit was forced to
stay in his native place.

11. From the above, it is evident that
there can never be an encyclopedic
exposition as to what would constitute
cause of action in a case.