# Mateshwari Devi & Anr v. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors

- **Citation:** (2025) 10 ILRA 910
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-10-06
- **Case number:** First Appeal From Order No. 2081 of 2025
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mateshwari-devi-anr-v-vidyakant-pandey-ors-54830
- **Pages:** 12

## Headnote

in setting aside the order of the Trial Court
rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d)
C.P.C. on the ground of limitation, and in
remanding the matter for adjudication, holding
that the question of limitation in the facts of the
case was a mixed question of law and fact
requiring framing of issues and leading of
evidence.

Headnotes
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O.7
R.11(d), O.43 R.1(u) - Limitation Act,
1963 - Art.59 - Rejection of plaint - Suit
for cancellation of sale deed - Bar of
limitation - Date of knowledge - Mixed
question of law and fact - Scope of
scrutiny under Order VII Rule 11 -
Averments in plaint alone relevant -
Remand by First Appellate Court - No
substantial question of law - Appeal
dismissed.

Held:
While considering an application under Order
VII Rule 11(d) C.P.C., the Court is required to
confine itself strictly to the averments made in
the plaint, and the assertions contained in the
written statement or in the application seeking
rejection of plaint are wholly immaterial at that
stage. The power under Order VII Rule 11 being
drastic in nature, it can be exercised only where
the bar of limitation is apparent on the face of
the plaint. [Paras 23, 26]

In a suit seeking cancellation of a sale deed, the
period of limitation is governed by Article 59 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, under which limitation
commences from the date when the facts
10 All. Mateshwari Devi & Anr. Vs. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors.
911
entitling the plaintiff to seek cancellation first
become known. The emphasis under Article 59
is not on the date of execution of the document,
but on the date of knowledge, as pleaded by the
plaintiff. [Paras 30-33]

Where the plaint contains a specific averment
that knowledge of the execution of the sale
deed was acquired at a later point of time, and
such assertion forms the basis of accrual of
cause of action, the issue relating to limitation
becomes a triable issue. In such circumstances,
the question of limitation would be a mixed
question of law and fact, requiring appreciation
of evidence, and the plaint cannot be rejected
summarily under Order VII Rule 11(d) C.P.C.
[Paras 27-28, 34]

The Trial Court, while rejecting the plaint, had
traversed beyond the plaint averments and
relied upon assertions contained in the written
statement and the application under Order VII
Rule 11(d), as also on surmises and conjectures.
Such an approach was held to be impermissible.
[Paras 29, 31]

The First Appellate Court was therefore justified
in setting aside the order rejecting the plaint
and remanding the matter, holding that the Trial
Court had failed to confine itself to the
pleadings in the plaint while deciding the
application under Order VII Rule 11(d). [Paras
29-31]

An appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(u) C.P.C. is
required
to
be
examined
on
the
same
parameters as a second appeal under Section
100 C.P.C.. In absence of any substantial
question of law, the appeal was held not to
merit admission and was dismissed. [Paras 3538].

Appeal dismissed. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust
Association vs. Sri Bala and Co. 2025 SCC
Online SC 48 and R. Nagraj (Dead)
Through Lrs and another vs. Rajmani and
others 2025 SCC Online SC 762; P V Guru
Raj Reddy vs. P Neeradha Reddy (2015) 8
SCC
331;
Chhotanben
vs.
Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar, (2018) 6 SCC
422; Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. Vs.
Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260;
Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2003) 1 SCC 557; ITC Ltd. Vs. Debts
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC
70;
T.
Arivandandam
vs.
T.V.
Satyapal,(1977) 4 SCC 467; Roop Lal Sathi
vs. Nachhattar Singh Gill, (1982) 3 SCC
487; Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh
Property
(1998)
7
SCC
184;
Sopan
Sukhdeo Sable vs. Asstt. Charity Commr.
(2004) 3 SCC 137; Ram Prakash Gupta vs.
Rajiv Kumar Gupta (2007) 10 SCC 59;
Church of Christ Charitable Trust &
Educational
Charitable
Society
vs.
Ponnniamman Educational Trust (2012) 8
SCC

## Text

_Characters 0–39,993 of 40,634. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39993 for what follows._

910 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
obtain report from the office of SubRegistrar concerned in order to ascertain
the true market value of the disputed
properties involved in the three sale deeds
and also the market value of the disputed
construction regarding which the relief of
mandatory injunction was claimed. The
trial court is directed to send Amin
Commission on the spot for ascertaining
the market value of the disputed property,
which includes the value of the land and
superstructure standing on it, in accordance
with the rules framed by the U.P.
Government under the Stamp Act, 1899
and then determine the correct market
value of the disputed property. The trial
court is also directed to ascertain, whether
the predecessors of the plaintiffs were one
of the parties in the disputed sale deeds.
16. In view of the above facts, the
trial court has erred in passing the
impugned order without going through the
relevant provisions and without examining
the matter in right perspective.

17. Accordingly, this appeal has
merits and is liable to be allowed at the
admission stage.
18. Accordingly, the appeal is
hereby allowed. The impugned order dated
28.04.2025, is hereby set aside and the
matter is remitted back to the trial court for
deciding the issue of valuation and court
fees according to the observations made in
this order, after hearing both the parties, in
accordance with law.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 910
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 06.10.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR
SRIVASTAVA, J.
First Appeal From Order No. 2081 of 2025

Mateshwari Devi & Anr.. ...Appellants
Versus
Vidyakant Pandey & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellants:
Devansh Misra, Saurabh Pandey

Counsel for the Respondents:
Rahul Sahai

Issue for Consideration
Whether the First Appellate Court was justified
in setting aside the order of the Trial Court
rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d)
C.P.C. on the ground of limitation, and in
remanding the matter for adjudication, holding
that the question of limitation in the facts of the
case was a mixed question of law and fact
requiring framing of issues and leading of
evidence.

Headnotes
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - O.7
R.11(d), O.43 R.1(u) - Limitation Act,
1963 - Art.59 - Rejection of plaint - Suit
for cancellation of sale deed - Bar of
limitation - Date of knowledge - Mixed
question of law and fact - Scope of
scrutiny under Order VII Rule 11 -
Averments in plaint alone relevant -
Remand by First Appellate Court - No
substantial question of law - Appeal
dismissed.

Held:
While considering an application under Order
VII Rule 11(d) C.P.C., the Court is required to
confine itself strictly to the averments made in
the plaint, and the assertions contained in the
written statement or in the application seeking
rejection of plaint are wholly immaterial at that
stage. The power under Order VII Rule 11 being
drastic in nature, it can be exercised only where
the bar of limitation is apparent on the face of
the plaint. [Paras 23, 26]

In a suit seeking cancellation of a sale deed, the
period of limitation is governed by Article 59 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, under which limitation
commences from the date when the facts
10 All. Mateshwari Devi & Anr. Vs. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors.
911
entitling the plaintiff to seek cancellation first
become known. The emphasis under Article 59
is not on the date of execution of the document,
but on the date of knowledge, as pleaded by the
plaintiff. [Paras 30-33]

Where the plaint contains a specific averment
that knowledge of the execution of the sale
deed was acquired at a later point of time, and
such assertion forms the basis of accrual of
cause of action, the issue relating to limitation
becomes a triable issue. In such circumstances,
the question of limitation would be a mixed
question of law and fact, requiring appreciation
of evidence, and the plaint cannot be rejected
summarily under Order VII Rule 11(d) C.P.C.
[Paras 27-28, 34]

The Trial Court, while rejecting the plaint, had
traversed beyond the plaint averments and
relied upon assertions contained in the written
statement and the application under Order VII
Rule 11(d), as also on surmises and conjectures.
Such an approach was held to be impermissible.
[Paras 29, 31]

The First Appellate Court was therefore justified
in setting aside the order rejecting the plaint
and remanding the matter, holding that the Trial
Court had failed to confine itself to the
pleadings in the plaint while deciding the
application under Order VII Rule 11(d). [Paras
29-31]

An appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(u) C.P.C. is
required
to
be
examined
on
the
same
parameters as a second appeal under Section
100 C.P.C.. In absence of any substantial
question of law, the appeal was held not to
merit admission and was dismissed. [Paras 3538].

Appeal dismissed. (E-14)

Case Law Cited
Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust
Association vs. Sri Bala and Co. 2025 SCC
Online SC 48 and R. Nagraj (Dead)
Through Lrs and another vs. Rajmani and
others 2025 SCC Online SC 762; P V Guru
Raj Reddy vs. P Neeradha Reddy (2015) 8
SCC
331;
Chhotanben
vs.
Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar, (2018) 6 SCC
422; Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. Vs.
Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260;
Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra,
(2003) 1 SCC 557; ITC Ltd. Vs. Debts
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC
70;
T.
Arivandandam
vs.
T.V.
Satyapal,(1977) 4 SCC 467; Roop Lal Sathi
vs. Nachhattar Singh Gill, (1982) 3 SCC
487; Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. Vs. Ganesh
Property
(1998)
7
SCC
184;
Sopan
Sukhdeo Sable vs. Asstt. Charity Commr.
(2004) 3 SCC 137; Ram Prakash Gupta vs.
Rajiv Kumar Gupta (2007) 10 SCC 59;
Church of Christ Charitable Trust &
Educational
Charitable
Society
vs.
Ponnniamman Educational Trust (2012) 8
SCC 706; Narayanan vs. Kumaran (2004)
4 SCC 26; Jegannathan vs. Raju Sigamani
(2012) 5 SCC 540; Shrivatsa Goswami vs.
Anant Prasad Singh 2024 (2) ADJ 763:
Referred.

List of Acts / Statutes
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Limitation Act,
1963.

List of Keywords
Rejection
of
plaint;
Limitation;
Date
of
knowledge; Suit for cancellation of sale deed;
Mixed question of law and fact; Scope of
scrutiny; Remand by appellate court; No
substantial question of law.

Case Arising From
Judgment and order dated 31.05.2025 passed
by the Additional District Judge / Special Judge
(SC/ST Act), Sonbhadra in Civil Appeal No. 32 of
2024, arising out of judgment and decree dated
28.03.2024 passed by the Additional Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Sonbhadra in Original Suit No.
303 of 2003

Appearance for Parties
For the Appellants: Sri Devansh Misra, Sri
Saurabh Pandey
For the State: Sri Rahul Sahai

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra
Kumar Srivastava, J.)

Heard Sri Devansh Mishra, learned
counsel for the appellants and Sri Rahul
912 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Sahai, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents.

2. With the consent of counsel for
the parties, the appeal is taken up for
admission/final disposal.

3. The instant appeal under Order
43 Rule 1 (u) of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 19081 is directed against the
judgment and order dated 31.5.2025 passed
by the Additional District Judge/Special
Judge, SC/ST Act, Sonbhadra in Civil
Appeal No.32 of 2024 (Vidyakant Pandey
and others vs. Mateswari Devi and others).

4. The civil appeal had arisen out
of the judgment and decree dated 28.3.2024
passed by the Additional Civil Judge
(Junior Division), Sonbhadra in Original
Suit No.303 of 2003 (Harishanker & Ors.
vs. Smt. Mateswari & Anr.), whereby the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC moved by the defendants, vide paper
no.102ga, was allowed and the plaintiffs'
suit was dismissed.

5. The factual background of the
case is being set out herein below.

6. Originally, the father of the
respondents, namely Hari Shanker had
instituted a suit for cancellation of a sale
deed dated 9.7.1978 in respect of plot
no.55Aa ad-measuring an area of 3 Bigha
10 Biswa and 13 Dhur, and plot no.55Ba
ad-measuring an area 8 Biswa 18 Dhur,
situate at Village Tarawan, Pargana Barher,
Tehsil Robertsganj, District Sonbhadra.
The said suit was instituted on 8.10.2003
for cancellation of a sale deed dated
9.7.1978,
registered
on
17.11.1978.
Plaintiff no.1 in paragraph 8 of his plaint
explained the delay in institution of the
suit, contending that he had no prior
knowledge about the said sale deed and he
was a 70 years old man whose children
resided outside the village. Subsequently,
after his children returned to the village, the
entries recorded in the revenue records
were inspected and for the first time
knowledge of the said sale deed was gained
by the plaintiffs on 10.4.2003.

7. The defendants filed their
written statements as paper nos.31A and
37A, inter alia, asserting that it was after a
lapse of almost 25 years, a challenge to the
said sale deed was being raised without
disclosing the specific dates on which the
inspection
of
revenue
records
was
conducted. The trial Court, vide order dated
17.7.2007, had framed the issues. One
additional issue was also framed on
6.1.2011 pertaining to maintainability of
the plaintiffs suit.

8. During the course of evidence
being led, an application under Order VII
Rule 11 (d) of CPC came to be filed by the
defendants stating that the suit instituted by
the plaintiffs was time barred and liable to
be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of
CPC. In the above mentioned application,
the defendants,
inter alia, took the
following grounds:

 (i) The limitation for institution
of a suit for cancellation of a document is 3
years. However, the suit was instituted after
a lapse of almost 25 years.
 (ii) The plaintiff/father of the
respondents had admitted in the plaint that
the name of the defendants/appellants had
been recorded in the revenue records.

 (iii) The plaintiff by clever
drafting had tried to explain the delay by
stating that the knowledge regarding the
said sale deed was first obtained in April,
10 All. Mateshwari Devi & Anr. Vs. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors.
913
2003.
However,
the
said
fact
was
contradicted
since
the
plaintiff
had
admitted to the fact that he was a 70 years
old man and his children reside outside the
village, which made it apparent that the
plaintiff had never been in possession over
the
suit
property
and
only
as
an
afterthought, the said suit had been
instituted to harass the defendants.

9. The plaintiff-respondents filed
their objections to the Order VII Rule 11
application
filed
by
the
defendantsappellants, which came to be numbered as
Paper No.104C.

10. The trial Court, while allowing
the application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC filed by the defendants, rejected the
suit as time barred and recorded a finding
that by clever drafting the plaintiffrespondents had tried to create a cause of
action and bring it within the purview of
limitation. The plaintiff-respondents, being
aggrieved by order dated 28.3.2024,
preferred a Civil Appeal under Section 96
of CPC, alleging that the suit could not be
rejected under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of
CPC for being time barred as the question
of limitation is a mixed question of fact and
law for which evidence is required to be
led. The appellate Court, vide order dated
31.5.2025 has set aside the order passed by
the trial Court and remitted the matter back
for consideration of preliminary issues,
being issue nos.3, 4 and 7.

11. The first appellate Court, while
allowing the Civil Appeal, has recorded a
finding that the question of limitation is a
mixed question of fact and law. As per
Article 59 of the Indian Limitation Act,
1963,
the
period
of
limitation
for
cancellation of document/instrument begins
from the date of knowledge of the
execution of the document/instrument,
which the plaintiffs in its plaint, at para
no.8, had asserted to be in the month of
April, 2003, upon inspection of the revenue
records.

12. Aggrieved by the aforesaid
order passed by the first appellate Court,
the instant appeal has been filed.

13. Counsel for the appellants has
sought to assail the findings recorded by
the first appellate Court regarding question
of limitation being a mixed question of fact
and law and requiring leading of evidence
and framing of issues, by contending that
the aforesaid rule is not inflexible, and in
the instant case, the plaintiff-respondents
had failed to give any plausible explanation
for instituting a suit after a period of 25
years, and no particulars had been given as
to the date on which inspection of the
revenue records was carried out and the
copy of khatauni had also not been placed
on record.

14. It has been urged that the
assertion made by plaintiff no.1 that he was
70 years' old man and his children do not
reside in the same village is contradictory
to the stand that he continued to be in
possession of the suit property and upon a
dispute having arisen with the defendantappellants, an inspection was carried out
and thereafter, knowledge regarding the
execution of the sale deed was first
obtained in the month of April, 2003. It has
been further argued that the plaintiffrespondents, by means of clever drafting,
have attempted to create a cause of action
for a time barred suit. A contention is also
sought to be raised that the suit is barred by
Section 49 of the U P Consolidation of
Holdings Act, 1953, Section 331 of the U P
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
914 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Act, 1950 and Section 206 of the U P
Revenue Code, 2006 and objections in this
regard had been taken in the written
statement filed by the defendants. Reliance
has been placed on the decisions in Indian
Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust
Association vs. Sri Bala and Co.2 and R.
Nagraj (Dead) Through Lrs and another
vs. Rajmani and others3 to submit that
the general rule that question of limitation
would be a mixed question of law and fact
and that usually on a reading of the plaint,
it is not rejected as being barred by law of
limitation, is not an inflexible rule.

15. Counsel appearing for the
respondents has supported the judgment of
the first appellate Court by contending that
the trial Court, while disposing of the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of
CPC, ought to have confined itself to the
averments made in the plaint and could not
have traversed beyond the pleadings in the
plaint to arrive at a conclusion on the
question of limitation, which being a mixed
question of fact and law, could not have
been decided at the stage of Order VII Rule
11. It has been asserted that the plaint
having contained specific assertion with
regard to the cause of action for filing the
suit and having raised issues which
necessitated a detailed adjudication based
on oral and documentary evidence, it was
impermissible for the trial Court to
summarily reject the suit on the ground of
limitation.
16. Upon hearing the counsel for
the parties and perusing the pleadings and
the material on record, it would be
necessary to examine whether in the facts
of present case, the rejection of the plaint in
exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11
(d) can be held to be justified.
17. It has been specifically averred
in the plaint that in the month of April,
2003, when plaintiff no.1 went for
harvesting the crops as per his usual
routine, the defendants husbands created
a dispute and during the course of the
dispute, they mentioned a sale deed relating
to the property. Plaintiff no.1 was of age
around 70 years and his children were
residing outside the village. Subsequently,
after his children returned back to the
village, the entries recorded in the revenue
records were inspected and it was then that
the plaintiffs came to know about the sale
deed sometime in the month of April, 2003.
The
plaintiff
no.1
approached
the
defendants through certain relatives so that
the sale deed may be got cancelled, but
they kept evading and finally refused to do
so sometimes in the month of September,
2003 and thereafter, the suit was instituted,
seeking cancellation of the sale deed and
consequential reliefs.

18. The defendant nos.1 and 2 filed
their written statements.

19. On the basis of the pleadings of
the parties, the trial Court on 17.7.2007,
framed the following issues:

 1. Whether the sale deed executed
on 9.11.78 and registered at Sub-Registrar
Office Robertsganj at book no.1, volume
no.417, page no.205-207, serial no.1545
dated 17.11.78 is liable to be cancelled on
the grounds pleaded in the plaint ?

 2.
Whether
the
suit
is
undervalued and the court fee paid is
insufficient ?
 3.
Whether
this
court
has
authority to adjudicate on the issues
involved ?
 4. Whether the suit is hit by
Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holding
Act ?
10 All. Mateshwari Devi & Anr. Vs. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors.
915
 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff
is barred by estoppel and acquiescence ?

 6. Whether the plaintiff is entitled
for any relief?

20. On 6.1.2011, one additional
issue with regard to the maintainability of
the plaintiffs' suit was also framed.

21. It was thereafter, at the stage of
evidence, that an application 102ga was
preferred by defendant no.1 under Order
VII Rule 1 (d) of CPC for rejection of the
plaint, primarily on the ground that the suit
for
cancellation
of
sale
deed
9.11.1978/17.11.1978 had been instituted
after about 25 years of its execution and,
therefore, it would be barred by limitation.

22.
The
plaintiffs
in
their
objections to the aforesaid application,
asserted that as per Article 59 of the Indian
Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation would
commence from the date of knowledge of
the execution of the sale deed, which in the
present case, was obtained in the month of
April, 2003, therefore, the institution of the
suit could not be said to be beyond
limitation. The plea with regard to the suit
being barred by Section 49 of the U P
Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 was
denied by the plaintiffs. Referring to
Section 331 of the U P Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and Section
206 of the U P Revenue Code, 2006, it was
asserted that the power to cancel a
registered document is solely vested with
the Civil Court.

23. The drastic nature of the power
conferred under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC
in respect of rejection of plaint was
examined in the decision in P V Guru Raj
Reddy vs. P Neeradha Reddy4, wherein it
was observed that while exercising the
power under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC
only the averments in the plaint are
required to be seen, and the stand of the
defendants in written statement or in the
application for rejection of plaint is wholly
immaterial at that stage. It was observed
that the plaint can be rejected only if the
averments made therein ex facie do not
disclose the cause of action or on a reading
thereof, the suit appears to be barred by any
law.

24. The considerations that would
be relevant while examining the plea as to
rejection of plaint on the ground of suit
being barred by limitation upon an
application filed under Order VII Rule 11
(d) of CPC came up for consideration in the
case
of
Chhotanben
vs.
Kiritbhai
Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar5 and, it was
stated that in a case where the issue
regarding
the
suit
being
barred
by
limitation was a triable issue, the plaint
could not be rejected at the threshold in
exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11
(d) of CPC.

25. In a case where an application
is made for rejection of plaint under Order
VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC on the ground that
suit is barred by the law of limitation, it
would be the duty of the court to scrutinize
the averments contained in the plaint as a
whole on their face value to ascertain the
bar of limitation and to take a decision
thereon. The averments in the written
statement as well as the contention of the
defendants would be wholly immaterial
while considering the prayer for rejection
of plaint. This position in law has been
discussed in Shakti Bhog Food Industries
Ltd. vs. Central Bank of India6, wherein
after referring to the earlier decisions in
Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra7;
916 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
ITC Ltd. vs. Debts Recovery Appellate
Tribunal8; T. Arivandandam vs. T.V.
Satyapal9;
Roop
Lal
Sathi
vs.
Nachhattar Singh Gill10; Raptakos Brett
& Co. Ltd. vs. Ganesh Property11;
Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs. Asstt. Charity
Commr.12; Ram Prakash Gupta vs.
Rajiv Kumar Gupta13 and Church of
Christ Charitable Trust & Educational
Charitable Society vs. Ponnniamman
Educational Trust14, it was observed as
follows:

 7. Order 7 Rule 11 CPC
gives ample power to the court to reject the
plaint, if from the averments in the plaint, it
is evident that the suit is barred by any law
including the law of limitation. This
position is no more res integra. We may
usefully refer to the decision of this Court
in Ram Prakash Gupta vs. Rajiv Kumar
Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to
20, the Court observed as follows: (SCC
pp. 65-66) (2020) 17 SCC 260

 13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the
plaint is liable to be rejected in the
following cases:

 (a) where it does not disclose a
cause of action;
 (b) where the relief claimed is
undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being
required by the court to correct the
valuation within a time to be fixed by the
court, fails to do so;
 (c) where the relief claimed is
properly valued but the plaint is written
upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the court to
supply the requisite stamp paper within a
time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;
 (d) where the suit appears from
the statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law;
 (e) where it is not filed in
duplicate;

 (f) where the plaintiff fails to
comply with the provisions of Rule 9;

 14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of
Maharashtra, [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was
held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of
the Code that:

 9. the relevant facts which
need to be looked into for deciding an
application thereunder are the averments in
the plaint. The trial court can exercise the
power at any stage of the suit before
registering the plaint or after issuing
summons to the defendant at any time
before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under
clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC,
the averments in the plaint are germane; the
pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement would be wholly irrelevant at
that stage. (SCC p. 560, para 9).

 15. In ITC Ltd. vs. Debts
Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2
SCC 70] it was held that the basic question
to be decided while dealing with an
application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of
the Code is whether a real cause of action
has been set out in the plaint or something
purely illusory has been stated with a view
to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.

 16.
The
trial
court
must
remember that if on a meaningfulnot
formalreading
of
the
plaint
it
is
manifestly vexatious and meritless in the
sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue,
it should exercise its power under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the
ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If
clever drafting has created the illusion of a
10 All. Mateshwari Devi & Anr. Vs. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors.
917
cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the
bud at the first hearing by examining the
party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.
(See T. Arivandandam vs. T.V. Satyapal,
[(1977) 4 SCC 467] , SCC p. 468.)

 17. It is trite law that not any
particular plea has to be considered, and the
whole plaint has to be read. As was
observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v.
Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487],
only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected
and if no cause of action is disclosed, the
plaint as a whole must be rejected.

 18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd.
v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it
was observed that the averments in the
plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out
whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was
applicable.

 19. In Sopan Sukhdeo Sable vs.
Charity Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this
Court held thus: (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15)

 15.
There
cannot
be
any
compartmentalisation,
dissection,
segregation and inversions of the language
of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such
a course is adopted it would run counter to
the
cardinal
canon
of
interpretation
according to which a pleading has to be
read as a whole to ascertain its true import.
It is not permissible to cull out a sentence
or a passage and to read it out of the
context in isolation. Although it is the
substance and not merely the form that has
to be looked into, the pleading has to be
construed as it stands without addition or
subtraction or words or change of its
apparent grammatical sense. The intention
of the party concerned is to be gathered
primarily from the tenor and terms of his
pleadings taken as a whole. At the same
time it should be borne in mind that no
pedantic approach should be adopted to
defeat
justice
on
hair-splitting
technicalities.

 20. For our purpose, clause (d) is
relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint
does not contain necessary averments
relating to limitation, the same is liable to
be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the
duty of the person who files such an
application to satisfy the court that the
plaint does not disclose how the same is in
time. In order to answer the said question,
it is incumbent on the part of the court to
verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12
mandates where a plaint is rejected, the
court has to record the order to that effect
with the reasons for such order.

 8. On the same lines, this Court in
Church of Christ Charitable Trust &
Educational
Charitable
Society
vs.
Ponnniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8
SCC 706: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612],
observed as follows: (SCC pp. 713-15,
paras 10-12)
 10. It is clear from the above
that where the plaint does not disclose a
cause of action, the relief claimed is
undervalued and not corrected within the
time allowed by the court, insufficiently
stamped and not rectified within the time
fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed
to enclose the required copies and the
plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions
of Rule 9, the court has no other option
except to reject the same. A reading of the
above provision also makes it clear that
power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code
can be exercised at any stage of the suit
either before registering the plaint or after
the issuance of summons to the defendants
or at any time before the conclusion of the
trial.
918 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 11. This position was explained
by this Court in Saleem Bhai vs. State of
Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], in which,
while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the
Code, it was held as under: (SCC p. 560,
para 9)
 9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11
CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts
which need to be looked into for deciding
an application thereunder are the averments
in the plaint. The trial court can exercise
the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC at
any stage of the suit before registering
the plaint or after issuing summons to the
defendant at any time before the conclusion
of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an
application under clauses (a) and (d) of
Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the
plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the
defendant in the written statement would be
wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a
direction to file the written statement
without deciding the application under
Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be
procedural
irregularity
touching
the
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.
It is clear that in order to consider Order 7
Rule 11, the court has to look into the
averments in the plaint and the same can be
exercised by the trial court at any stage of
the suit. It is also clear that the averments
in the written statement are immaterial and
it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the
averments/pleas in the plaint. In other
words, what needs to be looked into in
deciding such an application are the
averments in the plaint. At that stage, the
pleas taken by the defendant in the written
statement are wholly irrelevant and the
matter is to be decided only on the plaint
averments. These principles have been
reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v.
Ganesh Property, [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and
Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. Vs. Vessel M.V.
Fortune Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100].
 12. It is also useful to refer the
judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V.
Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, wherein while
considering the very same provisions i.e.
Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial
court in considering such application, this
Court has reminded the trial Judges with
the following observation : (SCC p. 470,
para 5)

 5. The learned Munsif must
remember that if on a meaningful not
formal reading of the plaint it is
manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the
sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue,
he should exercise his power under Order 7
Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the
ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And,
if clever drafting has created the illusion of
a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the
first hearing by examining the party
searchingly under Ordr 10 CPC. An activist
Judge is the answer to irresponsible law
suits.
The trial
courts
would
insist
imperatively on examining the party at the
first hearing so that bogus litigation can be
shot down at the earliest stage. The Penal
Code is also resourceful enough to meet
such men, (Chapter XI) and must be
triggered against them. It is clear that if
the allegations are vexatious and meritless
and not disclosing a clear right or
material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial
Judge to exercise his power under Order 7
Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the
illusion of a cause of action as observed by
Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred
decision [T. Arivandandam vs. T.V.
Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, it should be
nipped in the bud at the first hearing by
examining the parties under Order 10 of the
Code.

26. In view of the foregoing
discussions, the legal position that emerges,
10 All. Mateshwari Devi & Anr. Vs. Vidyakant Pandey & Ors.
919
as fairly well settled, is that while
considering an application under Order VII
Rule 11, the Court is to confine itself to the
averments made in the plaint, and the
assertions made in the written statement or
even the application filed under Order VII
Rule 11, would not be material. In a
situation where an objection is taken under
clause (d) of Rule 11 with regard to
limitation, it would be the duty of the
person who files the application to satisfy
the Court that the plaint does not disclose
as to how it is within time.
27. The decisions in
Indian
Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust
Association (supra) and R. Nagraj (Dead)
Through LRs (supra) which have been
sought to be relied upon by the appellants
have reiterated the settled principle that
normally the question of limitation would
be a mixed question of law and fact;
however, the same would not be an
inflexible rule, and in cases where action is
initiated several years after the right to sue
having accrued without any pleading to
explain the reasons for delay, the question
of limitation is to be treated as a question of
law. In the present case, the plaint contains
a specific averment that execution of the
sale deed in question was not in the
knowledge of the plaintiffs, and upon
becoming aware of the said fact and
carrying out necessary inspections, they
gained knowledge of the same in April,
2003 and upon refusal of the defendants to
get the sale deed cancelled, sometimes in
the month of September, 2003, the suit was
filed. This aspect of the matter has been
duly noticed by the first appellate Court to
come to a conclusion that the accrual of
cause of action had been sufficiently
disclosed in the plaint and, therefore, the
trial Court had committed an error in
rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule
11 (d).
28. The questions relating to the
starting point of limitation and reckoning
the date of knowledge of essential facts,
which form basis of the cause of action,
would have to be held to be triable issues
and a suit cannot be dismissed at the
threshold or upon an application under
Order VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC in cases
where such issues exist.

29. The first appellate Court has
duly considered the afore-stated legal
position to arrive at a conclusion that the
trial Court while rejecting the plaint was at
a fault in failing to confine itself to the
averments in the plaint, and had based its
conclusion on assertions regarding facts
stated in the application filed under Order
VII Rule 11. It has also noted that the
conclusion derived by the trial Court to
disbelieve the averment in the plaint that
execution of the disputed sale deed was not
in the knowledge of the plaintiffs when
consolidation operations were pending in
the village concerned is based on surmises
and
conjectures,
which
was
wholly
impermissible
while
considering
an
application under Order VII Rule 11.
Furthermore, it has been observed that the
inference drawn by the trial Court that the
suit is barred under Section 49 of the U P
Consolidation of Holdings Act was also not
based on the strength of the plaint
averments but by traversing beyond what
was stated in the plaint.

30. The view taken by the trial
Court that the suit was barred by limitation
has not been accepted by the first appellate
Court by referring to Article 59 of the
Indian Limitation Act in terms whereof the
limitation would have to be reckoned from
the date when the facts entitling the
plaintiffs to seek relief first become known
to them.
920 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
31. The rejection of plaint on the
ground of limitation would not be legally
sustainable unless the same is apparent
from a plain reading of the plaint averments
and is to be derived on the strength of the
pleadings and the evidence to be adduced
by the parties. The first appellate Court
accordingly, has set aside the order
rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule
11 (d) for the reason that the trial Court,
while doing so, had failed to confine itself
to the averments made in the plaint.

32. The period of limitation for
suits seeking to cancel or setting aside an
instrument or decree or for rescission of a
contract is prescribed under Article 59 of
the Limitation Act, 1963. The emphasis
under Article 59 is not on the date of
transaction, but on the accrual of the cause
of action, which in cases involving
allegations
of
fraud
or
unauthorized
execution of documents would relate to the
date on which the plaintiff acquires
knowledge of such facts. As per its terms,
the limitation period is three years and the
time begins to run from the date when the
facts entitling the plaintiff to have the
instrument cancelled or contract rescinded
first become known to him.
33. The key trigger under Article
59 would not be the date of execution of
the instrument or decree, but the limitation
period would start when the facts entitling
the plaintiff to seek relief first become
known to him. This would be especially
relevant in cases involving fraud or
mistake, where the knowledge of such
grounds may arise after the transaction or
decree takes effect, and the period of
limitation would therefore start running
from the date of discovery of the said facts.

34. The issue as to whether the
plaintiffs had prior knowledge or were
otherwise aware of the transaction at an
earlier point of time, or whether the
assertion with regard to the date of
knowledge is credible, would be matters
requiring appreciation of evidence. In a
situation where the date of knowledge has
been specifically pleaded in the plaint and
forms the basis of accrual of cause of
action, the issue of limitation cannot be
decided at the threshold. The question of
limitation, in such a situation, would be a
mixed question of fact and law, which
would require framing of issues and
appreciation of evidence, and cannot be
adjudicated summarily. Thus, rejection of
the plaint on the ground of limitation, in
such circumstances, without permitting the
parties to lead evidence would not be
legally permissible.

35. The present appeal under Order
43 Rule 1 (u) of CPC is required to be
admitted and heard on substantial questions
of law and on grounds on which a second
appeal is heard under Section 100 CPC, as
has been laid down in Narayanan vs.
Kumaran15 and Jegannathan vs. Raju
Sigamani16, and reiterated in a recent
decision of this Court in Shrivatsa
Goswami vs. Anant Prasad Singh17.

36.
Learned
counsel
for
the
appellant has not been able to dispute the
settled legal position that while considering
the application under Order VII Rule 11,
the plaint averments are required to be seen
and the assertions in the written statement
or the application filed under Order VII
Rule 11 would be wholly immaterial.

37. The conclusion drawn by the
first appellate Court that the trial Court,
while allowing the application under Order
VII Rule 11 (d) of CPC and rejecting the
plaint, has traversed beyond the plaint
10 All. National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Sunita & Ors.
921
averments and has placed reliance
on the assertions of facts in the written
statement and the application filed under
Order VII Rule 11 (d), therefore, cannot be
said to suffer from any patent error or
illegality.
38. In these circumstances, this
Court is satisfied that no substantial
question of law arises for consideration for
the purpose of admitting the appeal.
Consequently, the appeal does not merit
admission and is, accordingly, dismissed.
39. Counsel for the appellants, at
this stage, submits that the first appellate
Court while setting aside the order passed
by the trial Court under Order VII Rule 11
of CPC and restoring the suit to its original
number, has granted liberty to the trial
Court to proceed with the issues nos.3, 4
and 7, as preliminary issues, before
proceeding any further. He has sought to
urge that the trial Court be directed to
decide the said issues as preliminary issues
without
being
prejudiced
by
the
observations made in the judgment of the
first appellate Court.

40. In this regard, it may be stated
that the observations that have been made
by the first appellate Court are only for the
purpose of deciding the correctness of the
order passed by the trial Court, rejecting
the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of
CPC, and the case having been remanded
with liberty to the trial Court to proceed
with issues nos.3, 4 and 7 as preliminary
issues, there should not be any manner of
doubt that the trial Court would proceed
accordingly.
----------
(2025) 10 ILRA 921
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 13 .10.2025

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SANDEEP JAIN, J.
First Appeal From Order No. 2339 of 2025

National Insurance Co. Ltd. ...Appellant
Versus
Smt. Sunita & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Radhey Shyam

Counsel for the Respondents:

Issue for Consideration
Whether the Insurance Company was
liable to indemnify the legal heirs of the
deceased
owner-cum-driver
of
the
offending vehicle, when the accident
occurred due to the negligence of the
deceased himself, and the insurance policy
was a package policy covering personal
accident risk of the owner-cum-driver, and
whether the award of compensation by
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was
legally sustainable.

Headnotes
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - ss.163-A, 173
- Motor accident - Owner-cum-driver -
Negligence of owner - Package policy -
Personal accident cover - Liability of
insurer - Scope of appeal - Award
affirmed.

HELD:
If an accident is caused by owner's negligence,
then also, Insurance Co.