# Manoj Bansal & Ors v. State Of U.P. & Anr - **Citation:** (2016) 7 ILRA 218 - **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad - **Decided:** 2016-07-05 - **Bench:** Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi - **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/manoj-bansal-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-44017 - **Pages:** 5 ## Text 218 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 11. In Deva Raj Vs. U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow & Ors., AIR 1977 Allahabad 452, a Division Bench of this Court had examined the provisions of Section 51 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, which is similar to the provisions of Section 164 of the Electricity Act, 2003 and observed that in view of the notification issued by the State Government under Section 51 of the 1910 Act read with Section 10 of the Telegraphs Act, the respondents have the power to instal the towers on the land owned by a person. Similarly the Madras High Court, in E. Venkatesan & Ors. Vs. Chairman, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Madras & Ors., AIR 1977 Madras 64 while dealing with the powers under Section 51 of the Act of 1910, also observed :- "From the above settled position of law, it is clear that when the Electricity Board exercises power under Section 51 of the Electricity Act read with Section 10 of the Telegraphs Act, they are not acquiring any land. They are only making use of the land for the purpose of laying electricity lines for which full compensation is given for the damage caused. It is also clear therefrom that no notice is required to the owner before laying the poles or constructing any tower, nor any consent is required from them." 12. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, this Court is of the considered opinion that the construction of transmission power service lines cannot be stopped for want of payment of compensation. However, an appropriate direction can be issued to the competent authority for determining the compensation in accordance with law and pay the same to the tenure holders over whose land the towers are being erected. 13. We accordingly dispose of this petition, with liberty to the petitioners to move an appropriate application before the concerned District Magistrate with regard to their claim alongwith certified copy of this order and other supported materials, whereupon the District Magistrate shall pass appropriate orders on the claim of the petitioners for compensation in accordance with law within three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. ---------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CRIMINAL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.07.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MRS. VIJAY LAKSHMI, J. Application U/S 482 No.- 34386 Of 2015 Manoj Bansal & Ors. ...Applicants Versus State Of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties Counsel for Applicants: Ram Kishore Pandey 7 All. Manoj Bansal & Ors. Vs State Of U.P. & Anr. 219 Counsel for Opposite Parties: G.A., Manoj Kumar Srivastava, Sudhir Shukla In the present application applicant had filled the affidavit to bring the compromise on record which was entered between the parties and the order passed by the learned A.C.J.M., Pilibhit on the said compromise which shows that the said compromise has been duly verified and accepted by the learned trial court. Counsel for opposite party no. 2 has opposed on the ground that the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. being non compoundable, the matter cannot be settled by way of compromise. In (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303; Gian Singh Versus State of U.P., a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of Supreme Court has held as under :- "Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor." Court observed that in view the fact that the parties have put to an end their all disputes by means of settlement, it does not appear just and proper to continue the criminal proceedings under Section 498-A I.P.C. against the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law that too in a case where no injury has been caused to the victim. Application is allowed and the entire proceedings of Case No. 1051 of 2015 ( State Vs. Manoj Bansal and others) arising out of Case Crime No. 508 of 2014, under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. and Section 3⁄4 of D.P. Act, Police Station Amariyan, DistrictPilibhit including charge sheet no. 9 of 2015 pending in the court of A.C.J.M.-IInd, Pilibhit are hereby quashed. (Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Vijay Lakshmi, J.) 1. Learned counsel for both the parties are present. 2. Learned counsel for the applicant has filed an affidavit today to bring on record the compromise entered into between the parties and the order passed by the learned A.C.J.M., Pilibhit on the said compromise which shows that the said compromise has been duly verified and accepted by the learned trial court. He prays that in view of the facts as mentioned in the said compromise the continuance of criminal proceedings are nothing but a futile exercise and the same may be quashed. 3. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 has no objection but learned A.G.A. has opposed on the ground that the offence under Section 498-A I.P.C. being non compoundable, the matter cannot be settled by way of compromise. 4. In so far as the contention of learned A.G.A. regarding the non compoundability of offence under Section 498-AI.P.C. is concerned, in a catena of judgments the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laiddown the guidelines and has directed the High Courts to exercise its inherent powers and to quash the criminal proceedings of the F.I.R. or the complaint in view of the compromise even in the cases related to non compoundable offences. 220 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 5. In (2012) 10 Supreme Court Cases 303; Gian Singh Versus State of U.P., a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of Supreme Court has held as under :- "Where High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that dispute between the offender and victim has been settled although offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrong doing that seriously endangers and threatens well-being of society and it is not safe to leave the crime- doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation......... .... However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to victim and the offender and victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or F.I.R if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard and fast category can be prescribed. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, 7 All. Manoj Bansal & Ors. Vs State Of U.P. & Anr. 221 etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." 6. In (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675; B.S. Joshi and others Versus State of Haryana and another, in paragraphs 14 and 15 the Supreme Court has held as under : - "14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian Penal Code. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 382 of the Code." 7. In (2008) 4 Supreme Court Cases 582; Madan Mohan Abbot Versus State of Punjab, the Supreme Court has held in paragraph 6 as under : - "6. We need to emphasize that it is perhaps advisable that in disputes where the question involved is of a purely personal nature, the Court should ordinarily accept the terms of the compromise even in criminal proceedings as keeping the matter alive with no possibility of a result in favour of the prosecution is a luxury which the Courts, grossly overburdened as they are, cannot afford and that the time so saved can be utilized in deciding more effective and meaningful litigation. This is a common sense approach to the matter based on ground of realities and bereft of the technicalities of the law." 8. Hence in view of the judgment of the Apex Court it is clear that in the interest of justice, even non compoundable cases which are settled between the parties, can be decided in terms of the settlement between the parties. 222 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES 9. Keeping in view the fact that the parties have put to an end their all disputes by means of settlement, it does not appear just and proper to continue the criminal proceedings under Section 498-A I.P.C. against the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law that too in a case where no injury has been caused to the victim. 10. In view of the above application is allowed and the entire proceedings of Case No. 1051 of 2015 ( State Vs. Manoj Bansal and others) arising out of Case Crime No. 508 of 2014, under Sections 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. and Section of D.P. Act, Police Station Amariyan, District Pilibhit including charge sheet no. 9 of 2015 pending in the court of A.C.J.M.-IInd, Pilibhit are hereby quashed. ----------- ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL SIDE DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.07.2016 BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUDHIR AGARWAL, J. THE HON'BLE PRABHAT CHANDRA TRIPATHI, J. Writ A No.- 39215 Of 1998 Anil Kumar Singh ...Petitioner versus State Of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents Counsel for Petitioner: Ashok Khare, A.K. Singh, B.N.Singh Counsel for Respondents: C.S.C., Gautam Baghel, Prakash Padia, V.K.Singh In the present writ the Petitioner Anil Kumar Singh has challenged impugned advertisement No. 1 of 1998 (Annexure 28 to the writ petition), whereby Allahabad University, Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as 'University') has advertised one post of Librarian in pay scale of Rs.4500-7300/- in daily newspaper 'Rojgar Samachar' dated 7- 13/11/1998. He has also sought mandamus commanding respondents to comply with Government Orders dated 18.2.1995 and 26.7.1995 and in compliance thereto, transfer Library of Kali Prasad University College (hereinafter referred to as 'College') to University Library and adjust petitioner against post of 'Librarian' in the Library of University with all consequential benefits. Lastly, he has prayed for placing him in pay scale of Rs. 4500-7300 w.e.f 26.7.1995 pursuant to Government Order dated 29.2.1996, and make regular disbursement of salary and also pay arrears of salary from July, 1995. It has not been argued before the court that petitioner is a person who can be said to be appointed as 'Librarian' in accordance with provisions of Statutes under Central Act, 2005. There is no other provision brought to the notice of the court under which a person appointed by a Principal of College can be absorbed as 'Librarian' of University which is a separate individual post governed by different Statutes and petitioner has never been appointed, following the aforesaid procedure prescribed in the Statutes.