# Mohammad Arif v. Laiq Ahmad

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 730
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-04
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 3 of 2026
- **Bench:** Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohammad-arif-v-laiq-ahmad-54197
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

730 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

9. On the other hand, Shri Raj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondents-Union of India
admitted the fact that under the conciliation proceedings only conciliation can be made. In case conciliation
proceeding fails, the only remedy is available to refer the matter to the Central Government who will
recommend to the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal will pass
an appropriate order.

10. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the material on
record.

11. Admitted position is that the order passed by the Regional Level Commissioner is wholly without
jurisdiction. He has no authority under law to pass the order for payment of wages under conciliation
proceedings. In case he was satisfied that the wages are liable to be paid to the labourer then by disposing of
the conciliation proceeding he has to make reference to the Central Government for its transmission to the
Competent Authority i.e. Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. In this view of the matter, the Regional Level
Commissioner has committed manifest error of law and jurisdiction in proceeding to decide the controversy
involved in the matter.

12. The consequential orders are also dependent upon the order passed by the Regional Level
Commissioner, therefore, the order rejecting recall application as well as initiating proceeding for recovery of
the amount is wholly without jurisdiction and is not sustainable in the eyes of law.

13. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the reasons assigned above, impugned orders
dated 2/11/2006, 5/6/2008 and the recovery certificate dated 4.7.2008 are hereby quashed.

14. In the result, this writ petition is allowed.

15. The orders impugned show that in a very perfunctory and cursory manner, the orders have been
passed, therefore an exemplary cost to the tune of Rs.50,000/- to be payable to the petitioner is imposed upon
the then Regional Level Commissioner who was appointed at the relevant point of time when the order was
passed.
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(2026) 2 ILRA 730
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 3 of 2026

Mohammad Arif ...Petitioner
Versus
Laiq Ahmad ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
2 All. Mohammad Arif Vs. Laiq Ahmad
731
(A) Whether permitting summoning of documents at the stage of final arguments amounted to allowing the
plaintiff to fill up lacunae in the case and defeated a valuable right which had accrued in favour of the
defendant.
(B) Whether the trial court was justified in fixing the matter for arguments/orders without affording adequate
opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine witnesses and to advance submissions in the light of the
additional documents brought on record.

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908- Order VII Rule
14(3)- The discretion under Order VII Rule 14(3) CPC is required to be exercised judiciously by
applying a threefold test: (i) whether the omission to file the document earlier was bona fide; (ii)
whether the document is relevant and necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute; and
(iii) and whether permitting its production at a later stage would occasion serious prejudice or
irreparable injustice to the defendant- The Trial Court has recorded a clear finding that the
omission occurred due to an inadvertent and bona fide mistake arising out of the simultaneous
filing of several eviction suits against different tenants on the same date. The documents sought
to be summoned pertain to the notice terminating the tenancy, postal receipts evidencing
dispatch, and the reply notice submitted by the defendant, all of which form the very foundation
of the eviction proceedings. Significantly, the documents were already part of the judicial record
of a connected SCC suit and were not sought to be introduced for the first time- Fairness in
procedure necessarily requires that once such documents are permitted to be brought on record,
the opposite party must be afforded a real, effective, and meaningful opportunity to meet the
same by way of cross-examination and by advancing arguments.

Held- No illegality in the impugned orders insofar as they relate to summoning and taking on record the
relevant documents- having regard to the subsequent fixation of the matter for final orders and the concern
expressed on behalf of the petitioner regarding lack of adequate opportunity, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the ends of justice would be best served by directing the Trial Court to afford full opportunity to
the parties before proceeding to pronounce final judgment- Petition disposed of. (E-15)
(Para 15, 16, 19, 20 & 21)

Case Law Cited
K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (2011) 11 SCC 275; Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal
AIR 1962 SC 527; State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari AIR 1976 SC 1177; Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal,
Kotah AIR 1955 SC 425

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

List of Keywords
Order VII R.14, Production of documents; the opposite party must be afforded opportunity; by way of crossexamination and by advancing arguments

Case Arising From
the orders dated 03.09.2025 and 09.10.2025 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, , as also the order
dated 20.11.2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Bareilly whereby the revision preferred by the
petitioner under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act came to be dismissed as not
maintainable.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioners(s) : Rama Goel Bansal, Shalini Goel
Counsel for Respondent(s) : Rupesh Srivastav
732 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(Delivered by Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.)

1. Heard Ms Rama Goel Bansal, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Rupesh Srivastav,
learned counsel for the respondent.

2. The present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India calls in question the
orders dated 03.09.2025 and 09.10.2025 passed by the Judge, Small Causes Court, Bareilly in SCC
Suit No. 6 of 2019, as also the order dated 20.11.2025 passed by the learned District Judge,
Bareilly in Misc. Civil Case No. 397 of 2025, whereby the revision preferred by the petitioner
under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act came to be dismissed as not
maintainable.

3. The dispute has its genesis in SCC Suit No. 6 of 2019 instituted by the respondent-plaintiff
seeking eviction of the petitioner-defendant from a shop situated at Meena Bazar, Mohalla Tanda,
near Imambara Baheri, District Bareilly. The plaintiff asserted his ownership over the premises on
the strength of a registered sale deed dated 15.04.1988 and pleaded that the shop in question
formed part of Kadri Market, which was constructed during the years 2000-2001.

4. It was the specific case of the plaintiff that the shop was let out to the defendant in the year
2003 at a monthly rent of Rs.2,500/- per shop and that the defendant was in occupation of two
shops at a total monthly rent of Rs.5,000/- per month. It was alleged that the defendant committed
default in payment of rent after August 2018. Consequently, a notice dated 16.01.2019 terminating
the tenancy and demanding arrears of rent was issued. Alleging non-compliance with the said
notice, the eviction suit came to be instituted.

5. The plaintiff further pleaded that on the same date he had instituted several eviction suits
against different tenants occupying various shops in the same market, namely SCC Suit Nos. 4 to 9
of 2019. It was asserted that each of the said suits was filed along with the respective notices
terminating tenancy, postal receipts evidencing dispatch, and reply notices submitted by the
concerned defendants. According to the plaintiff, owing to the simultaneous filing of multiple suits,
an inadvertent and bona fide mistake occurred at the stage of presentation, resulting in the basic
documents relating to SCC Suit No. 6 of 2019 being wrongly tagged with the record of SCC Suit
No. 7 of 2019 and vice versa.

6. During the course of proceedings, the defence of the defendant was struck off. The plaintiff
led his evidence and, during cross-examination, PW-1, after perusing Paper No.8C2, stated that the
said document was the notice issued to the defendant. It was thereafter, at the stage of final
arguments, that the plaintiff moved an application dated 19.08.2025 (Paper No.81C) seeking
summoning of the relevant documents from the record of SCC Suit No. 7 of 2019.

7. By order dated 03.09.2025, the Trial Court directed summoning of the record of SCC Suit
No. 7 of 2019 from the record room. Subsequently, by order dated 09.10.2025, the application was
allowed, the Trial Court accepting the explanation furnished by the plaintiff that the omission was
bona fide and occurred on account of an inadvertent mistake while filing multiple suits
simultaneously. While allowing the application, the Trial Court expressly granted liberty to the
2 All. Mohammad Arif Vs. Laiq Ahmad
733
defendant to move an application for recalling witnesses for further cross-examination in respect of
the documents so summoned.

8. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial
Small Cause Courts Act, which came to be registered as Misc. Civil Case No. 397 of 2025. The
revisional court, by order dated 20.11.2025, dismissed the revision holding that the impugned order
did not amount to a "case decided" and, therefore, was not amenable to revisional jurisdiction.

9. Before this Court, counsel for the petitioner initially assailed the impugned orders
contending that permitting summoning of documents at the stage of final arguments amounted to
allowing the plaintiff to fill up lacunae in the case and defeated a valuable right which had accrued
in favour of the defendant. However, after making submissions to some extent, learned counsel
could not seriously dispute that the order passed by the Trial Court summoning the documents on
the ground of a bona fide mistake could not be said to be perverse or wholly unjustified, inasmuch
as it was passed in furtherance of the ends of justice.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted that the
omission in filing the correct set of documents at the time of institution of the suit was wholly
inadvertent and was a direct consequence of the simultaneous filing of multiple eviction suits
against different tenants on the same date. It was urged that the documents sought to be summoned
were not new documents being introduced for the first time in the proceedings, but were already
part of the judicial record of a connected SCC suit and constituted the foundational documents of
the plaintiff's case. It was further submitted that no prejudice whatsoever was caused to the
defendant, particularly in view of the liberty granted by the Trial Court to recall witnesses for
further cross-examination and to address arguments on the basis of the said documents.

11. The principal grievance of the petitioner which survives for consideration is that by a
subsequent order dated 20.01.2026, the Trial Court has fixed the matter for arguments/orders
without affording adequate opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine witnesses and to advance
submissions in the light of the additional documents brought on record. Learned counsel for the
respondent, in all fairness, does not oppose the prayer that such opportunity be granted before the
suit is finally decided.

12. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is
intended to ensure that subordinate courts act within the bounds of their authority, exercise
jurisdiction vested in them in accordance with law, and adhere to the principles of natural justice.
Though this Court does not sit as a court of appeal over interlocutory or procedural orders, it is
obliged to intervene where a procedural irregularity results in denial of a fair opportunity to a party.

13. Order VII Rule 14(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure places a procedural embargo on the
reception in evidence of documents which were required to be produced or listed at the time of
presentation of the plaint but were not so produced. The object underlying the provision is to ensure
procedural transparency and fairness by mandating early disclosure of the documentary foundation
of the plaintiff's claim and by preventing surprise to the opposite party at a later stage of the
proceedings. At the same time, the provision itself confers discretion upon the Court to grant leave
734 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
for production of documents at a subsequent stage, thereby indicating that the rule is directory and
not mandatory.

14. A code of procedure is a body of law designed to facilitate justice and further its ends, and
should not be treated as an enactment providing for punishments and penalties. The laws of
procedure are grounded on the principles of natural justice, which require that a person should not
be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind the back of a party, and that
proceedings affecting life or property should not continue without affording an effective
opportunity of participation. Subject to clearly defined exceptions, procedural provisions must
therefore be construed, wherever reasonably possible, in the light of these principles.

15. The discretion under Order VII Rule 14(3) CPC is required to be exercised judiciously by
applying a three fold test: (i) whether the omission to file the document earlier was bona fide; (ii)
whether the document is relevant and necessary for effective adjudication of the dispute; and (iii)
and whether permitting its production at a later stage would occasion serious prejudice or
irreparable injustice to the defendant.

16. In the present case, the Trial Court has recorded a clear finding that the omission occurred
due to an inadvertent and bona fide mistake arising out of the simultaneous filing of several
eviction suits against different tenants on the same date. The documents sought to be summoned
pertain to the notice terminating the tenancy, postal receipts evidencing dispatch, and the reply
notice submitted by the defendant, all of which form the very foundation of the eviction
proceedings. Significantly, the documents were already part of the judicial record of a connected
SCC suit and were not sought to be introduced for the first time.

17. The exercise of discretion by the Trial Court is further reinforced by the safeguards
incorporated in the order itself. Liberty was expressly granted to the defendant to recall witnesses
for further cross-examination in respect of the documents so summoned. Such an approach is in
consonance with the settled principle that procedural laws are handmaids of justice and ought to be
applied in a manner that advances, rather than obstructs, the cause of substantive justice. The
Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah1 and State of Punjab v. Shamlal
Murari2 has consistently held that rules of procedure are intended to advance justice and not to
defeat it. It has also been emphasised that procedural provisions should be construed pragmatically
so as to further the cause of fair trial rather than frustrate it on technical grounds. This principle has
also been consistently reiterated that where the Court is satisfied about the bona fides of a party and
adequate opportunity is afforded to the opposite side, production of documents at a later stage does
not vitiate the proceedings.

18. The inherent powers of the Court preserved under Section 151 CPC are intended to
supplement the procedural framework of the Code and to ensure that justice is done in situations
where rigid adherence to procedure may result in injustice. The scope and amplitude of Section 151
CPC have been authoritatively explained by the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai
Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal3, wherein it was held that the inherent powers of the Court are
complementary to the powers expressly conferred by the Code and may be exercised to secure the
ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, so long as their exercise is not in
2 All. Mohammad Arif Vs. Laiq Ahmad
735
conflict with any express provision of law. A conjoint reading of Order VII Rule 14(3) CPC
and Section 151 CPC makes it clear that where the interests of justice so demand, and where
adequate opportunity is afforded to the opposite party to meet the case set up by the additional
documents, the Court is well within its jurisdiction to permit their production, subject to
appropriate safeguards, for processual law is meant to be not an obstruction but an aid to
justice. The Court is invested with the widest possible discretion to ensure that justice is done
to all concerned, and such discretion must be exercised to advance the cause of justice while
safeguarding fairness to the opposite party and strict adherence to the principles of natural
justice.

19. At the same time, fairness in procedure necessarily requires that once such documents
are permitted to be brought on record, the opposite party must be afforded a real, effective, and
meaningful opportunity to meet the same by way of cross-examination and by advancing
arguments. Any denial of such opportunity would offend the principles of natural justice and
would warrant supervisory interference by this Court.

20. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no illegality, jurisdictional error
or perversity in the orders dated 03.09.2025 and 09.10.2025 passed by the Trial Court, nor in
the order dated 20.11.2025 passed by the revisional court, insofar as they relate to
summoning and taking on record the relevant documents. The approach adopted by the
courts below is in consonance with the law laid down by the Supreme Court in K.K.
Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy4, wherein it has been held that procedural provisions, including
the power to permit additional evidence or recall of witnesses, are intended to advance
justice and can be exercised where the Court is satisfied about the bona fides of the party and
where the opposite side is afforded adequate opportunity to rebut the material so brought on
record. Consequently, the relief sought by the petitioner for setting aside the impugned
orders is declined.

21. However, having regard to the subsequent fixation of the matter for final orders and
the concern expressed on behalf of the petitioner regarding lack of adequate opportunity, this
Court is of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be best served by directing the
Trial Court to afford full opportunity to the parties before proceeding to pronounce final
judgment.

22. Accordingly, the petition is disposed of with a direction to the Judge, Small Causes
Court, Bareilly to afford adequate opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence, to recall and
cross-examine witnesses, if so prayed, in respect of the documents summoned from the record
of SCC Suit No. 7 of 2019, and thereafter to hear and decide the matter after granting
reasonable opportunity of arguments to both sides. The Trial Court may regulate the
proceedings, subject to appropriate terms, so as to balance procedural fairness with expeditious
disposal.

23. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case,
which shall be decided independently by the Trial Court in accordance with law.
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736 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
(2026) 2 ILRA 736
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 252 of 2026

Lko. Development Authority ...Petitioner
Versus
Prem Chandra ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
Whether interest can only be awarded from the date of notification under Section 4 and not from any date
prior to initiation of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. and the award of interest from the date of
taking possession on 30.12.1984 is without jurisdiction and, therefore, the award cannot be executed to the
extent it awards interest for the period prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Section 47; The
Land Acquisition Act, 1894- Section 4, 28 & 34- Perusal of the order dated 19.12.2025 indicates
that it nowhere assigns any reason for rejecting the objection of the petitioner that the Land
Acquisition Act does not stipulate payment of interest from a date prior to issuance of
notification under Section 4 of the Act which was the sole ground raised in the application under
Section 47 C.P.C. The submissions of the learned counsel for the opposite party-decree holder
recorded in the impugned order also do not contain any reply to the solitary ground raised in the
application under Section 47 C.P.C. and the only objection is application under Section 47 C.P.C.
advanced during pressing submissions was that the application had been filed with an intention
to cause delay in execution proceedings- The opposite party is claiming is that although he was
deprived of the possession of the land in the year 1984, he should be paid compensation at the
rates prevalent on 19.04.2010, i.e., 26 years later, and he should be given interest on the
amount of compensation calculated at the rates prevalent on 19.04.2010, since 31.12.1984. This
claim is not equitable.

Held- LARA had no jurisdiction to award interest for any period prior to 19.04.2010 - the date of issuance of
the notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. It is settled law that the plea of lack of
jurisdiction can be raised at any stage, even during execution proceedings by filing an application under
Section 47 CPC. LARA has passed the impugned orders without dealing with the plea of lack of jurisdiction
raised by the petitioner which makes the orders unsustainable in law- Petition allowed. (E-15)

Case Law Cited
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.: (2003) 3 SCC 524; . C.G. Thampi v. Jyothis: 2022 SCC OnLine
Ker 704; Tapan Chandra Deb Barma v. Dulal Chandra Deb Barma: 1979 SCC OnLine Gau 17; State of A.P. v.
V. Sarma Rao: (2007) 2 SCC 159; Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd.: (2003) 2 SCC 111,;
Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers: (2003) 6 SCC 659; Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra
Shankar Patil: (2010) 8 SCC 329; Union of India v. Budh Singh: (1995) 6 SCC 233; R.L. Jain (D) by LRs. Vs.
DDA and others: (2004) 4 SCC 79; Madishetti Bala Ramul v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2007) 9 SCC 650;
Tahera Khotoon v. Land Acquisition Officer: (2014) 13 SCC 613; Dhanush Vir Singh v. Ila Sharma: 2024 SCC
OnLine All 3693