# Mewati Devi v. State of U.P

- **Citation:** (2025) 12 ILRA 389
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2025-12-03
- **Case number:** Criminal Appeal U/S 413 BNSS No. 560 of 2025
- **Bench:** Rajeev Misra, Dr. Ajay Kumar-Ii
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mewati-devi-v-state-of-u-p-52928
- **Pages:** 13

## Text

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12 All. Mewati Devi Vs. State of U.P.
389
within two weeks of actual release from jail
in terms of Section 437-A CrPC with
undertaking to appear before appellate
court as and when appeal is filed against
this judgment and he is required to appear
before the court.

93. Office/Registry is directed to send
the copy of this judgment for necessary
compliance along with trial Court record to
the court concerned forthwith.

94. The trial Court to send compliance
report within four weeks.

95. A copy of this judgment be also
sent to Senior Superintendent, District jail,
Lucknow forthwith.

96. The Court keeps record the
assistance rendered by Mr. Ankur Garg,
Research Associate of this Court.
----------
(2025) 12 ILRA 389
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.12.2025

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAJEEV MISRA, J.
THE HON'BLE DR. AJAY KUMAR-II, J.

Criminal Appeal U/S 413 BNSS No. 560 of 2025

Mewati Devi ...Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
Matter pertains to appeal against acquittal
under S. 413 BNSS -
"whether the inference drawn by Court below
that registration of FIR on the alleged date and
time is suspicious"; "whether P.W.1 Mewati Devi
and P.W.2 Jaikesh are chance witnesses";
"whether the presence of P.W.1 Mewati Devi
and P.W.-2 Jaikesh on the spot at the time of
the incident is doubtful and their testimonies are
not
trustworthy";
and
"whether
reasons
recorded by Court below in support of it's
conclusion that prosecution has failed to
establish the guilt of accused beyond reasonable
doubt, are cogent and valid reasons or
illusionary and against the weight of evidence
on record, therefore, illegal and perverse".
(Paras 21, 26, 33, 48, 49-51)

Headnotes
Criminal Law - Trial - Appeal against
Acquittal - Scope of Interference - "if two
views
are
possible,
one
supporting
acquittal and other indicating conviction,
the High Court should not in such a
situation reverse the order of acquittal" -
reiterated; interference permissible only
where findings are "illegal, perverse or
erroneous". (Paras 16-20, 49-51)
Criminal Jurisprudence - Appeal against
acquittal
-
Double
presumption
of
innocence - Principles of interference.
FIR - Delay and Suspicion - Effect -
Material contradictions regarding "timing
of registration of the FIR"; FIR allegedly
scribed and handed over "on the spot";
delay in forwarding to Circle Officer and
C.J.M. - "time and date on which the said
FIR is stated to be registered becomes
highly suspicious".
(Paras 22-26)
Evidence - Chance Witnesses - Scrutiny -
P.W.1 and P.W.2 held to be "chance
witnesses";
presence
at
place
of
occurrence
"not
properly
explained";
evidence requires "very cautious and close
scrutiny". (Paras 27-33)
Ocular Evidence v. Medical Evidence -
"medical evidence does not corroborate
the ocular version of the occurrence";
absence
of
"crush
injury"
despite
allegation
of
vehicle
running
over
deceased "3-4 times". (Paras 14(5) - (7),
45 - 48)

Held: No perversity in the judgment so as to
interfere with the findings returned by Court
below - the conclusion drawn by Court below
is the outcome of due appreciation of
evidence on record - it thus, cannot be said
that only the view consistent with the guilt of
accused is possible - Appeal under S. 413
BNSS "fails and is, accordingly dismissed.
(Paras 49-51) (E-7)
390 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Case Law Cited
Bharwad Jakshibhai Nagjibhai and others vs.
State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 602; Babu
Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar
vs.
State
of
Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 561; Gamini
Bala Koteshwara Rao vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2009) 10 SCC 636; Balraje @
Trimbak vs. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 6
SCC 673; Shakarlal vs. State of Rajasthan,
(2004) 10 SCC 632.

List of Acts
Indian Penal Code, 1860; Arms Act, 1959;
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(BNSS); Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords
appeal against acquittal; chance witnesses;
suspicious
FIR;
medical
evidence;
ocular
version; perverse findings; double presumption
of innocence; beyond reasonable doubt.

Case Arising From
APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
under Section 413 BNSS arising out of judgment
dated 30.08.2025 passed by the Sessions
Judge, Azamgarh, in Sessions Trial Nos. 28 of
2012, 491 of 2014 and 29 of 2012, arising out
of Case Crime Nos. 376 of 2011 and 515 of
2011,
Police
Station
Raunapar,
District
Azamgarh.

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant:
Kiran Yadav, Sanjay Kumar Yadav
Advs. for the Respondents:
G.A.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Ajay Kumar-II, J.)

1. Heard Mr. Sanjay Kumar Yadav, the
learned counsel for appellant and the learned
A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1.

2. Challenge in this Criminal Appeal is
to the judgment dated 30.08.2025 passed by
Sessions Judge, Azamgarh, in Sessions Trial
No. 28 of 2012 (State vs. Ram Karan Yadav
and others), Sessions Trial No. 491 of 2014
(State vs. Jai Prakash @ Prakash Yadav and
others) arising out of Case Crime No. 376 of
2011, under Sections 302/149, 147 IPC,
Police Station Raunapar, District Azamgarh
and Session Trial No. 29 of 2012 (State vs.
Vijai Yadav), arising out of Case Crime No.
515 of 2011, under Section 3/25 Arms Act,
Police Station- Raunapar, District Azamgarh,
whereby the accused opposite parties 2 to 9
have been acquitted by Court below of the
charges framed against them.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the first
informant-appellant moved a Written Report
dated 02.08.2011 by stating that her husband
had gone to Chandpatti to sell milk in the
morning. On 02.08.2011, at around 12:00
noon, Subhash, Ramkaran, Rambadan and
Heera were sitting in ambush 1 km west from
Vishen Ka Pura Chowk with a four wheeler
and one motor cycle. There was a land
dispute with Subhash. They had also
threatened her husband. Her husband's
vehicle was pushed and he was made to fall.
He got up and ran away. By then, aforesaid
persons chased and caught her husband and
broke his legs and hands by running the car
over him, due to which, he died on the spot.
She was taken by her son Jaikesh on a bicycle
and after getting medicines when they
reached the spot, they identified all the
aforesaid persons. Meanwhile, one Niranjan
Yadav also came on the spot. All the three
persons have seen the incident.

4. On the aforementioned Written
Report (Tehrir) of appellant, FIR against the
named accused persons as Case Crime No.
376 of 2011, under section 302/34 IPC at
4:00 pm on 02.08.2011 at Police Station
Raunapar, District Azamgarh was registered.

5. After completion of investigation,
charge-sheet
was
submitted
against
opposite parties 2 to 9 under Sections
302/34, 147 IPC. Another charge-sheet was
12 All. Mewati Devi Vs. State of U.P.
391
also submitted against opposite party 5
Vijai Yadav, under Section 3/25 Arms Act.
Thereafter cognizance was taken upon
same and the cases were committed to the
Court of Sessions. After hearing both the
parties, the charges were framed against
opposite parties 2 to 9, under Sections
302/149, 147 IPC and charge under Section
3/25 Arms Act was also separately framed
against opposite party 5 Vijai Yadav.

6. In order to prove it's case,
prosecution adduced eight prosecution
witnesses, namely, P.W.-1 Smt. Mewati
Yadav (the informant/wife of deceased),
P.W.-2 Jaikesh (son of the deceased), P.W.-
3 Dr. Santosh Kumar (Autopsy Surgeon),
P.W.-4 Parmarath Yadav (witness of
panchnama), P.W.-5 Ramkrishna Dwivedi
(Ist
Investigating
Officer),
P.W.-6
Rampreet Yadav (witness of prosecution
sanction), P.W.-7 Harigovind Singh (Scribe
of FIR) and P.W.-8 Tejbahadur Singh (the
then
In-charge
Inspector
and
2nd
Investigating
Officer).
The
witnesses
adduced by the prosecution have given
their respective oral evidence and also
proved 27 prosecution papers, namely,
Written Report (Tehrir) as Ex. Ka-1, Post
Mortem Report as Ex. Ka-2, Inquest Report
(Panchayatnama) as Ex. Ka-3, Police
Form-13 as Ex. Ka-4, Letter to C.M.O. as
Ex. Ka-5, Photonash as Ex. Ka-6, letter to
Inspector as Ex. Ka-7, Site Plan as Ex. Ka8, Recovery memo of blood stained earth
and plain earth as Ex. Ka-9, Recovery
memo of blood stained grass as Ex. Ka-10,
Recovery memo of spectacles of the
deceased as Ex. Ka-11, Recovery memo of
one pair slippers of deceased as Ex. Ka-12,
Recovery memo of motorcycle as Ex. Ka13, Copy of Report No.9 regarding arrest of
accused Rambadan Yadav as Ex. Ka-14,
Copy of Report No.14 regarding arrest of
accused Heera Yadav as Ex. Ka-15,
Recovery memo of motorcycle and country
made pistol on the spot as Ex. Ka-16, Site
Plan of recovery memo of motorcycle on
the pointing out of accused Vijai Yadav as
Ex. Ka-17, Recovery memo of Bolero Car
as Ex. Ka-18, Charge-sheet against accused
Ramkaran Yadav, Rambadan Yadav, Vijai
Yadav, Lal Bahadur Yadav and Heera
Yadav
as
Ex.
Ka-19,
Sanction
for
prosecution as Ex. Ka-20, Check FIR (Case
Crime No. 515/2011) as Ex. Ka-21, G.D. as
Ex. Ka-22, Charge-sheet against accused
Vijai Yadav as Ex. Ka-23, Charge-sheet
against accused Jai Prakash @ Prakash
Yadav, Hariprakash Yadav, Ramesh Yadav
and Subhash Yadav as Ex. Ka-24, Check
FIR (Case Crime No. 376/2011) as Ex. Ka25, G.D. Entry as Ex. Ka-26 and report of
FSL (Forensic Science Laboratory) as Ex.
Ka-27.

7. In statement recorded under section
313 Cr.P.C., the accused-opposite parties 2
to 9 denied the prosecution version and the
commission of alleged incident. They
stated that P.W.-1 and P.W.2 have given
false evidence against them. It has also
been stated that they are innocent and have
been falsely implicated due to enmity.

8. The defence got examined Sant
Ram Yadav as D.W.-1, Lekhpal Jagarnath
Singh as D.W.-2 and Dr. Sanket as D.W.-3
to prove the innocence of the accused. The
defence has proved documents, namely,
papers
regarding
Farmer
Accidental
Insurance Scheme as Ex. Kha-1, Report of
Lekhpal regarding benefit of Insurance
Scheme as Ex. Kha-2, Information letter
regarding The Oriental Insurance Company
Limited as Ex. Kha-3, Registration Form of
Farmer Accidental Insurance Scheme as
Ex. Kha-4, Death Certificate of the Insured
person issued by the Lekhpal as Ex. Kha-5,
Witness Certificate as Ex. Kha-6, Death
392 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Certificate as Ex. Kha-7, Report of Sub
Divisional Magistrate dated 16.08.2011 as
Ex. Kha-8, Medical Form of Subhash
Yadav as Ex. Kha-9, Paper Nos. 191 Kha/1
and 191 Kha/3 as Ex. Kha-10 and Paper
Nos. 192 Kha/2 and 192 Kha/4 as Ex. Kha11.

9. By the impugned judgment dated
30.08.2025, Court below has acquitted the
accused of the charges under Sections
302/149, 147 IPC and opposite party 5
Vijai Yadav, under Section 3/25 Arms Act.

10. Thus, feeling aggrieved by the
impugned judgment passed by Court
below, the present appeal has been
preferred by the informant-appellant.

11. Learned counsel for appellant
submits that the accused committed murder
of appellant's husband at 12:00 noon on
02.08.2011 in her presence. The incident
was seen not only by the appellant but by
her son Jaikesh and one Niranjan Yadav
also. Informant and her son Jaikesh are the
eye witnesses of aforesaid murder, but,
Court below has wrongly disbelieved their
trustworthy testimonies and has thereby
committed gross illegality. The eye-witness
account as stated by informant and her son
Jaikesh is fully supported by medical
evidence and enmity due to land dispute
between the parties was the motive behind
this murder. Court below has erred law in
acquitting
the
accused
persons.
The
impugned judgment of acquittal is against
the weight of the evidence on record and
therefore, same is liable to be set-aside by
this Court.

12. Learned A.G.A. for State-opposite
party-1 has however vehemently opposed
the present appeal. According to the
learned A.G.A., Court below has correctly
appreciated the testimonies of the eye
witnesses and therefore, rightly come to the
conclusion that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 are not
the eye witnesses of the alleged incident.
Court below has also rightly found that the
injuries found on the body of the deceased
are not such injuries, which could have
been caused on account of a four wheeler
running over the body of deceased several
times. As both P.W.-1 and P.W.2 have not
been found to be eye witnesses of the
incident, therefore, Court below has rightly
acquitted the accused. Lastly, it has been
argued that no ground to interfere in the
impugned judgment and order is made out,
therefore, learned A.G.A. urged for the
dismissal of present appeal.

13. We have heard the learned counsel
for appellant as well as the learned A.G.A.
for State-opposite party-1 and perused the
record.

14. The trial Court while acquitting the
accused,
has
recorded
the
following
findings:

1. Registration of the First
Information Report at the concerned
regarding Police Station on the alleged
date and time, was found to be suspicious
raising doubts regarding credibility of the
prosecution case.

2. P.W.-1 Mewati Devi and P.W.-
2 Jaikesh were found to be chance
witnesses.

3. The presence of P.W.-1 and
P.W.2 on the spot at the time of incident,
was found to be doubtful.

4. P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 have made
highly contradictory statements in their
evidence
regarding
several
material
details of incident.

5. The evidence of P.W.-1 and
P.W.-2 does not in any way corroborate
12 All. Mewati Devi Vs. State of U.P.
393
the ante mortem injuries found on the
body of the deceased and their evidence in
this regard, is completely contradictory to
the medical evidence available on record.
In short, the medical evidence does not
corroborate the ocular version of the
occurrence.

6. As per evidence of P.W.-1 and
P.W.-2, total nine persons were seated in a
four wheeler and the deceased was driven
on and off by the offending vehicle 3-4
times with intention to kill but not a single
crush injury was found on the body of
deceased.

7.
After
appreciating
the
evidence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, they were
found not to be present on the spot at the
time of incident and therefore, both of
them did not see the incident happening.
The evidence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 was
thus found to be not trustworthy.

15. After recording the above findings,
Court
below
concluded
that
since
prosecution has failed to prove the charges
against
the
accused
persons
beyond
reasonable
doubt
by
means
of
the
impugned judgment, acquitted the accused
of the charges framed against them.

16. While considering the scope of
interference in an appeal against acquittal,
it has been held by the Supreme Court that
if two views are possible, one supporting
acquittal and other indicating conviction,
the High Court should not, in such a
situation, reverse the order of acquittal
recorded by Court below.

17. Reference in this regard be made
to the judgment of Supreme Court in
Bharwad Jakshibhai
Nagjibahi
and
others vs. State of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC
602, which is most appropriately applicable
to the facts of the present case. Paragraph-9
of the report is relevant for the controversy
in hand and is accordingly, reproduced
herein-below:-

" Law is now well settled that
though the Cr.P.C. does not make any
distinction between the powers of the
Appellate Court while dealing with an
order of conviction or of acquittal,
normally the Appellate Court does not
disturb an order of acquittal in a case
where two views of the evidence are
reasonably
possible.
But
the
above
principle is not applicable where the
approach of the trial Judge in dealing
with evidence is manifestly erroneous and
the
conclusions
drawn
are
wholly
unreasonably and perverse. In the instant
case, we find that the High Court was
fully conscious and did not transgress the
bounds, of its appellate powers while
dealing and reversing the order of
acquittal."

18. While dealing with an appeal
against acquittal the Apex Court in Babu
Sahebagouda Rudragoudar Vs. State of
Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 561,
has observed as under:

"39. Thus, it is beyond the pale
of doubt that the scope of interference by
an appellate Court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial
Court in favour of the accused has to be
exercised within the four corners of the
following principles:-

(a)
That
the
judgment
of
acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

(b) That the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material
evidence on record;

(c) That no two reasonable views
are possible and only the view consistent
394 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
with the guilt of the accused is possible
from the evidence available on record.

40. The appellate Court, in order
to interfere with the judgment of acquittal
would have to record pertinent findings on
the above factors if it is inclined to reverse
the judgment of acquittal rendered by the
trial Court."

19. It has also been observed in abovementioned judgment that an Appellate
Court, however, must bear in mind that in
case
of
acquittal,
there
is
double
presumption in favour of accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available
to him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured
his acquittal, the presumption of his
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed
and strengthened by Court below. It has
further been observed that the Appellate
Court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that
the only conclusion, which can be recorded
on the basis of the evidence on record was
that the guilt of the accused was proved
beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible.

20. The Supreme Court in Gamini
Bala Koteshwara Rao vs. State of Andra
Pradesh, (2009) 10 SCC 636, has
observed that interference in an appeal
against acquittal should be rare and in
exceptional circumstance. It was further
held that it is open to the High Court to
reappraise the evidence and conclusion
arrived at by Court below. However, it is
limited to those cases where the judgment
of Court below was perverse. This Court
went to declare that the word "perverse", as
understood in law, has been understood to
mean, "against the weight of evidence". If
there are two views and Court below has
taken one of the views merely because
another view in plausible, the Appellant
Court will not be justified in interfering
with the verdict of acquittal.

21. Having heard the learned counsel
for appellant, the learned A.G.A. for Stateopposite party-1 upon evaluation of the
impugned judgment including the reasons
recorded therein, in the light of deposition
of the injured witness i.e. appellant and
keeping in mind the limitation with a Court
of appeal dealing with a judgment of
acquittal, this Court finds that following
four questions arise for consideration in
present appeal:-

i. Whether the inference drawn
by Court below that registration of FIR on
the alleged date and time is suspicious,
which raises doubt on credibility of the
prosecution case, is legally sustainable.

ii. Whether P.W.1 Mewati Devi
and P.W.2 Jaikesh are chance witnesses.

iii. Whether the presence of
P.W.1 Mewati Devi and P.W.-2 Jaikesh on
the spot at the time of the incident is
doubtful and their testimonies are not
trustworthy.

iv. Whether reasons recorded by
Court below in support of it's conclusion
that prosecution has failed to establish the
guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt,
are
cogent
and
valid
reasons
or
illusionary and against the weight of
evidence on record, therefore, illegal and
perverse.

Question No. i. Whether the
inference drawn by Court below that
registration of FIR on the alleged date
and time is suspicious, which raises doubt
on credibility of the prosecution case, is
legally sustainable?.
12 All. Mewati Devi Vs. State of U.P.
395

22. As per prosecution version, the
alleged incident took place on 02.08.2011
at around 12:00 noon, the FIR of which
was registered at 4:00 p.m. on the same day
at
Police
Station
Raunapar,
District
Azamgarh, on a Written Report (Tehrir)
moved by Mewati Devi, the widow of
deceased. The factum of the registration of
the FIR was also mentioned in G.D. No.
29, time 16:00 hours on 02.08.2011. As per
persecution
version,
the
informantappellant Mewati Devi and Jaikesh are the
eye witnesses of the alleged incident. The
informant-appellant Mewati Devi in her
deposition as P.W.-1 has stated that she got
scribed the Written Report (Tehrir) (Ex.
Ka-1) out side the concerned police station
from
some
person.
In
her
crossexamination, she stated that said Written
Report (Tehrir) was written on the spot
where her husband died. She further stated
that while writing the Written Report
(Tehrir), Police Official from the Police
Station Raunapar also came on the spot
including S.H.O. (Bade Daroga) and some
Constables and her application was taken
by
S.H.O.
concerned
on
the
spot.
Aforementioned disclosure in her crossexamination reveals that she had not gone
to the police station for registration of the
FIR, someone on the spot wrote down the
Written Report (Tehrir) upon her dictation
and same was delivered to the Police
Official present on the spot.

23. As per the testimony of P.W.-5
Investigating
Officer,
Ramkrishna
Dwivedi, the said FIR was registered in
his absence and he got the copy of the
Check FIR, etc. on the spot. Whereas the
informant-appellant herself is stating
that
she
handed
over
her
written
application to S.H.O. concerned on the
spot.
There
is,
thus
material
contradiction
regarding
timing
of
registration of the FIR in evidence of
P.W.-1 informant-appellant and P.W.-5
Investigating Officer.

24. The factum of registration of the
FIR was also mentioned in G.D. No. 29,
time 16:00 hours dated 02.08.2011 (Ex.
Ka-26) wherein, it has been mentioned
that Mewati Devi came with one
Niranjan Yadav to the Police Station and
gave written application, whereas the
informant-appellant
in
her
crossexamination has stated that the said
application was handed over to the
concerned S.H.O. on the spot.

25. The said Check FIR was received
in the Court of concerned Chief Judicial
Magistrate
on
06.08.2011
and
surprisingly, the said Check FIR was also
seen by the concerned Circle Officer only
on 04.08.2011, which is evident from the
cross-examination
of
the
P.W.-5,
Investigating Officer as is mentioned at
page-36 of the impugned judgment. This
also shows that said Check FIR was not
only seen/forwarded by the concerned
Circle Officer with the delay of two days,
but same has been sent to the concerned
C.J.M.
with
delay
of
four
days.
Resultantly, the time and date on which
the said FIR is stated to be registered,
becomes highly suspicious.

26. After carefully considering aforesaid
aspects of present case as recorded by Court
below in para-32 of impugned judgment, we are
of the considered opinion that the finding
recorded by Court below with regard to
registration of the FIR at the concerned police
station at the alleged time and date, being
suspicious raises doubt on the credibility of
prosecution
case,
is
legally
sustainable.
Therefore, question no.i is answered in the
affirmative.
396 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

Question No. ii. Whether P.W.1
Mewati Devi and P.W.2 Jaikesh are the
chance witnesses?.

27. As per narration in the FIR, the
alleged incident was seen by the wife
Mewati Devi and son Jaikesh of the
deceased, when they were returning back
after getting medicines for Mewati Devi.
Therefore, both of them are stated to be eye
witnesses of the alleged incident. However,
in the Written Report (Tehrir) (Ex. Ka-1)
only four persons, namely, Subhash,
Ramkaran, Rambadan and Heera were
named by P.W.-1 Mewati Devi and names
of other accused were disclosed during the
course of investigation.

28. P.W.-1 Mewati Devi in her
examination-in-chief, has stated that she
and her son Jaikesh went to the Doctor for
taking medicines. Her son Jaikesh took her
on bicycle for getting medicines. When
they were returning at around 12:00 noon
on 02.08.2011 accused Subhash Yadav,
Ramkaran Yadav, Rambadan Yadav, Vijai
Yadav, Heera Yadav, Hari Prakash, Jai
Prakash, Ramesh Lal Bahadur and three
unknown persons who had covered their
faces with clothes, were riding on a four
wheeler whereas accused Vijai Yadav was
driving a motor-cycle. Her husband's
vehicle was pushed and thereafter, he got
up and ran away. By then, aforesaid
accused chased and caught her husband.
They thereafter got him back to the spot
and thereafter, a four wheeler was run over
her husband 3-4 times and murdered her
husband on the spot.

29. P.W.-2 Jaikesh (son of the
deceased) also deposed on similar lines as
his mother Mewati Devi. However, this
witness Jaikesh has stated that accused
Subhash
Yadav,
Ramkaran
Yadav,
Rambadan
Yadav,
Heera,
Vijai,
Jai
Prakash, Hari Prakash, Ramesh and Lal
Bahadur were on the four wheeler. This
witness has also stated that when his father
was being mercilessly beaten by the
accused persons, he and her mother
shouted, whereupon accused Vijai Yadav
placed country made pistol on the head of
his mother because of which, they stopped
shouting. In the meanwhile, Hari Prakash,
Jai Prakash, Lal Bahadur, Ramesh, Heera,
Ramkaran, Rambadan, who had caught
hold of his father asked Subhash to drive
the Bolero vehicle over and above his
father.

30. The incident took place 1 km west
from Vishen Ka Puura Chowk on a road.
Smt. Mewati Devi P.W.-1, (wife of the
deceased) and Jaikesh P.W.-2 (son of the
deceased) are chance witnesses interested
in conviction of accused because of their
inimical dispositions towards appellant. Let
us examine their evidence with caution and
close scrutiny in order to ascertain whether
their presence on the spot is properly
explained and whether they fall under the
category of wholly reliable witnesses in
order to base conviction of accused on their
testimonies. At the same time it will have
to be kept in mind that merely because the
eye witnesses are the family members of
the deceased, their evidence cannot per se
be discarded. Relationship is not a factor to
affect credibility of a witness. Ordinarily a
close relation would be the last to screen
the real culprit and falsely implicate an
innocent person. At the same time it needs
to be kept in mind while appreciating
evidence of such witness that when feelings
run high and there is personal cause for
enmity, there is a tendency to drag in an
innocent person against whom a witness
has a grudge, along with the guilty. In the
case of Balraje @ Trimbak Vs. State of
12 All. Mewati Devi Vs. State of U.P.
397
Maharashtra, reported in (2010) 6 SCC
673, the Apex Court has held that when the
eye witnesses are stated to be interested and
inimically deposed against the accused, it
would not be proper to conclude that they
would shield the real culprit and rope in an
innocent person. If after careful analysis
and scrutiny of their evidence, the reason
given by the witnesses appears to be clear,
cogent and credible, there is no reason to
discard the same.

31. A chance witness is the one who
happens to be at the place of occurrence of
an offence by chance, and therefore, not as
a matter of course. In other words, he is not
expected to be at the said place. A person
walking
on
a
street
witnessing
the
commission of an offence can be a chance
witness. Merely because a witness happens
to see an occurrence by chance, his
testimony cannot be eschewed though a
little more scrutiny may be required at
times. This again is an aspect which is to be
looked into in a given case by the court.
The evidence of a chance witness therefore,
requires a very cautious and close scrutiny
and a chance witness must adequately
explain his presence at the place of
occurrence. Deposition of a chance witness
whose presence at the place of incident
remains doubtful should be discarded (vide
Shakarlal vs. State of Rajasthan [(2004)
10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579]).

32. The evidence of chance witness
can be accepted provided statement of such
witness adequately explains the presence of
such witness and such evidence stands the
test of caution and close scrutiny.

33. Admittedly, the place of alleged
incident is neither the residence of the
deceased nor his work place, rather it is a
public road. Admittedly, in the early
morning, the deceased left alone for selling
milk in Chandpatti. It is the case of the
prosecution that P.W.-1 Mewati Devi on
the fateful day, at about 10:00 a.m.
suddenly, fell ill and therefore, went to
Chandpatti market on a bicycle with her
minor son Jaikesh. As per prosecution
story, Mewati Devi P.W.-1 became ill only
after her husband had left home for selling
milk. In this background, Mewati Devi
P.W.-1 first visited the Doctor and after
getting medicines in due course, started her
return journey and during her return
journey, she arrived at the spot, where she
alongwith her minor son Jaikesh witnessed
the incident. In this prosecution story,
Mewati Devi P.W.-1 and Jaikesh P.W.-2
both were aware of the fact that the
deceased was also there in Chandpatti
market for selling milk. Therefore, it is
very surprising that instead of contacting
deceased, they had visited Doctor at their
own and took medicines. It is also an
admitted fact that said Chandpatti market is
about 5 kms from their home. In this
background, it is abundantly clear that both
Mewati Devi P.W.-1 and Jaikesh P.W.-2
are chance witnesses, who are alleged to be
present on the alleged spot. Therefore, in
our opinion, conclusion of Court below
regarding these witnesses to be chances
witnesses, is a right conclusion. Therefore,
question
no.ii
is
answered
in
the
affirmative.

Question No. iii. Whether the
presence of P.W.1 Mewati Devi and P.W.-
2 Jaikesh on the spot at the time of the
incident is doubtful and their testimonies
are not trustworthy?.

34. Law regarding appreciation of
evidence of chance witnesses is well
settled. In the present case, both Mewati
Devi P.W.-1 and Jaikesh P.W.-2 are wife
398 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
and son of the deceased respectively.
Therefore, these witnesses are family
members
of
the
deceased.
In
this
background, their evidence needs to be
carefully analyzed specifically with the
objective whether these witnesses were
actually present on the date, time and place
of the incident. If the answer to this
question is in the affirmative, only then it
can be evaluated that their evidence is
trustworthy or not.

35. Mewati Devi P.W.-1 and Jaikesh
P.W.-2 both have stated that they were
returning on bicycle after getting medical
treatment from Chandpatti market and they
had witnessed the incident while returning
home from said Chandpatti market. Mewati
Devi P.W.-1 in her cross-examination has
stated that she left home for Chandpatti
market at 10:00 a.m. and met the Doctor at
about
11:00
a.m.,
Doctor
took
approximately two hours to examine her
and
thereafter
she
was
administered
glucose.

36. Similarly, Jaikesh, P.W.-2 in his
cross-examination has stated that he took
her mother for medical treatment at 10:00
a.m. He further stated that the distance
from Chandpatti market to his home is
about 5 km. He arrived in the Hospital
within 40-45 minutes and Doctor examined
his mother for about 20-25 minutes.

37. Mewati Devi P.W.-1 has specifically
stated that she was administered glucose
whereas her son Jaikesh P.W.-2 has stated
that Doctor did not administer glucose to her
mother and an injection was administered to
her. If their statements are presumed to be
true then in that eventuality, not less than 4045 minutes were taken by these witnesses
from start of their journey upto their arrival at
hospital. Mewati Devi P.W.-1 has stated that
Doctor took approximately 2 hours to
examine her and his son Jaikesh has stated
that Doctor took 20-25 minutes. Therefore, as
per statement of P.W.-1, it was already 12:00
noon in hospital, whereas P.W.2 Jaikesh, it
was already 11:30 a.m. at the hospital, even if
it is presumed that these witnesses started
their return journey at 11:30 a.m., in that
eventuality too, possibility of presence of
both P.W.-1 Mewati Devi and Jaikesh P.W.-2
at spot, (which is approximately 4 km from
the hospital) at 12:00 noon becomes
completely doubtful.

38. We, are therefore, of the opinion that
conclusion drawn by Court below regarding
the presence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 being
doubtful at the time of incident, is a right
conclusion drawn from due appreciation of
evidence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 at page 38, 39
and 40 of the impugned judgment.

39. Mewati Devi P.W.-1 in her evidence
has stated that at the time of incident, a four
wheeler was being driven by accused Lal
Bahadur, whereas her son Jaikesh P.W.-2 has
stated that it was Subhash Yadav, who was
driving the said four wheeler. Therefore,
there is material contradiction in the
testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 regarding
the person who was actually driving the said
vehicle, which is alleged to have caused the
alleged incident. The whole prosecution story
is that the deceased was run over 3-4 times by
the four wheeler. In this background, it was
very important for both of these witnesses to
clearly specify who was actually driving the
vehicle at the time of incident. The said
material contradiction cannot be ignored.

40. P.W.-1 in her deposition has also
stated that nine accused were sitting in the
Bolero vehicle at the time of incident.
However, Jaikesh P.W.-2 has stated in his
deposition that Hariprakash, Jaiprakash,
12 All. Mewati Devi Vs. State of U.P.
399
Lal Bahadur, Subhash, Ramesh, Hira,
Ramkaran and Rambadan laid the deceased
on the road and asked Subhash Yadav to
run the vehicle over the deceased and
Subhash Yadav drove the vehicle over the
deceased 3-4 times moving it back and
forth. Thus, there is material contradiction
in the evidence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2
regarding manner in which the said
incident had occurred. If both the witnesses
were actually present at the spot, certainly
then there would not have been such
material contradictions in their testimonies
regarding the manner in which the incident
had occurred and name of accused, who
was driving the offending vehicle.

41. P.W.-1 Smt. Mewati Devi and
P.W.-2 Jaikesh both have stated that road
on which the incident is alleged to have
occurred is going from North to South
whereas the Investigating Officer, P.W.-5
has stated that road of the incident, goes
from East to West. Court below has
specifically recorded that in site plan
(Exhibit A-8), the road of the incident is
shown from the East to West. If these
prosecution witnesses were actually present
at the spot, they would certainly have
known in which direction the road is, on
which the incident is alleged to have
occurred.

42. As per depositions of P.W.1 and
P.W.2, the deceased's body was lying in the
middle of road. P.W.1 has not stated that
the deceased was lifted by anyone.
However, as per the inquest report Exhibit
A-3, the deceased's body was found at the
location "X" located on the southern side of
the road and not in the middle of road
which again raises doubts on the presence
of these witnesses on the spot, at the time
of occurrence.

43. P.W.-2 Jaikesh in his examinationin-chief has stated that accused stuffed his
father's mouth with mud and grass and in
this background when these two witnesses
were present at the spot, then mud and
grass must have been present in the
deceased's mouth even after his death.
However, post mortem report does not
mention any grass or mud in the deceased's
mouth. The Autopsy Surgeon in his crossexamination has stated that during the
course of post mortem no pieces of grass
were found in the mouth of deceased.

44. Therefore, the statements of Smt.
Mewati Devi, P.W.1 and Jaikesh P.W.2 are
highly contradictory and the presence of
these witnesses at the time of incident, is
also highly doubtful.

45. As per prosecution story, the
deceased was run over by Bolero Vehicle
3-4 times, although there is material
contradiction in the deposition of P.W.1
and P.W.2 regarding the manner of
incident. However, both these witnesses
have consistently, stated that deceased was
run over 3-4 times by Bolero Vehicle. As
per prosecution story and depositions of
P.W.1 and P.W.2 both hands and legs of
the deceased were broken. Therefore, it is
very important to find out whether there is
any crush injury on the body of the
deceased or not and whether hands and legs
of accused were also broken or not.

46.
During
the
post-mortem
examination,
P.W.-3
observed
the
following ante mortem injuries on the body
of the deceased Singhasan Yadav:

1. An abrasion measuring 0.5
cm x 0.4 cm on the left side of the face,
below the left eye.
400 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

2. An abrasion measuring 12 cm
x 0.4 cm on the back of the left forearm.

3. Multiple abraded contusions
measuring 65 cm x 20 cm on the back of
the arm and forearm.

4. Lacerated wound measuring 3
cm x 1 cm x muscle-deep on the front of
the right arm.

5. Multiple abraded contusions
measuring 72 cm x 32 cm across the
abdomen and down the chest.

6. Multiple abraded contusions
measuring 50 cm x 20 cm on the right side
of the back, from the shoulder down to the
gluteal region.

7. Multiple abraded contusions
measuring 60 cm x 15 cm down to the
waist and left lower limb.

8. An abrasion 0.2 cm x 2 cm on
the right knee.

47. On internal examination of the
deceased's body, P.W.-3 stated that all the
chest bones (ribs), sternum, and coccyx
were broken. The right and left lungs were
lacerated. There was approximately one
litre of blood in the chest cavity. The
membrane covering the heart was torn. The
heart was empty and weighed 1.50 grams.
The stomach membrane was torn. There
was approximately one litre of blood in the
stomach. The liver was ruptured. The
spleen was ruptured.

48. Thus, it is apparently, clear that
none of the hands and legs of the deceased
were found broken. Moreover, there is not
a single crush injury on the body of the
deceased. When a Bolero vehicle is run
over 3-4 times over a normal human being
that too if 8-9 persons are sitting in such
Borelo vehicle, then in that eventuality,
there ought to be some crush injury on the
body of a normal human being. It is true
that all the ribs of the deceased were
broken and although lungs were also
lacerated, however, only multiple abrated
contusions were found over his chest and
his back but no crush injury and/or no
broken bone of hands and legs of the body
of the deceased was also found. Therefore,
version of the prosecution, i.e. the deceased
was run over by Bolero vehicle several
times over his body and the legs and hands
were broken, does not find support from his
post mortem report. In short the ocular
version
of
the
occurrence
is
not
corroborated by the medical evidence on
the record. This also raises doubt on the
veracity of the version of incident put
forward by P.W.1 and P.W.2 again raising
serious doubt regarding their presence on
the spot at the time of the incident. As a
cumulative result of above findings, Court
below has rightly come to the conclusion
that P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 were not present at
the time of incident and their testimonies
are not trustworthy. Therefore, question
no.iii is answered in the affirmative.

Question
No.
iv.
Whether
reasons recorded by Court below in
support of it's conclusion that prosecution
has failed to establish the guilt of accused
beyond reasonable doubt, are cogent and
valid reasons or illusionary and against
the
weight
of
evidence
on
record,
therefore, illegal and perverse.

49.