# Meena Pandey v. U.O.I. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2023) 2 ILRA 189
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-01-30
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 25066 of 2022
- **Bench:** Manoj Kumar Gupta, Rajendra Kumar-Iv
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/meena-pandey-v-u-o-i-ors-49638
- **Pages:** 9

## Headnote

(A) Civil Law - The Indian Easements
Act, 1882 - Section 60 - License when
revocable - The Government of India
Act, 1833 - Section 43 - Title in the land
continues to vest in Union of India -
Grantee only enjoys the occupancy
rights under the license - permitted to
raise permanent structure, which alone
can be transferred by him and not the
land - The Union of India retains
unfettered right of resumption any time
by
giving
one
month
notice
-
Determination of the amount or value
of building is a ministerial act and
payment
thereof
is
the
resultant
consequence
-
not
a
condition
precedent for serving a valid notice of
resumption. (Para - 8,14,)

Petitioner raised permanent structure over land
- which was granted license - effect -
Resumption notice upon petitioner - to resume
land in question - constructions existing over it -
possession of land - Old Grant terms - contained
in
Governor
General-in-Council
Order
(G.G.O.).(Para - 1 to 9)

HELD:-GGO No.179 was a statutory exercise
and an existing law. Entitled to build permanent
structure .Determination of value of the
construction and its payment was not a
condition precedent for resuming the land and
consequently the resumption notices cannot be
said to be invalid. (Para -15,17)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

## Text

2 All. Meena Pandey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
189
Court in the case of Dinesh Kumar
Pandey (supra), Jaswant Singh Sarna
(supra), Abdul Kafi (supra), Brij Nandan
Singh (supra) and Pawan Kumar Jha
(supra) it is apparent that the order
impugned dated 07.09.2020, whereby the
competent authority has rejected the
application of the petitioner for grant of
firearms license, is clearly against the
provisions of Section 14 of the Act, 1959.
The reasons contained in the order
impugned are also beyond the reasons as
have been enumerated under Section 14 of
the Act, 1959. This aspect of the matter has
also not been considered by the appellate
authority while rejecting the appeal of the
petitioner vide his order dated 12.04.2021.
Consequently, the writ petition deserves to
be allowed and is allowed. The orders
impugned
dated
12.04.2021
and
07.09.2020, copies of which are Annexures
1 and 2 respectively to the writ petition, are
quashed. The matter is remitted to the
District Magistrate, Pratapgarh, to pass an
order on the application of the petitioner for
grant of firearms license within a period of
six weeks from the date of receipt of a
certified copy of this order, keeping in view
the observations made above.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 189
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 30.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MANOJ KUMAR GUPTA, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

Writ C No. 25066 of 2022
Connected With
Writ C No. 25115 of 2022

Meena Pandey ...Petitioner
Versus
U.O.I. & Ors. ...Respondents
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Tarun Agrawal, Sri Ravi Kant (Sr.
Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondents:
A.S.G.I., Sri Sanjay Kumar Om

(A) Civil Law - The Indian Easements
Act, 1882 - Section 60 - License when
revocable - The Government of India
Act, 1833 - Section 43 - Title in the land
continues to vest in Union of India -
Grantee only enjoys the occupancy
rights under the license - permitted to
raise permanent structure, which alone
can be transferred by him and not the
land - The Union of India retains
unfettered right of resumption any time
by
giving
one
month
notice
-
Determination of the amount or value
of building is a ministerial act and
payment
thereof
is
the
resultant
consequence
-
not
a
condition
precedent for serving a valid notice of
resumption. (Para - 8,14,)

Petitioner raised permanent structure over land
- which was granted license - effect -
Resumption notice upon petitioner - to resume
land in question - constructions existing over it -
possession of land - Old Grant terms - contained
in
Governor
General-in-Council
Order
(G.G.O.).(Para - 1 to 9)

HELD:-GGO No.179 was a statutory exercise
and an existing law. Entitled to build permanent
structure .Determination of value of the
construction and its payment was not a
condition precedent for resuming the land and
consequently the resumption notices cannot be
said to be invalid. (Para -15,17)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of Cases cited:-

1. Usha Kapoor & ors. Vs G.O.I. & ors., (2014)
16 SCC 481

2. Ganga Sahai Vs Badrul Islam, AIR (29) 1942
AllD 330
190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
3. Senior Superintendent, R.M.S. Cochin & Anr.
Vs K.V. Gopinath, Sorter, (1973) 3 SCC 867

4. Chotey Lal Vs Mt. Durga Bai, AIR 1950 Alld.
661

5. U.O.I. Vs Harish Chand Anand, AIR 1996 (SC)
203

6. U.O.I. Vs Tek Chand, (1999) 3 SCC 565

7. Raj Singh Vs U.O.I., AIR 1973 Del 169

8. C.E.O. Vs Surendra Kumar Vakil & ors. , 1993
(3) SCC 555

9. Mirza Mohd. Hasan Vs Buddhu, AIR 1932
AII.32

10. Nabi Mahomed Vs Bhagwat Prasad Shukul,
1931 ALJ 649

11. Chotey Lal Vs Mt. Durga Bai, AIR 1950 AII
661

(Delivered by Hon'ble Manoj Kumar
Gupta, J.)

1. These petitions call in question the
resumption notices dated 1.7.2022, issued
by the Director General, Defence Estate,
Ministry of Defence, Government of India,
New Delhi (respondent no. 1) acting on
behalf of the President of India. Thereby,
the possession of the land held by the
petitioners on Old Grant terms was sought
to be resumed upon expiry of one month
from the date of notice, along with the
structures built over it. As the petitions
involve similar issues of facts and law,
therefore both the petitions were heard
together and are being decided by this
common judgment.

Writ - C No. 25066 of 2022 :

2. Ganga Prasad, the predecessor-ininterest of the petitioner, enjoyed a grant in
pursuance
of
an
Agreement
dated
27.10.1892 under the Old Grant terms,
contained in Governor General-in-Council
Order No. 179 dated 12.09.1836 (for short,
referred to as ''GGO No. 179'). He raised
pukka constructions over the said land. It
bears Bungalow No. 8, Ponappa Road,
General Land Register (GLR) Survey No.
122, New Cantt., Allahabad (Prayagraj) and
is situated within the limits of the Military
Cantonment. It is alleged that Ganga Prasad
executed a will dated 12.11.1953 in favour
of his wife Rajwanti Devi, bequeathing a
limited interest. On her death on 18.5.1994,
her interest in the property devolved on her
nephew Krishna Dwivedi. The petitioner is
daughter-in-law
of
Krishna
Dwivedi.
Krishna Dwivedi, during his lifetime,
inducted Defence Estate Officer as a tenant
in the property in question. It is alleged that
SCC Suit No. 34 of 2004 is pending at the
behest of the petitioner against respondent
no. 3 for eviction and recovery of arrears of
rent. It is also alleged that getting annoyed
thereby, respondent no. 2 served the
impugned resumption notice upon the
petitioner, seeking to resume the land in
question and the constructions existing over
it, in exercise of power under GGO No.
179 dated 12.9.1836.

Writ - C No. 25115 of 2022 :

3. The property in dispute in the
instant case is Bungalow No. 1, Ashoka
Road, General Land Register (GLR)
Survey No. 122, New Cantt., Allahabad
(Prayagraj). It was also settled with Ganga
Prasad under the Old Grant terms contained
in Governor General-in-Council order No.
179 dated 12.09.1836 (GGO No. 179). It
devolved upon Krishna Dwivedi in the
same manner. In the said property, Krishna
Dwivedi
inducted
Accounts
Officer,
Allahabad Circle, Ministry of Defence, as
2 All. Meena Pandey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
191
tenant. SCC Suit No. 79 of 2004 was filed
by the petitioner, who is son of Krishna
Dwivedi for recovery of arrears of rent and
eviction. It was decreed on 1.8.2009 and
thereafter a revision filed against the said
judgment and decree of JSCC was also
dismissed. The matter is pending in Writ -
C No. 46076 of 2011, under Article 227 of
the Constitution, before this court and an
interim order is in operation in favour of
the respondents. During pendency of the
said writ petition, the impugned resumption
notice dated 1.7.2022 was served upon the
petitioner.

Submissions

4. Sri Ravi Kant, learned Senior
Counsel, appearing for the petitioners in
both the cases, submitted that: -

(a) The status of the grantees, i.e.
the petitioners, is that of licensee and not
tenant. The predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners
have
executed
work
of
permanent character and incurred expenses
in its execution and therefore, the license
had become irrevocable under Section 60
of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 (for
short ''the Act'). The notice seeking to
resume the land in dispute is therefore void
in the eyes of law. In support of his
submission, he has placed reliance on the
judgment of Supreme Court in Usha
Kapoor and Others v. Government of
India and Others1 and that of this Court
in Ganga Sahai v. Badrul Islam2.

(b) Under Clause 6 of GGO No.
179, the power of resumption can be
exercised upon payment of the value of
building, as may have been erected. The
compensation amount has to be offered
along with the notice of resumption, while
in the instant case, it has not been done.
Only an assurance was given that as and
when the Committee, specified in the
notice,
determines
the
amount
of
compensation,
it
will
be
paid.
Consequently, the notice is invalid. In
support of his contention, he has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in Senior Superintendent, R.M.S.
Cochin and Another vs. K.V. Gopinath,
Sorter3.

(c) A large number of other
similarly situated lands in close proximity
of the land in dispute, have not been
resumed and further some of the properties
resumed in the past had not been utilized
for the purpose for which resumption was
made and this clearly reveals that the
resumption of the land in dispute was a
result of arbitrary exercise of power,
violative of Articles 13, 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India.

Per contra, Sri Sanjay Kumar
Om, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents, submitted that: -

(a) Under GGO No. 179 dated
12.9.1836,
only
limited
rights
were
conferred in favour of the predecessor-ininterest of the petitioner. It was specifically
provided that the power of resumption of
the land in dispute would remain with the
grantor and therefore, Section 60 of the
Indian Easement Act. 1882 will have no
application. In support of his submission,
he has placed reliance on the judgments of
this Court in Chotey Lal vs. Mt. Durga
Bai4 and Ganga Sahai vs. Badrul Islam
(supra).

(b)
The
determination
of
compensation of the value of building
erected on the land in question and its
payment is permissible after the notice of
resumption is given, being ministerial acts,
as held by the Supreme Court in Union of
India vs. Harish Chand Anand5.

(c) The possession of the land in
dispute was taken on 31.8.2022 and is
192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
being presently used by the Union of India
for running of its offices. The allegation
that there has been discrimination, is not
correct, as resumption of any particular
land is based on several factors, taking into
account public purpose and there is no
violation of any constitutional or statutory
provision while resuming the land. The
allegation that some other land, resumed in
the past, have not been utilized for any
public purpose, is incorrect and further, it
will not have any effect on the validity of
the resumption notices, impugned herein.

(d) The payment of compensation
will be made as soon as the amount is
determined by the Committee, after hearing
the petitioners.

ANALYSIS

Old Grant - Nature of Rights

5. We first proceed to examine the
nature of rights conferred to the grantee
under the grant. Admittedly, the grant was
''old grant' regulated by Order No. 179
issued by the Governor General-in-Council
dated 12.9.1836. In Union of India vs. Tek
Chand6, the Supreme Court had approved
the view taken by the Delhi High Court in
Raj Singh vs. Union of India7, wherein
GGO No. 179 was held to be a statutory
exercise made under Section 43 of the
Government of India Act, 1833. The
relevant part of GGO No. 179 dated
12.9.1836 is extracted below: -

6. Conditions of occupancy : No
ground will be granted except on the
following conditions, which are to be
subscribed by every grantee as well as by
those to whom his grant may subsequently
be transferred:-

1. Resumption of land. The
Government to retain the power of
resumption at any time on giving one
months' notice and paying the value of such
buildings as may have been authorised to
be erected.

2. Land belongs to Government.
Land cannot be sold by grantee.

Transfer
of
houses
between
military officers.

The ground, being in every case
the property of Government, cannot be sold
by the grantee; but houses or other property
thereon situated may be transferred by one
military or Medical Officer to another
without restriction except in the case of
reliefs, when, if required, the terms of sale
or transfer are to be adjusted by a
Committee of Arbitration.

3. Arbitration in case of transfer
on relief. Transfer of houses to civilian. If
the ground has been built upon, the
buildings are not to be disposed of to any
person, of whatever description, who does
not belong to the army, until the consent of
the Officer Commanding the Station shall
have been previously obtained under his
hand.

4. Transfer to native. When it is
proposed, with the consent of the General
Officer, to transfer possession to a native,
should the value of the house, buildings or
property to be so transferred exceed Rs.
5000, the sale must not be effected until the
sanction of Government shall have been
obtained through His Excellency the
Commander-in-Chief.

7. Houses claimable for purchase
or hire at option of owner. Committee of
Arbitration. All houses in a military
cantonment being the property of persons
not belonging to the army, which may be
deemed by the Commanding Officer of the
station suitable, from their locality, for the
accommodation of Officers, shall be
claimable for purchase or for hire at the
option of the owner, in the former case at a
valuation, and in the latter at a rent, to be
fixed, in case of the parties disagreeing by a
2 All. Meena Pandey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
193
Committee of Arbitration constituted as
follows:

Note :- In this clause the
following words were substituted by G.. by
the President of the council of India in
Council No. 700 dated 3rd July 1855 for
the words "being the property of persons
not belonging to the army".

"not being occupied by a person
belonging to the army on duty, at the
station, or whose residence therein may be
authorised by Government".

"7. Power to require owner to let
house to Military Officer. The owner of any
house in a military cantonment not
occupied by person belonging of his agent
shall not be resident within the cantonment
or in its vicinity, shall be taken to mean an
official notification dated 14 day before the
day on which the committee is to assemble,
it will be duty of the commanding officer to
nominate a member of the committee shall
thereupon proceed to arbitration".

Note
-
"One
month"
was
substituted for "14 days in paragraph 2
above, by G.O. By the G..-in-c., No. 174,
dated 5th August, 1840."

6. The nature of rights which were
conferred to a grantee under GGO No. 179
was considered by the Supreme Court in
Chief Executive Officer vs. Surendra
Kumar Vakil & Others8. It has been held
that thereunder, the ownership remains with
the Government and the land cannot be
sold by a grantee. The original grantee is
given right to build permanent structure
over the land and which only can be
transferred by him. Where the transfer is to
a
military
personnel,
there
was
no
restriction, but in case of a transfer to a
civilian, a prior permission was required
from the Officer Commanding the Station.
The Supreme Court also referred to the
book Cantonment Laws by J.P. Mittal,
dealing with the subject. It has been noted
that the ''Old Grant', was a species of land
tenure. The primary object of the grant was
to
meet
the
need
of
residential
accommodation of the military officers
near their place of duty. In due course of
time, the civilians were also encouraged to
build bungalows over government lands,
subject to restriction that they will not have
any right in the land and it would be subject
to resumption anytime.

7. In Usha Kapoor and others
(supra), the Supreme Court had held that
the grantee of rights under GGO No. 179
enjoys only possessory or occupancy rights
in respect of the structure built by him. The
terms of the grant is statutory in nature. The
title in the land continues to vest in the
Union of India and therefore, it continues
to enjoy the power of resumption. The
observations are as follows: -

"13. The decision of this Court in
Chief Executive Officer vs. Surendra
Kumar Vakil also considered the legal
effect of the entries in the G.L.R. which
Register is required to be maintained by the
Military Estates Officer of the Cantonment
under the provisions of the Cantonment
Land Administrative Rules framed in
exercise of power under Section 280 of the
Cantonment Act, 1924. The General Land
Register maintained by the Cantonment
Board under the Cantonment Act and the
Rules framed thereunder is a public
document and the entries therein are
conclusive evidence of title. This is the
view expressed by this Court in two other
decisions, namely, Union of India vs.
Ibrahim Uddin & Anr. and Union of India
& Ors. vs. Kamla Verma, apart from the
decision in Chief Executive Officer v.
Surendra Kumar Vakil. The reference to the
nature of the holding i.e. old grant and the
194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
nature of rights of the holder i.e. occupancy
rights, in the G.L.R. extracted above, in our
considered view, is conclusive of the fact
that the land is covered by an old grant and
the rights enjoyed by the appellants were
mere possessory or occupancy rights in
respect of the structures thereon. The terms
of such grants being statutory and the same
having vested title of the land in the UOI
with
the
power
of
resumption,
the
impugned notices dated 14th December,
2001 and 5th February, 2002 must be
acknowledged to be legal and valid."

8. The consistent opinion of the
Supreme Court while interpreting GGO No.
179 is that title in the land continues to vest in
Union of India. The grantee only enjoys the
occupancy rights under the license. He is
permitted to raise permanent structure, which
alone can be transferred by him and not the
land. The Union of India retains unfettered
right of resumption any time by giving one
month notice.

Effect of Section 60 of the Easement
Act

9. We now proceed to examine the
second aspect, i.e. what would be the effect of
the petitioner having raised permanent
structure over land in respect of which license
was granted. Indisputably the structure built
was a permanent structure. Section 60 of the
Easement Act reads as follows: -

"60. License when revocable.-- A
license may be revoked by the grantor,
unless--

(a) it is coupled with a transfer of
property and such transfer is in force;

(b) the licensee, acting upon the
license, has executed a work of a permanent
character and incurred expenses in the
execution."

10. We have already adverted to the
relevant Clause of GGO No. 179 and we
have noted that the grantor while granting
right to the grantee to raise permanent
structure, had retained with itself the right of
resumption. The grantee had specifically
agreed to the aforesaid term of the Grant
while accepting the grant. It had brought into
existence a binding contract between the
parties, apart from the statutory force that
inheres in the GGO No. 179. In Mirza
Mohammad Hasan vs. Buddhu9, it was
held that there is no bar under any law which
precludes a party from surrendering land,
although there may be a structure standing
thereon. This principle has been relied upon
by this Court in Ganga Sahai (supra). In that
case,
the
defendant
had
executed
a
kirayanama under which he was entitled to
raise
constructions.
He
had,
however,
specifically
agreed
that
whenever
the
landlord would require the land, he would
vacate it. The question relating to extension
of benefit of Section 60 of the Act to the
defendant was decided by holding that he
having agreed to a term contrary to the
provisions of Section 60 of the Easement Act
cannot claim benefit of the same. While
taking the said view, the learned Judge has
placed reliance on two previous decisions of
this Court in Mirza Mohammad Hasan
(supra) and Nabi Mahomed vs. Bhagwat
Prasad Shukul10.The relevant paragraph
from the judgment is extracted below: -

"Section 60, Easements Act, was
pleaded by the defendant throughout, and I
may concede for the defendant that the
construction which has been built upon the
premises is a work of a permanent
character within the meaning of that
expression in Section 60, Easement Act. I
agree, however, with Mohammad Ismail, J.
in what he said in AIR 1938 All. 32 at page
34:
2 All. Meena Pandey Vs. U.O.I. & Ors.
195

"Again, I have not been referred
to any provision of law which precludes a
party from binding itself to surrender land,
although there may be a construction of a
permanent character standing thereon."

In 1931 A.L.J. 649 a Bench of
this Court, of which I was a member said :

"In the absence of any express
term to the contrary, the case would come
under Section 60, Easements Act, under
which a license cannot be revoked when
the licensee, acting upon the license, has
executed a work of a permanent character
and incurred expenses in the execution."

It was clearly recognized in this
case that a contract to the contrary would
disentitle
the
licensee
from
deriving
advantage
conferred
by
section
60,
Easements Act, and in the present case, the
defendant has, in terms expressed in
unambiguous language, given out that the
landlord would have the right to get the site
vacated whenever he so chose."

11. Again, in Chotey Lal vs. Mt.
Durga Bai11, wherein somewhat similar
situation arose, it was held by this Court
that the benefit of Section 60 of the
Easement Act would not be available to a
grantee who has entered the grant knowing
well that after her death her heirs would not
be left with any right. In the said case, one
Mussamat Kallo was the maid servant of
the plaintiff. She was permitted to construct
a house on the disputed site on the
condition that the right of possession was
for her lifetime only and upon her death the
plaintiff would be entitled to the possession
of the site. After the death of Mussamat
Kallo, her heirs resisted handing over of
possession to the plaintiff, compelling him
to file a suit for ejectment. In the aforesaid
backdrop, the law as noted above was laid
down. The decree of eviction passed by the
trial court was upheld. It has been held that
the grantee would be bound by the
undertaking given by him at the time of
accepting the license and her heirs would
be precluded from claiming benefit of
Section 60 of the Easement Act.

12. We have already noted the terms
of the grant in favour of the predecessor in
title of the petitioner. Clause 6 thereof
specifically provided that the Government
would retain the power of resumption and
the said power could be exercised any time
on giving one month notice. The power of
resumption would not get diluted in any
manner by the fact that the grantee was
given right to raise permanent structure.
The petitioner therefore is bound by the
stipulations contained in this behalf in
GGO No. 179 and cannot derive any
advantage out of Section 60 of the
Easement Act. The argument is devoid of
substance and hence rejected.

Whether payment of compensation
alongwith notice necessary

13. Coming to the issue as to whether
the resumption notice would be rendered
illegal as the respondents have not offered
compensation along with the impugned
notice, the reliance placed by learned
counsel for the petitioner on the judgment
in case of Senior Superintendent, R.M.S.
Cochin (supra), would be of no help. In the
said
case,
the
Supreme
Court
was
interpreting a statutory provision relating to
termination of service of a government
servant. Thereunder, the Government was
given power to terminate service at any
time by giving one month notice. In case
the Government decides to terminate the
service forthwith it had to pay a sum
equivalent
to
one
month
pay
plus
allowances in lieu of the notice. While
interpreting the said clause, it was held that
196 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
payment of one month pay plus allowances,
was a condition for termination of service
forthwith and the said requirement could
not be dispensed with. In the said judgment
itself, another statutory provision, although
covering a similar situation but differently
worded, was also considered. It was held
that having regard to the language of the
said statutory provision, payment in lieu of
notice was not a condition precedent for
valid termination of the service although
the government servant would be entitled
to the same in due course.

14. In fact, we may not have to take
assistance of the precedents rendered by the
Supreme Court on service jurisprudence, as
the issue in hand is directly covered by
judgment of Supreme Court in Union of
India vs. Harish Chand Anand (supra)
wherein the Supreme Court had decided
exactly the same issue in context of GGO
No. 179 dated 12.9.1836. It has been held
that the determination of the amount or
value of building is a ministerial act and
payment
thereof
is
the
resultant
consequence. It is not a condition precedent
for serving a valid notice of resumption.
The law laid down in this regard in
paragraph 6 of the Law Report is extracted
below: -

"6. It would appear that detailed
instructions in that behalf were made in the
Standing Order No.241 which was produced
before the Division Bench of the High Court of
Allahabad in which Military Engineer was
instructed to evaluate the value of the building
which was resumed by the Government for
payment of the amount to the erstwhile
licensee. We are not concerned in this appeal as
to the method of valuation. Suffice it to state
that the Order No.241 though does not
contemplate of issuing prior notice to erstwhile
licensee whose licence has been determined
under Clause I of the Grant, before
determination of the actual amount, the
erstwhile grantee is entitled to a notice, so that
the grantee would be at liberty to place before
the competent authority all relevant material for
determining the value of the building and for
payment of the amount thereof. It is seen that it
is not a condition precedent to determine, at the
first instance, the compensation after giving an
opportunity; make payment thereof and then to
resume the property. What is a condition
precedent is issuance of one month's notice and
on expiry thereof the Government is entitled to
resume the land. The amount is to be
determined as required under the relevant
provisions after giving opportunity and which
could be done thereafter. After all, the property
would be resumed for public use and
determination of value of the building erected is
a ministerial act and payment thereof is the
resultant consequence. This process would take
some time and if the reasoning of the High
Court of Allahabad is given effect to, it would
defeat the public purpose. The view of the Delhi
High Court is consistent with the scheme and
appears to be pragmatic and realistic. The High
Court, therefore, was not right in its conclusion
that it is a condition precedent to determine the
amount of the value of the building in the first
instance
and
payment
thereof
before
resumption of the property."

 (emphasis supplied by us)

15. It is thus clear that the determination
of value of the construction and its payment
was not a condition precedent for resuming
the land and consequently the resumption
notices cannot be said to be invalid on the
aforesaid ground.

Plea of misuse of power of resumption

16. It was urged that the respondents
had, in like manner, got vacated several
lands, but which are still lying unutilized.
2 All. Smt. Kalawati Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
197
However, we find no force in the
contention. So far as the disputed lands are
concerned, it is an admitted fact that
Government offices are already being run
therefrom. It is also not disputed that the
respondents had taken possession of the
lands in pursuance of impugned notices of
resumption and that they continue to run
their offices.

Conclusion

17. GGO No.179 was a statutory
exercise and an existing law. The rights
conferred thereunder to a grantee was a
species of land tenure where the grantee
was only conferred with possessory rights
over the land. He was entitled to build
permanent structure, which he could also
transfer subject to certain restrictions, but
title in the land continued to vest in the
Union of India, with unfettered right to
resume any time for public purpose by
serving a month's notice. The payment of
compensation
was
not
a
condition
precedent for valid resumption of land. It
was a ministerial act and payment, a
resultant consequence.

18. As a result of the aforesaid
discussion, there is no merit in the
petitions.
The
same
are
accordingly
dismissed, but without any order as to
costs.
----------
(2023) 2 ILRA 197
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.01.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUNEET KUMAR, J.
THE HON'BLE RAJENDRA KUMAR-IV, J.

Writ C No. 41628 of 2011
Smt. Kalawati Devi ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri V.B. Khare, Sri A.K. Shukla

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Ashish Kumar Srivastava

(A) Land Law - The Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976 - Section 6 -
Persons holding vacant land in excess of
ceiling limit to file statement, Section 8 -
Preparation of draft statement as regards
vacant land held in excess of ceiling limit ,
Section 10 - Acquisition of vacant land in
excess
of
ceiling
limit
-
Section
10(1)/10(3) - notification i.e. land vesting
in the State - rationale behind Sections
10(5) and 10(6) of the Act - Section 10(5)
prescribes an ordinary and logical course
of action that ought to be followed before
the authorities decided to use force to
dispossess the occupant under Section
10(6) - a grievance cannot be raised long
after an alleged violation of Section 10(5),
as the erstwhile owner can still be evicted
by the State if they fail to deliver
possession - Urban Land Ceiling and
Regulation (Repeal Act, 1999). (Para -
15,11,18 )

Possession of surplus land - taken by State -
question - whether petitioner have right to
retain possession of the surplus land -
transferred to him by the erstwhile owner - after
vesting of the land in the State under Section
10(3) of the Act.(Para - 20)

HELD:-Petitioner lacks locus. The surplus land
vested with the State upon notification under
Section 10(3) followed by dispossession of the
erstwhile owner of the land (Khelai) under
Section 10(5) way back in 1981. Owner never
protested or agitated his dispossession before
any authority or Court. The subsequent buyer
(Petitioner) cannot raise challenge to the
procedure of dispossession at belated stage on
the strength of a sale deed being void ab-initio.
(Para -23)