# Mata Baksh Singh v. State of U. P. & Ors. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 1718
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-24
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 2000170 of 2015
- **Bench:** Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra, Brij Raj Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mata-baksh-singh-v-state-of-u-p-ors-issue-for-consideration-54824
- **Pages:** 52

## Text

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1718 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 2 ILRA 1718
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 24.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SANGEETA CHANDRA, J.
THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Writ C No. 2000170 of 2015
with
Another connected cases

Mata Baksh Singh ...Petitioners
Versus
State of U. P. & Ors. ...Respondents
ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
(i) Whether the invocation of the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, and the consequent dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A, was justified in the facts
and circumstances of the case?
(ii) Whether reservation of land for "future planning" amounts to utilization?
(iii) Whether the auction and subsequent transfer in favour of the private respondent are hit by
the doctrine of lis pendens?
(iv) Whether the impugned actions result in deprivation of property otherwise than by authority
of law, infringing Article 300-A?
(v) Whether the landowner is entitled to seek reversion or challenge auction and whether
actions are arbitrary, illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 300-A?
HEADNOTE
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4, 5-A, 6, 16, 17(1), 17(4), 17(3-A) - Transfer of Property Act,
1882 - s. 52 - Constitution of India - Arts. 14, 300-A - Acquisition proceedings - Urgency clause
- Dispensation of enquiry - Auction - Lis pendens - Utilisation - Deprivation of property:
Held:
A. The condition precedent for invoking Section 17(1) is the existence of real, genuine and
compelling urgency. The appropriate Government must be satisfied that possession of the land is
urgently required and that any delay would frustrate the very purpose of acquisition, to the
extent that even the minimum statutory period prescribed for filing objections and conducting
enquiry under Section 5-A cannot be afforded without defeating the public purpose. Such urgency
must be based on objective material and due application of mind. Mere administrative exigency or
convenience, however pressing, does not meet the statutory threshold. A mechanical recital of urgency in the
notification, unsupported by reasons or contemporaneous record, is bad in law, and non-application of mind
vitiates the invocation of Section 17. The power to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A is an
extraordinary and exceptional power. The right under Section 5-A is a valuable statutory right available to the
landowner, and its exclusion cannot be resorted to as a matter of routine. Such dispensation is permissible
only in exceptional circumstances where strong and demonstrable reasons exist, justifying the elimination of
even a brief enquiry. (Para 14, 17, 23)
2 All. Mata Baksh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1719
B. The right of objection under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is not an empty formality but
a valuable and substantive right available to a landholder prior to compulsory acquisition. Dispensation of
such enquiry by invoking the urgency clause under Section 17 can be sustained only in exceptional
circumstances where the urgency is real, immediate and compelling. Any routine, casual or
mechanical exercise of this extraordinary power undermines the statutory safeguard embodied in Section 5-A
and is liable to be interdicted by constitutional courts. Section 17(4), which enables such dispensation, has the
effect of depriving the landowner of the valuable right to object and be heard; hence, it cannot be invoked
lightly or as a matter of routine. Mere planned development of a city or town does not automatically
justify invoking Section 17(4) of the Act. The possibility of encroachment or future need for land is not a
sufficient reason to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A. (Para 28, 57)

C. By insertion of sub-section (3-A) in Section 17 of the Act, it is made obligatory that 80% of the estimated
compensation must be tendered prior to taking possession. Absolute vesting of land in the State is contingent
upon compliance with this condition. The statutory scheme contemplates a clear sequence-first, payment of
80% of the estimated compensation; second, taking of possession; and third, consequent vesting. Failure to
adhere to any stage of this sequence vitiates the invocation of the emergency provision. Accordingly,
possession taken without prior payment of 80% of the estimated compensation cannot be regarded as lawful,
nor can it result in absolute vesting of the land in the State. Compulsory acquisition, undertaken in breach of
this mandatory safeguard, stands rendered illegal. Even where possession is purportedly assumed under
Section 17, non-compliance with Section 17(3-A) defeats the legal fiction of vesting. Court has held that where
such payment is not made before dispossession, the acquisition loses its character under Section 17, and in
the absence of an award within the prescribed period, the entire proceedings lapse. Thus, non-payment of
80% compensation prior to possession renders such possession unlawful, and vesting cannot be treated as
absolute or indefeasible. In the present case, the mandatory requirement under Section 17(3-A) was
admittedly not fulfilled (Paras 61, 74).

D. Article 300-A of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of property except by authority
of law. The expression "authority of law" requires that the State strictly follow the procedure prescribed under
the statute, and that the power of acquisition be exercised fairly, legally, and in accordance with all mandatory
provisions. Dispensing with the right of objection under Section 5-A casually or without genuine urgency is
neither fair nor lawful, and mechanical or arbitrary exercise of power cannot satisfy constitutional
requirements. The deprivation of the property shall be only by authority of law, be it an Act of Parliament or
State Legislature, but not by executive fiat or an order. Though the right to property is no longer a
fundamental right, it remains a constitutional right. A person can be deprived of property only by authority of
a valid law, and such law must prescribe a just, fair and reasonable procedure. State cannot take property by
executive action or in an arbitrary manner; deprivation must strictly conform to statutory provisions. Any
action not supported by valid law or taken in violation of prescribed procedure would be unconstitutional and
liable to be struck down. (Para 56, 59, 60)

E. Where land acquired for a public purpose remains unused for a considerable period and is thereafter
selectively alienated, the action ceases to serve the declared purpose and amounts to arbitrary deprivation.
The doctrine of eminent domain permits acquisition only for a predominantly public purpose, not for transfer
to private parties under the guise of development. Such selective alienation, particularly after long nonutilisation, reflects misuse of statutory power and defeats the very object of acquisition. Even if compensation
has been paid, deprivation of property in such circumstances does not satisfy the mandate of Article 300-A of
the Constitution. Consequently, the action warrants strict judicial scrutiny and cannot be sustained merely on
the ground of formal compliance with procedure.

F. The object of the proviso to Section 17 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 is to prevent
indefinite retention of land acquired for public purpose without its utilization. the proviso confers a substantive
right upon the ousted landholder to apply for restoration after five years of non-utilisation. The right so
conferred is not an empty formality but a substantive safeguard intended to ensure that land acquired for a
declared public purpose is not retained indefinitely without being put to meaningful and bonafide use. Where
1720 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
land remains unutilised for a prolonged period and the Authority fails to utilise it for the declared purpose, the
right of the landholder to seek restoration cannot be defeated by mere procedural delay or inaction. (Para 84)

G. The expression "utilization" in the relevant statutory provision connotes actual use of the land for the
purpose for which it has been acquired, and not a mere proposal, intention or reservation for an
uncertain future. Reservation of land for "future planning" is inherently contingent and indeterminate and does
not result in any present or tangible use. Mere earmarking or retention of land for a prospective project, in the
absence of concrete steps towards development or implementation, cannot in law be regarded as utilisation.
The State is not permitted to retain acquired land for an indefinite period on the vague ground of "future
planning". The land must be put to real and effective use for the stated public purpose. Utilisation must be
real, substantive and demonstrable, and not illusory, and reservation of land without actual
development or use does not satisfy the requirement of utilisation. (Paras 34, 35, 37)

H. The doctrine of lis pendens, embodied in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is founded on
public policy and mandates that during the pendency of litigation wherein rights to immovable property are
directly and substantially in issue, the property cannot be transferred so as to prejudice the rights of any party
to the lis. A transfer pendente lite is not void ab initio; however, it does not confer any independent or
superior right on the transferee, who merely steps into the shoes of the transferor and holds the property
subject to the final outcome of the proceedings. (Para 36)

I. The only ground assigned was that delay in making the land available would delay construction of the
residential scheme and affect development in the region. The Court held that such reasoning merely reflects
administrative convenience and apprehension of project delay, which are routine features of
development activities, and do not disclose any extraordinary or emergent circumstance warranting
dispensation of the statutory safeguard under Section 5-A. There was no material to indicate that
even the brief period required for conducting an enquiry under Section 5-A would frustrate the declared public
purpose. The satisfaction recorded was mechanical and not based on objective considerations.
Accordingly, invocation of Section 17 was held to be arbitrary, unconstitutional and unsustainable in
law. (Para 30)

J. The entire auction process undertaken by the Raebareli Development Authority was arbitrary, nontransparent and contrary to the mandatory Government Orders and statutory provisions. The
disputed land, originally reserved for future planning, was selectively converted into Commercial Plot C-1A and
auctioned without proper publication, correct valuation or adherence to the prescribed
procedure.The reserve price was arbitrarily and erroneously fixed, without applying the correct
commercial circle rates and mandatory additions, and in clear disregard of applicable circle rate
enhancements, coupled with non-compliance of the requirement of adequate publication in widely circulated
newspapers. As a result, the property was sold at a grossly inadequate and undervalued price.The Court
found that the auction proceedings suffered from material irregularities and procedural violations.
(Para 55)

K. The continued non-utilisation of the acquired land, its physical possession remaining with the petitioner,
coupled with the selective carving out and auction of only his land during the pendency of the proceedings,
reinforces the arbitrariness of the action. The fact that the petitioner's land alone was segregated and
promptly auctioned supports the contention that the exercise was intended to defeat his pending claim for
release of unutilised land and to render the writ petition infructuous. Such steps, undertaken only after
initiation of the writ proceedings and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the prolonged nonutilisation, cannot be treated as bona fide utilisation for the declared public purpose and are, therefore,
subject to judicial scrutiny. No material has been placed on record to indicate that the land was utilised for the
stated public purpose for several years after acquisition. The subsequent act of auctioning does not constitute
bona fide utilisation in furtherance of the original scheme, nor does it reflect any immediate necessity
connected with the declared purpose. (Para 88)
2 All. Mata Baksh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1721
L. Point No. (i) was answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. The invocation of the
urgency clause under Section 17, together with the dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A, was held to
be arbitrary, unconstitutional and unsustainable in law. It was further held that reservation of land for "future
planning", in the absence of actual development or use, does not amount to utilisation within the meaning of
the provision; accordingly, Point No. (ii) was answered in the negative. Point No. (iii) was decided in favour of
the petitioner. The Court found that the auction proceedings conducted by the Raebareli Development
Authority suffered from material irregularities and procedural violations. It was also held that invocation of the
urgency clause dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, in the absence of any real, immediate or
compelling urgency, demonstrated non-application of mind and amounted to a colourable exercise of statutory
power, the cumulative effect whereof resulted in deprivation of the petitioner's property otherwise than by
authority of law, in contravention of Article 300-A; accordingly, Point No. (iv) was answered in favour of the
petitioner. It was further held that the original landowner, whose land remained unutilised for a prolonged
period, whose compensation was not tendered in compliance with Section 17(3-A), and who continued in
physical possession till June 2023, was entitled to seek reversion/restoration and to challenge the hurried
transfer/auction. The belated carving out and auction of only the petitioner's land during pendency of the writ
proceedings, without demonstrable public purpose or bona fide utilisation, was held to be arbitrary and
tainted with malice in law, offending Article 14 and resulting in deprivation of property contrary to Article 300A; accordingly, Point No. (v) was answered in the affirmative, in favour of the petitioner and against the
respondents.

M. The Court held that the acquisition proceedings and the consequential actions of the respondents, insofar
as they related to the petitioner's land, were unsustainable in law. The invocation of urgency under Section 17
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, in the absence of any real or demonstrable urgency, and the mechanical
dispensation of the valuable right under Section 5-A, vitiated the acquisition. Further, non-compliance with the
mandatory requirement under Section 17(3-A) regarding tender of 80% compensation prior to taking
possession rendered the alleged possession illegal and incapable of conferring lawful vesting. The prolonged
non-utilisation of the land belied the claim of urgency, and the subsequent carving out and auction of Plot C1A during the pendency of the writ petition was arbitrary and not in furtherance of the declared public
purpose. (Para 104)

N. The writ petitions were allowed to the extent of the petitioner's land; the impugned auction and
consequential allotment were quashed; and the respondents were directed to restore possession to the
petitioner, subject to deposit of acquisition charges with interest at 12% per annum in terms of the proviso to
Section 17 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, upon which the land was to stand restored
free from encumbrances, and the auction purchaser was to be refunded the deposited amount with interest at
7% per annum or the prevailing bank rate, whichever was higher, within three months. (Para 104) (E-5)
CASE LAW CITED
Dora Phalauli v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 1594;
State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319;
Narayan Narayan Govind Gavate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1977 SC 183;
Dev Sharan v. State of U.P., (2011) 4 SCC 769;
Union of India v. Kishan Lal Arneja, AIR 2004 SC 3582;
Union of India v. Shiv Raj, (2010) 11 SCC 242;
Anand Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 11 SCC 242;
Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P.;
Om Prakash v. State of U.P., (1998) 6 SCC 1;
Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 596;
K. Kumara Gupta v. Sri Markendaya and Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple, 2022 (5) SCC 710 ;
Ram and Shyam Company v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267;
State of Punjab v. Mehar Din, (2022) 5 SCC 648;
1722 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Lakshmanasami Gounder v. CIT, (1992) 1 SCC 91;
State of M.P. v. Shri Ram Ragubir Prasad Agarwal, (1979) 4 SCC 686;
ICICI Bank v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (2005) 6 SCC 404.

List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894;
Transfer of Property Act, 1882;
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973;
Constitution of India.
List of Keyword
Urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Dispensation of enquiry under Section 5A; Valuable statutory right of objection under Section 5-A; Administrative convenience and apprehension of
project delay; Real, immediate and compelling urgency; Mechanical recital of urgency / Mechanical
satisfaction; Utilisation - actual use of the land; Reservation of land for future planning; Doctrine of lis
pendens / Transfer pendente lite; Arbitrary, non-transparent auction contrary to mandatory Government
Orders; Grossly inadequate and undervalued price / Throwaway price; Article 300-A - deprivation of property
except by authority of law; Illegal possession / Possession on paper; Vesting of land / Land never vested in
the State.
CASE ARISING FROM
Writ - C No. 2000170 of 2015; Writ - C No. 6261 of 2022; Writ - C No. 3283 of 2024 - a bunch of three
petitions filed by petitioner Mata Baksh Singh, relating to the acquisition proceedings initiated
by the State Government with respect to 08.08.2016 hectares of land situated in villages
Ratapur, Baraeepur and Akhtiyarpur, District Raebareli - State of U.P.
Appearances for Parties
Advs For Petitioner: Anish Srivastava Lall, Anand Shanker Asthana, Anuj Kudesia, Manish Chaudhary, Vikas
Kumar Agrawal, Shreya Chaudhary, Rinku Kumar Verma.
Advs For Respondents: C.S.C., Amarendra Kumar Bajpai, Dharmendra Kumar Dixit, Ghaus Beg, Apoorva
Tewari, Saharsh Srivastava.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Sangeeta Chandra, J.)

1. This is a bunch of three petitions filed by petitioner Mata Baksh Singh, which relate to the
acquisition proceedings initiated by the State Government with respect to 08.08.2016 ha of land
situated in three villages, Ratapur, Baraeepur, and Akhtiyarpur in District Raebareli. The State of
U.P. and the Raebareli Development Authority are the respondents in two of such Writ Petitions,
and in the third Writ Petition that has been filed in 2024, the auction purchaser of the land in
question has been arrayed as respondent no. 5 (hereinafter referred to as 'the private respondent').

2. For the purposes of clear exposition and consideration, the judgment has been divided into
the following sections-
2 All. Mata Baksh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1723
A.
Submissions of the Counsel for the Petitioner
B.
Submissions of the respondent State of Uttar
Pradesh
C.
Submissions of the Counsel for the Raibareli
Development Authority
D.
Submissions of the Counsel for the Private
Respondent
E.
Points for Consideration
F.
Analysis
G.
Conclusion

Submissions of the Counsel for the Petitioner

3. Sri Vishwajeet Singh, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri Anand Shankar Asthana,
presented the case on behalf of the petitioner and advanced his submissions as follows:

(i) The petitioner had purchased a plot admeasuring 204 sq. m. (2200 sq. ft.) out of khasra
no.201/1, situated in village Akhtiyarpur on the Lucknow Allahabad Highway, Tehsil Sadar,
District Raebareli, through a registered sale deed on 09.04.2002, and applied for mutation, which
was also done in his name. The stamp duty was inadvertently calculated at residential rates,
although the property in question was commercial in nature as it was situated adjoining the
Lucknow Allahabad Highway, and a Suit No. 5111 of 2002 was instituted against the petitioner,
which was decided on 31.05.2004, imposing a fine as well as stamp duty to the tune of Rs. 11,006/-
, which was deposited by the petitioner in the office of the Tehsildar on 15.10.2004. Consequently,
the said plot stood registered as commercial property in favour of the petitioner.

(ii) Subsequently, a Notification under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 05.04.2006 for developing a residential colony by the
Raebareli Development Authority in the name of Yatayat Nagar. A Notification under Section 6/17
was issued on 25.07.2007. Since, Section 17 was invoked, the Section 5-A enquiry was dispensed
with, and the first opportunity to file objections came to be given to the petitioner only when notice
under Section 9 was issued by the S.L.A.O.

(iii) The petitioner raised an objection before the Special Land Acquisition Officer saying
that his land was commercial and compensation be paid to him at commercial rates. An inspection
was done on 23.09.2008 and a report filed on 06.10.2008. The S.L.A.O., Raebareli, however,
1724 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
rejected such objections and calculated compensation at residential circle rate and offered
Rs.75,371/- through Award dated 30.05.2009. The petitioner did not accept the compensation but
filed a Reference application for enhancement under Section 18 of the Act, 1894. The Raebareli
Development Authority deposited compensation in the Treasury as revenue deposit on 08.02.2011.
The petitioner remained in possession of the land of khasra no. 201/1 and also filed a Suit Regular
Suit No.36 of 2015 for injunction against the Raebareli Development Authority, in which a
Commission was called for by the Civil Judge. The site was inspected and a Commission Report
was submitted on 04.04.2015, indicating the possession of the petitioner over the said land.

(iv) Subsequently, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 170 (Land Acquisition) of 2015
challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4/17 and 6/17 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894. Such writ petition was renumbered as Writ-C No. 2000170 of 2015 seeking quashing of the
acquisition notifications and the Award, relying on Pune Municipal Corporation v. Harakchand
Misirimal Solanki AIR 2014 SC 982 wherein it was held that under Section 24(2) of the Land
Acquisition Act of 2013, acquisition lapses if possession is not taken and compensation is not paid
for more than five years prior to commencement of the new Act. Government Orders dated
28.02.2014 and 24.03.2014 had directed authorities to act in accordance with the said judgment and
the petitioner relying upon them asserted that compensation was neither offered nor paid and relied
on Khatauni dated 24.03.2015 showing his continued ownership.

(v) During pendency, the petitioner also filed Writ-C No. 6261 of 2022 seeking release of
his unutilized land in khasra no. 201/1. He alleged discriminatory treatment, as similarly situated
landholders were restored possession and permitted constructions, contrary to the principle of
equality laid down in State of Karnataka v. Karnataka State Patel Sangha (2007) 4 SCC 207.

(vi) In Writ-C No. 6261 of 2022, the petitioner asserted that his land remained unutilized
for more than five years after acquisition and was therefore liable to be released under Section 17
of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. By order dated 13.09.2022, this Court
directed the counsel for the respondent to obtain instructions on whether the land of the petitioner
had been utilized under the scheme. However, instead of answering this specific query, the
Raebareli Development Authority filed a counter-affidavit on 03.09.2023, nearly one year later,
without disclosing that the land had already been auctioned in favour of respondent no. 5.

(vii) The petitioner further alleges that the auction was conducted clandestinely. His land,
earlier marked as D-1, was later shown as commercial Plot C-1A, in the auction notice and that it
formed part of Ekta Vihar Colony. The plot area was wrongly shown as 175 sq. m. instead of 204
sq. m. After learning that possession of the entire 204 sq. m. had been handed over pursuant to the
auction, the petitioner lodged a complaint, following which an allegedly incorrect report dated
19.09.2023 was submitted by the Raebareli Development Authority to the State Government.
Consequently, Writ-C No. 9486 of 2023 was filed and disposed of on 02.11.2023 with liberty to
submit a fresh representation. The petitioner thereafter filed a representation on 10.11.2023 seeking
release of land under Sections 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and 17 of the U.P. Urban
Planning and Development Act, 1973, which was rejected on 20.02.2024, leading to the present
writ petition.
2 All. Mata Baksh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1725

(viii) That the rejection of the representation of the petitioner rests on an erroneous
interpretation of Section 17 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973. The provision
itself contemplates acquisition for development purposes under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
and its proviso grants a substantive right of restoration where the acquired land remains unutilized
for five years. The petitioner asserts that he continued in lawful possession of the land until June
2023, having earlier let it out for a licensed liquor vend and thereafter retaining possession even
after the tenancy ended. Despite this, the Development Authority allegedly dispossessed him and
proceeded to auction the land without paying compensation. It is submitted that such prolonged
deprivation of property, forcing a 73-year-old landholder to litigate for nearly two decades, is
arbitrary and unconstitutional. Reliance is placed on Tukaram Kana Joshi & Ors. vs. M.I.D.C. &
Ors. (2013) 1 SCC 565 and Sukh Dutt Ratra and Anr. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors.,
(2022) 7 SCC 505 to contend that the State cannot divest citizen of his property without authority
of law and just compensation, consistent with Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution.

(ix) That the State Government invoked the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land
Acquisition Act,1894 without proper application of mind to the statutory prerequisites. Although,
the satisfaction regarding urgency is subjective, it must be founded on relevant material showing a
genuine need for immediate possession. In cases of planned urban development or residential
schemes, no presumption operates in favour of the State, and the burden lies on the Government to
justify both the urgency and the dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5A. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that recourse to Section 17 is an exception and cannot be
adopted as a routine measure. While the power exercised under Section 17 is administrative and
ordinarily commands deference, it remains open to judicial review where the opinion is based on
extraneous or irrelevant considerations or reflects non-application of mind. Strong reliance is
placed on Radhy Shyam(D)Thr. Lrs & Ors vs State Of U.P.& Orr, Greater Noida Industrial
Development Authority vs. Devendra Kumar and ors (2011) 12 SCC 375, Laxmi Devi versus State
of Bihar and others, reported in 2015 (10) SCC 241 (para 1320); Ram Dhari Jindal Trust v. Union
of India & Others reported in 2012 (11) SCC 370 (para 15, 17 to 21); Anand Singh v. State of U.P.
& Others, reported in 2010 (11) SCC 242 (para 41 to 51), to contend that the impugned invocation
of urgency is legally unsustainable.

(x) That Section 17(3-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, mandates that at least eighty
percent of the estimated compensation must be tendered and paid before taking possession, failing
which the vesting of the land does not become absolute. In Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State
of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 1408), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that the urgency
clause cannot be invoked as a mere formality and emphasised that the protective safeguards under
Section 17(3-A) must be complied with strictly; non-payment of the required compensation would
render the acquisition invalid and possession unlawful. In the present case, neither tender nor
payment of the requisite compensation was made to the petitioner, and therefore, the possession
taken is illegal. Consequently, the protection against lapse under Section 11-A cannot be invoked
by the State.

(xi) That the auction conducted by the Raebareli Development Authority was illegal and
arbitrary. The disputed land was earmarked for future planning in the 2016 layout plan, yet was
selectively carved out and auctioned without proper publicity or compliance with relevant
1726 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Government Orders. Such auction, allegedly resulting in inadequate consideration, is liable to be
set aside as per K. Kumara Gupta v. Sri Markendaya and Sri Omkareswara Swamy Temple,
reported in 2022 (5) SCC 710 and allied precedents. Additionally, reliance is placed on Section 17
of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, contending that since the land remained
unutilized for over five years, the petitioner was entitled to seek restoration, which was wrongly
denied.

(xii) The learned Counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Lucknow Development Authority v. Gopal Das (Deceased), (2019) 8 SCC 172,
wherein it was held that the applicability of the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Act of 1973 depends
upon whether the acquired land was actually developed after completion of acquisition
proceedings. The Court clarified that where no development or utilization of the land takes place
within five years from the date of acquisition, the tenure holder becomes entitled to restoration of
the land on payment of statutory charges, in accordance with law.

(xiii) In view of the aforesaid facts and the settled legal position, it has been submitted
that the impugned acquisition, forcible deprivation of possession in 2023, and subsequent auction
of the land of the petitioner suffer from arbitrariness, illegality, and non-compliance with
mandatory statutory safeguards. The prolonged non-utilization of the land, non-payment of
compensation, unlawful invocation of urgency, and denial of the statutory right of restoration
clearly vitiate the action of the respondents. It has therefore been prayed that the writ petition be
allowed. ,

Submissions of the respondent State of Uttar Pradesh

4. The State Respondents has been represented by Sri Manish Mishra, Additional Chief
Standing Counsel and it has been stated as follows-

(i) That the petitioner repeatedly approached this Court belatedly, despite the Award
dated 30.05.2009 and possession having been taken. The petitioner earlier sought only
enhancement of compensation by filing a Section 18 reference and never challenged the acquisition
on merits. Statutory notices were duly issued, objections were considered, surveys conducted, and
possession taken in 2009. As the petitioner did not accept compensation, the awarded amount was
deposited in the Treasury under Section 31 of the 1894 Act. Subsequent writ petitions were
successive and misconceived.

(ii) That the acquisition proceedings strictly complied with the 1894 Act. Notifications
under Sections 4/17 and 6/17 were issued within the statutory period and were valid in law. Actual
possession was taken by preparing a panchnama and handing over land to the Development
Authority, which is sufficient for large tracts as held in Banda Development Authority versus Moti
Lal Agarwal and others, (2011) 5 SCC 394. Section 17(3A) was neither applicable nor available,
being prospective in nature. Compensation was duly offered after declaration of the Award. The
petitioner, having accepted the acquisition by filing a Section 18 reference, raised belated and
untenable challenges.
2 All. Mata Baksh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1727

(iii) That the second writ petition, filed after more than six years of the first, was barred
as it arose from the same cause of action, namely the acquisition proceedings, and attracted the bar
under Order II Rule 2 CPC, as explained in Cuddalore Powergen Corporation Ltd. v. Chemplast
Cuddalore Vinyls Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 82. The petitioner could not raise new grounds
which were available earlier, including violation of Section 17(3A), based on Laxmi Devi v. State
of Bihar, (2015) 10 SCC 241, or Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC
OnLine SC 1408. No pleading of prejudice was made, except inadequacy of compensation, which
is irrelevant at the Section 5-A stage. Possession was taken on 30.05.2009, and the land vested
absolutely in the State under Section 16, as held in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal,
(2020) 8 SCC 129.

(iv) That once possession of acquired land is taken, power under Section 48 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be exercised, as held in Visakhapatnam Urban Development
Authority v. S.S. Naidu (2016) 13 SCC 180. In the present case, acquisition stood completed on
30.05.2009, with declaration of the Award and taking of possession, followed by vesting of land in
the State free from encumbrances. Reliance was placed on State of M.P. v. V.P. Sharma, AIR 1966
SC 1593; Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation v. Subodh Singh (2011) 11 SCC 100; and
Government of A.P. v. Syed Akbar (2005) 1 SCC 558. Section 17 of the U.P. Urban Planning and
Development Act, 1973 was inapplicable as the land formed part of the approved development
plan. The petitioner's representation was belated, and successive writ petitions were barred by
delay, acquiescence, and Order II Rule 2 CPC, particularly after filing a Section 18 Reference.

(v) In view of the undisputed fact that the Award was declared on 30.05.2009, possession
of the land was taken, and the land vested absolutely in the State under Section 16 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court. Compensation was
duly offered and, upon refusal, deposited in the Treasury in accordance with law. The acquisition
proceedings attained finality, and the petitioner himself accepted the same by seeking enhancement
under Section 18. Subsequent challenges are barred by delay, acquiescence, and Order II Rule 2
CPC. The land having been utilized under an approved development plan, no case for interference
under Article 226 is made out. In view of the foregoing submissions, the writ petitions are liable to
be dismissed.

Submissions of the Counsel for the Raebareli Development Authority

5. Learned Senior Counsel Sri Asit Chaturvedi assisted by Sri Dharmendra Kumar Dixit
appearing for the Raebareli Development Authority, while opposing the writ petition, submitted
that-

a. That after declaration of Award on 30.05.2009, possession was taken of the land in
question. Compensation of Rs.75,371/- was offered to the petitioner on 26.06.2009, but on his
refusal to take the same, it was deposited in the District Treasury on 08.02.2011. Land was
acquired for the purpose of a residential colony and it has been utilized. 8.816 hectares of land was
acquired for construction of Yatayat Nagar Residential Colony. Under Section 14 of the U.P. Urban
Planning and Development Act, 1973, a development plan was finalized on 11.11.2009, which was
revised on 26.07.2016. Land admeasuring 1185 m2, which includes 175.11 m2 of land of the
1728 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petitioner, has been reserved for future planning. It was later numbered as C-1A Commercial Plot
and approved for auction by the Vice-Chairman, Raebareli Development Authority, on 30.05.2003.
Since the utilization of the acquired land has been completed, it cannot be released in favour of the
petitioner. It was also stated in the counter-affidavit that the judgments cited by the petitioner are
inapplicable to the facts of the case. Issues settled by the Award dated 30.05.2009 cannot be
reopened. The Reference made by petitioner under Section 18 is pending solely for enhancement of
compensation. The Raebareli Development Authority has deposited Rs. 3,35,62,147/- as
compensation for the entire scheme and its name was duly recorded in revenue records on
26.12.2015 for plot no. 201/1 also.

(ii) That Possession of the land was duly taken by the Raebareli Development Authority
after payment of compensation; hence, the Act of 2013 is inapplicable in view of Indore
Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129. All land acquired under the notifications
dated 05.04.2006 and 25.07.2007 and Award dated 30.05.2009 is with the Authority. No original
owner, including the petitioner, remains in possession or raised construction. Relevant possession
documents were duly filed.

(iii) The acquired land forms part of a duly approved development scheme. An area of
8.816 hectares was acquired for construction of the Yatayat Nagar Residential Colony. The
development plan was finalized on 11.11.2009 and subsequently revised on 26.07.2016. The land
admeasuring 1185 square metres, including 175.11 square metres claimed by the petitioner, was
reserved for future planning and later designated as Commercial Plot No. C-1A, which was
approved for auction by the competent authority on 30.05.2023. It was emphasized that once
possession is taken and the land is incorporated into an approved development plan, it is deemed to
have been utilized in law. Physical construction is not a sine qua non for utilization, as consistently
held by judicial precedents.

(iv) The argument regarding Appellate Authority of Section 48 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 is wholly misconceived. The power to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 can
be exercised only prior to taking possession. In the present case, possession was taken on
30.05.2009, rendering any subsequent request for release or reconveyance legally impermissible.
The representation made by the petitioner under Section 48 in the year 2023, after the land had
already been auctioned and allotted, was therefore untenable and devoid of any legal foundation.

(v) The provisions of the Act of 2013 are inapplicable, as both the Award and possession
preceded its enforcement. In view of the Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development
Authority v. Manoharlal, acquisition does not lapse once possession has been taken and
compensation has been paid or deposited in accordance with law. The contention regarding alleged
non-compliance with Section 17(3-A) is also liable to be rejected, as the Award was passed well
within the period prescribed under Section 11-A, and no prejudice was either pleaded or has been
established. The petitioner, having sought enhancement of compensation by filing a Section 18
Reference, accepted the acquisition and is estopped from assailing it on merits after a prolonged
delay.
2 All. Mata Baksh Singh Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
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(vi) The writ petition is barred by delay, laches, acquiescence, and abuse of process. The
petitioner has raised successive challenges arising from the same cause of action, which have
already attained finality.