# Manjeet Singh @ Inder @ Manjeet Singh Chana v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 4 ILRA 21
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-04-09
- **Case number:** Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 934 of 2025
- **Bench:** Mahesh Chandra Tripathi, Prashant Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/manjeet-singh-inder-manjeet-singh-chana-v-state-of-u-p-ors-53103
- **Pages:** 6

## Headnote

Arrest-Remand Order-Arrest memo on a
printed proforma -did not contain any column
specifying the grounds or reasons for arrest-
arrest violates Article 22 of the Constitution of
India- no such effort had been made by the
learned Magistrate to ensure adequate legal
aid
to
the
accused
petitioner
and
no
appropriate opportunity of hearing at the time
judicial remand-Remand order and arrest
quashed.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

Cases Cited:

## Text

4 All. Manjeet Singh @ Inder @ Manjeet Singh Chana Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
21
or adulteration of poison in laddus that
were given to the children as per law laid
down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda
(supra) and Hari Prashad (supra) as noted
above. In any case administration of
poisonous substance to three children
though only one child Chandra Kiran, out
of three children died because of poisonous
substance and chemical examiner report is
not categorical to the effect that any
poisonous substance that was found in
stomach wash of the other two children. On
the contrary, it records that no poisonous
substance was found in their stomach wash
(at page 9 of the paper book).

17. Thus, in the present case, as laid
down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra)
and
Hari
Prashad
(supra),
the
circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn have not been fully
established. In other words, prosecution
has failed to establish the act of
administration of poisonous substance to
the deceased, which must have been
proved beyond any shadow of doubt even
though there may be a strong suspicion,
as one child, out of three children died.
We find that in the present case the chain
of evidence and circumstances is not
complete and it could not be approved by
the prosecution that in all human
probability the act must have been done
by the accused persons.

18. Consequently, the present appeal is
accordingly
allowed.
The
impugned
judgement and order dated 25.4.1984
convicting and sentencing appellants is
hereby set aside and the appellants are
acquitted of all the charges levelled against
them. Bail bonds are cancelled and sureties
are discharged. The surviving appellant no.
1-Prem son of Genda need not surrender.

19. Copy of this judgement be sent to
the
court
concerned
for
necessary
compliance.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 21
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 09.04.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MAHESH CHANDRA
TRIPATHI, J.
THE HON'BLE PRASHANT KUMAR, J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 934 of 2025

Manjeet Singh @ Inder @ Manjeet Singh
Chana ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Praveen Shrivastav, Sri Anupam Verma

Counsel for the Respondents:
G.A., Sri Vinod Singh

Arrest-Remand Order-Arrest memo on a
printed proforma -did not contain any column
specifying the grounds or reasons for arrest-
arrest violates Article 22 of the Constitution of
India- no such effort had been made by the
learned Magistrate to ensure adequate legal
aid
to
the
accused
petitioner
and
no
appropriate opportunity of hearing at the time
judicial remand-Remand order and arrest
quashed.

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

Cases Cited:

1. Ashish Kakkar Vs UT of Chandigarh-Criminal
Appeal No.1518 of 2025 @ SLP [Crl] No.1662 of
2025

2. Prabir Purkayastha Vs St. (NCT of Delhi)
(2024) 8 SCC 254
22 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3. Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab @
Abu Mujahid Vs St. of Maharashtra, (2012) 8
S.C.R. 295

4. Vihaan Kumar Vs St. of Har., LAWS(SC)-
2025-2-20 (Para 21)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Mahesh Chandra
Tripathi, J.
&
Hon'ble Prashant Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Anupam Verma, learned
counsel for the petitioner, Shri Paritosh
Malviya, learned AGA-I for the Staterespondents, and Shri Vinod Singh, learned
counsel for the informant - respondent No.
4.

2. The instant writ petition has been
preferred
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India for issuance of an
appropriate writ, order, or direction in the
nature of certiorari for quashing the
impugned remand order dated 26.12.2024
passed by the learned Magistrate in First
Information
report
dated
15.02.2024
registered as Case Crime No.77 of 2024,
under Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 406,
504, 506 IPC, Police Station Milak, District
Rampur, and to direct the release of the
petitioner
on
personal
bond
as
the
investigation is still ongoing.

3. Shri Anupam Verma, learned
counsel for the petitioner submits that the
core issue involved in the petition is not the
merits of the allegations mentioned in the
FIR but the illegality in the process of
arrest and procedural lapses during the
remand proceedings. He places reliance
upon the arrest memo and states that it was
a printed proforma which did not contain
any column specifying the grounds or
reasons for arrest. It is argued that neither
the reasons for the arrest nor the grounds
were communicated in writing to the
petitioner at the time of arrest, as per
mandate
of
Article
22(1)
of
the
Constitution of India as well as the
statutory provisions under Section 50
CrPC.

4.
Learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner further argues that immediately
after the arrest, the petitioner was produced
before the learned remand Magistrate on
26.12.2024 and was remanded to judicial
custody through a printed remand order,
which does not mention whether any
opportunity of hearing was granted to the
accused to contest his custodial detention.
He further submits that the petitioner has
confined his relief to the extent that he was
not provided with any grounds of arrest or
particulars, whereas the arrest memo
merely mentions the petitioner's name and
place of arrest.

5. In this backdrop, learned counsel
for the petitioner submits that the arrest
violates Article 22 of the Constitution of
India, which guarantees protection against
arrest and detention without being informed
of the grounds thereof. He also submits
that, as per constitutional mandate, the right
to consult and be defended by a legal
practitioner of one's choice must be
ensured. These rights are designed to
ensure that no person is arrested or detained
without being informed of the reasons for
such action. He also refers to Section 50
Cr.P.C. (now Section 47 BNSS), which
provides that every police officer or other
person arresting any person without a
warrant shall forthwith communicate to
him the full particulars of the offence or
other grounds for such arrest. He places
further reliance upon Section 50A Cr.P.C.
(now Section 48 BNSS), which imposes an
obligation on the arresting officer to inform
4 All. Manjeet Singh @ Inder @ Manjeet Singh Chana Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
23
a nominated person about the arrest and
mandates that such information must be
recorded in a register maintained at the
police station. It is further submitted that
the Magistrate, before whom the arrested
person
is
produced,
must
ensure
compliance with sub-sections (2) and (3). It
is argued that the remand order is
mechanical and does not reflect any
judicial satisfaction regarding the necessity
of judicial custody.

6. Lastly, learned counsel for the
petitioner submits that the arrest of the
petitioner and the consequential remand
order are liable to be set aside due to noncommunication of the grounds of arrest.

7. Per contra, Shri Paritosh
Malviya, learned AGA-I, opposed the
relief and has placed instructions on record.
He submits that considering the FIR dated
15.02.2024 and the alleged complicity of
the petitioner, no relief should be accorded
to the petitioner in the instant case.

8. The relief is also opposed by
Shri Vinod Singh, learned counsel for
the informant. He vehemently contends
that no relief may be accorded and the writ
petition deserves to be dismissed as devoid
of merit.

9. We have heard the rival
submissions and perused the record.

10. The impugned order dated
26.12.2024 was passed by the learned
remand Magistrate in FIR dated 15.02.2024
registered as Case Crime No.77 of 2024,
under Sections 420, 467, 468, 469, 406,
504, 506 IPC, Police Station Milak, District
Rampur based on application by the
investigating officer. However, the arrest
and remand order are under challenge in
the present petition mainly on three
grounds grounds, namely "(a) the reason of
arrest and ground of arrest were not
communicated to the petitioner; (b) arrest
memo does not contain any column on
ground of arrest and reason of arrest; and
(c) no opportunity of hearing or no
opportunity to the petitioner was given for
defending his custodial remand." The
petitioner was not furnished with the
grounds of arrest as mandated under
Section 50 Cr.P.C. (now Section 47
BNSS), and only an arrest memo lacking
such
details
was
provided.
Upon
examination of the record and instructions,
we have no hesitation in holding that
neither the reasons nor grounds for arrest
were communicated in writing to the
petitioner at the time of arrest, thereby
violating the constitutional safeguards
under Article 22(1) and the statutory
mandate under Section 50 Cr.P.C. The
arrest memo and remand orders on record
(Annexure-1 to the writ petition) reflect
that only a printed format memo was
provided, without mentioning grounds of
arrest. Further, the right to access legal aid
is a valuable right of the accused, who must
be informed of his right to consult and be
defended by a legal practitioner. In case the
accused is unable to engage counsel, the
State must provide legal aid. These rights
flow from Articles 21, 22(1) and 39A of the
Constitution of India. Adequate legal aid to
the accused at State expenses is also
enshrined in Section 304 Cr.P.C. (now
Section 341 BNSS).

11. The importance of the remand
Magistrate's duty to apply judicial mind
and afford an opportunity to the accused to
oppose remand was emphasized by the
Supreme Court in Mohammed Ajmal
Mohammad Amir Kasab @ Abu Mujahid
v. State of Maharashtra, (2012) 8 S.C.R.
24 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
295 (Paras 484-488). Further, the right of
an arrested person to be informed in writing
of the grounds of arrest and furnishing of
such written grounds to the arrested person
was made an imperative requirement of law
in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of
Delhi), LAWS(SC)-2024-5-46, and Pankaj
Bansal v. Union of India, LAWS(SC)-
2023-10-3.

12. Similarly various protections
afforded under the Constitution to a person
facing arrest were expounded by the
Supreme Court in Vihaan Kumar v. State
of Haryana, LAWS(SC)-2025-2-20 (Para
21), which is reproduced below:

 "(21.) Therefore, we conclude:

a) The requirement of informing
a person arrested of grounds of arrest is a
mandatory requirement of Article 22(1);

b) The information of the grounds
of arrest must be provided to the arrested
person in such a manner that sufficient
knowledge of the basic facts constituting
the grounds is imparted and communicated
to the arrested person effectively in the
language which he understands. The mode
and method of communication must be such
that the object of the constitutional
safeguard is achieved;

c) When arrested accused alleges
non-compliance with the requirements of
Article 22(1), the burden will always be on
the Investigating Officer/Agency to prove
compliance with the requirements of Article
22(1):

d) Non-compliance with Article
22(1) will be a violation of the fundamental
rights of the accused guaranteed by the
said Article. Moreover, it will amount to a
violation of the right to personal liberty
guaranteed
by
Article
21
of
the
Constitution. Therefore, non- compliance
with the requirements of Article 22(1)
vitiates the arrest of the accused. Hence,
further orders passed by a criminal court of
remand are also vitiated. Needless to add
that it will not vitiate the investigation,
charge sheet and trial. But, at the same
time, filing of chargesheet will not validate
a breach of constitutional mandate under
Article 22(1);

e) When an arrested person is
produced before a Judicial Magistrate for
remand, it is the duty of the Magistrate to
ascertain whether compliance with Article
22(1) and other mandatory safeguards has
been made; and

f) When a violation of Article
22(1) is established, it is the duty of the
court to forthwith order the release of the
accused. That will be a ground to grant
bail even if statutory restrictions on the
grant
of
bail
exist.
The
statutory
restrictions do not affect the power of the
court to grant bail when the violation of
Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is
established."

13. In a recent judgment of Apex
Court
dated
25.03.2025
passed
in
Criminal Appeal No.1518 of 2025 @ SLP
[Crl] No.1662 of 2025) (Ashish Kakkar
vs. UT of Chandigarh) has considered the
similar issue. The judgment and order dated
25.03.2025 is reproduced below:

 "Leave granted.

2. The appellant was arrested on
30.12.2024 in connection with FIR No.
33/2022 registered under Sections 384,
420, 468, 471, 509 and 120B of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 and remanded to police
custody for a period of 3 days.

3. Vide the present appeal, the
appellant has challenged both his arrest
and the remand order dated 30.12.2024 on
three grounds, namely, there is a clear noncompliance of the mandate under Section
4 All. Manjeet Singh @ Inder @ Manjeet Singh Chana Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
25
41-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the
Code'); the appellant was not heard at the
time of remand and the grounds of arrest
as mandated under Section 50 of the Code
have not been furnished to the appellant as
against the mere arrest memo.

4. We are inclined to consider
only the last issue raised by the appellant
with respect to the non- furnishing of the
grounds of arrest.

5. Upon perusing annexure P-3,
we can see that what has been provided to
the appellant is only an arrest memo in the
prescribed format, which is meant to be
given to the appellant by way of an
intimation. It has been filled up with the
name of the appellant along with the place
of arrest. Additionally, it has been written
that he has been arrested based upon the
statement of the co- accused.

6. We are in agreement with the
submission made by the learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant that
the said arrest memo cannot be construed
as grounds of arrest, as no other
worthwhile particulars have been furnished
to him.

7. This, being a clear noncompliance of the mandate under Section
50 of the Code which has been introduced
to give effect to Article 22(1) of the
Constitution of India, 1950 we are inclined
to set aside the impugned judgment,
particularly, in light of the judgment
rendered by this Court reported as Prabir
Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)
(2024) 8 SCC 254.

8. In such view of the matter, the
impugned judgment stands set aside and
the arrest of the appellant followed by the
consequential remand order are also set
aside.

9. The appellant shall be set at
liberty, until and unless he is required in
any other case. The appeal stands allowed
accordingly.

10. Pending application(s), if
any, shall also stand disposed of."

14.
In
the
instant
matter,
admittedly, no such effort had been made
by the learned Magistrate to ensure
adequate legal aid to the accused petitioner
and appropriate opportunity of hearing at
the time judicial remand. Even the arrest
memo does not contain any column
regarding
grounds
of
arrest
of
the
petitioner. This very issue is primarily the
bone of contention between the parties in
the instant matter. Accordingly, this, being
a clear non-compliance of the mandate
under Section 50 of the Code which has
been introduced to give effect to Article
22(1) of the Constitution of India, 1950, we
are inclined to set aside the impugned order
in view of law laid down by the Apex
Court in Prabir Purkayastha (supra),
Pankaj Bansal (supra) and Ashish Kakkar
(supra).

15. In such view of the matter, the
impugned order dated 26.12.2024 is hereby
set aside. The arrest of the petitioner is also
quashed.

16. The petitioner shall be set at
liberty, unless required in connection with
any other case.

17. In light of the above, the writ
petition is allowed.

18. Let the order be communicated
to Director General of Police, Uttar Pradesh
through Registrar General of this Court and
accordingly, a circular be issued to all the
Commissioners of Police/ SSPs/ SPs for
necessary compliance of Section 50 and
26 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
50A (now Section 47 and 48 BNSS) in the
light of the observations made above.
----------
(2025) 4 ILRA 26
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.04.2025
BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ BHATIA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 2997 of 2022

Smt. Kusum ...Petitioner
Versus
Anand Kumar & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Deepak Kumar, Vindeshwri Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Vivek Kumar Pandey, Mahendra Pratap
Singh, Vivek Shukla

A. Insurance Law - Insurance Act, 1938 -
Section
39(7)
-
Entitlement
to
get
insurance benefits - Rights of nominee
vis-a-vis legal heirs - Held, the nominee
cannot be held to be the owner of the
money lying in the account. Section 39(7)
also has to be interpreted to hold that the
beneficial nominee cannot be said to be
the owner of the money out of the
proceeds of policy - The nominee would
not unsettle the rights of the legal heirs by
virtue of the respective succession act.
[Para 4, 35(i) and 35(ii)]

B. Interpretation of statute - The pari
materia provision contained in Section
39(7) of the Insurance Act cannot be
interpreted
in
contradiction
to
the
interpretation
of
the
pari
materia
provision contained in Section 45-ZA(2) of
the Banking Regulation Act. (Para 13)

C. Interpretation of statute - Harmonious
construction
-
When
two
statutes
operating in different fields are called
upon
for
conciliation,
harmonious
construction is to be adopted - On
harmonious interpretation of the two
provisions i.e. Insurance Act and Hindu
Succession Act, the rights conferred by
Hindu Succession Act will prevail over
the rights claimed by the nominee under
Section 39(7) of the Insurance Act, the
succession
act
being
specific
to
succession
in
contradiction
to
the
Insurance Act which is general. [Para 27
and 35(iii)]

D. Interpretation of statute - General
law
Vs
Specific
law
-
Generalia
specialibus
non
derogant
and
generalibus specialia - Applicability -
When two statutes which are operating
in
different
fields
are
up
for
interpretation, the Special Act would
prevail over the General Act. (Para 27)

Petition dismissed. (E-1)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Smt. Sarbati Devi & anr.Vs Smt. Usha Devi;
(1984) 1 SCC 424

2. Ram Chander Talwar & anr. Vs Devender
Kumar Talwar & ors.; (2010) 10 SCC 671

3. Shweta Singh Huria & ors. Vs Santosh Huria
& ors.; AIR 2021 Delhi 121

4.
Mallela
Manimala
Vs
Mallela
Lakshmi
Padmavathi & ors.; 2023 SCC OnLine AP 459

5. W.P. (M.D.) No. 11044 of 2021; K.R. Sakthi
Murugeswari Vs The Division Manager, Life
Insurance Corporation of India & ors. decided
on 16.10.2023 : 2023/MHC/4812

6. RFA No.100471 of 2023; Smt. Neelavva @
Neelamma Vs Smt. Chandravva @ Chandrakala
@ Hema & ors. decided on 20.02.2025

7. Shakti Yezdani & anr.Vs Jayanand Jayant
Salgaonkar & ors.; (2024) 4 SCC 642

8. Arun Kumar Singh Vs Jaya w/o Chetan Singh
Chouhan & ors.; 2022 SCC OnLine MP 5948

9. KSL and Industries Ltd. Vs Arihant Threads
Ltd.
&
ors.;
(2009)
9
SCC
763