# Masood Ahmad & Anr v. Sardar Jaswant Singh & Anr

- **Citation:** (2013) 3 ILRA 1184
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2013-08-07
- **Case number:** First Appeal from Order No.1963 of 2003
- **Bench:** Prakash Krishna
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/masood-ahmad-anr-v-sardar-jaswant-singh-anr-42685
- **Pages:** 7

## Headnote

Motor Vehicle Act.-1988, Section-173
First appeal from order- against order
passed by Motor Accident claim Tribunalalthough awarded Rs. 5,0000/ under
section 140-but held-claim petition not
maintainable-as the injury caused-due to
blast of tanker-which fell down 20'
beside
the
road-due
to
collusion
between truck and bus-and leakage of
petrol-held
claim
petition
is
maintainable.

Held: Para-23
Thus in view of aforesaid facts and
circumstances of the case and in view of
the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court, it can be clearly held that
"claimant
shall
be
entitled
to
compensation from Insurance Company
if it is proved that accident of deceased
arose out of use of motor vehicle

Case Law discussed:
AIR 1991 SC 1769; AIR 2000 SC 1930; AIR
1999 SC 136; AIR 2001 SC 485; 2005(1) TAC

## Text

1184 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(3)
The
decision
of
the
Commissioner under sub-section (2), shall
be final and shall not be called in question
in any court.]

6. From a perusal of the aforesaid
provision it is apparently clear that the
Registrar has been given various powers
for cancelling the registration of the
Society. Section 12D(1)(c) which was
inserted by U.P. Act No. 11 of 1984
provides that an appeal would also lie
against an order where the certificate of
renewal
has
been
obtained
by
misrepresentation or fraud.

7. In the opinion of the Court, the
appeal of the petitioner was maintainable
and that the appellate authority committed
an error in rejecting the appeal on the
ground that it was not maintainable.

8. In the light of the aforesaid, the
impugned appellate order is quashed. The
writ petition is allowed.

9. The matter is remitted back to the
appellate authority to decide the appeal of the
petitioners after hearing all the parties
concerned within 6 months from the date of
production of the certified copy of this order.
--------
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 07.08.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE PRAKASH KRISHNA, J.
THE HON'BLE VIPIN SINHA. J.

First Appeal from Order No.1963 of 2003

Masood Ahmad & Anr.
...Appellants
Versus
Sardar Jaswant Singh & Anr...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri H.P. Dubey
Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri V.C. Tyagi, Sri Pankaj Kumar Tyagi
Smt. Archana Tyagi, Sri P. Tyagi

Motor Vehicle Act.-1988, Section-173
First appeal from order- against order
passed by Motor Accident claim Tribunalalthough awarded Rs. 5,0000/ under
section 140-but held-claim petition not
maintainable-as the injury caused-due to
blast of tanker-which fell down 20'
beside
the
road-due
to
collusion
between truck and bus-and leakage of
petrol-held
claim
petition
is
maintainable.

Held: Para-23
Thus in view of aforesaid facts and
circumstances of the case and in view of
the law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court, it can be clearly held that
"claimant
shall
be
entitled
to
compensation from Insurance Company
if it is proved that accident of deceased
arose out of use of motor vehicle

Case Law discussed:
AIR 1991 SC 1769; AIR 2000 SC 1930; AIR
1999 SC 136; AIR 2001 SC 485; 2005(1) TAC
404.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Vipin Sinha, J.)

1. The present First Appeal From
Order
has
been
filed
against
the
judgement and order dated 30.04.1997
passed by Sri B.B. Roy, II Additional
District Judge, Saharanpur (Acting as
Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal) in
Accident Claim No. 108 of 1996 which
was heard and disposed off by the
aforesaid judgement and order.

2. The relief sought by this appeal is
that this Court may be pleased to allow the
appeal and set aside the judgement and order
dated 30.04.1997 passed by II Additional
District Judge, Saharanpur (Acting as Motor
Accidents
Claims
Tribunal).
3 All] Masood Ahmad and Anr. Sardar Jaswant Singh & Anr.
1185

3. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

4. The facts in brief of this case are
that; on 13.07.1995, the son of appellants
was sitting in a Bus No. U.P-11A-7950
which was about to commence its journey
from Gangoh. However, at about 08.00
A.M., a bomb blast took place inside the
bus as a result of which, a number of
persons who were sitting in the bus along
with the son of appellants got injured and
ultimately succumbed to injuries.

5. There is no dispute regarding the
date or time or place of occurrence and
there is also no dispute that there was a
bomb blast on 13.07.1995 while the bus
was standing at Gangoh in preparation for
its onward journey. On account of the said
accident, a number of persons had
received injuries and some also died. A
number of claim cases were filed before
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. The
same being Claim Petition Nos. 128 of
1995, 129 of 1995, 130 of 1995, 1 of
1996, 42 of 1996 and 108 of 1996.

6. However, as far as the present
appeal is concerned, it arises out of Motor
Accident Claims Petition No. 108 of
1996.

7. A perusal of the record also
shows that all the claim petitions were
clubbed together and were decided jointly
by a common order dated 30.04.1997.

8. It is an admitted position on
record that no written statement was filed
by either of the opposite parties in Claim
Petition No. 108 of 1996 which was
preferred by the appellants.

9. The claim petition filed by the
appellants was under Section 163A/166 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act'). The Claims
Tribunal vide its impugned order had
though awarded interim compensation to
other claimants for a sum of Rs. 50,000/-
under Section 140 of the Act however, did
not grant any interim compensation to the
appellants on the ground that they had not
sought any compensation under Section
140 of the Act.

10. However, the Tribunal after
going through the evidence on record and
various judgements as mentioned in the
order itself, came to the conclusion that
the claim itself is not maintainable and
accordingly, the Claim Petition No. 108
of
1996
was
dismissed
as
not
maintainable.

11. Aggrieved against which, the
present first appeal has been filed before
this Court.

12. The main contention of the
learned counsel for the appellants is that
the Tribunal has erred in law in rejecting
the claim preferred by the appellants
holding
that
the
same
was
not
maintainable.

13. Learned counsel for the
respondents on the other hand submits
that the tribunal was quite justified in
rejecting the Claim Petition No. 108 of
1996 along with other claim petitions on
the ground of maintainability as there was
no rash or negligent act on the part of the
driver of the Bus.

14. It was also contended by learned
counsel for the respondent that the claim
petition could not have been filed by the
appellants simultaneously under Section
163A/166 of the Act and also i.e.
Saharanpur not being a terrorist affected
1186 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
or disturbed area and as such no benefit
can be claimed merely because a bomb
explosion had taken place in the bus
which was standing at Gangoh.

15. A number of case law have been
cited at the bar. Sri V.C. Dixit has
referred few High Court judgements but
we are noticing Apex Court's precedents
only.

16. After due consideration of the
relevant case law on the point, the
position which crystallizes is herein as
under (with due reference to the citation
and the relevant extract):

(A) Shivaji Dayanu Patil Vs.
Vatschala Uttam; AIR 1991 SC 1769.

17. There was a collision between a
petrol tanker and a truck due to which the
petrol tanker went off the road and fell at
a distance of about 20 feet from the
highway leading to leakage of petrol
which
collected
nearby.
Later
an
explosion took place in the petrol tanker
resulting in fire. Number of persons who
assembled near the petrol tanker sustained
burn injuries and few of them succumbed
to the injuries. The victims filed the claim
petitions which were dismissed by the
Claims Tribunal on the ground that the
explosion and the fire had no connection
with the accident, and was altogether an
independent accident. The appeal was
allowed by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court holding that the explosion
was a direct consequence of the accident.
The Division Bench of the High Court
affirmed the findings of the learned Single
Judge against which the matter came up
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
dismissed the Special Leave Petition
holding that the explosion and fire
resulting in the injuries and death was due
to the accident arising out of the use of
the motor vehicle. The findings of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court are reproduced
herein under:

"25. These decisions indicate that the
word "use", in the context of motor vehicles,
has been construed in a wider sense to
include the period when the vehicle is not
moving and is stationary, being either parked
on the road and when it is not in a position to
move
due
to
some
break-down
or
mechanical defect. Relying on the above
mentioned decisions, the Appellate Bench of
the High Court had held that the expression
"use of a motor vehicle" in section 92-A
covers accidents which occur both when the
vehicle is in motion and when it is stationary.
With reference to the facts of the present.
case the learned Judges have observed that
the tanker in question while proceeding
along National Highway No. 4 (i.e. while in
use) after colliding with a motor lorry was
lying on the side and that it cannot be
claimed that after the collision the use of the
tanker had ceased only because it was
disabled. We are in agreement with the said
approach of the High Court. In our opinion,
the word "use" has a wider connotation to
cover the period when the vehicle is not
moving and is stationary and the use of a
vehicle does not cease on account of the
vehicle having been rendered immobile on
account of a break-down or mechanical
defect or accident. In the circumstances, it
cannot be said that the petrol tanker was not
in the use at the time when it was lying on its
side after the collision with the truck.

35. This would show that as
compared to the expression "caused by"
the expression "arising out of" has a wider
connotation. The expression "caused by"
3 All] Masood Ahmad and Anr. Sardar Jaswant Singh & Anr.
1187
was used in Sections 95(1)(b)(i) and (ii) and
96(2)(b)(ii) of the Act. In Section 92-A of the
Act, Parliament, however, chose to use the
expression "arising out of" which indicates
that
for
the
purpose
of
awarding
compensation under Section 92A, the causal
relationship between the use of the motor
vehicle and the accident resulting in death or
permanent disablement is not required to be
direct and proximate and it can be less
immediate. This would imply that accident
should be connected with the use of the
motor vehicle but the said connection need
not
be
direct
and
immediate.
This
construction of the expression "arising out of
the use of a motor vehicle" in section 92A
enlarges the field of protection made
available to the victims of accident and is in
consonance with the beneficial object
underlying the enactment.

36. Was the accident involving
explosion and fire in the petrol tanker
connected with the use of tanker as a
motor vehicle? In our view, in the facts
and circumstances of the present case, this
question must be answered in the
affirmative. The High Court has found
that the tanker in question was carrying
petrol which is a highly combustible and
volatile material and after the collision
with the other motor vehicle the tanker
had fallen on one of its sides on sloping
ground resulting in escape of highly
inflammable petrol and that there was
grave risk of explosion and fire from the
petrol coming out of the tanker. In the
light of the aforesaid circumstances the
learned Judges of the High Court have
rightly concluded that the collision
between the tanker and the other vehicle
which had occurred earlier and the escape
of petrol from the tanker which ultimately
resulted in the explosion and fire were not
unconnected but related events and
merely because there was interval of
about four to four and half hours between
the said collision and the explosion and
fire in the tanker, it cannot be necessarily
inferred that there was no Causal relation
between explosion and fire. In the
circumstances, it must be held that the
explosion and fire resulting in the injuries
which led to the death of Deepak Uttam
More was due to an accident arising out
of the use of the motor vehicle viz. the
petrol tanker No. MKL 7461.

(B) Rita Devi Vs. New India
Assurance Co. Ltd.; AIR 2000 SC 1930.

19. The deceased was employed to
drive an auto rickshaw for ferrying
passengers on hire. On the fateful day, the
auto rickshaw was parked in the rickshaw
stand at Dimapur when some unknown
passengers engaged the deceased for journey.
As to what happened on that day is not
known. It was only on the next day that the
police was able to recover the body of the
deceased but the auto rickshaw in question
was never traced out. The owner of the
rickshaw claimed compensation from the
insurance company for the loss of auto
rickshow. The heirs of the deceased claimed
compensation for the death of the driver on
the ground that the death occurred on
account of accident arising out of use of the
motor vehicle. The Apex Court held that the
heirs of the deceased would be entitled to
compensation. The question as to whether
the case of murder would be covered was
also gone into. Paras 9 and 10 are relevant
and are quoted below:

9. A conjoint reading of the above
two sub-clauses of Section 163A shows
that a victim or his heirs are entitled to
claim from the owner/Insurance Company a
compensation for death or permanent
1188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
disablement suffered due to accident arising
out of the use of the motor vehicle
(emphasis supplied), without having to
prove wrongful act or neglect or default of
any one. Thus it is clear, if it is established
by the claimants that the death or
disablement was caused due to an accident
arising out of the use of motor vehicle then
they will be entitled for payment of
compensation. In the present case, the
contention of the Insurance Company which
was accepted by the High Court is that the
death of the deceased (Dasarath Singh) was
not caused by an accident arising out of the
use of motor vehicle. Therefore, we will
have to examine the actual legal import of
the words death due to accident arising out
of the use of motor vehicle.

10. The question, therefore, is can a
murder be an accident in any given case ?
There is no doubt that murder, as it is
understood, in the common parlance is a
felonious act where death is caused with intent
and the perpetrators of that act normally have
a motive against the victim for such killing.
But there are also instances where murder can
be by accident on a given set of facts. The
difference between a murder which is not an
accident and a murder which is an accident,
depends on the proximity of the cause of such
murder. In our opinion, if the dominent
intention of the Act of felony is to kill any
particular person then such killing is not an
accidental murder but is a murder simplicitor,
while if the cause of murder or act of murder
was originally not intended and the same was
caused in furtherance of any other felonious
act then such murder is an accidental murder.

(C) Samir Chanda Vs. Managing
Director, Assam State Trans. Corporation;
AIR 1999 SC 136.

20. The Apex Court upheld the
claim for compensation in respect of
injuries were suffered by the claimant due
to bomb blast inside the vehicle relying
on the decision given in Shivaji Dayanu
Patil's case (Supra).

(D) S. Kaushnuma Begum Vs. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd.; AIR 2001 SC
485.

21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held
that the principle of strict liability propounded
in Rylands V. Fletcher 11861 AII.E.R 1 was
applicable in claims for compensation made
in respect of motor accidents. The relevant
findings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are
reproduced hereunder:

"12. Even if there is no negligence on
the part of the driver or owner of the motor
vehicle, but accident happens while the
vehicle was in use, should not the owner be
made liable for damages to the person who
suffered on account of such accident? This
question depends upon how far the Rule in
Rylands vs. Fletcher (supra) can apply in
motor accident cases. The said Rule is
summarised by Blackburn, J, thus:

The true rule of law is that the person
who, for his own purposes, brings on his land,
and collects and keeps there anything likely to
do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his
peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima
facie answerable for all the damage which is
the natural consequence of its escape. He can
excuse himself by showing that the escape
was owing to the plaintiffs default, or,
perhaps, that the escape was the consequence
of vis major, or the act of God; but, as nothing
of this sort exists here, it is unnecessary to
inquire what excuse would be sufficient.

19. Like any other common law
principle, which is acceptable to our
jurisprudence, the Rule in Rylands vs.
3 All] Masood Ahmad and Anr. Sardar Jaswant Singh & Anr.
1189
Fletcher can be followed at least until any
other new principle which excels the former
can be evolved, or until legislation provides
differently. Hence, we are disposed to adopt
the Rule in claims for compensation made
in respect of motor accidents.

20. No Fault Liability envisaged in
Section 140 of the MV Act is distinguishable
from the rule of strict liability. In the former
the compensation amount is fixed and is
payable even if any one of the exceptions to
the Rule can be applied. It is a statutory
liability created without which the claimant
should not get any amount under that count.
Compensation on account of accident arising
from the use of motor vehicles can be claimed
under the common law even without the aid
of a statute. The provisions of the MV Act
permits that compensation paid under no fault
liability can be deducted from the final
amount awarded by the Tribunal. Therefore,
these two are resting on two different
premises. We are, therefore, of the opinion
that even apart from Section 140 of the MV
Act, a victim in an accident which occurred
while using a motor vehicle, is entitled to get
compensation from a Tribunal unless any one
of the exceptions would apply. The Tribunal
and the High Court have, therefore, gone into
error in divesting the claimants of the
compensation payable to them.

(E) National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs.
Shiv Dutt Sharma; 2005 (1) TAC 404.

22. Two sets of claims were made in this
case; one relating to the accident in a bus and
the other relating to an accident where bullets
of terrorists killed the passengers of a bus. The
Jammu and Kashmir High Court held as under:

"43. On the basis of the judicial
pronouncements and the material which
has come on the record, it is concluded:

(i) That a passenger travelling in a
bus when he suffers from an injury on
account of bomb explosion or on account
of any other activity including terrorist
activity, he would be well within his
rights to claim compensation. This view is
spelt out from the decision given by the
Supreme Court of India in Shivaji Dayanu
Patil v. Vatschala Uttam Mare and the
latter decisions noticed above;

(ii) That even if a person is not
actually in the vehicle and is standing
outside and suffers an injury, even in that
case Supreme Court of India has allowed
compensation in Shavaji Dayanu Patil v.
Vatschala Uttam Mor, . Therefore, merely
because some of the victims were taken
out of the bus and thereafter shot dead,
would not make any difference;

(iii) That the material which has
come on the record justified the grant of
the compensation and the quantum
thereof is accordingly sustained.

9.
Following
the
aforesaid
judgements, it is held that the accident in
question arose out of the use of the motor
vehicle and, therefore, the claimants are
entitled to compensation under Section
163-A of the Motor Vehicle Act.

23. Thus in view of aforesaid facts and
circumstances of the case and in view of the
law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court,
it can be clearly held that "claimant shall be
entitled to compensation from Insurance
Company if it is proved that accident of
deceased arose out of use of motor vehicle."

24. Reference may also be made to
the judgement of Delhi High Court
rendered in the case of D.T.C. And Ors.
Vs. Meena Kumari And Another in
MAC. APP. No. 512-13 decided on
1190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
03.02.2010 in which the question arose
"as to whether D.T.C. is liable to pay
compensation for death of Sansar Pal due
to a bomb blast in a D.T.C. bus" and it
was held that the claimant would be
entitled to compensation.

25. This Court is of the view that the
claim petition before the Tribunal would
be maintainable.

26. Thus, the judgement and order
of the court below dated 30.04.1997 is
liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the
same is set aside inasmuch as it pertains
to Claim Petition No. 108 of 1996. The
matter is remitted back to the Tribunal to
decide the claim petition on all other
issues. It is left open to the parties to raise
all issues as they deem fit before the
Tribunal including the issue as to whether
the claim petition is maintainable under
Section 163A/166 simultaneously.

27. The Tribunal after giving
opportunity of hearing to both the parties
will decide the case preferably within a
period of six months from today keeping
in view the fact that the appellant at
present is a very senior citizen and aged
about 77 years.

28. The appeal is allowed and as
indicated above is restored to the Tribunal
to re-decide the Claim Petition No. 108 of
1996 afresh.

29. No order as to costs.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.08.2013

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE VISHNU CHANDRA GUPTA, J.

Criminal Misc. Case No.3061 of 2009
(u/s 482 Cr.P.C.)

Prabhat Chaturvedi

 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. and Anr.
 ...Opp. Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri B.M. Sahai, Sri Raj Priya Srivastava

Counsel for the Respondents:
Govt. Advocate, Sri Diwakar Nath Tiwari,
Sri I.H. Farooqui, Sri Manoj Kumar Mishra
Sri Rajendra Prasad Mishra

Code
of
Criminal
Procedure-Section
188(c)- Requirement of permission by
central Govt.-offence under section 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and Section 3/4
D.P. Act-part of offence committed at
Riyadh and partly at India-whether
without permission of central govt order
passed
by
Magistrate
at
Lucknow
without
jurisdiction?
held-where
complete offence committed at 'Riyadh'-
sanction from central government mustpart of offence demand of dowry took
place
at
Lucknow-allegation
of
ill
treatment
at
Lucknow-held-Lucknow
court has jurisdiction.

Held: Para-22 and 23
22. In view of factual matrix in case in
hand the offence committed at Riyad is
complete offence and has no nexus with
other
offence alleged
to have been
committed in India. This offence under
Section 326 IPC would not be triable
without permission granted by the Central
Government in view of proviso of Section
188 Cr.P.C. However the other offence
which has been committed in India as
alleged in the FIR and found to be
committed in India during investigation
would be tried and decided by the
Magistrate. Hence proceeding in respect
thereof may continue irrespective of the
fact that no permission of the Central
Government has been given in this case to
prosecute the petitioner for the offence
alleged to have been committed at Riyad
in
Saudi
Arab.