# Md Sameer Rao v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 6 ILRA 931
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-05-25
- **Case number:** Matter under Article 227 No. 3671 of 2022
- **Bench:** Ajay Bhanot
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/md-sameer-rao-v-state-of-u-p-ors-50477
- **Pages:** 15

## Headnote

A. Civil Law- impugned order- Regional
Secretary, Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad,
Regional Office, Bareilly, U.P.- rejected the
application of the petitioner for change of
his
name
in
the
High
School
and
Intermediate certificates.

B. Fundamental right to a name-right to
keep a name of choice or change the name
according to personal preference-Article
19(1)(a)
of
the
Constitution--comes
within
the
ambit
of
right
to
lifeguaranteed
under
Article
21
of
the
Constitution of India-restrictions on the
fundamental right to a name- not an
absolute
right-subject
to
various
reasonable restrictions. (Paras 23,26, 27
and 32)
HELD:
The intimacy of human life and a person's name
is undeniable. The right to keep a name of
choice or change the name according to
personal preference comes within the mighty
sweep of the right to life guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 23)

Bhatia, J. in Rashmi Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. &
anr. reaffirmed the right to change the name as
a facet of the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of
India. (Para 27)

Clearly the importance of a name is an universal
human value and a cherished right across
jurisdictions. Commonality of human values and
consensus of judicial authorities often becomes
the basis of universal human rights. (Para 32)

C.
Impugned
order-Regulation
7
of
Chapter
III
of
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921correction of clerical errors in the name or
the other particulars of a candidateRegulation 40 of Chapter XII of the Uttar
Pradesh
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921- application seeking change of name
recorded in High School or Intermediate
certificates
issued
by
the
Boardapplication made after 7 years and 5
months-petitioner's
claim
rejected
on
ground of delay and bar of limitation-for
the purpose of change of name-students
appearing in different Boards-comprise
one class-Regulation 40(ग)-fails the test
of reasonable restriction under Article
19(1)(a)
and
Article
21-Doctrine
of
'reading down' invoked-. (Paras 38, 39,
40, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 59)

HELD:

For the purpose of change of name, the
students appearing in different Boards across
the country comprise one class. The CBSE byelaws do not contain any restrictions as are
imposed in the Regulations of the U.P.
Intermediate Education Act, 1921, discussed
above. The students who appear in the UP
Board
are
treated
deferentially
and
discriminated
against
the
candidates
who
932 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appear in the CBSE Board, as regards their right
to change of name. This constitutes violation of
right to equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. (Para 52)

The restrictions contained in Regulation 40 (ग)
are
disproportionate
and
in
nature
of
prohibitions and fail the test of reasonable
restrictions on fundamental rights under Article
19(1)(a) and Article 21 and Article 14 of the
Constitution
of India. The restrictions in
Regulation 40 (ग) are arbitrary and infringe the
fundamental right to choose and change own's
name vested by virtue of Article 19(1)(a), Article
21 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(Para 53)

Situation of unconstitutionality can be saved by
invoking the doctrine of 'reading down'. (Para
54)

Writ petition allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,992 of 47,758. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39992 for what follows._

6 All. Md Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
931
in mutation proceedings is dismissed at the
admission stage without making any
observation which may affect the merits of
the case.

21. The dismissal of the writ petition
will not affect the right of the petitioners to
seek
redressal
of
his
grievance
in
accordance with law.
----------
(2023) 6 ILRA 931
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 25.05.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJAY BHANOT, J.

Matter under Article 227 No. 3671 of 2022
with
Writ-C No. 14043 of 2023

Md Sameer Rao ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
In Person, Sri Hritudhwaj Pratap Sahi

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Gaurav Mahajan, Sri Rajesh Tripathi

A. Civil Law- impugned order- Regional
Secretary, Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad,
Regional Office, Bareilly, U.P.- rejected the
application of the petitioner for change of
his
name
in
the
High
School
and
Intermediate certificates.

B. Fundamental right to a name-right to
keep a name of choice or change the name
according to personal preference-Article
19(1)(a)
of
the
Constitution--comes
within
the
ambit
of
right
to
lifeguaranteed
under
Article
21
of
the
Constitution of India-restrictions on the
fundamental right to a name- not an
absolute
right-subject
to
various
reasonable restrictions. (Paras 23,26, 27
and 32)
HELD:
The intimacy of human life and a person's name
is undeniable. The right to keep a name of
choice or change the name according to
personal preference comes within the mighty
sweep of the right to life guaranteed under
Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 23)

Bhatia, J. in Rashmi Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. &
anr. reaffirmed the right to change the name as
a facet of the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of
India. (Para 27)

Clearly the importance of a name is an universal
human value and a cherished right across
jurisdictions. Commonality of human values and
consensus of judicial authorities often becomes
the basis of universal human rights. (Para 32)

C.
Impugned
order-Regulation
7
of
Chapter
III
of
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921correction of clerical errors in the name or
the other particulars of a candidateRegulation 40 of Chapter XII of the Uttar
Pradesh
Intermediate
Education
Act,
1921- application seeking change of name
recorded in High School or Intermediate
certificates
issued
by
the
Boardapplication made after 7 years and 5
months-petitioner's
claim
rejected
on
ground of delay and bar of limitation-for
the purpose of change of name-students
appearing in different Boards-comprise
one class-Regulation 40(ग)-fails the test
of reasonable restriction under Article
19(1)(a)
and
Article
21-Doctrine
of
'reading down' invoked-. (Paras 38, 39,
40, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55 and 59)

HELD:

For the purpose of change of name, the
students appearing in different Boards across
the country comprise one class. The CBSE byelaws do not contain any restrictions as are
imposed in the Regulations of the U.P.
Intermediate Education Act, 1921, discussed
above. The students who appear in the UP
Board
are
treated
deferentially
and
discriminated
against
the
candidates
who
932 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
appear in the CBSE Board, as regards their right
to change of name. This constitutes violation of
right to equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. (Para 52)

The restrictions contained in Regulation 40 (ग)
are
disproportionate
and
in
nature
of
prohibitions and fail the test of reasonable
restrictions on fundamental rights under Article
19(1)(a) and Article 21 and Article 14 of the
Constitution
of India. The restrictions in
Regulation 40 (ग) are arbitrary and infringe the
fundamental right to choose and change own's
name vested by virtue of Article 19(1)(a), Article
21 and Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
(Para 53)

Situation of unconstitutionality can be saved by
invoking the doctrine of 'reading down'. (Para
54)

Writ petition allowed. (E-14)

List of Cases cited:

1. Sumpurnanand Vs St. of U.P. & ors., 2018
(11) ADJ 550

2. Olga Tellis Vs Bombay Municipal Corpn, 1985
(3) SCC 545

3. Munn Vs Illinois; 1877 (94) US 113

4. Kashish Gupta Vs Central Board of Secondary
Education & ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 1590

5. Rayaan Chawla Vs University of Delhi & anr.,
2020 SCC OnLine Del 1413

6. Jigya Yadav Vs CBSE, 2021 (7) SCC 535

7. Rashmi Srivastava Vs St. of U.P. & anr., 2022
(9) ADJ 696

8. Coeriel and Aurik Vs The Netherlands,
Communication No. 453/1991

9. Raihman Vs Latvia, Communication No.
1621/2007

10. Standesamt Stadt Niebüll, 2006 EUEJ C96/04A
11. K. S. Puttaswamy Vs U.O.I., 2017 (10) SCC
1

12. Jeeja Ghosh Vs U.O.I., 2016 (7) SCC 761

13. Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited Vs U.O.I.,
Civil Appeal No. 8129, 8130 and 8131 of 2022;
April 05, 2023 MANU/SC/0333/2023

14. Subramanian Swamy Vs Raju, 2014 (8) SCC
390

15. DTC Vs Mazdoor Congress, 1991 Supp (1)
SCC 600

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajay Bhanot, J.)

1. The judgement is being structured
in the following conceptual framework to
facilitate the discussion:

I
Introduction
II
Facts
III
Submissions of learned counsels
IV
Concept of names and constitutional
perspectives:

A.
Fundamental Right to a
name
B.
Restrictions
on
the
fundamental
right
to
a
name

V
Impugned
order
and
statutory
provisions : Analysis
VI
Conclusions and Directions

2. Both writ petitions arise out of
same issue and are being decided by a
common judgement.

I. Introduction:
6 All. Md Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
933

3. By the impugned order dated
24.12.2020
the
Regional
Secretary,
Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad, Regional
Office, Bareilly, U.P. has rejected the
application of the petitioner for change of
his name in the High School and
Intermediate certificates.

II. Facts:

4. Brief facts are these. Name of the
petitioner was recorded as "Shahnawaz" in
the Board of High School Examination
certificate,
and
the
Intermediate
Examination certificate by the Madhyamik
Shiksha Parishad issued in 2013 and 2015
respectively.

5. The petitioner publicly disclosed
the change of his name by causing the
following notification to be published in
the Gazette of India bearing Gazette No. 39
New Delhi, Saturday, September 26 -
October 2, 2020 (Asvina 4, 1942) Part-IV,
Page 1091:

" I hitherto known as SHAHNAWAZ
son of MAUVEEN HUSAIN, residing at
village Mehloli, Pot Jalalpur Khs, Tehsil
Bilari, Disst. Moradabad, Uttar Pradesh244411, have changed my name and shall
hereafter be known as MD. SAMEER
RAO.

It is certified that I have complied with
other legal requirements in this connection.

SHAHNAWAZ

[Signature (in existing old name)]"

6. A similar notification was also
published in a local daily newspaper
"Hindustan" having wide circulation in the
area.

7. The petitioner made an application
for change of his name from "Shahnawaz"
to "Md Sameer Rao" to the respondent
Board in the year 2020. The said
application was declined by the impugned
order.

III. Submissions of learned counsels

8. The petitioner was present in Court
and expressed his inability to engage a
counsel due to paucity of funds. A request
was made by the Court to the members of
the Bar at large to represent the petitioner
pro bono. Shri Hritudhwaj Pratap Sahi,
learned counsel volunteered to represent
the petitioner and assist the Court in high
traditions of the legal profession. Shri
Rajesh Tripathi, learned counsel for the
Union of India is present.

9. Shri Hritudhwaj Pratap Sahi,
learned counsel for the petitioner/amicus
curiae submitted as under:

(A). The rejection of the name change
application by the respondent authorities is
arbitrary and contrary to the statutory
provisions holding the field.

(B). The right to keep name is
relatable to fundamental rights of a citizen
guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21
of the Constitution of India.

(C). The relevant Regulations have to
be interpreted in light of the holdings of the
constitutional
courts
to
uphold
the
fundamental rights of the petitioner. The
offending provisions of Regulation 40 (ग)
are liable to be read down.

(D). The authority erred in law by
rejecting the application on the grounds of
limitation by invoking Regulation 7 framed
under the Intermediate Education Act,
934 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
1921, which is inapplicable to applications
for change of name.

10. (I). Shri I. P. Srivastava, learned
Additional Chief Standing Counsel submits
that the change of name is not an absolute
right and subject to various restrictions
imposed by law. The application for change
of name was rightly rejected since it was
barred by limitation.

(II). Citation of wrong provision will
not void the impugned order since power is
vested in the authority by virtue of
Regulation 40 of the U.P. Intermediate
Education Act, 1921.

(III). The claim of the petitioner for
change of name is in the teeth of the said
provision. The proposed name falls in the
prohibited category since it discloses the
religion of the applicant.

(IV). Regulation 40 (ग) are not liable
to be read down and are reasonable
restrictions on fundamental rights.

IV.
Concept
of
names
and
constitutional perspectives:

A. Fundamental Right to a name

11. The most ancient stirrings of
human thought evidenced in the Rigveda
exalted keeping of names as a primal act of
human life1:

"....प्रारभम्िक दशा में पदाथो के नाम रखे गए है। यह
ज्ञान का पहला चरण है"

12. Western scholars opine that usage
of name became prevalent in the earliest
specimens of humankind which are kindred
with our own. "The primitive human
speech was probably a very scanty
collection of names, and may have been
eked out with gestures and signs.2" The
first recorded evidences of human thought
and transactions discovered in the remnants
of the ancient Mesopotamian civilization
contain references to the name of a
person3.

13. "These are the names of the sons
of Israel who went down into Egypt....as
Reuben and Simeon they descended [into
Egypt] and as Reuben and Simeon they
went out". - Shemot 1:1 (Exodus)

This passage from Torah's Shemot
shows the importance of names in ancient
Jewish customs.

14. "What is a name....?4 asked a
forlorn Juliet. But name was all. The lovers
met their tragic fate only because Romeo
took the name of his ancestors. General
MacArthur's mother cautioned him of how
honour was a facet of name and urged him
to "remember the world will be quick with
its blame if shadow or shame ever darken
your name". Nearer home the bard Maithli
Saran Gupt invoked the power of name as a
summon and spur to action "...जग में रह कर
कुछ नाम करो, कुछ काम करो, कुछ काम करो5..."

15. Virtues of name are celebrated in
verse and prose, in spiritual literature and
secular texts. The importance of an
individual's name is experienced in all
aspects of life including social interfaces
and commercial transactions. Power and
glory of the human name transcends time
and is not fenced by boundaries.

16. The invention of the "name"
played a significant role in the development
of human societies, and even changed the
course of human evolution. The idea of
giving a name to each individual added to
human skills to adapt to the needs of social
6 All. Md Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
935
living, and enhanced the capacity of
humankind to survive and progress as a
species. The human name is an inalienable
part of an individual's life, and an
indispensable tool for the human race to
enter into social groups and thrive as a race.
Name imparts a unique identity to each
human
being.
Every
person
finds
fulfillment of life in their6 name.

17. Tradition and sources of human
names are many and varied. Naming
traditions are derived from the cultural
deposit, historic memories, value systems,
inspiring personalities, religious beliefs of a
society and things that bring joy. Names are
chosen to cherish the human life that newly
comes into being. Similarly change of
name too has its roots in ancient customs of
various societies. Sannyasa order and the
priestly
class
in
different
religious
persuasions make it imperative for the
seeker to drop the birth name symbolizing
renouncement of past associations, and take
a new name manifesting the quest for a
higher cause.

18. The inextricable connection
between an individual's name and the
person's life inevitably becomes a subject
matter of constitutional law discourse.

19. The discussion will be taken
forward with assistance of authorities in
point.

20. This Court in Sumpurnanand vs.
State of U.P. and others7 while examining
the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in light of various landmarks in
constitutional law observed:

"29. The simple words of Article 21 of
the Constitution of India, had profound
significance
in
development
of
constitutional law in India.

30.
The
resolve
to
create
the
Constitution was the collective will of the
people of India. The promise of the
Constitution is to every individual citizen
of India. Part III of the Constitution is
anchored in the individual and revolves
around the individual citizens. The simple
word ''life'' in Article 21 of the Constitution
of
India
presented
a
complex
jurisprudential problem to the Courts. The
simple word ''life'' did not disguise for long
the profound intent of the constitution
framers. The approach of the Courts to the
provision in the Constitution progressed
from
tentative
to
visionary,
the
interpretation of provision advanced from
literal to prophetic.

31. What was the meaning of life for
the people of India on the morrow of our
independence? If life meant physical
existence and mere survival, Indian people
had shown remarkable resilience to live
through the vicissitudes of history. The
people of India have lived in servitude,
survived famines, lived in an iniquitous
social order often dominated by prejudice,
penury and illiteracy. Trackless centuries
are filled with the record of survival of the
people of India. Surely life of the Indian
people could not remain the same after the
dawn of independence of India. Surely the
meaning of life for the people of India had
to change after the advent of the Republic
of India. The founding fathers, had the
audacity to dream of transforming the
meaning of life for the people of India. The
Courts in India had the vision and the
courage to make the dreams a reality. Life
had to embrace all the attributes which
made life meaningful and all the pursuits
which made life worth living.

32. The probe into the purpose of life
has traditionally been the province of the
936 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
philosophers.
The
framers
of
the
constitution, brought the word ''life'' in the
ambit of the constitution. Constitutional
law put the meaning of life in the domain
of the Courts. ''Life'' is very much the
concern of the Courts. The search for the
meaning of life is the business of the
Courts. Indeed, the discovery of the
meaning of life is central to realizing the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.

34. The Courts in India, knew early on
that understanding the significance of life
was the key to providing the security of
justice. While interpreting Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, embraced life in all its breadth and
profundity
and
eschewed
a
narrow
interpretation."

21. A defining moment came in the
constitutional history when the Supreme
Court liberated life from the fetters of
physical existence and found that the sweep
of the right to life conferred by Article 21
of the Constitution of India is wide and farreaching.
Olga
Tellis
v.
Bombay
Municipal Corpn8 endorsed the holding in
Munn v. Illinois9 that life was "something
more than mere animal existence and the
inhibition against the deprivation of life
extends to all those limits and faculties by
which life is enjoyed".

22. Article 21 was set on a career of
constantly expanding boundaries and the
ambit of life was progressively enlarged.

23. The intimacy of human life and a
person's name is undeniable. The right to
keep a name of choice or change the name
according to personal preference comes
within the mighty sweep of the right to life
guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India.

24. Kerala High Court in Kashish
Gupta Vs. Central Board of Secondary
Education and others10, brought the right
to a name within the scope of Article
19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution
of India by holding:

"8. Name is something very personal
to an individual. Name is an expression of
one's individuality, one's identity and one's
uniqueness. Name is the manner in which
an individual expresses himself to the
world at large. It is the foundation on which
he moves around in a civil society. In a
democracy, free expression of one's name
in the manner he prefers is a facet of
individual right. In Our Country, to have a
name and to express the same in the
manner he wishes, is certainly a part of
right to freedom of speech and expression
under Article 19 (1) (a) as well as a part of
the right to liberty under Article 21 of the
Constitution
of
India.
State
or
its
instrumentalities cannot stand in the way of
use of any name preferred by an individual
or for any change of name into one of his
choice except to the extent prescribed
under Article 19(2) or by a law which is
just, fair and reasonable. Subject to the
limited grounds of control and regulation of
fraudulent or criminal activities or other
valid causes, a bonafide claim for change
of name in the records maintained by the
Authorities ought to be allowed without
hesitation."

25. Similarly Delhi High Court in
Rayaan Chawla Vs. University of Delhi
and another11 set its face against adopting
a technical approach to the issue of change
of name and expounded the law as under:

"14. Hence, the aforesaid judgment
has clearly stated that to have a name and
to express the same in the manner he
6 All. Md Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
937
wishes, is a part of the right to freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19(1)
(a)as well as right to liberty under Article
21of the Constitution of India. It cannot be
denied that the right to change a name is a
protected right and the petitioner would
normally be not denied the said right on
technical issues."

26. The Supreme Court in Jigya
Yadav Vs. CBSE12, held that "name is an
intrinsic element of identity". The nexus of
name and identity, and the freedom to
express one's identity in the manner of
one's preference was thus expounded in
Jigya Yadav (Supra):

"125.Identity, therefore, is an amalgam
of various internal and external including
acquired characteristics of an individual
and name can be regarded as one of the
foremost
indicators
of
identity. And
therefore, an individual must be in
complete control of her name and law must
enable her to retain as well as to exercise
such control freely "for all times". Such
control would inevitably include the
aspiration of an individual to be recognised
by a different name for a just cause. Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution provides for a
guaranteed right to freedom of speech and
expression.
In
light
ofNavtej
Singh
Johar[Navtej Singh Joharv.Union of India,
(2018) 10 SCC 1 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] ,
this freedom would include the freedom to
lawfully express one's identity in the
manner of their liking. In other words,
expression of identity is a protected
element of freedom of expression under the
Constitution.

126.Having recognised the existence
of this right, the essential question pertains
to the rights that flow due to the change of
name. The question becomes vital because
identity, as stated above, is a combination
of diverse set of elements.Navtej Singh
Johar[Navtej Singh Joharv.Union of India,
(2018) 10 SCC 1 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 1]
dealt with "natural identity" and here we
are dealing with name, which can only be
perceived
as
an
"acquired
identity".
Therefore, the precise scope of right and
extent of restrictions could only be
determined upon deeper examination.

127.To begin with, it is important to
explain what we understand by this right to
change of name as a constituent element of
freedom of expression of identity. Any
change in identity of an individual has to
go through multiple steps and it cannot be
regarded as complete without proper
fulfilment of those steps. An individual
may self-identify oneself with any title or
epithet at any point of time. But the change
of identity would not be regarded as
formally or legally complete until and
unless the State and its agencies take note
thereof in their records. Afterall, in social
sphere, an individual is not only recognised
by how an individual identifies oneself but
also by how his/her official records identify
him/her. For, in every public transaction of
an individual, official records introduce the
person by his/her name and other relevant
particulars."

27. Bhatia, J. in Rashmi Srivastava
Vs.
State
of
U.P.
and
another13
reaffirmed the right to change the name as a
facet of the fundamental right guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution
of India.

28. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee in Coeriel and Aurik
v. The Netherlands14 acknowledged
that name is an indispensable component
of a person's identity and it falls within
the realm of right to privacy by holding
thus:
938 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"10.2....The Committee is of the view
that a person's surname constitutes an
important component of one's identity and
that the protection against arbitrary or
unlawful interference with one's privacy
includes the protection against arbitrary or
unlawful interference with the right to
choose
and
change
one's
own
name.........The question arises whether
the refusal of the authorities to recognize a
change of surname is also beyond the
threshold of permissible interference within
the meaning of article 17.
10.5. In the present case, the authors'
request for recognition of the change of
their first names to Hindu names in order to
pursue their religious studies had been
granted in 1986. The State party based its
refusal of the request also to change their
surnames on the grounds that the authors
had not shown that the changes sought
were essential to pursue their studies, that
the names had religious connotations and
that they were not 'Dutch sounding'. The
Committee finds the grounds for so
limiting the authors' rights under article 17
not to be reasonable. In the circumstances
of the instant case the refusal of the authors'
request was therefore arbitrary within the
meaning of article 17, paragraph 1, of the
Covenant."

29. A similar view was taken by the
United Nations Human Rights Committee
in Raihman v. Latvia15, and by the Court
of Justice of the European Community in
Standesamt Stadt Niebüll16.

30. International jurisprudence has
increasingly
recognized
"the
growing
importance of human rights in international
law, of the obligation to recognize and
respect individual identity, as well as the
generality of certain human rights standards
such as the prohibition of discrimination,
the right to private life, and the right to a
name17"

31.

Various
international
instruments18i also vest the right to a name
in every person.

32. Clearly the importance of a name
is an universal human value and a
cherished
right
across
jurisdictions.
Commonality
of
human
values
and
consensus of judicial authorities often
becomes the basis of universal human
rights.

IV.
B.
Restrictions
on
the
fundamental right to a name

33. The fundamental right to keep or
change a name is vested in every citizen by
virtue of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. But it is not an
absolute right and is subject to various
reasonable
restrictions
as
may
be
prescribed by law.

34. The limitations or restrictions
imposed by law on fundamental rights have
to be fair, just and reasonable. Reference
can be profitably made to the following
holdings of the Supreme Court in K. S.
Puttaswamy Vs. Union of India19:

24.....The jurisprudential foundation
which held the field sixty three years ago in
M P Sharma and fifty five years ago in
Kharak Singh has given way to what is
now a settled position in constitutional law.
Firstly, the fundamental rights emanate
from basic notions of liberty and dignity
and the enumeration of some facets of
liberty as distinctly protected rights under
Article 19 does not denude Article 21 of its
expansive ambit. Secondly, the validity of
6 All. Md Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
939
a law which infringes the fundamental
rights has to be tested not with reference
to the object of state action but on the
basis of its effect on the guarantees of
freedom. Thirdly, the requirement of
Article 14 that state action must not be
arbitrary
and
must
fulfil
the
requirement of reasonableness, imparts
meaning to the constitutional guarantees
in Part III

(emphasis supplied)

260. The impact of the decision
inCooper[Rustom Cavasjee Cooperv.Union
of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248] is to establish
a link between the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.
The immediate consequence of the decision
is that a law which restricts the personal
liberties contained in Article 19 must meet
the
test
of
permissible
restrictions
contemplated by clauses (2) to (6) in
relation to the fundamental freedom which
is
infringed.
Moreover,
since
the
fundamental rights are interrelated, Article
21 is no longer to be construed as a residue
of rights which are not specifically
enumerated in Article 19. Both sets of
rights overlap and hence a law which
affects one of the personal freedoms
under Article 19 would, in addition to the
requirement of meeting the permissible
restrictions contemplated in clauses (2)
to (6), have to meet the parameters of a
valid "procedure established by law"
under Article 21 where it impacts on life
or personal liberty. The law would be
assessed not with reference to its object
but on the basis of its effect and impact
on the fundamental rights. Coupled with
the breakdown of the theory that the
fundamental
rights
are
watertight
compartments, the post-Maneka[Maneka
Gandhiv.Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC
248] jurisprudence infused the test of
fairness and reasonableness in determining
whether the "procedure established by law"
passes muster under Article 21. At a
substantive level, the constitutional values
underlying each article in the Chapter on
Fundamental Rights animate the meaning
of the others. This development of the law
has followed a natural evolution. The basis
of this development after all is that every
aspect of the diverse guarantees of
fundamental rights deals with human
beings. Every element together with others
contributes in the composition of the
human personality. In the very nature of
things, no element can be read in a manner
disjunctive from the composite whole. The
close relationship between each of the
fundamental
rights
has
led
to
the
recognition of constitutional entitlements
and interests. Some of them may straddle
more than one, and on occasion several,
fundamental rights. Yet others may reflect
the core value upon which the fundamental
rights are founded. (emphasis supplied)

"294.......The
inter-relationship
between the guarantee against arbitrariness
and the protection of life and personal
liberty operates in a multi-faceted plane.
First, it ensures that the procedure for
deprivation
must
be
fair,
just
and
reasonable. Second, Article 14 impacts both
the procedure and the expression "law". A
law within the meaning of Article 21 must
be consistent with the norms of fairness
which originate in Article 14. As a matter
of principle, once Article 14 has a connect
with Article 21, norms of fairness and
reasonableness would apply not only to the
procedure but to the law as well. (emphasis
supplied)

35. Scope of reasonableness of
restrictions on fundamental rights was
further elaborated in Puttaswamy (supra)
as follows:
940 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

"310...Three requirements apply to all
restraints on privacy (not just informational
privacy).
They
emanate
from
the
procedural and content-based mandate of
Article 21. The first requirement that
there must be a law in existence to justify
an encroachment on privacy is an express
requirement of Article 21. For, no person
can be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The existence
of law is an essential requirement. Second,
the requirement of a need, in terms of a
legitimate state aim, ensures that the
nature and content of the law which
imposes the restriction falls within the
zone of reasonableness mandated by
Article 14, which is a guarantee against
arbitrary state action. The pursuit of a
legitimate state aim ensures that the law
does not suffer from manifest arbitrariness.
Legitimacy, as a postulate, involves a value
judgment. Judicial review does not reappreciate or second guess the value
judgment of the legislature but is for
deciding whether the aim which is sought
to be pursued suffers from palpable or
manifest
arbitrariness.
The
third
requirement ensures that the means
which are adopted by the legislature are
proportional to the object and needs
sought to be fulfilled by the law.
Proportionality is an essential facet of
the guarantee against arbitrary state
action because it ensures that the nature
and quality of the encroachment on the
right is not disproportionate to the
purpose of the law. Hence, the three-fold
requirement for a valid law arises out of the
mutual
inter-dependence
between
the
fundamental
guarantees
against
arbitrariness on the one hand and the
protection of life and personal liberty, on
the other. The right to privacy, which is an
intrinsic part of the right to life and liberty,
and the freedoms embodied in Part III is
subject to the same restraints which apply
to those freedoms." (emphasis supplied)

36. Tests of reasonableness on
restrictions stated in Jeeja Ghosh Vs.
Union of India20 will be applicable to the
facts of this case:

"The constitutional value of human
dignity has a central normative role.
Human dignity as a constitutional value is
the factor that unites the human rights into
one whole. It ensures the normative unity
of human rights. This normative unity is
expressed in the three ways: first, the value
of human dignity serves as a normative
basis for constitutional rights set out in the
constitution; second, it serves as an
interpretative principle for determining the
scope of constitutional rights, including the
right to human dignity; third, the value of
human dignity has an important role in
determining the proportionality of a
statute limiting a constitutional right."

(emphasis supplied)

37. The position of law in respect of
limits on fundamental rights was also
clarified in Madhyamam Broadcasting
Limited vs. Union of India21:

"48. Rights are not absolute in a
constitutional
democracy.
The
jurisprudence that has emanated from this
Court is that rights can be limited but such
a limitation must be justified on the ground
of reasonableness. Though, only Article 19
of the constitution expressly prescribes that
the limitation must be reasonable, after the
judgments
of
this
Court
in
RC
Cooper(supra) and Maneka Gandhi (supra)
it is conclusive that the thread of
reasonableness runs through the entire
chapter on fundamental rights guiding the
6 All. Md Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
941
exercise of procedural and substantive
limitations. That leaves us to answer the
question of the standard used to assess the
'reasonableness' of the limitation. The text
of the Constitution does not prescribe a
standard of review. Much ink has flowed
from this Court in laying down the varying
standards to test reasonability: rationality,
Wednesbury
unreasonableness,
proportionality, and strict scrutiny.

49. Reasonableness is a normative
concept that is identified by an evaluation
of
the
relevant
considerations
and
balancing them in accordance with their
weight. It is value oriented and not purpose
oriented. That is why the courts have been
more than open in identifying that the
action
is
unreasonable
rather
than
identifying if the action is reasonable. This
is also why the courts while assessing the
reasonableness
of
limitations
on
fundamental rights have adopted a higher
standard of scrutiny in the form of
proportionality.
The
link
between
reasonableness and proportionality and the
necessity of using the proportionality
standard
to
test
the
limitation
on
fundamental rights has been captured by
Justice Jackson in the course of the
Canadian Supreme Court's judgment in R
v. Oakes:

"To establish that a limit is reasonable
and demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society, two central criteria
must be satisfied. First, the objective,
which the measures, responsible for a limit
on a Charter right or freedom are designed
to serve, must be "of" sufficient importance
to warrant overriding a constitutionally
protected right or freedom...Second ... the
party invoking Section 1 must show that
the means chosen are reasonable and
demonstrably justified. This involves "a
form of proportionality test." (emphasis
supplied)

50
The
proportionality
analysis
assesses both the object and the means
utilised, which are pertinent requirements
while
testing
an
infringement
of
fundamental rights. This Court has held
that the proportionality standard can be
used to assess the validity of administrative
action
infringing
upon
fundamental
freedoms. However, the courts have till
date used the proportionality standard to
only test the infringement of a substantive
right such as the right to privacy protected
under Article 21, and the freedoms
protected under Article19."

V. Impugned order and statutory
provisions : Analysis

38. The impugned order dated
24.12.2020 references Regulation 7 of
Chapter
III
of
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Intermediate Education Act, 1921, while
invalidating the claim of the petitioner on
the ground of delay and bar of limitation.

39. Regulation 7 of Chapter III of the
Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act,
1921 pertains to correction of clerical
errors in the name or the other particulars
of a candidate entered in the High School
or Intermediate certificates issued by the
Board. The aforesaid provision is clearly
not applicable in cases of change of name.
However, it is trite that citing a wrong
provision shall not vitiate the order if the
authority is possessed of powers to pass
such orders.

40. Application seeking change of
name recorded in the High School or
Intermediate certificates issued by the
Board are regulated by Regulation 40 of
Chapter
XII
of
the
Uttar
Pradesh
Intermediate Education Act, 1921 and
942 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
relevant
parts
thereof
are
extracted
hereinunder for ease of reference:

"40. प्रमाण पत्र में नाम पररवतथन पररिद् सर्ल
उम्मीदवारों द्वारा भवभहत प्रभियानुसार आवेदन पत्र देने तथा इस
अध्याय के भवभनयम 22 (13) में भनधाथररत शुल्क देने पर
प्रमाण पत्र में भनम्नांभकत प्रभतबन्धों के अधीन नाम पररवतथन कर
सकती है--

(क) आवेदन पत्र उभचत सारणी द्वारा भदया जायेगा तथा
भजस विथ में परीक्षा हुई थी. उसकी 31 माचथ से तीन विथ के
िीतर पररिद के सभचव के कायाथलय में पहुूँचजाना चाभहए।
आवेदक को एक भटकट लगे हुए कागज पर शपथ-पत्र देना
होगा, जो प्रथम श्रेणी के मभजस्रेट अथवा नोटरी द्वारा यथाभवभध
प्रमाभणत होना चाभहए. भजसमें नाम में पररवतथन के वैध कारण
भदये होंगे तथा जो एक राजपभत्रत अभधकारी द्वारा यथा भवभध
प्रमाभणत होगा और परीक्षाथी जहाूँ वह भनवास करता है, वहाूँ
के स्थानीय दैभनक पत्र की तीन भवभिन्न भतभथयों के संस्करणों में
अपने नाम के पररवतथन को भवज्ञाभपत करेगा, इससे पूवथ भक उसे
पररवभतथत नाम का नया प्रमाण-पत्र प्राप्त हो । सम्बभन्धत भतभथयों
के समाचार पत्रों की प्रभतयाूँ आवेदन पत्र के साथ संलग्न करना
अभनवायथ है।

(ख) पररिद् द्वारा नाम पररवतथन के आवेदन-पत्र
भनम्नभलभखत को छोड़कर अन्य भकन्हीं कारणों से स्वीकार नहीं
भकये जायेंगे।

नाम में िद्दापन हो अथवा नाम से अपशब्द की ध्वभन
भनकलती हो अथवा नाम असम्मान प्रतीत होता हो अथवा अन्य
ऐसी भस्थभत होने पर।

(ग) परीक्षाभथथयों द्वारा नाम के पहले या बाद में उपनाम
जोड़ने धमथ अथवा जाभत सूचक शब्दों के जोड़ने अथवा
सम्मानजनक शब्द या उपाभध जोड़ने जैसे भकसी िी प्रकार के
आवेदन पत्रों को स्वीकायथ नहीं भकया जायेगा। इसी प्रकार धमथ
अथवा जाभत पररवतथन के आधार पर अथवा भववाभहत छात्र /
छात्राओं के नाम में िी भववाह के र्लस्वरूप नाम पररवभतथत हो
जाने पर पररिद द्वारा नाम में पररवतथन नहीं भकया जायेगा।"

41. The provisions have to be
interpreted in a permissive manner to
realize the fundamental rights of the
petitioner. The scope of the provision
cannot be constricted by a pedantic
construction which will undermine the
fundamental rights.

42. Regulation 40 (क) contemplates
that an application for change of name has
to be filed within three years from 31st of
March of the year when the candidate
appeared in the examination. Admittedly in
this case, the application was made 7 years
and 5 months after the petitioner sat for the
High
School
and
Intermediate
examinations respectively.

43. A similar limitation of three years
provided in the CBSE bye-laws relating to
name change was questioned in Jigya
Yadav (supra) and was found wanting in
reasonableness. A narrow approach or a
rigid construction of the limitation period
in Regulation 40 (ग) will inroad upon the
fundamental rights of the petitioner vested
by Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the
Constitution of India. The said limitation of
three years in Regulation 40 (ग) cannot be
held to be mandatory and can be relaxed in
the facts and circumstances of a case.

44. In the facts and circumstances of
this case, the delay was liable to be
condoned.

45. In this wake, rejection of the
application for change of name on the
ground
of
delay
is
arbitrary
and
transgresses the fundamental rights of the
petitioner vested by virtue of Article
19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution
of India.

46. The next question is whether the
application is in the teeth of restrictions as
regards change of name contained in the
Regulation 40 of Chapter XII of the Uttar
Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, 1921
as quoted above.
6 All. Md Sameer Rao Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
943

47. Regulation 40(ख) and 40 (ग)
respectively contain the reasons for which
the application can be accepted, and the
causes on which the same can be declined.

48. Under Regulation 40(ख), the
application for change of name shall be
entertained only if the name is gross or
sounds
offensive,
or
appears
to
be
derogatory and the like situations. The
provision has to be read on the construction
canon of "ejusdem generis". The three
categories for change of name which have
been described cannot be read in isolation.
When a general phrase follows a list of
specific instances, the general phrase will
be interpreted to include items of the same
class or in the likeness of those already
listed.

49. The deduction from a reading of
the provision is that a name which lowers a
person's self esteem may be dropped.
Alternatively any name that enhances a
person's self worth may be adopted.

50. Regulation 40 (ग) provides that
applications seeking to adopt nick names,
names disclosing a person's religion or
caste or use of honorific word or a title will
not be accepted. Similarly name change
application pursuant to religious conversion
or change of caste or change of name after
marriage are not liable to be entertained.

51. It is noteworthy that law does not
prevent giving the said names at birth. The
names given at christening can also be
taken later in life.