# (Mattes under Article 227) Muntjir v. General Manager, PNB Metlife India

- **Citation:** (2015) 3 ILRA 1212
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-09-23
- **Case number:** C.M.W.P. No. 5490 of 2015
- **Bench:** Manoj Kumar Gupta
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mattes-under-article-227-muntjir-v-general-manager-pnb-metlife-india-43375
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Constitution of India, Art.-226-Jurisdictionwrit
of
certiorari-order
passed
by
permanent lok adalat-stamp reporterobjected to convert petition under Art.-
227-in view of Radhey Shyam case-heldmisconceived order passed by Tribunal
stand on different footing-Tribunal-not
within perview of Civil Court-held-writ
petition under Art.-226-maintainable.
Held: Para-7
Thus, it is clear that the judgment in the
case of Radhey Shyam (supra) lays down
the law only in relation to the orders of
civil courts and it does not extend to the
orders passed by inferior tribunals or
courts, which are not civil courts.
Case Law discussed:
(2015) 5 SCC 423; (2003) 6 SCC 675; AIR
1967 SC 1

## Text

1212
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
amount coming to their shares in fixed
deposit. Thus, the direction for deposit of
50% of the amount coming to the share of
petitioner no.2 and 3 being contrary to the
directions given in the award dated
31.10.2012, cannot be sustained and is
hereby set aside.
11. As regard the shares of petitioner
no. 1, it is noticeable that there are two
demand notices brought on record by her.
The first notice dated 29.4.2014 by
Allahabad Bank requires her to pay a sum
of Rs.59,339/- as the amount due and
payable towards loan taken by her late
husband Dhamendra Mohan. The second
notice of even date refers a loan taken by
her on 22.10.2012, wherein she is
required to pay Rs.37,611/- alongwith
interest. Thus,
there was
sufficient
material before the Tribunal to establish
that the claimants were indebted to the
bank and were in need of money.
12. A supplementary affidavit has
been filed by learned counsel for the
petitioners
stating
that
a
sum
of
Rs.88,000/- was paid to petitioner no.1
and an equal amount was deposited in
fixed deposit in her name. It is not in
dispute that Dharmendra Mohan, the
bread earner for the family had died. In
such situation, it should have been
visualised by the Tribunal that there are
several other liabilities apart from daily
expenses which the claimants were to
meet. In such view of the matter, the
request for release of additional sum
which is in fixed deposit cannot be said to
be unreasonable or arbitrary or a mere
ruse to withdraw the amount. The
Tribunal while deciding the application
has approached the controversy in a
lopsided manner, without appreciating the
view point of the claimants.
13. In the case of A. V. Padma and
others vs. R. Venugopal and others3, the
Supreme Court permitted withdrawal of
money deposited in fixed deposit in
favour of widow to enable her to provide
a dwelling unit to her second daughter
who is co-owner in the house, but was
residing in a rented accommodation on
exorbitant rent. It is held that the widow
was obliged to provide shelter to her
daughter, and if the money remains
locked in fixed deposit, it would only
yield
paltry
interest,
whereas,
the
daughter would be compelled to pay
exorbitance rent. It was held that the
decision of the Tribunal to invest the
amount in fixed deposit was a result of
rigid and mechanical approach. The
decision fully supports the case of the
petitioner herein.
14. In view of the discussions made
above, the impugned order passed by the
Tribunal dated 22.4.2012 is set aside. The
application filed by the petitioners paper
no. 13-Ga shall stand allowed. The
tribunal
shall
permit
premature
encashment of the FDR in favour of the
petitioners, leaving alone the FDRs in the
name of Smt. Vedvati, for which no
request for premature encashment was
made.
15. The Tribunal shall ensure that
compliance of this order is made within a
period of three weeks from date of
production of certified copy of this order,
by the petitioners, before the Tribunal.
16. The petition stands allowed
accordingly.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 23.09.2015
3 All] Muntjir Vs. General Manager, PNB Metlife India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.
1213
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.
C.M.W.P. No. 5490 of 2015
(Mattes under Article 227)
Muntjir
 ...Petitioner
Versus
General Manager, PNB Metlife India
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri V.C. Dixit
Counsel for the Respondents:
------
Constitution of India, Art.-226-Jurisdictionwrit
of
certiorari-order
passed
by
permanent lok adalat-stamp reporterobjected to convert petition under Art.-
227-in view of Radhey Shyam case-heldmisconceived order passed by Tribunal
stand on different footing-Tribunal-not
within perview of Civil Court-held-writ
petition under Art.-226-maintainable.
Held: Para-7
Thus, it is clear that the judgment in the
case of Radhey Shyam (supra) lays down
the law only in relation to the orders of
civil courts and it does not extend to the
orders passed by inferior tribunals or
courts, which are not civil courts.
Case Law discussed:
(2015) 5 SCC 423; (2003) 6 SCC 675; AIR
1967 SC 1
(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar
Gupta, J.)
1. This petition as originally drafted
under Article 226 of the Constitution is
for quashing of the order passed by the
Permanent Lok Adalat constituted under
the provisions of the Legal Services
Authorities Act, 1987. It is pointed out by
learned counsel for the petitioner that the
Stamp Reporter refused to accept the
petition on the ground that a petition
under
Article
226
would
not
be
maintainable, and the petitioner can only
file a petition under Article 227 of the
Constitution. It is further pointed out by
learned counsel for the petitioner that he
personally went to the Stamp Reporter
and requested him to accept the petition,
as framed, inasmuch as, there is no legal
embargo in maintaining a petition under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution,
challenging the order of a tribunal.
2. He also placed reliance on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in the
case of Radhey Shyam & another Vs
Chhabi
Nath
&
Others1
wherein,
according to him, the legal embargo in
maintaining a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution, is in respect of orders
passed by the Civil Courts and not in
respect of the order passed by a tribunal.
He points out that Stamp Reporter refused
to accept the petition and therefore, he
was compelled to change the provision of
law under which, the petition is being
filed from that under Article 226 to
Article 227 of the Constitution.
3. He further submitted that the
petitioner is still seeking a writ of
certiorari and a writ of mandamus, as the
petition is directed against the order of
Permanent Lok Adalat, which is acting as
a tribunal and not a civil court.
4. The submission made by learned
counsel for the petitioner appears to have
force. In the case of Radhey Shyam
(supra),
the
Supreme
Court
was
considering the reference made to it by a
two judge bench, expressing doubts about
correctness of the law laid down in Surya
Dev Rai vs Ram Chander Rai and others2
in so far as it held that interference with
1214
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the judicial orders of civil courts is
permissible by issuing a writ of certiorari.
In paragraph 27 of the referring order,
reliance was placed on paragraph 63 of
the Constitutional Bench judgment of 9
judges in the case of Naresh Shridhar
Mirajkar
and
others
vs
State
of
Maharashtra3. Paragraph 27 of the
referring order is extracted herein below:-
"It is clear from the law laid down in
Mirajkar in para 63 that a distinction has
been made between judicial orders of
inferior courts of civil jurisdiction and
orders of inferior tribunals or court which
are not civil courts and which can not pass
judicial orders. Therefore, judicial orders
passed
by
civil
courts
of
plenary
jurisdiction stand on a different footing in
view of the law pronounced in para 63 in
Mirajkar. The passage in the subsequent
edition of Halsbury (4th Edn.) which has
been quoted in Surya Dev Rai does not
show at all that there has been any change
in law on the points in issue pointed out
above."
(emphasis supplied)
5. Thus, while referring the matter to
a Larger Bench, their Lordships of the
Supreme
Court,
drew
a
distinction
between the orders passed by the inferior
courts of civil jurisdiction and the order of
inferior tribunals or courts, which are not
civil courts. Thus, the reference to the
larger bench was confined only to the
consideration of the question regarding
scope of a writ of certiorari in relation to
the orders of civil courts and not those of
inferior tribunals.
6. The Supreme Court while
answering the reference held that the
orders of the civil courts are not amenable
to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution. But the said dictum of
law, as noted above, is confined only to
judicial orders of civil courts and not
those of the tribunals, which as noted
above, stand on a different footing. This is
also clear from the following observations
made by the Supreme Court while
answering, the reference:-
"... All courts in the jurisdiction of a
High Court are subordinate to it and
subject to its control and supervision
under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is
constitutionally conferred on all High
Courts.
Broad
principles
of
writ
jurisdiction followed in England are
applicable to India and a writ of certiorari
lies against patently erroneous or without
jurisdiction
orders
of
Tribunals
or
authorities or courts other than judicial
courts. There are no precedents in India
for High Courts to issue writs
to
subordinate courts. Control of working of
subordinate courts in dealing with their
judicial orders is exercised by way of
appellate or revisional powers or power of
superintendence
under
Article
227.
Orders of civil court stand on different
footing from the orders of authorities or
Tribunals
or
courts
other
than
judicial/civil courts......"
(emphasis supplied)
7. Thus, it is clear that the judgment
in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) lays
down the law only in relation to the orders
of civil courts and it does not extend to
the orders passed by inferior tribunals or
courts, which are not civil courts.
8. In such view of the matter, this
Court is of the opinion that the objection
being raised by the Stamp Reporter in
relation to petitions filed under Article
226 of the Constitution, challenging
3 All] State of U.P. & Ors. Vs. Raj Karan & Anr.
1215
orders
of
tribunal
is
not
correct.
Accordingly, the petitioner is permitted to
convert this petition into that under
Article 226 of the Constitution, as it was
originally drafted.
9.
The office is directed to treat the
petition, as one under Article 226 and to
place it before the appropriate court hearing
such matters, after registering as a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution, if
possible as fresh case on 29.9.2015.
10. This order be placed before the
Stamp Reporter, for its guidance in
matters coming to it for reporting.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 01.09.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR , J.
Writ-C No. 6108 of 2004
State of U.P. & Ors.
 ...Petitioners
Versus
Raj Karan & Anr.
...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
S.C.
Counsel for the Respondents:
S.K. Srivastava, Amit Yadav, Anil Yadav,
S.C.,
S.K.
Chaubey,
Shyam
Narain,
Sudhanshu Narain
U.P. Industrial Dispute Act-1947-Section-6N- Retirement of Daily wagers-working for
last 11 years-retaining juniors-termination
without retrenchment compensation-or one
month salary in lieu thereof-held-illegaldirection of reinstatement with 50% back
wages-proper-warrant no interference by
Writ Court.
Held: Para-18
The
respondent
was
removed
from
service
unceremoniously
by
the
employer without any valid or cogent
reason despite the workman having put
in eleven years of service. The conduct of
the petitioner-employer tantamounts to
unfair labour practice as provided under
the VIth schedule to the Industrial
Disputes Act, by employing the workmen
as temporaries and to continue them for
such years with the object of depriving
them of the status and privileges of
permanent workmen.
Case Law discussed:
1990 (83) FLR 497; [2000 (86) FLR 649];
[2013 (139) FLR 541]; (1979) 2 SCC 80;
(2007) 2 SCC 433; (2014) 7 SCC 177; (2007) 5
SCC 755; (2006) 4 SCC 1; (2009) 8 SCC 556;
(2014) 7 SCC 190; [2005] 5 SCC 591; (2014)
11 SCC 85.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.)
1. The petitioner/employer is assailing
the award dated 05 March 2003 published on
15 October 2003 in Adjudication Case No.
528 of 1992 passed by Labour Court,
Gorakhpur. State Government on 27 August
1992 referred the following dispute:
"Whether the termination of service
of the workman Shri Raj Karan by its
employer w.e.f. 01.12.1991 is legal and
justified? If not, the relief workman is
entitled to get?"
2. The case of the respondent/workman
is that he was engaged as Beldar by the
Irrigation Department of the State since 1980,
worked for more than 240 days in a calander
year but without notice or retrenchment
compensation,
was
terminated
by
the
employer on 01 December 1991.
3. The petitioner in their objection/written
statement denied the allegations contenting that
the respondent/workman was engaged on