# Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd v. Alok Tandon, Chairman N.O.I.D.A. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 2 ILRA 1281
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-01-17
- **Case number:** Contempt Application (Civil) No. 5162 of 2019
- **Bench:** Suneet Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mayur-farm-pvt-ltd-v-alok-tandon-chairman-n-o-i-d-a-ors-45658
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - section
2(b) - civil contempt - contempt
jurisdiction
- limited to punish the
contemnor, not for disobedience of the
order, but upon returning a finding that
the
disobedience
is
wilful
-
Mere
disobedience is not sufficient unless it is
shown and proved that the disobedience
is wilful, deliberate and intentional -
casual, accidental or unintentional acts of
disobedience under the circumstances
which
negate
any
suggestions
of
contumacy - may amount to a contempt
in theory only - that does not render the
contemnor liable to punishment - To hold
somebody guilty of contempt of Court,
the concerned person must have wilfully
disobeyed
judgment,
decree
etc.
or
should have wilfully committed breach of
an undertaking given to a Court -
Petition not maintainable.(Para-13,18)

Contempt petition filed under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, for punishing the opposite
parties,
including,
the
Chairman/Chief
Executive
Officer,
New
Okhala
Industrial
Development Authority (Noida), for flouting the
order passed in First Appeal. (Para-2)

HELD:- NOIDA satisfied the decree, though
not to the satisfaction of the applicant - NOIDA
authorities cannot be punished - disobedience,
if any, not intentional and wilful - matter relates
to infringement of a decree or decretal order, it
is not expedient to invoke and exercise
contempt jurisdiction, in essence, as a mode
for executing the decree - remedy available to
the applicant is to take recourse in execution
1282 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings and not in contempt proceedings -
Punishment for disobedience/infringement of a
decree is not akin to execution of the decree -
jurisdiction of Contempt Court distinct and
different than that of executing Court. (Para26)

Contempt petition dismissed. (E-7)

LIST OF CASES CITED:-

## Text

2 All. Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Alok Tandon, Chairman N.O.I.D.A. & Ors.
1281
the interpretation of the applicant. The
doubt persists and as such in any event the
respondents being the alleged contemners
are entitled to have the benefit or
advantage of such a doubt having regard
to the nature of the proceeding as noticed
herein before more fully."

15. What comes out from a perusal
of the aforesaid judgements is that for an
act of contempt to be made out against the
contemnor, there has to be a deliberate and
wilfull disobedience and defiance of the
order passed by a Court of law and that the
directions which are alleged to have been
violated should be unambiguous.

16. Keeping in view the aforesaid
discussion and the law in this regard, it
cannot be said that there is any deliberate
or wilful disobedience of the judgement
and order dated 16.2.2018 passed by the
writ Court.

17. Accordingly, the contempt
petition is dismissed.

18. However, it would be open to the
applicant to challenge the order dated
29.03.2019, in case he is so aggrieved,
before the appropriate Court in the
appropriate proceedings.
----------
(2020)02ILR A1281

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 17.01.2020

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.

Contempt Application (Civil) No. 5162 of 2019

Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. ...Applicant
Versus
Alok Tandon, Chairman N.O.I.D.A. & Ors
 ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Applicant:
Sri
Arvind
Srivastava,
Sri
Arvind
Srivastava, Sri Sarveshwari Prasad, Sri
Rishabh Kumar, Sri Yanendra Pandey, Sri
K.N. Tripathi

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
Sri Kaushalendra Nath Singh, Sri M.C.
Chaturvedi

A. Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - section
2(b) - civil contempt - contempt
jurisdiction
- limited to punish the
contemnor, not for disobedience of the
order, but upon returning a finding that
the
disobedience
is
wilful
-
Mere
disobedience is not sufficient unless it is
shown and proved that the disobedience
is wilful, deliberate and intentional -
casual, accidental or unintentional acts of
disobedience under the circumstances
which
negate
any
suggestions
of
contumacy - may amount to a contempt
in theory only - that does not render the
contemnor liable to punishment - To hold
somebody guilty of contempt of Court,
the concerned person must have wilfully
disobeyed
judgment,
decree
etc.
or
should have wilfully committed breach of
an undertaking given to a Court -
Petition not maintainable.(Para-13,18)

Contempt petition filed under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971, for punishing the opposite
parties,
including,
the
Chairman/Chief
Executive
Officer,
New
Okhala
Industrial
Development Authority (Noida), for flouting the
order passed in First Appeal. (Para-2)

HELD:- NOIDA satisfied the decree, though
not to the satisfaction of the applicant - NOIDA
authorities cannot be punished - disobedience,
if any, not intentional and wilful - matter relates
to infringement of a decree or decretal order, it
is not expedient to invoke and exercise
contempt jurisdiction, in essence, as a mode
for executing the decree - remedy available to
the applicant is to take recourse in execution
1282 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceedings and not in contempt proceedings -
Punishment for disobedience/infringement of a
decree is not akin to execution of the decree -
jurisdiction of Contempt Court distinct and
different than that of executing Court. (Para26)

Contempt petition dismissed. (E-7)

LIST OF CASES CITED:-

1. Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Dharam
Dhoda and others , (2003) 11 SCC 1

2. Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs. United India
Insurance Company Ltd. , (2010) 12 SCC 770

3. B.K. Kar vs. High Court of Orissa , AIR 1961
SC 1367

4. State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari ,
AIR 1954 Pat 513

5. N. Baksi vs. O.K. Ghosh8, AIR 1957 Pat 528 ,
AIR 1957 Pat 528

6.
Jiwani
Kumari
Parikh
vs.
Satyabrata
Chakravorty , (1990) 4 SCC 737

7. Gyani Chandra vs. State of Andhra Pradesh ,
(2016) 15 SCC 164

8. Niaz Mohammad and others vs. State of
Haryana and others , (1994) 6 SCC 332

9. Dushyant Somal vs. Sushma Somal , (1981)
2 SCC 277

10. Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High Court of Delhi ,
(2012) 4 SCC 307

11. Bank of Baroda vs. Sadruddin Hassan Daya
, (2004) 1 SCC 360

12. Sakharan Ganesh Aaravandekar & Anr. v.
Mahadeo Vinayak Mathkar & Ors. , (2008) 10
SCC 186

13. Mahender Kumar Gandhi v. Mohammad
Tajer Ali & Ors. , (2008) 10 SCC 795

14. Niaz Mohammad and others vs. State of
Haryana and others , (1994) 6 SCC 332
15. Rama Narang vs. Ramesh Narang and
anothers , AIR 2006 SC 1883

16. Debabrata Bandopadhyay and others vs.
The State of West Bengal and another , AIR
1969 SC 189

(Delivered by Hon'ble Suneet Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Shri K.N. Tripathi, learned
Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Arvind
Srivastava and Shri Rishabh Kumar,
learned counsels for the applicant and Shri
M.C.
Chaturvedi,
learned
Senior
Advocate, assisted by Shri Kaushalendra
Nath Singh, learned counsels for the
opposite party.

2. The instant contempt petition has
been filed under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971, for punishing the opposite
parties, including, the Chairman/Chief
Executive Officer, New Okhala Industrial
Development
Authority
(Noida),
for
flouting the order dated 14 December
2007, passed in First Appeal: Jagdish
Chandra and others vs. New Okhala
Industrial Development Authority, Noida1
(First Appeal No. 412 of 2007).

3. The Stamp Reporter has reported
that the judgment and decree of the
Appellate Court was brought to the notice
of the opposite parties on 7 February 2014,
accordingly, the contempt petition has
been filed after a lapse of 6 years 65 days.
The opposite party no. 1 has put in
appearance and filed affidavit, inter alia,
stating that the petition apart from being
barred by laches and delay, the judgment
and decree of the Appellate Court is not
executable under the Contempt of Courts
Act, 19712. The contempt petition is not
maintainable, remedy available to the
applicant/appellant is before the civil court
by resorting to execution proceedings.
2 All. Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Alok Tandon, Chairman N.O.I.D.A. & Ors.
1283

4. The facts, briefly stated, for the
purposes of the instant petition, is that the
plot of the applicant came to be acquired
in proceedings under the Land Acquisition
Act, 18943, pursuant to a notification
issued on 30 October 1987. The award
came to be passed by the Special Land
Acquisition
Officer
determining
the
compensation at Rs. 46.64 per sq. yard.
The award/compensation was subjected to
challenge in reference, the learned District
Judge enhanced the compensation to Rs.
148.75 paise per sq. yard vide judgment
dated 28 August 2000. The Reference
Court, however, directed deduction of 50%
of the development charge from the
compensation
amount.
Aggrieved,
appellant/applicant herein, along with
other aggrieved persons, filed separate
First Appeals which came to be decided by
a common judgment and order by this
Court. The Appellate Court vide judgment
and order dated 14 December 2007,
enhanced the compensation to Rs. 297.50
paise per sq. yard and set aside the order of
the Reference Court to the extent directing
deduction of 50% of development charge.
The operative portion of the order reads
thus:

"Accordingly,
the
impugned
reference and the award to the extent of
deduction made from the correct market
value for arriving at the amount of
compensation to be paid to the petitioners
is concerned is hereby quashed and the
respondents are directed to recalculate the
amount
of
compensation
without
deducting
any
amount
towards
development charges and pay the same to
the petitioners within three months from
today alongwith interest @ 10% per
annum to be calculated on the same from
the date the amount of compensation was
to be paid till the date of payment.

With these observations the first
appeals and/or cross-objections of the
respective parties are disposed of. No
order is passed as to costs."

5. The judgment was subjected to
challenge by NOIDA in Special Leave
Petition No. 5276 of 2009, which came to
be dismissed on 29 October 2014. NOIDA
paid the compensation determined by the
Appellate Court on 29 October 2014,
immediately after the dismissal of the
appeal.

6. The learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the applicant submits that
the Appellate Court had directed payment
of interest @ 10% per annum, which
according to him, is interest over and
above the compensation and the statutory
interest contemplated under Section 34 of
the Land Acquisition Act. It is further
urged that NOIDA by not paying the
interest over and above the compensation
amount, which includes the statutory
interest, the opposite parties have willfully
and deliberately flouted the order of this
Court. It is further contended that by not
paying the interest as directed by this
Court, it is a continuing cause of action,
therefore, the petition is not barred by
delay and latches. However, by abundant
caution an application under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963, for condoning
the delay has been filed.

7. In rebuttal, the learned counsel
appearing for the NOIDA would urge that the
judgment and decree has been duly satisfied,
the amount towards compensation along with
statutory interest payable @ 9%/15% was paid
forthwith. The applicants are not entitled to any
further interest. It is further urged that the
Appellate Court had merely directed 10%
interest, whereas, NOIDA has paid interest @
1284 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
15% which is in excess and is liable to be
recovered from the applicants. It is further
contended that almost fifty First Appeals came
to be decided by a common order, but none of
the appellants, have approached this Court or
initiated execution proceedings claiming 10%
interest, over and above the statutory interest
already paid by NOIDA. The applicant is the
only appellant that has approached this Court
after lapse of more than 6 years. NOIDA is not
required to pay any further amount towards
interest.

8. The learned counsel would further
submit that there is no wilful and deliberate
disobedience of the order and decree. The
decree stands satisfied. In any case the
decree cannot be executed in contempt
jurisdiction bypassing the civil remedy.

9.

Rival
submissions
fall
for
consideration.

10. The question that primarily arises
is, as to whether, a decree of a civil court can
be executed in contempt proceedings or in
the alternative whether there is wilful
disobedience of the order of the Appellate
Court to invoke the jurisdiction under the
Contempt Act.

11. The facts, inter-se parties, are not in
dispute. It would be apposite to briefly scan
the authorities on the proposition of law and
the meaning of the expression ''wilful
disobedience'.

12. Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act,
is relevant for adjudication, which reads
thus:

"2. Definitions. - In this Act,
unless the context otherwise requires,-

(a). ......

(b). "civil contempt" means wilful
disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a
court or wilful breach of an undertaking
given to a court;

(c). .......

(i). xxxxx

(ii). xxxxx

(iii). xxxxx

(d). ......."

13. The contempt jurisdiction is limited
to punish the contemnor, not for disobedience
of the order, but upon returning a finding that
the disobedience is wilful. Mere disobedience
is not sufficient unless it is shown and proved
that the disobedience is wilful, deliberate and
intentional.

14. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs.
Dharam Dhoda and others4, Supreme Court
while explaining the expression ''wilful' and
Section 2 of the Contempt Act, held, that it
means an act or omission done voluntarily and
intentionally with the specific intent not to do
something that the law requires to be done. In
order to constitute contempt, the order of the
court must be of such nature which is capable
of execution in normal circumstances.

"17. ...... "Wilful" means an act
or omission which is done voluntarily and
intentionally and with the specific intent to
do something the law forbids or with the
specific intent to fail to do something the
law requires to be done, that is to say, with
bad purpose either to disobey or to
disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate
action done with evil intent or with a bad
motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to
constitute contempt the order of the court
must be of such a nature which is capable
of execution by the person charged in
normal circumstances. It should not
require any extraordinary effort nor should
2 All. Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Alok Tandon, Chairman N.O.I.D.A. & Ors.
1285
be dependent, either wholly or in part,
upon any act or omission of a third party
for its compliance. This has to be judged
having
regard
to
the
facts
and
circumstances of each case....."

15. The Court must not only be
satisfied about the disobedience, but
should
also
be
satisfied
that
such
disobedience was wilful and intentional. If
from the circumstances of a particular
case, the Court is satisfied that although
there has been a disobedience but the
disobedience is the result of some
compelling circumstances under which it
is not possible for the contemnor to
comply the order, the court would not
punish the alleged contemnor.

16. Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar
Gupta vs. United India Insurance Company
Ltd.5, while analysing the scope of Section
2(b) of the Contempt Act observed as under:

"17. This now leads us to the next
question and a more relevant one, as to
whether a proceeding for contempt initiated
against the appellant can be held to be
sustainable merely on speculation, assumption
and
inference
drawn
from
facts
and
circumstances of the instant case. In our
considered opinion, the answer clearly has
to be in the negative in view of the well-
settled legal position reflected in a catena of
decisions of this Court that contempt of a
civil nature can be held to have been made
out only if there has been a wilful
disobedience of the order and even though
there may be disobedience, yet if the same
does not reflect that it has been a conscious
and wilful disobedience, a case for contempt
cannot be held to have been made out. In
fact, if an order is capable of more than one
interpretation giving rise to variety of
consequences, non-compliance with the same
cannot be held to be wilful disobedience of the
order so as to make out a case of contempt
entailing the serious consequence including
imposition of punishment. However, when
the courts are confronted with a question as
to whether a given situation could be
treated to be a case of wilful disobedience,
or a case of alame excuse, in order to
subvert
its
compliance,
howsoever
articulate it may be, will obviously depend
on the facts and circumstances of a
particular case; but while deciding so, it
would not be legally correct to be too
speculative based on assumption as the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 clearly
postulates and emphasises that the ingredient
of wilful disobedience must be there before
anyone can be hauled up for the charge of
contempt of a civil nature."

17. It thus follows that the Court
would not overlook or ignore the statutory
ingredients of contempt of a civil nature
under Section 2(b), that the disobedience
to the order alleging contempt has to
satisfy the test that it is a wilful
disobedience. In other words Section 2(b)
could be invoked only when there is wilful
disobedience and the Section provides
scope
for
reasonable
or
rational
interpretation of an order or the facts and
circumstances
arising
therein.
Mere
unintentional disobedience is not enough
to hold anyone guilty of contempt
although disobedience might have been
established.
Absence
of
wilful
disobedience on part of the contemnor will
not hold guilty unless contempt involves a
degree of fault or misconduct. Thus, the
unintentional disobedience is not sufficient
to justify for holding one guilty of
contempt.

18. It is settled law that casual,
accidental
or
unintentional
acts
of
1286 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
disobedience under the circumstances
which
negate
any
suggestions
of
contumacy, may amount to a contempt in
theory only but that does not render the
contemnor liable to punishment. To hold
somebody guilty of contempt of Court, the
concerned person must have wilfully
disobeyed judgment, decree etc. or should
have wilfully committed breach of an
undertaking given to a Court. (Refer: B.K.
Kar vs. High Court of Orissa6; State of
Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari7 and
N. Baksi vs. O.K. Ghosh8, the principle
was reiterated in Jiwani Kumari Parikh
vs. Satyabrata Chakravorty9 and Gyani
Chandra
vs.
State
of
Andhra
Pradesh10).

19. In Niaz Mohammad and others
vs. State of Haryana and others11,
wherein, the contemnors had not obeyed
the judgment and released the salary,
disobedience was held, in the given facts
not wilful so as to tantamount to civil
contempt. The Supreme Court drew a
distinction between a court executing an
order
and
punishing
for
contempt.
Reliance was placed on Dushyant Somal
vs. Sushma Somal12, to hold that where
the contemnor is able to place before the
court sufficient material to conclude that it
is impossible to obey the order, the court
will not be justified in punishing the
alleged contemnor.

20. In Kanwar Singh Saini vs. High
Court of Delhi13, the question posed
before the Supreme Court was as to
whether, the statement/undertaking given
by a party culminating into a decree of a
civil court, an application under Order 39
Rule 2A C.P.C. or under the Contempt Act
could be entertained by the civil court
and/or whether the matter could be
referred by the civil court to the High
Court at all. The Court held that in case
grievance of non-compliance with the
terms of the decree passed in the civil suit,
the remedy available to the aggrieved
person is to approach the execution court
under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC.

"10. In case there is a grievance
of non-compliance of the terms of the
decree passed in the civil suit, the remedy
available to the aggrieved person is to
approach the execution court under Order
XXI Rule 32 CPC which provides for
elaborate proceedings in which the parties
can adduce their evidence and can
examine and cross-examine the witnesses
as opposed to the proceedings in contempt
which are summary in nature. Application
under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC is not
maintainable once the suit stood decreed.
Law does not permit to skip the remedies
available under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC
and resort to the contempt proceedings for
the reason that the court has to exercise its
discretion under the Act 1971 when an
effective and alternative remedy is not
available to the person concerned. Thus,
when
the
matter
relates
to
the
infringement of a decree or decretal
order embodies rights, as between the
parties, it is not expedient to invoke and
exercise
contempt
jurisdiction,
in
essence, as a mode of executing the
decree or merely because other remedies
may
take
time
or
are
more
circumlocutory in character. Thus, the
violation of permanent injunction can
be set right in executing the proceedings
and not the contempt proceedings."

21. The violation or breach of the
undertaking which became part of the
decree of the Court, amounts to contempt
of Court, irrespective of the fact that it is
open to the decree-holder to execute the
2 All. Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Alok Tandon, Chairman N.O.I.D.A. & Ors.
1287
decree. In other words, for breach of an
undertaking the person can be punished for
contempt, but the decree has to be got
executed in accordance with the prescribed
procedure before the contempt civil court.
The Supreme Court in Bank of Baroda
vs. Sadruddin Hassan Daya14 held as
follows:

"14. The respondents had filed
consent terms in this Court but the
same contained an undertaking that
they would not alienate, encumber or
charge the properties to anyone until
the decree was satisfied. Acting upon
this undertaking and the consent terms,
this Court passed the decree....., This
Court, therefore, put its imprimatur
upon the consent terms and made it a
decree of the Court. The violation or
breach of the undertaking which
became part of the decree of the
Court certainly amounts to contempt
of Court, irrespective of the fact that
it is open to the decree holder to
execute the decree. Contempt is a
matter between the Court and the
alleged contemner and is not affected
in any manner by the rights or
obligations of the parties to the
litigation inter se......

15........
In
the
present
proceedings
we
are
basically
concerned with the violation or
breach of the undertaking given by
the
respondents.
Shri
C.A.
Sundaram, learned senior counsel,
has submitted that the Respondent
No. 2 was not personally present and
the undertaking was given by him
through a power of attorney. In our
opinion, the mere fact that the
respondent No. 2 was personally not
present and the undertaking and the
consent terms were given through a
power of attorney will make no
difference as he also got benefit
under the consent decree passed by this
Court."

22. In a given case if the court grants
time to a tenant to vacate the tenanted premises
and the tenant files an undertaking to vacate
the same after expiry of the said time, but does
not vacate the same, the breach of the
undertaking would amount to contempt. (See:
Sakharan Ganesh Aaravandekar & Anr. v.
Mahadeo Vinayak Mathkar & Ors.15 and
Mahender Kumar Gandhi v. Mohammad
Tajer Ali & Ors.16.

23. In an appropriate case where
exceptional circumstances exist, the Court may
also resort to the provisions applicable in case
of civil contempt, for violation/breach of
undertaking/judgment/order
or
decree.
However, before passing any final order on
such application, the Court must satisfy itself
that there is violation of such judgment, decree,
direction or order and such disobedience is
wilful and intentional. Though in a case of
execution of a decree, the executing Court may
not be bothered whether the disobedience of
the decree is wilful or not and the Court is
bound to execute a decree whatever may be
the consequence thereof. In a contempt
proceeding, the alleged contemnor may satisfy
the Court that disobedience has been under
some compelling circumstances, and in that
situation, no punishment can be awarded to
him. (See: Niaz Mohammad and others vs.
State of Haryana and others17, Bank of
Baroda (supra); and Rama Narang vs.
Ramesh Narang and anothers18.

24. The contempt proceedings being
quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of
proof required is the same as in other
criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is
entitled
to
the
protection
of
all
1288 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
safeguards/rights which are provided in
Criminal Jurisprudence, including, the
benefit of doubt. There must be a clear-cut
case of obstruction of administration of
justice by a party intentionally to bring the
matter within the ambit of the said
provision. The case should not rest only on
surmises and conjectures. In Debabrata
Bandopadhyay and others vs. The State
of West Bengal and another19, Supreme
Court observed as under:

"A question whether there is contempt
of court or not is a serious one. The court is both
the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation.
It behoves the court to act with as great
circumspection
as
possible
making
all
allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties
arising from inveterate practices in courts and
tribunals. It is only when a clear case of
contumacious
conduct
not
explainable
otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be
punished......... Punishment under the law of
Contempt is called for when the lapse is
deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and
in defiance of authority. To take action in an
unclear case is to make the law of contempt do
duty for other measures and is not to be
encouraged."

25. In the facts of the instant case, it is not
being disputed by the applicants that the
compensation at the rate determined by the Court
and the interest, thereon, has been paid by
NOIDA. The issue between the parties is
whether applicant is entitled to interest @ 10%
over and above the statutory interest provided
under the Land Acquisition Act. The categorical
stand of NOIDA authority is that they have
satisfied the decree and no further amount is
required to be paid. Rather, it is urged that they
have paid excess amount towards interest.

26. In the given facts the question that
arises is as to whether the alleged disobedience
by NOIDA is wilful and deliberate inviting
punishment. Having regard to the fact that
NOIDA satisfied the decree, though not to the
satisfaction of the applicant, NOIDA authorities
cannot be punished. The disobedience, if any, is
not intentional and wilful. The matter relates to
infringement of a decree or decretal order, it is not
expedient to invoke and exercise contempt
jurisdiction, in essence, as a mode for executing
the decree. The remedy available to the applicant
is to take recourse in execution proceedings and
not in contempt proceedings. Punishment for
disobedience/infringement of a decree is not akin
to execution of the decree. The jurisdiction of a
Contempt Court is distinct and different than that
of the executing Court.

27. For the reasons and law stated herein
above, the petition fails, accordingly dismissed.

28. This order and the observations made
therein would not prejudice the cause of the
applicant in the event the applicant takes remedy
of execution of the decree.
----------
(2020)02ILR A1288

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.02.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE PANKAJ MITHAL, J.
THE HON'BLE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA,
J.

Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 1077 of 2020

Ranpal Pradhan ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Smt. Swati Agrawal Srivastava

Counsel
for
the
Respondents: