# Meva Lal v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 11 ILRA 219
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2018-10-31
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 4533 of 2019
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/meva-lal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-45386
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

Civil Law - Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998 - Rule 203B (3) - Prohibition
against release of Vehicle - No court to
release a vehicle involved in accident
causing death or permanent disability -
when such vehicle is not covered by Policy
of Insurance against third party risks -
unless the owner/registered owner of the
vehicle - furnishes sufficient security to
the satisfaction of the Court to pay
compensation that may be awarded in a
claim case arising out of such accident -
Held - it is the registered owner at the
time of accident who alone would be liable
to satisfy the award made by a claims
tribunal- subsequent owner of the vehicle
has no liability to satisfy the award
involving the vehicle that he owns, which
was earlier involved in an accident at
some point of time when someone else
was the registered owner - A fortiorari
subsequent owner cannot be made liable
to furnish security for the satisfaction of
an award that the tribunal may make in
relation to the fatal accident - provisions
of Rule 203-B (3) would not apply in a
case where the vehicle is seized from the
hands of a registered owner, who is a
transferee and not at all connected to the
offending
vehicle
when
the
accident
happened (Para 19, 21)

Allowed (E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

Prakash Chand Daga Vs Saveta Sharma, (2019)
2 SCC 747

## Text

11 All. Meva Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
219
an identity that springs from and vanishes
with the individual. It has no independent
existence or continuity.

14. In the context of an offence under
section 138 of the Act, by virtue of
Explanation (b) to section 141 of the Act,
only a partner of a 'firm' has been
artificially equated to a 'director' of a
'company'. Its a legal fiction created in a
penal statute. It must be confined to the
limited to the purpose for which it has been
created. Thus a partner of a 'firm' entails the
same vicarious liability towards his 'firm' as
'director' does towards his 'company',
though a partnership is not an artificial
person. So also, upon being thus equated,
the partnership 'firm' and its partner/s
has/have to be impleaded as an accused
person in any criminal complaint, that may
be filed alleging offence committed by the
firm. However, there is no indication in the
statute to stretch that legal fiction to a sole
proprietary concern.

15. Besides, in the case of a sole
proprietary concern, there are no two
persons
in
existence.
Therefore,
no
vicarious liability may ever arise on any
other person. The identity of the sole
proprietor and that of his 'concern' remain
one, even though the sole proprietor may
adopt a trade name different from his own,
for such 'concern'. Thus, even otherwise,
conceptually, the principle contained in
section 141 of the Act is not applicable to a
sole-proprietary concern.

16. Accordingly, there is no defect in
the complaint lodged against the applicant,
in his capacity as the sole proprietor of the
concern M/s Rashmi Arosole & Chemicals.
There was no requirement to implead his
sole proprietary concern as an accused
person nor there was any need to
additionally implead the applicant by his
trade name.

17. On perusal of the averment of the
parties, it is crystal clear that petitioner
taken the money in advance by way of loan
and petitioner handed over the cheques
bearing no. 850213 & 850214 amount of
Rs. 50,000/- each only for the security for
payment of money advance by way of loan.
So the transaction of money and cheques
not in the prosecution of business of firm
but cheques handed over by petitioner to
Nepal Singh in individual capacity. So due
to aforesaid reason too no need to implead
the sole proprietor firm by his firm name.

18. So the reason aforesaid, there is
no illegality or irregularity in the orders
dated 31.10.2018 passed by Additional
Court No. 3, Agra and the order dated
6.2.2020 passed by Additional Sessions
Judge, Court No. 17, Agra against the
petitioner, hence no interference warranted.

19. The petition lacks merit and is,
accordingly, dismissed.
----------
(2020)11ILR A219
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.11.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 4533 of 2019
(Criminal)

Meva Lal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rajesh Kumar Srivastava, Sri Jai
Prakash Rao
220 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Counsel for the Respondents:
A.G.A.

Civil Law - Uttar Pradesh Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1998 - Rule 203B (3) - Prohibition
against release of Vehicle - No court to
release a vehicle involved in accident
causing death or permanent disability -
when such vehicle is not covered by Policy
of Insurance against third party risks -
unless the owner/registered owner of the
vehicle - furnishes sufficient security to
the satisfaction of the Court to pay
compensation that may be awarded in a
claim case arising out of such accident -
Held - it is the registered owner at the
time of accident who alone would be liable
to satisfy the award made by a claims
tribunal- subsequent owner of the vehicle
has no liability to satisfy the award
involving the vehicle that he owns, which
was earlier involved in an accident at
some point of time when someone else
was the registered owner - A fortiorari
subsequent owner cannot be made liable
to furnish security for the satisfaction of
an award that the tribunal may make in
relation to the fatal accident - provisions
of Rule 203-B (3) would not apply in a
case where the vehicle is seized from the
hands of a registered owner, who is a
transferee and not at all connected to the
offending
vehicle
when
the
accident
happened (Para 19, 21)

Allowed (E-5)

List of Cases cited:-

Prakash Chand Daga Vs Saveta Sharma, (2019)
2 SCC 747

(Delivered by Hon'ble J.J. Munir, J.)

1. This petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution is directed against an order
passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Court No. 9, Allahabad dated
02.05.2019 in Criminal Revision No. 86 of
2019, dismissing the said revision and
affirming an order of the Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Allahabad dated 11.12.2018 in
Case Crime No. 682 of 2014, under Section
279/304A I.P.C., P.S. Civil Lines, District
Allahabad (now Prayagraj). The learned
Magistrate by his order, last mentioned, has
required the petitioner on his application
seeking
release
of
his
car,
bearing
registration No. U.P. 70 CA 9417, to
furnish a sum of Rs. 5 lacs in cash or in the
form of bank security, as a condition
precedent to the consideration of his
application.

2. Meva Lal, the petitioner is a retired
government servant. He is aged about 74
years. He was an employee with the
District
Collectorate,
Allahabad
(now
Prayagraj). Meva Lal purchased a secondhand car on 18.04.2017 from Mrs. Archana
Mohan w/o Sudhanshu Asthana r/o 573A/4, Bailly Colony, Rajapur, Police Station
Cantt., District Prayagraj. The car is a
Hyundai i10. He purchased the said vehicle
for a price of Rs. 2 lacs. Meva Lal applied
to the Registering Authority under Sub
Section (1) of Section 50 Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 requesting that transfer of
ownership may be entered in his name, in
the
certificate
of
registration.
This
application was accepted by the Registering
Authority and his name was entered in the
certificate of registration dated 12th March,
2013, on 18.04.2017. Meva Lal also took
out an insurance policy that covers inter
alia 3rd party risks. This policy was
purchased from the United India Insurance
Company Limited. It was issued on
09.03.2018. The policy was valid from
10.03.2018 to 09.03.2019.

3. Meva Lal says that on 15.09.2018
at 5:45 in the evening hours, the S.H.O.,
Civil Lines along with one Deena Nath, a
Sub Inspector and four police constables
were about their task of checking vehicles
11 All. Meva Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
221
at the Subhash Chauraha, Civil Lines,
Prayagraj. Sub Inspector Deena Nath
signalled Meva Lal's car to stop and asked
him to show its papers. Meva Lal claims
that he produced all documents relating to
the car required under the law, but Deena
Nath had something else in mind. He
demanded some illegal gratification. Meva
Lal firmly declined. Annoyed, Deena Nath
Yadav seized Meva Lal's car. Meva Lal
says that on his demand, as to why his car
had been seized, S.I. Deena Nath Yadav
told him that the vehicle was wanted in
connection with Case Crime No. 682 of
2014, under Section 279, 304-A I.P.C., P.S.
Civil Lines, District Allahabad (now
Prayagraj). Meva Lal further says that he
asked the Sub Inspector to show him a
copy of the FIR, so that he may know that
his car was indeed wanted in connection
with that crime, but the police officer
declined that request. Meva Lal secured a
copy of the FIR under reference, which is
one registered on 16.10.2014. It presently
bears Case Crime No. 682 of 2014, under
Section 279, 304A I.P.C., P.S. Civil Lines,
District Allahabad, but earlier, it was
registered as Case Crime No. 632 of 2014
at the same police station. Meva Lal asserts
with reference to the contents of the said
FIR that it does not show that his vehicle is
mentioned there or otherwise wanted.

4. In these circumstances, Meva Lal
made an application seeking release of his
car to the Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Allahabad. The accident subject matter of
Case Crime No. 682 of 2014 was a fatal
accident, where one Viswajeet Sachan s/o
Sadhu Ram Sachan lost his life. The
learned Magistrate, by his order dated
11.12.2018, required the applicant to
furnish in cash a sum of Rs. 5 lacs or a
bank security worth the said amount, to be
appropriated
towards
payment
of
compensation that may be awarded in the
claim by the deceased's heirs, relating to
the accident. The Magistrate ordered that
the release application would be considered
on merits, once the aforesaid deposit was
made good or security furnished. The
Magistrate put this condition precedent,
subject to fulfillment of which he would
consider the release application, on the
strength of Rule 203-B (3) of the Uttar
Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998.

5. Aggrieved, Meva Lal carried a
revision to the learned Sessions Judge,
Allahabad where it was numbered as
Criminal Revision No. 86 of 2019. This
revision came up for determination before
the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Court No. 9, Allahabad, who dismissed the
same by means of his order dated
02.05.2019.
Both
these
orders
shall
hereinafter be referred to collectively as
''the impugned orders'; singularly they shall
be referred to as the context may require.

6. A counter affidavit has been
filed on behalf of the State, dated 10th
July, 2019, to which a rejoinder dated
22nd July, 2019 has been put in on
behalf of Meva Lal. Meva Lal has
further filed a supplementary affidavit
dated
30th
July,
2019,
on
23rd
September,
2019.
A
supplementary
counter affidavit on behalf of the State
to the supplementary has been put in on
9th August, 2019. Meva Lal has rebutted
it with the supplementary rejoinder
affidavit presented on 21st September,
2019.

7. Parties have exchanged much
pleadings because they are at issue as to
how this car, that is subject matter of
release proceedings, came to be connected
to the crime. Also, the police dispute the
222 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
manner of apprehension of the vehicle that
Meva Lal has asserted.

8.

Heard
Mr.
Rajesh
Kumar
Srivastava,
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner and Mr. J.P. Tripathi, learned
Additional
Government
Advocate
appearing on behalf of the State.

9. It is submitted by Mr. Rajesh
Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the
petitioner that a reading of the FIR relating
to Case Crime No. 682 of 2014 does not
show the slightest involvement of the car in
question, or for that matter, of any four
wheeler whatsoever. It is a complete
account of the occurrence which has no
place for the involvement of a car, let alone
the car in question. He submits that the FIR
specifically describes the offending vehicle
as a two wheeler, a Pulsar motorcycle
bearing registration No. U.P. 70 BN 8519.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits
that the FIR, to its face, is telltale that S.I.
Deena Nath has falsely implicated Meva
Lal's vehicle in connection with this crime,
misusing his statutory powers. Learned
counsel also submits that the accident in
question involved a solitary vehicle, a
Pulsar motorcycle bearing the registration
number, last mentioned that happened on
16.10.2014, at the road crossing of the
Accountant General's Office. He asserts
that the car in question which is a four
wheeler
of
Hyundai
make,
bearing
registration No. U.P. 70 CA 9417, has
nothing to do with the accident dated
16.10.2014. In addition, he submits that
Meva Lal was not the owner of the car on
16.10.2014 which he, as already said,
acquired second hand on 18.04.2017. He is,
therefore, in no way liable, either under the
criminal law or for the compensation claim
arising from the accident dated 16.10.2014.
At the most, learned counsel submits that
Meva Lal could be regarded as a witness,
who holds custody of material evidence in
the crime, which he would be obliged to
produce at the trial.

10.

Mr.
Tripathi,
the
learned
Additional Government Advocate on the
other hand has refuted the submissions
advanced on behalf of the petitioner. He
urges that Rule 203-B (3) of the Uttar
Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1998 (for
short, ''the Rules') are unambiguous and do
not invest the Court with jurisdiction, in
case of a fatal motor accident, to release a
vehicle involved therein when the vehicle
is not covered by an insurance policy
against
3rd
party
risks,
unless
the
owner/registered owner of the vehicle
furnishes
sufficient
security,
to
the
satisfaction of the Magistrate, to pay
compensation that may be awarded in the
claim petition concerning the accident. He
submits that there is no issue about the fact
that the accident here was a fatal accident.

11. It is also a fact, according to Mr.
Tripathi, that the petitioner was the
registered owner of the vehicle, when it
was seized and the release applied for. He
points out that in the report submitted under
Rule 203-A in Form SR-48 Ka, the
insurance
policy/insurance
certificate
number and its particulars have not been
indicated by the Investigating Officer,
which would show that the vehicle was not
covered by an insurance policy, against
third party risks. In the circumstances, the
Court had no option but to require the
registered owner to furnish security that
would be appropriated towards satisfaction
of an award, which the claims tribunal may
render. He has taken this Court through the
Investigating
Officer's
report
dated
08.11.2018 submitted to the C.J.M. in Form
48 Ka, annexed to the writ petition, part of
11 All. Meva Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
223
Annexure No. 5. He also submits that the
supplementary affidavit annexes a copy of
the claim petition, filed on behalf of the
deceased's heirs. In the claim petition, there
is a clear mention of the involvement of the
car in question, besides the motorcycle
mentioned in the FIR. The registration
numbers of both vehicles appear in column
No. 15 of that petition.

12. It is also pointed out that in the
first paragraph of the claim petition, the
manner of the accident described, mentions
the involvement of both vehicles, leading to
fatal consequences for the victim. In the
circumstances, learned A.G.A. submits that
the learned Magistrate had no option but to
insist on strict compliance with the
provisions of Section 203-B (3) of the
Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioner, at
this stage, points out that the FIR does not
at all indicate a word about the involvement
of any four-wheeler. The four-wheeler has
been brought in, in the claim petition
because the police involved this vehicle
without basis, whereas the claimants have
thought that they would receive a higher
compensation, may be under some illadvice, owing to the involvement of a car
in that accident.

13. This Court has given a thoughtful
consideration to the matter and perused the
record. What is not in doubt is the fact that
when the accident took place, Meva Lal was
not the registered owner of the car or any
kind of an owner. The Court says so because
Rule 203-B of the Rules contemplates
liability, not only of the registered owner, but
also of the owner who could be a person
other than the registered owner. This is
evident from the terms of Rule 203-B.

14. A perusal of the report submitted
by Investigating Officer in SR Form 48 Ka
dated 28.11.2018 shows that in column 8, it
is clearly mentioned that the name and
address of the owner at the time of the
accident
was:
Archana
Mohan
w/o
Sudhansu Asthana r/o 573-A/4 , Bailley
Colony Rajapur, P.S. Cantt., District
Allahabad. Thus, it is admitted to the
prosecution that on the date of the accident,
the petitioner, Meva Lal had nothing to do
with the vehicle, let alone be its registered
owner. He has absolutely no connection to
the accident.

15. A reading of the FIR does show
that it carries a graphic and comprehensive
description of the accident, where the
solitary offending vehicle identified, is a
motorcycle
of
Pulsar
make,
bearing
registration No. U.P. 70 BN 8519. It is a
way with reporting motor accidents that
FIR's, subject to some exceptions, carry a
detailed account, at least indicating the
complete description of the offending
vehicle.
The
FIR
here,
even
if
a
generalisation is to be eschewed, certainly
carries a comprehensive account. There is
absolutely no mention of a four-wheeler
being involved across the length and
breadth of it. The Court does not wish to
comment much about this issue, as it would
ultimately be a matter to be judged at the
trial. The remarks in this connection carried
in this judgment must be understood as
limited to the purpose of a decision about
the unconditional maintainability of the
release application and nothing more.
These ought not to weigh with the Court
holding trial.

16. This Court notices that the
involvement of the car in question was
brought in through a written application
made on behalf of Neelima Sachan, the
deceased's wife to the S.S.P., Allahabad
(now Prayagraj) annexed as CA-1 to the
224 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
supplementary
counter
affidavit.
This
application, of which a photostat copy is
annexed, does not bear any date. This
application has been described in paragraph
4 of the supplementary counter affidavit,
where also, there is no reference to the date
when this application was made on behalf
of Neelima Sachan. An eye-witness of the
occurrence, a certain Imtiyaz Husain, has
been recorded by the police in a statement
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. mentioned in
CD-11. A photostat copy of the aforesaid
CD also shows overwriting in the CD
number, where CD-10 has been overwritten
with CD-11. The I.O. has signed this
particular part of the case diary on
13.12.2015. There is a mention of the
vehicle in the said CD. There could be
some doubts about the manner in which it
has been written, but again this Court does
not wish to comment on this point. The
vehicle has been shown parked outside the
railway station, unclaimed in CD-27, dated
16.09.2018. About this discovery and
recovery of the car in question, there is GD
entry number 14 dated 16.09.2018, made at
5 minutes past 11 o'clock. The police,
therefore, in substance, deny all that Meva
Lal has said about the apprehension of his
vehicle, while he was moving in it at the
Subhash crossing, Civil Lines. This Court
need not go into the precise detail of how
the vehicle was apprehended and fell into
the hands of the police. What is notable is
the fact that it is not in issue at all that at
the time of accident, Meva Lal was not the
owner or the registered owner, as already
said.

17. In a case like this, would the
provisions of Rule 203-B(3) at all apply?
Rule 203-B (3) is designed to ensure
through the criminal justice system and
before the vehicle is released, recovery of
money that may be applied towards
satisfaction of the award or some part of it,
which the claims tribunal may make in the
case of a fatal accident. It is designed
ultimately to ensure ready satisfaction of
the award of the claims tribunal, or so
much of it as may be satisfied, out of
proceeds collected from the owner or the
registered owner, before he takes back the
offending vehicle. The provisions of
Section 203-A and 203-B of the Rules are
quoted in extenso:

"203-A. Duties of Investigating
Police Officer - (1) The Investigating
Police Officer shall prepare a site plan,
drawn on scale as to indicate the layout and
width etc. of the road/roads or place as the
case
may
be,
the
position
of
Vehicle/Vehicles, or persons, involved and
such other facts as the case may be
relevant, authenticated by the witnesses and
in case no witness is available same shall
be recorded, so as to preserve the evidence
relating to accident. He shall also get the
scene of accident photographed from such
angles as to clearly depict the accident, as
above, inter-alia for the purpose of
proceeding before the Claims Tribunal.

(2)
The
Investigation
Police
Officer shall get full particulars of the
insurance Certificate/Policy in respect of
the Motor Vehicle involved in the accident
and to require the production of documents
mentioned in-sub-section (1) of Section
158, and thereupon either to take the same
in possession against receipt, or to retain
the
photocopies
of
the
same,
after
attestation thereof by the person producing
them.

(3)
The
Investigating
Police
Officer may verify the genuineness of the
documents gathered under sub-rule (2) by
obtaining confirmation in writing from the
authority purporting to have issued the
same.
11 All. Meva Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
225

(4)
The
Investigating
Police
Officer
shall
submit
detailed
report
regarding the accident to the Claims
Tribunal,
along
with
site
plan
and
photograph prepared under sub-rule (1),
documents gathered and verified under subrules (1) and (3) or action taken, in case of
documents found forged copies of report
under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, medico legal reports and postmortem report (in case of death), First
Information Report, by not later than
fifteen days or receipt of order/requisition
issued by the Claims Tribunal:

Provided that such information
may also be furnished to the Insurance
Company if requested by or through its
agent or by the injured/sufferer or next of
the kin or legal representatives of the
deceased of the accident. The Investigating
Police Officer shall submit report under
this rule to the Claims Tribunal in Form SR
48-A.

(5) Duties of Investigating Police
Officer, enumerated in sub-rules (1) to (3)
shall be construed as if they are included in
Section 23 of U.P. Police Act, 1861 and
any
break
thereof,
shall
entail
consequences envisaged in that law.

203-B.
Prohibition
against
release of vehicle.-(1) No vehicle, involved
in any accident, shall be released by
investigating Police Officer or any Police
Officer superior to him unless a release
order is passed, by the court having
jurisdiction.

(2) No vehicle, involved in any
accident shall be released by the Judicial
Magistrate, having jurisdiction, unless the
compliance of sub-rules (1) to (3) of Rule
203-A is ensured from the investigating
Police Officer and duly attested copies of
Registration
Certificate,
Insurance
Certificate,
Route
Permit,
Fitness
Certificate of vehicle as the case may be
and driving license of the driver who was
driving at the time of accident, are filed by
the applicant.

(3) No court shall release a
vehicle involved in accident causing death
or permanent disability when such vehicle
is not covered by Policy of Insurance
against
third
party
risks unless
the
owner/registered owner of the vehicle
furnishes
sufficient
security
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
Court
to
pay
compensation that may be awarded in a
claim case arising out of such accident.

(4) Where the vehicle is not
covered by a policy of insurance against
third
party
risks,
or
when
the
owner/registered owner of the vehicle has
failed to furnish sufficient security under
sub-rule (3), or the policy of insurance
produced by owner is found fake/forged,
the vehicle shall be sold in public auction
by
the
Judicial
Magistrate
having
jurisdiction, on expiry of six months of the
vehicle being seized by the investigating
Police Officer and proceeds thereof, shall
be deposited with the Claims Tribunal,
having jurisdiction over the area in
question, for the purpose of satisfying the
compensation to be awarded in claim case."

18. A reading of Rules 203-A and
203-B together leads one to the conclusion
that it is the owner or the registered owner
at the time when the accident occurred,
who alone would be within the mischief of
this Rule. If, by some failure of the
Investigating Agency or some other cause,
the vehicle is transferred to a third party by
the registered owner, the third party having
no
concern
with
the
accident,
the
provisions of Rule 203-B would not
impinge upon such transferee owner's
rights to secure release. This would be the
conclusion from the whole gamut of the
provisions. The Rule contemplates, in the
226 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
first instance, particulars of the insurance
policy to be secured by the I.O. and
disclosed to the Magistrate and in the event
of the vehicle not being covered by a policy
of insurance against third party risk, the
owner or the registered owner of the
vehicle may be required to furnish
sufficient security that may satisfy an
award made by the claims tribunal relating
to the accident. The policy of insurance
contemplated in the scheme of Section 203
A and 203-B (3) is a policy covering the
vehicle at the time of the accident. Here,
the registered owner, who is a transferee
and had nothing to do with the vehicle
when it caused the accident, can possibly
never furnish the insurance policy which
sub-rule (3) of Rule 203 B envisages. A
fortiorari he cannot be made liable to
furnish security for the satisfaction of an
award that the tribunal may make in
relation to the fatal accident.

19. There is another facet of the
matter. The subsequent owner of the
vehicle has no liability to satisfy the award
involving the vehicle that he owns, which
was earlier involved in an accident at some
point of time when someone else was the
registered owner. Rather, it is the registered
owner at the time of accident who alone
would be liable to satisfy the award made
by a claims tribunal.

20. In this connection, reference may
be made to the guidance of the Supreme
Court in Prakash Chand Daga v. Saveta
Sharma, 2019 (2) SCC 747. Here, the issue
was where a vehicle had been transferred
and the statutory period prescribed under
Section 50(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act
to report the transfer to the Registering
Authority had not expired or the transfer of
ownership entered in the certificate of
registration, an accident took place, would
the transferor be liable to satisfy an award
made by the claims tribunal? Their
Lordships in Prakash Chandra Daga
(supra) held:

5. It is true that in terms of
Section 50 of the Act, the transfer of a
vehicle ought to be registered within 30
days of the sale. Section 50(1) of the Act
obliges the transferor to report the fact of
transfer within 14 days of the transfer. In
case the vehicle is sold outside State, the
period within which the transfer ought to be
reported gets extended. On the other hand,
the transferee is also obliged to report the
transfer to the registering authority within
whose jurisdiction the transferee has the
residence or place of business where the
vehicle is normally kept. Section 50 thus
prescribes timelines within which the
transferor and the transferee are required to
report the factum of transfer. As per subsection (3) of said Section 50, if there be
failure to report the fact of transfer, fine
could be imposed and an action under
Section 177 could thereafter be taken if
there is failure to pay the amount of fine.
These timelines and obligations are only to
facilitate the reporting of the transfer. It is
not as if that if an accident occurs within
the period prescribed for reporting the said
transfer, the transferor is absolved of the
liability.

6. Chapter XII of the Act deals
with the Claims Tribunals and as to how
applications for compensation are to be
preferred and dealt with. While considering
such claims, the Claims Tribunal, in case of
an accident is required to specify the
amount which shall be paid by the insurer
or owner or driver of the vehicle involved
in the accident or whether such amount be
paid by all or any of them, as the case may
be. It is well settled that for the purposes of
fixing such liability the concept of
11 All. Meva Lal Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
227
ownership has to be understood in terms of
specific definition of "owner" as defined in
Section 2(30) of the Act.

7. In Pushpa v. Shakuntala
[Pushpa v. Shakuntala, (2011) 2 SCC 240 :
(2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 399 : (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 682] the vehicle in question belonged
to one Jitender Gupta who was its
registered owner. He sold said vehicle to
one Salig Ram on 2-2-1993 and gave its
possession to the transferee. Despite said
sale, the change of ownership was not
entered in the Certificate of Registration.
The
earlier
insurance
policy
having
expired, the transferee took out fresh
insurance policy in the name of original
owner Jitender Gupta. In an accident that
took place on 7-5-1994, two persons lost
their
lives.
The
heirs
and
legal
representatives lodged separate claims and
an issue arose as to who was liable as
owner. The submissions that Jitender
Gupta, the registered owner had no control
over the vehicle and the possession and
control of the vehicle was in the hands of
the transferee and as such no liability could
be fastened on the transferor were rejected
by this Court. It was observed in para 11 as
under: (SCC p. 244)

"11.
It
is
undeniable
that
notwithstanding the sale of the vehicle
neither the transferor Jitender Gupta nor
the transferee Salig Ram took any step
for the change of the name of the owner
in the certificate of registration of the
vehicle. In view of this omission Jitender
Gupta must be deemed to continue as the
owner of the vehicle for the purposes of
the Act, even though under the civil law
he ceased to be its owner after its sale on
2-2-1993."

8. In the decision in Naveen
Kumar [Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar,
(2018) 3 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 :
(2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 661] the legal position
was adverted to and this Court observed as
under: (SCC pp. 11-12, paras 13-14)

"13. The consistent thread of
reasoning which emerges from the above
decisions is that in view of the definition of
the expression "owner" in Section 2(30), it
is the person in whose name the motor
vehicle stands registered who, for the
purposes of the Act, would be treated as the
"owner". However, where a person is a
minor, the guardian of the minor would be
treated as the owner. Where a motor
vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire
purchase, lease or hypothecation, the
person in possession of the vehicle under
that agreement is treated as the owner. In a
situation such as the present where the
registered owner has purported to transfer
the vehicle but continues to be reflected in
the records of the registering authority as
the owner of the vehicle, he would not
stand absolved of liability. Parliament has
consciously introduced the definition of the
expression "owner" in Section 2(30),
making a departure from the provisions of
Section 2(19) in the earlier 1939 Act. The
principle underlying the provisions of
Section 2(30) is that the victim of a motor
accident or, in the case of a death, the legal
heirs of the deceased victim should not be
left in a state of uncertainty. A claimant for
compensation ought not to be burdened
with following a trail of successive
transfers, which are not registered with the
registering authority. To hold otherwise
would be to defeat the salutary object and
purpose
of
the
Act.
Hence,
the
interpretation to be placed must facilitate
the fulfilment of the object of the law. In
the present case, the first respondent was
the "owner" of the vehicle involved in the
accident within the meaning of Section
2(30). The liability to pay compensation
stands fastened upon him. Admittedly, the
vehicle was uninsured. The High Court has
228 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
proceeded [Vijay Kumar v.Rakesh, 2016
SCC
OnLine
P&H
18767]
upon
a
misconstruction of the judgments of this
Court in Reshma [HDFC Bank Ltd. v.
Reshma, (2015) 3 SCC 679 : (2015) 2 SCC
(Civ) 379 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 408] and
Purnya Kala Devi [Purnya Kala Devi v.
State of Assam, (2014) 14 SCC 142 :
(2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 251 : (2015) 1 SCC
(Cri) 304] .

14.
The
submission
of
the
petitioner is that a failure to intimate the
transfer will only result in a fine under
Section 50(3) but will not invalidate the
transfer of the vehicle. InT.V. Jose [T.V.
Jose v. Chacko P.M., (2001) 8 SCC 748 :
2002 SCC (Cri) 94] , this Court observed
that there can be transfer of title by
payment of consideration and delivery of
the car. But for the purposes of the Act, the
person whose name is reflected in the
records of the Registering Authority is the
owner. The owner within the meaning of
Section 2(30) is liable to compensate. The
mandate of the law must be fulfilled."

9. The law is thus well settled and
can be summarised: (SCC pp. 625-26, para
4)

"4. ... even though in law there
would be a transfer of ownership of the
vehicle, that, by itself, would not absolve
the party, in whose name the vehicle stands
in RTO records, from liability to a third
person. ... Merely because the vehicle was
transferred does not mean that [such
registered owner] stands absolved of his
liability to a third person. So long as his
name continues in RTO records, he remains
liable to a third person." [P.P. Mohammed
v. K. Rajappan, (2008) 17 SCC 624, para 4
: (2010) 4 SCC (Cri) 587]

21. The principle of law laid down by
the Supreme Court, therefore, makes it
clear that the liability to satisfy an award
made by the claims tribunal is of the
registered owner, when the accident takes
place. The provisions of Rule 203-B (3)
would, therefore, not apply in a case where
the vehicle is seized from the hands of a
registered owner, who is a transferee and
not at all connected to the offending vehicle
when the accident happened. The scope of
the provisions of Rule 203-B (3) stood
exhausted here, upon transfer of the vehicle
in favour of Meva Lal and the time it was
seized. The Rule applies not by virtue of
seizure of the vehicle in connection with a
fatal motor accident, but by virtue of the
vehicle being in the hands of the registered
owner, or may be the owner, at the time
when the accident took place; and such a
registered owner, or the owner, seeking
release.

22. In the opinion of this Court, both
the Courts below were, therefore, in
manifest error to require the petitioner to
deposit in cash a sum of Rs. 5 lacs, or in the
alternate, furnish bank security before his
application for release was considered.

23. In the result, this petition succeeds
and is allowed. The impugned orders dated
11.12.2018 and 02.05.2019 passed by the
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad and the
learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court
No. 9, Allahabad, respectively, are hereby
set aside. It is ordered that the learned Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad shall proceed
to decide the petitioner's release application
within a period of three weeks from the date
of receipt of a computer generated and self
attested copy of this order downloaded from
the
official
website
of
High
Court
Allahabad, in accordance with law, after
hearing the parties concerned, but without
requiring the petitioner to make any cash
deposit or furnish bank security.
----------
11 All. Bhanu Pratap Singh Yadav Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
229
(2020)11ILR A229
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 22.10.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE MRS. SUNITA AGARWAL, J.
THE HON'BLE DINESH PATHAK, J.

Criminal Misc. Application U/S 372 Cr.PC (Leave
to Appeal) No. 4 of 2019

Bhanu Pratap Singh Yadav ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Opposite Parties

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri Ram Prakash Patel

Counsel for the Opposite Parties:
A.G.A.

A. Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code -
Section 307 - Ingredients - "Intention" or
"knowledge" are two alternative statutory
elements to hold any person guilty for the
commission of offence u/s 307 IPC - one
should
have
mens-rea
intending
to
commit
murder
or
should
possess
knowledge
that
overt
act,
in
all
probability, would cause death of victim -
bodily injury - Mere bodily injury capable
of causing death or not, are not sufficient
to hold any person guilty for committing
crime
under
aforesaid
sections
-
blameworthy condition of mind could be
gathered
from
the
direct
evidence,
circumstantial
evidence,
conduct
of
accused etc (Para 41)

B. Evidence Law - Evidence Act (1 of
1872)
-
Section
3
-
Evidence
-
Appreciation of - Discrepancies - minor
discrepancies
vis-à-vis
-
glaring
contradictions and discrepancies - Over
importance cannot be given to minor
discrepancies - Discrepancies which do
not go to the root of the matter and shake
the basic version of the witnesses, not
important
-
however
where
glaring
contradictions & discrepancies exists and
such discrepancies affect the genesis of
the crime - totters basic version of the
witnesses, affects the accusation made by
prosecution and the occurrence of crime,
it become relevant. (Para 32)

C. Criminal Law - Criminal Procedure Code
(2 of 1974) , S.372 - Appeal against
acquittal - power of appellate court to
interfere with acquittal - cardinal principle
- if two views on appreciation of evidence
are reasonably possible, one supporting
acquittal & other conviction, Appellate
Court should not reverse the order of
acquittal - appellate court may overrule or
disturb trial court's acquittal only if it has
"very substantial and compelling reasons"
for doing so - and for that Appellate Court
must come to the conclusion that the
findings of the Court below are not based
on the evidence on record, or suffers from
misreading of evidence - or that the view
taken by the court below, while acquitting
cannot be the view of a reasonable person
(Para 43, 44, 45)

Criminal Law - Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860) - Section 307 - Attempt to murder -
Proof - Allegation that accused shot fire at the
informant, due to which his motorcycle
tottered down towards the right side - No
recovery of firearm - I.O. neither found any
empty cartridge on spot nor recovered any
used cartridge - Timing of inflicting injuries to
victim is different as mentioned in FIR,
examination-in-chief and cross-examination of
informant - medical report, all the injuries are
shown to be superficial and simple in nature -
no retrieval of pellets or bullets from the
wound
-
considering
medical
report,
circumstances in totality, it cannot be said that
the accused made attempt to murder - no such
circumstances to suggest the intention of the
accused persons for committing homicidal
death of the informant or his wife - Acquittal,
proper. (Para 22, 24, 39, 40 42)

Dismissed (E-5)

1. Bharwada Ghoginbhai Hirjibhai Vs St. of Guj.
AIR 1983 SC 753