# Manoj Singh v. State of U.P. &Anr

- **Citation:** (2019) 1 ILRA 95
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2019-04-05
- **Case number:** CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. 33417 of 2017
- **Bench:** Saumitra Dayal Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/manoj-singh-v-state-of-u-p-anr-44507
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Section 138 Negotiable Instrument
Act, 1881- dishonour of cheque issued by
a sole proprietorship firm - not arrayed
as party in complaint case - no need to
array sole proprietary concern separately
-
application
challenging
complaint
dismissed
(Para 20& 23)

B. Section 141 of Negotiable Instrument
Act, 1881 - sole proprietary concern - is
only a trade name - it is neither a natural
nor a juristic person - not required to be
arrayed as party accused - Supreme Court
decision in Aneeta Haada distinguished

The relevance to array both the juristic person
i.e., company or partnership firm and natural
person i.e., directors or partners of the
company or firm so as to the directors and
partners make be held vicariously liable for the
wrongful act of the company or firm. However,
to the contrary, the sole proprietary concern is
the trade name of the business of the person
who conducts it. No two person/entity exist.
Therefore, it is not necessary to array the sole
proprietorship concern as an accused party to
the case. (Para 14 & 15)

C. Explanation (a) to Section 141 of
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881- whether
sole proprietary concern falls within the
meaning of the term 'Company' or 'Firm'
used in the provision - not body corporate as
not artificially incorporated under general or
special statute - cannot be said to be an
association of individuals because at least
two individuals form it - sole proprietary
concern remains the identified to the
individual who owns it - it does not have
separate/independent legal existence

There is a legal fiction created in law which
separates the entity from the person who
created it as in case of company or partnership
Firm. But on the other hand in case of a sole
proprietary concern it remains one. The trade
name does not constitute an entity different
from its owner - the sole proprietor. Second,
the partner to a firm has been artificially
equated to a director of a company. The
director or partners have vicarious liability
towards the artificial person. Therefore, the
artificial person i.e., the company or the firm
and natural persons i.e., the partners or
directors both are impleaded as an accused
person in any complaint. On the other hand,
this
principle
is
not
applicable
to
sole
proprietary concern.
Chronological List of Case Cited: -

## Text

1 All. Manoj Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
95
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on
the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of
weapons used etc. However, such an
exercise by the High Court would be
permissible only after the evidence is
collected after investigation and the charge
sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during
the trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in
paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of
this Court in the case of Narinder Singh
(supra) should be read harmoniously and to
be read as a whole and in the circumstances
stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power
under Section 482 of the Code to quash
the criminal proceedings in respect of
non-compoundable offences, which are
private in nature and do not have a
serious impart on society, on the ground
that there is a settlement/compromise
between the victim and the offender, the
High Court is required to consider the
antecedents of the accused; the conduct of
the accused, namely, whether the accused
was absconding and why he was
absconding, how he had managed with
the
complainant
to
enter
into
a
compromise etc."

9. The object of criminal law is
primarily to visit the offender with certain
consequences. He may be made to suffer
punishment or by paying compensation to
the victim, but the law at the same time also
provides that it may not be necessary in
every
criminal
offence
to
mete
out
punishment, particularly, if the victim wants
to bury the hatchet. If the offender and victim
want to move on in a matrimonial cases, they
may be allowed to compound the offences in
terms of settlement. Considering the facts
and circumstances of the case, as on date in
the light of dictum and guideline laid down
by the Apex Court as mentioned above, I
think the interests of justice would be met, if
the prayer of parties is acceded to and the
criminal proceedings and other litigation
between the parties is brought to an end.

On making settlement between
the parties in a matrimonial dispute, the
chance of ultimate conviction is bleak and
therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be
served by allowing a criminal prosecution
against the applicants to continue.

10. As a fallout and consequence of
above discussions, the impugned chargesheet dated 23.07.2018 arising out of Case
Crime No. 0005 of 2017, cognizance
order
dated
05.04.2019
and
entire
proceedings of case no.8333 of 2018
(State Vs. Alok Jaiswal and others), under
Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506, 406 IPC
and 3/4 D.P. Act, Police Station Mahila
Thana, District -Allahabad pending in the
court of 18th Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate,
Allahabad
against
the
applicants are hereby quashed.

11. The instant application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. is allowed in terms of
compromise as mentioned above.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.05.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SAUMITRA DAYAL SINGH, J.

CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION No. 33417 of 2017
(u/s -482 Cr. P.C.)

Manoj Singh ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. &Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sarita Mishra
96 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Section 138 Negotiable Instrument
Act, 1881- dishonour of cheque issued by
a sole proprietorship firm - not arrayed
as party in complaint case - no need to
array sole proprietary concern separately
-
application
challenging
complaint
dismissed
(Para 20& 23)

B. Section 141 of Negotiable Instrument
Act, 1881 - sole proprietary concern - is
only a trade name - it is neither a natural
nor a juristic person - not required to be
arrayed as party accused - Supreme Court
decision in Aneeta Haada distinguished

The relevance to array both the juristic person
i.e., company or partnership firm and natural
person i.e., directors or partners of the
company or firm so as to the directors and
partners make be held vicariously liable for the
wrongful act of the company or firm. However,
to the contrary, the sole proprietary concern is
the trade name of the business of the person
who conducts it. No two person/entity exist.
Therefore, it is not necessary to array the sole
proprietorship concern as an accused party to
the case. (Para 14 & 15)

C. Explanation (a) to Section 141 of
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881- whether
sole proprietary concern falls within the
meaning of the term 'Company' or 'Firm'
used in the provision - not body corporate as
not artificially incorporated under general or
special statute - cannot be said to be an
association of individuals because at least
two individuals form it - sole proprietary
concern remains the identified to the
individual who owns it - it does not have
separate/independent legal existence

There is a legal fiction created in law which
separates the entity from the person who
created it as in case of company or partnership
Firm. But on the other hand in case of a sole
proprietary concern it remains one. The trade
name does not constitute an entity different
from its owner - the sole proprietor. Second,
the partner to a firm has been artificially
equated to a director of a company. The
director or partners have vicarious liability
towards the artificial person. Therefore, the
artificial person i.e., the company or the firm
and natural persons i.e., the partners or
directors both are impleaded as an accused
person in any complaint. On the other hand,
this
principle
is
not
applicable
to
sole
proprietary concern.
Chronological List of Case Cited: -

1. (1998) 5 SCC 567 Ashok Transport Agency
Vs. Awadhesh Kumar
2. (2015) 1 SCC 617 Bhagwati Vanaspati
Traders Vs. Supt. Of Post Offices,

3. (2007) 5 SCC 103 Raghu Lakshminarayanan
Vs. Fine Tubes

4. 1992 (74) Company Cases 749 Sri Sivaskthi
Industries Vs. Arihant Metal Corporation

5.
1994
(80)
Company
Cases
656
P.
Muthuraman Vs. Padmavathi Finance (Regd)

6. 2002 (111) Company Cases 400 S.K. Real
Estates and Another Vs. Ahmed Meera

7. (2014) 6 SCC (Cri) Aneeta Handa Vs
Godfather Travels and Tours Private limited
and Anr.,

8. Application u/s 482 No. 31101 of 2013
Hintendra Kishan Lal Jain Vs State of U.P.
&Anr.(Application u/s 482 No. 31101 of 2013)
9. (1970) 3 SCC 491 State of Madras s. C.V.
Parekh and Anr. (E-10)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh, J.)

1. Heard learned counsel for the
parties.

2.

The
present
482
Cr.P.C.
application has been filed to quash the
judgment and order dated 27.07.2017
1 All. Manoj Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
97
passed by Additional Sessions Judge,
Court No.5, Allahabad in Criminal
Revision No.345/2016 (Manoj Singh Vs.
Shakeel Ahmad) as well as order dated
20.07.2016 passed by Additional Chief
Judicial
Magistrate,
Court
No.5,
Allahabad in Complaint Case No.485 of
2014, under Section 138 Negotiable
Instrument Act, P.S- Jhunsi, DistrictAllahabad.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant
submits,
the
complaint
is
wholly
incompetent since the cheque (giving rise
to the complaint) was issued by the
'company' M/s Manoj Rice Mill that was
not impleaded as an accused person (in
the complaint). Reliance has been placed
on Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred
to as the Act). The issue is stated to be
covered by a Single Judge decision of this
Court in the Application u/s 482 No.
31101 of 2013 (Hitendra Kishan Lal
Jain Vs. State of U.P. &Anr.), decided
on 13.12.2017.

4. That case involved default/dishonour
of a cheque issued by a proprietorship firm.
After referring to Section 141 of the Act, and
relying in decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Aneeta Haada Vs. Godfather Travels
and Tours Private Limited and Anr., (2014)
6 SCC(Cri) 845, the learned Single Judge
observed:-

"Since cheques in question were
belonging to a Firm and vide explanation
appended to Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instrument Act, firms or other association
of individual are also included in the
word 'Company'. Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Aneeta Hada (supra) has
clearly held that if cheque is issued by a
Firm or Company, the Firm / Company
must be arrayed as an accused. Same
view has been expressed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the cases relied upon
by the learned counsel for the applicant
that until and unless Company or Firm is
arrayed as an accused, director or other
officials of the Company / Firm cannot be
prosecuted / punished.

............................................................
................Thus, on the sole ground of
non-arraigning of the Firm as an accused
in the complaint, the submissions raised
by the learned counsel for the applicant
that complaint proceedings are an abuse
of process of law is acceptable. It is also
pertinent to mention here that it will be
immaterial whether the Firm running in
the name and style of 'New Arihant
Trading' is a proprietorship Firm or
registered Firm."

5. Shri Madan Mohan Srivastava,
learned counsel for the opposite party no.
2 and Sri Ankit Srivastava, learned AGA,
on the other hand submit, the position in
law is otherwise. The provision of Section
141 of the Act would not apply in the case
of a sole proprietorship concern and that it
would be restricted to a duly incorporated
company or a partnership firm or an
association of persons only.

6. Having heard learned counsel for
the parties and having perused the record,
in the first place there is no dispute to the
fact that the applicant was running a sole
proprietary concern in the name M/s
Manoj Rice Mill. It was neither a
partnership firm nor a company nor any
other association of persons. Then, the
provision of Section 141 of the Act
reads:-

"141. Offences by companies.-
98 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(1) If the person committing an
offence under section 138 is a company,
every person who, at the time the offence
was committed, was in charge of, and was
responsible to the company for the
conduct of the business of the company,
as well as the company, shall be deemed
to be guilty of the offence and shall be
liable to be proceeded against and
punished accordingly:

Provided that nothing contained in
this sub-section shall render any person liable
to punishment if he proves that the offence
was committed without his knowledge, or that
he had exercised all due diligence to prevent
the commission of such offence. [Provided
further that where a person is nominated as a
Director of a company by virtue of his holding
any office or employment in the Central
Government or State Government or a
financial corporation owned or controlled by
the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, he shall not
be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.]

(2)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1), where any
offence under this Act has been committed by
a company and it is proved that the offence
has been committed with the consent or
connivance of, or is attributable to, any
neglect on the part of, any director, manager,
secretary or other officer of the company,
such director, manager, secretary or other
officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of
that offence and shall be liable to be
proceeded against and punished accordingly.

Explanation.- For the purposes
of this section,-

(a) "company" means any body
corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals; and

(b) "director", in relation to a
firm, means a partner in the firm."

7. A plain reading of the provision
makes it clear, if the person committing
the offence is a "company", in that event
every natural person responsible for such
commission as also the artificial person
namely the company shall be deemed to
be guilty of the offence and be liable to be
proceeded
against
and
punished
accordingly. Also, certain other natural
persons may be held guilty, if so proved.

8. By way of the Explanation (a)
attached to that provision of law, the term
'company' (specifically for the purpose of
Section 141 of the Act), has been defined
to mean a body corporate or a firm or any
other association of individuals. In this
statutory context, it calls for examination
whether a sole proprietary concern,
qualifies or falls within the meaning of
the term 'company' or a 'firm' used in that
provision.

9. There can be no doubt as to the
meaning to be attributed to a "body
corporate". That has to be an entity
artificially incorporated, either by a special
statute
enacted
to
incorporate
such
corporations or under a general statute such
as the Companies Act whereunder public and
private
companies
are
commonly
incorporated, or a duly constituted entity
given such status under a statute such as cooperative societies, local authorities etc.
constituted under different enactments.
However, it can never be understood to
include a proprietorship firm that is neither
incorporated nor constituted by or under any
statute.

10. As to the meaning to be
attributed to the words "association of
1 All. Manoj Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
99
individuals",
the
same
has
to
be
understood as an entity created by the free
will of more than one individual, for
furtherance of a common object or
purpose. The use of the plural form of the
word 'individual' itself leaves no room for
any doubt in that regard. Then, for any
'association' of individuals to arise, there
have to exist at least two individuals to
form it. A single individual may never
form an association with himself.

11. Thus, the phrase "association of
individuals" necessarily requires such
entity to be constituted by two or more
individuals i.e. natural persons. On the
contrary a sole-proprietorship concern, by
very description does not allow for
ownership to be shared or be joint and it
defines,
restricts
and
dictates
the
ownership to remain with one person
only. Thus, "associations of individuals"
are
absolutely
opposed
to
soleproprietorship concerns, in that sense and
aspect.

12. A 'partnership' on the other hand
is a relationship formed between persons
who willfully form such relationship with
each other. Individually, in the context of
that relationship, they are called 'partners'
and collectively, they are called the 'firm',
while the name in which they set up and
conduct their business/activity (under
such relationship), is called their 'firm
name'.

13. While a partnership results in the
collective identity of a firm coming into
existence, a proprietorship is nothing
more than a cloak or a trade name
acquired by an individual or a person for
the purpose of conducting a particular
activity. With or without such trade name,
it (sole proprietary concern) remains
identified to the individual who owns it. It
does not bring to life any new or other
legal identity or entity. No rights or
liabilities arise or are incurred, by any
person (whether natural or artificial),
except that otherwise attach to the natural
person who owns it. Thus it is only a
'concern' of the individual who owns it.
The trade name remains the shadow of the
natural person or a mere projection or an
identity that springs from and vanishes
with the individual. It has no independent
existence or continuity.

14. In the context of an offence
under section 138 of the Act, by virtue of
Explanation (b) to section 141 of the Act,
only a partner of a 'firm' has been
artificially equated to a 'director' of a
'company'. Its a legal fiction created in a
penal statute. It must be confined to the
limited to the purpose for which it has
been created. Thus a partner of a 'firm'
entails
the
same
vicarious
liability
towards his 'firm' as 'director' does
towards
his
'company',
though
a
partnership is not an artificial person. So
also, upon being thus equated, the
partnership
'firm'
and
its
partner/s
has/have to be impleaded as an accused
person in any criminal complaint, that
may be filed alleging offence committed
by the firm. However, there is no
indication in the statute to stretch that
legal fiction to a sole proprietary concern.

15. Besides, in the case of a sole
proprietary concern, there are no two
persons in existence. Therefore, no
vicarious liability may ever arise on any
other person. The identity of the sole
proprietor and that of his 'concern' remain
one, even though the sole proprietor may
adopt a trade name different from his
own, for such 'concern'. Thus, even
100 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
otherwise, conceptually, the principle
contained in section 141 of the Act is not
applicable to a sole-proprietary concern.

16. In the case of Ashok Transport
Agency v. Awadhesh Kumar, (1998) 5
SCC 567, it has been held :

"6. A partnership firm differs
from a proprietary concern owned by an
individual. A partnership is governed by
the provisions of the Indian Partnership
Act, 1932. Though a partnership is not a
juristic person but Order XXX Rule 1
CPC
enables
the
partners
of
a
partnership firm to sue or to be sued in
the name of the firm. A proprietary
concern is only the business name in
which the proprietor of the business
carries on the business. A suit by or
against a proprietary concern is by or
against the proprietor of the business. In
the event of the death of the proprietor of
a proprietary concern, it is the legal
representatives of the proprietor who
alone can sue or be sued in respect of the
dealings of the proprietary business. The
provisions of Rule 10 of Order XXX which
make applicable the provisions of Order
XXX to a proprietary concern, enable the
proprietor of a proprietary business to be
sued in the business names of his
proprietary concern. The real party who
is being sued is the proprietor of the said
business. The said provision does not
have
the
effect
of
converting
the
proprietary business into a partnership
firm. The provisions of Rule 4 of Order
XXX have no application to such a suit as
by virtue of Order XXX Rule 10 the other
provisions of Order XXX are applicable
to a suit against the proprietor of
proprietary business "insofar as the
nature of such case permits". This means
that only those provisions of Order XXX
can be made applicable to proprietary
concern which can be so made applicable
keeping in view the nature of the case."
(emphasis supplied)

17.

In
Bhagwati
Vanaspati
Traders v. Supt. of Post Offices, (2015)
1 SCC 617, it has been held:

"11. We find merit in the second
contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellant. It is indeed
true, that the NSC was purchased in the name
of M/s Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders. It is also
equally true, that M/s Bhagwati Vanaspati
Traders is a sole proprietorship concern of
B.K. Garg, and as such, the irregularity
committed while issuing the NSC in the name
of M/s Bhagwati Vanaspati Traders, could
have easily been corrected by substituting the
name of M/s BhagwatiVanaspati Traders with
that of B.K. Garg. For, in a sole proprietorship
concern an individual uses a fictional trade
name, in place of his own name".

 (emphasis supplied)

18. Directly relevant to the question
raised
in
the
present
proceedings,
inRaghu Lakshminarayanan v. Fine
Tubes, (2007) 5 SCC 103, it was
observed:

"8. The concept of vicarious
liability was introduced in penal statutes
like the Negotiable Instruments Act to
make the Directors, partners or other
persons, in charge of and control of the
business of the company or otherwise
responsible for its affairs; the company
itself being a juristic person.

9.
The
description
of
the
accused in the complaint petition is
absolutely vague. A juristic person can be
a company within the meaning of the
1 All. Manoj Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
101
provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 or
a partnership within the meaning of the
provisions of the Partnership Act, 1932 or
an
association
of
persons
which
ordinarily would mean a body of persons
which is not incorporated under any
statute. A proprietary concern, however,
stands absolutely on a different footing. A
person may carry on business in the name
of a business concern, but he being
proprietor thereof, would be solely
responsible for conduct of its affairs. A
proprietary concern is not a company.
Company in terms of the Explanation
appended to Section 141 of the Negotiable
Instruments
Act,
means
any
body
corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals. Director has
been defined to mean in relation to a firm,
a partner in the firm. Thus, whereas in
relation to a company, incorporated and
registered under the Companies Act, 1956
or any other statute, a person as a
Director must come within the purview of
the said description, so far as a firm is
concerned, the same would carry the
same meaning as contained in the
Partnership Act.

10. It is interesting to note that
the term "Director" has been defined. It is
of some significance to note that in view
of the said description of "Director",
other than a person who comes within the
purview thereof, nobody else can be
prosecuted by way of his vicarious
liability in such a capacity. If the offence
has not been committed by a company, the
question of there being a Director or his
being vicariously liable, therefore, would
not arise.

11.......

12.......

13........

14. We, keeping in view the
allegations
made
in
the
complaint
petition, need not dilate in regard to the
definition
of
a
"company"
or
a
"partnership firm" as envisaged under
Section 34 of the Companies Act, 1956
and Section 4 of the Partnership Act,
1932 respectively, but, we may only note
that it is trite that a proprietary concern
would not answer the description of either
a company incorporated under the
Companies Act or a firm within the
meaning of the provisions of Section 4 of
the Partnership Act".
 (emphasis supplied)

19. The Madras High Court, in Sri
Sivasakthi
Industries
Vs.
Arihant
Metal Corporation 1992 (74) Company
Cases
749,
P.
Muthuraman
Vs.
Padmavathi Finance (Regd) 1994 (80)
Company Cases 656 and again in S.K.
Real Estates and Another Vs. Ahmed
Meeran 2002 (111) Company Cases 400
has
consistently
held
that
a
sole
proprietorship is neither a firm nor a
company
nor
an
association
of
individuals, under section 141 of the Act.

20. In contrast, in Aneeta Haada
(supra), there existed a duly incorporated
company whose cheque signed by its
authorized signatory (Aneeta Haada), had
been dishonored giving rise to the
criminal complaint alleging commission
of offence under Section 138 of the Act.
The Supreme Court held, in the case of
offence under Section 138 of the Act
being committed by a company/juristic
person, it would be imperative to first
arraign the company (juristic person) as
an accused person. The other category of
offenders i.e. natural person/s may be
arraigned only on the touchstone of
vicarious liability.
102 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

21. That three judge decision of the
Supreme Court is based on and follows
the earlier three judge decision of that
Court inSt. of Madras Vs C.V. Parekh
and Anr. (1970) 3 SCC 491, the
principle laid down and applied being, in
the case of an offence being committed
by a juristic person, the occasion to
proceed against the person authorized by
such person would arise only if the latter
is first arraigned as an accused person
and held guilty.

22. Plainly, there is no ratio laid
down, that in case of a sole-proprietary
concern, both the business concern and
the sole proprietor would be liable to be
prosecuted or be impleaded as accused
person in the criminal complaint. To that
extent, the decision of the learned single
judge
in
Hitendra
Kishan
Lal
Jain(supra), is not based on a correct
reading of Aneeta Haada (supra).

23. The above principle enunciated in
Aneeta
Haada
(supra)
or
C.V.
Parekh(supra) has no bearing in the case
of a sole-proprietary concern. Neither
there exist two persons/accused, nor there
exists any person other than the soleproprietor whose actions may constitute
ingredients of an offence under section
138 of the Act. He is the person engaged
in the conduct of his business/'concern'
and he is the person who issues/signs the
cheque, whose dishonour is the primary
ingredient of the offence.

24. While I would otherwise have been
bound to refer the matter to the larger bench
in view of my disagreement with Hitendra
Kishan Lal Jain (supra), however, in view
of further fact that the position in law stands
clearly
enunciated
by
authoritative
pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the
case of Ashok Transport Agency v.
Awadhesh Kumar (supra) and Bhagwati
Vanaspati Traders v. Supt. of Post Offices
(supra) as followed and directly applied to
section 141 of the Act in Raghu
Lakshminarayanan v. Fine Tubes (supra),
which decisions had not been placed and
therefore not considered in Hitendra
Kishan Lal Jain (supra), it appears that that
decision of the learned single judge, is
contrary to the binding law laid down by the
Supreme Court. Also, it has been rendered
per incuriam. Being bound by the law laid
down by the Supreme Court, there is no
requirement to refer the question to a larger
bench of the Court.

25. Accordingly, there is no defect
in the complaint lodged against the
applicant, in his capacity as the sole
proprietor of the concern M/s Manoj Rice
Mill. There was no requirement to
implead his sole proprietary concern as an
accused person nor there was any need to
additionally implead the applicant by his
trade name.

26. The present application lacks
merit and is accordingly dismissed.
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ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.09.2019

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE DINESH KUMAR SINGH-I, J.

CIVIL MISC. WRIT PETITION No.13549 of 2014
(u/s -482 Cr. P.C.)

Jai Prakash Rai &Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P.&Anr. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicants:
Sri
Ali
Hasan,
Sri
Istiyaq
Ali.