# Manmindar Singh v. M/s Chandra Cold Storage and others

- **Citation:** (2000) 2 ILRA 31
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 1999-02-23
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/manmindar-singh-v-m-s-chandra-cold-storage-and-others-39441
- **Pages:** 5

## Text

2All] Manmindar Singh V. M/s Chandra Cold Storage and others
31
reimbursement of medical expenses. This
counter affidavit was sworn on the last day of
July 1999 but there is no explanation for nonsanctioning the amount. The learned standing
counsel could not make any statement even
today
whether
the
amount
has
been
sanctioned, if not why. The petitioner is only
an Assistant in the office. The open-heart
surgery was performed in 1993. Even though
the expenditure incurred was Rs. 60,445=05
the
petitioner
did
not
object
to
recommendation of Rs. 42,277=00 only. He is
running for more than six and half years for
reimbursement of the amount spent by him on
his medical treatment. Since there is no
explanation it has to be accepted that
petitioner
is
entitled
to
the
amount
recommended by the Additional Director
(Chikistsa Upchar), Lucknow. It appears due
to long delay the responsibility is being
avoided. This is not fair to the petitioner. It is
unfortunate that even when there is no dispute
the authorities for the reasons best known to
them are not acting promptly. This leads to
unnecessary litigation and expenses. This
court directed the respondents to pay within
three months or show cause. The respondent
did not pay due attention to this order. In any
case the papers having been forwarded in May
1999, there appears no justification for
sanctioning authority to keep quiet. There is
no option but to direct respondents to make
payment
of
the
recommended
amount
immediately.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner
claims that on a sum of Rs. 42,277=00 he is
also entitled for interest at the rate of 18% per
annum which is opposed by the learned
standing counsel. The delay in payment is due
to the conduct of the employees in the
respondents office. The papers were received
in 1993 in Directors office but no action could
be taken for six years. The employees have no
doubt been suspended but that does not
redress the grievance of the petitioner. He has
to be compensated for this delay. In any case
once the Director of Health and Family
Welfare, U.P. Lucknow approved this amount
in 1995 it was the responsibility of the
authorities to ensure its payment. In my
opinion interest of justice will be served if an
interest of 12% per annum is awarded to the
petitioner from the date the Additional
Director
(Chikitsa
Upchar),
Lucknow
recommended
the
amount
of
medical
reimbursement.

6. In the result the writ petition succeeds
and is allowed. Writ of mandamus is issued to
respondent no.1 to sanction sum of Rs.
42,277=00 medical reimbursement to the
petitioner alongwith 12% interest and pay it
within a period of two months from the date a
certified copy of; this order is produced before
respondent no.1. It is clarified that 12%
interest payable to the petitioner shall be
calculated
from
28.1.1995,
when
the
Additional
Director
(Chikitsa
Upchar)
Lucknow
recommended
the
medical
reimbursement.

The petitioner shall be entitled to his
costs.

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By the Court

1. This appeal is directed against the
judgement and order dated 12.2.1999 passed
in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5350 of 1999
in Re: Chandra Cold Storage Versus State of
U.P. and others as well as against the order
dated 23.2.1999 passed on the Modification
Application moved in the writ petition
aforestated.

2. Respondent M/s. Chnadra Cold Storage
had taken certain loan from the Bank of India,
Fatehgarh Branch, Farrukhabad which was
repayable in instalments. It appears that on
default being made in payment of the
instalments a writ of demand and citation was
issued which was challenged in Civil Misc.
Writ Petition No. 30427 of 1998. The writ
petition came to the disposed of vide
judgement and order dated 18.9.1998 thereby
directing that the petitioner therein would
deposit the entire amount of loan in trimonthly four instalments. It was provided that
the first instalment would be payable on or
before 31.12.1998 up to which dated the
proceeding for recovery would remain stayed
and upon deposit of the first instalment seal
and lock put on the petitioner's cold storage
would be removed by the District Magistrate
and the recovery proceeding would remain
stayed so long as the petitioner went on
depositing the instalments. In the event of
failure to deposit any of the instalments, it
was provided that the stay order would cease
to be operative. It appears that the respondent
deposited a sum of Rs.3,00,000/- but failed to
deposit the entire outstanding dues whereupon
the cold storage of the respondent was put to
auction
on
31.1.1999
pursuant
to
an
advertisement in that regard published in
Amar Ujala and Dainik Jagran on 21.11.1999.
The appellant herein was the highest bidder
having
offered
Rs.52,40,000/-
for
the
purchase of the properties belonging to M/s.
Chandra Cold Storage. He deposited a sum
of Rs.1,00,000/- in cash and Rs.12,10,000/- in
the shape of bankers cheque no. E.M.G./C
No. 968833 dated 30.1.1999 on the fall of the
fall of the hammer in his favour. The rest of
the 3/4th amount i.e. Rs.39,30,000/- is said to
have been deposited on 10.2.1999 vide
another hankers cheque.

3. The writ petition giving rise to this
Special Appeal came to be filed by the
respondent cold storage challenging the
aforestated auction sale. The learned Single
Judge after hearing the counsel for the parties
directed that 3/4th of the outstanding amount
of loan might be deposited by 15th March,
1999 and the remaining 1/4th outstanding
amount of loan by 30th April, 1999. This
direction contained an stipulation that in the
event of default to deposit 3/4th of the
outstanding amount of loan the sale already
held would be confirmed after 15th March,
1999. A clarification application was filed on
the premises that it was not clear as to what
2All] Manmindar Singh V. M/s Chandra Cold Storage and others
33
amount was to the deposited under the orders
of the Court. The said application came to the
disposed of by the order dated 23.2.1999 with
the direction that the petitioner, (respondent
herein) would deposit 3/4th of the amount
which was due to be paid by it with the
respondent bank by the date fixed by order
dated 12.9.1999. The two orders dated
12.2.1999 and 23.2.1999 are under challenge
in this Special Appeal.

4. We have had heard Sri Y.K. Saxena for
the appellant and Sri R.N. Singh, Senior
Advocate for the respondent clod storage.

5. The submissions made by Sri Y.K.
Saxena, learned counsel for the appellant is
three fold. Firstly, that the writ petition giving
rise
to
this
Special
Appeal
was
not
maintainable in view of the fact that earlier
the respondent cold storage had filed a writ
petition challenging the recovery proceeding
which had been disposed of by fixing certain
instalments and the second Writ Petition
challenging the auction proceeding was being
based on the same cause of action was not
maintainable; secondly, that the petitioner had
on alternative remedy under the provisions of
the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms
Act,
1050
and
Rules
made
thereunder; and thirdly, that the learned Single
Judge ought not to have issued direction a in
exercise of power under Article 226 of the
Constitution which had the effect of depriving
the appellant of his right to get the auction
sale confirmed after expiry of 30 days from
the dated of auction. Sri R.N. Singh, Senior
Advocate appearing for the respondent cold
storage has submitted that the writ petition
giving rise to this Special Appeal was based
on a different cause of action; that the
alternative remedy stipulated under the U.P.
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950 (hereinafter refereed to as the Act of
1950) was not an absolute bar; and that the
appellant had no vested right to get the
auction sale confirmed which was not held
after giving thirty days clear notice.
6. In so far the maintainability of the Writ
Petition is concerned suffice it to say that the
alternative remedy being no an absolute bar
we are not inclined to dismiss the writ petition
on the plea of alternative remedy particularly
in view of the fact that in compliance of the
order dated 12.2.1999 and 23.2.1999 of the
learned Single Judge, the respondent cold
storage deposited the entire outstanding
amount, on the deposit of which the auction
sale could have been set aside by the
Collector in exercise of power under Rule
285-H of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Rules, 1952 (hereinafter refereed to
as the Rules) and the appellant herein has
already withdrawn the amount so deposited.

Coming to the question whether the
appellant has any vested right to the sale
being confirmed we may refer to the related
provisions. Rule 285-H Rules provides that
any person whose holding or other immovable
property has been sold under the Act may, at
any time within thirty days from the date of
sale apply to have the sale set aside on his
depositing in the Collector's office :-

"a) for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal
to 5 per cent of the purchase money; and

b) for payment on account of the arrears, the
amount specified in the proclamation in Z.A.
Form 74 as that for the recovery of which the
sale was ordered, less any amount which may,
since the date of such proclamation of sale,
have been paid on that account; and

c) the costs of the sale."

7. It is further provided therein that on the
making of such deposit the Collector shall
pass on order setting aside the same. It may
be observed that though earlier there was
some dispute at the Bar as to whether the
entire amount stipulated in Rule 285-H of
Rules of 1952 had been deposited by the
respondent cold storage but on 7.2.2000 when
the matter came up for hearing it was agreed
INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2000
34
at the Bar that the respondent clod storage had
deposited the entire amount which has already
been withdrawn by the appellant herein. The
auction sale has not been confirmed till date.
True, on the expiration of the 30 days from
the date of sale the Collector was enjoined to
pass an order confirming the sale after
satisfying himself that the purchase of the
land in question by the bidder would not
contravene the provisions of Section 154 of
Act of 1950 provided that no application as
mentioned in Rule 285-H and 285-I of the
Rules of 1952 had been made for cancellation
of the auction sale or if made had been
rejected by the Collector. A learned Single
Judge of this Court has held in Raghunath
Prasad Versus Board of Revenue 1987 R.D.
380 that the highest bidder would acquire
right, title or interest in the property only after
the confirmation of the sale and till then he
would not acquire any interest in the property
merely on his depositing the amount of
highest bid offered at the auction sale and
further that the Collector, apart from having a
power regarding making of confirmation of
sale or its refusal as envisaged under Rule
285-J of the Rules has also an inherent power
either to accept or reject the highest bid on
the
ground
that
the
bid
offered
was
inadequate. We agree with the view taken in
Rathunath Prasad (Supra) and accordingly
held that the appellant herein acquired no
right in the property merely because he had
deposited the entire amount offered by him at
the auction sale. On merit also the auction
sale was liable to be set aside firstly due to the
reason the 30 days clear notice was not given
and secondly, because 25% of the amount of
the bid was not deposited "immediately" as
stipulated by Rule 285-D of the Rules of 1952
inasmuch as the deposit by cheque was not a
valid deposit as per law laid down by the
Apex Court in Mahmood Ahmad Khan
(dead) through L.Rs. Versus Ranbir Singh and
others, 1995 A.W.C. 896. We are of the view
that the auction sale was no sale at all in the
eye of law and 25% of the purchase money
had not been deposited "immediately" on the
appellant being declared as the highest bidder.
In the circumstances it would be deemed that
no sale had taken at all as held by the Apex
Court in Mani Lal Mohana Lal Versus Syed
Ahmed, AIR 1954 SC 349.
8. In so far as the question whether the
order passed by the learned Single Judge has
the effect of defeating the provisions of Rules
285-H and 285-I of the Rules of 1952 is
concerned, it has been submitted by Shri
Y.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the appellant
that the statute provides 30 days time to
deposit the amount or move an application
before the Commissioner with the same
period for setting aside the sale to get an order
of cancellation on the ground that there had
been
material
irregularity
to
avoid
confirmation thereof stands defeated by the
order passed by the learned Single Judge who
gave time up to 30.4.1999 to deposit the entire
amount. In our opinion the submission made
by the learned counsel is misconceived. As
stated (Supra) the appellant acquired no
vested right to get the auction sale confirmed
automatically and that apart the power of this
Court to extend the period of depositing the
amount stipulated in Rule 285-H of the Rules
of 1952 is not in any manner fathered by
Rule 285-J of the Rules. In Gulab Chandra
Vs. Bahuria Ram Murat Koar, 1911 Indian
Cases 268 (13 Calcutta Law Journal 432) a
question arose as to whether the Court had the
power under Section 11 of the Court Fees Act
to enlarge the time fixed for payment of court
fees even when the application to enlarge the
time was made after the expiry of the time
within which the court fees were ordered to
be paid. It has been held by Calcutta High
Court in that case that, "It is not reasonable
construction of Section 11 of the Court fees
Act to hold that the Court has no power to
enlarge the time originally fixed for the
payment of court fees" and further that"
application to the Court to enlarge the time for
giving security might be made either before or
after the expiration of the time within which
the security had been ordered to be furnished,
2All] Hari Nath Singh Yadav V. The Administrator/Chairman, P. C.F. and others
35
and the Court might thereupon enlarge the
time according to any necessity which might
arise, where it was proper that they should do
so." The High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution has the power not only to issue
prerogative writs but it can also issue such
orders or directions as may be deemed fit and
proper in the ends of justice for the
enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III
and "for any other purpose." In the fact
situation of the case discussed above, the
learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was
justified in giving time to the respondent cold
storage to make necessary deposits and avoid
confirmation of the auction sale. The
appellant suffered no loss since he had
acquired no vested right to get the auction sale
confirmed. The auction sale suffered from
serious
infirmities
and
irregularities
in
conduct thereof. We are, therefore, not
inclined to interfere with the order passed by
the learned Single Judge.

9. The appeal fails and is dismissed
without there being any order as to costs.
Appeal dismissed.

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By the Court
1. Heard Learned counsel for the parties.

2. The petitioner is challenging the
impugned order dated 8.6.1999 Annexure 27
to the writ petition by which his service had
been terminated and recovery has been
ordered against him. The petitioner was an
employee of the U.P. Co-operative Federation
having been appointed on 21.12.1966 as
Assistant Accountant and thereafter he was
promoted in June 1981 as superintendent. In
1989 he was posted as District Manger of the
Federation at Etah when he was suspended
but the suspension order was stayed by the
High Court on 7.5.1990 as stated in paragraph
5 of the writ petition. Thereafter an enquiry
was held and his service was terminated.
Hence this petition.

3. Several ground have been taken by the
petitioner in this petition but it is not
necessary for us to go into all of them as we
are of the opinion that this petition deserves to
be allowed on one ground alone.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in