# Mohan Pandey v. Pooran Singh and

- **Citation:** (2011) 1 ILRA 236
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2011-02-15
- **Case number:** Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48485 of 2000
- **Bench:** Arun Tandon
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohan-pandey-v-pooran-singh-and-41851
- **Pages:** 4

## Headnote

Rule
1956-Rule-6Petitioner-based his claim on estopple
and
acquiescence-once
admitted
by
Training School can not be deprived from
completing the same-on Query made by
court regarding working of 100 days as
untrained Lekhpal-No proper response
given-voluminous documents placed in
counter
affidavit-proved
that
never
worked as untrained Lekhpal-claim not
based
upon
statutory
provisions
or
Government Order-can not be acceptedJudgment
relied
by
petitionerdistinguishable.

Held: Para 8

This Court has no hesitation to hold that
in the facts of the case it was established
beyond doubt that the petitioners were
not eligible for admission to the Lekhpal
Training
Institute
either
under
the
statutory rules or under the Government
Order dated 15.01.1986. The admission
to the Lekhpal Training Institute was
obtained by the petitioners on incorrect
statement
of
facts.
Therefore,
any
training obtained by the petitioners on
such false statement of fact cannot be
perpetuated by this Court by issuing a
1 All] Narendra Pratap Singh and others V. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others
237
direction to the respondent to offer
appointment
to
the
petitioners
as
Lekhpal on the basis of the training so
obtained. This Court, therefore, refuses
to exercise its discretion under Article
226 of the Constitution of India in the
facts of the present case.
Case law discussed:
2003 (2) SCC 111; AIR 2008 SCW 5817

## Text

236 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011
similar
circumstances,
where
similar
applications
were
submitted,
the
respondents have given appointment to the
wards of retiring employees but the said
treatment has been denied to petitioners.

9. Suffice it mention here that
application to provide appointment as a
result of acceptance of retirement is
available
only
when
application
is
conditional and not otherwise. Merely
because in some other matter some error or
illegality
has
been
committed
by
respondents that will not give a cause of
action to petitioners to claim parity in the
matter of such illegality. If some benefit has
been given by the respondents to some
persons illegally or contrary to the law, no
mandamus can be issued to the respondents
to commit same illegality again, inasmuch
as, the right of equality is not extended to
claim parity in illegal acts since it is well
settled legal position that two wrongs will
not make one right. The Apex Court in the
case of State of Bihar and others Vs.
Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another,
AIR 2000 SC 2306; Union of India and
another Vs. International Trading Co.
and another, AIR 2003 SC 3983; Lalit
Mohan Pandey Vs. Pooran Singh and
others, AIR 2004 SC 2303; M/s Anand
Buttons Ltd. etc. Vs. State of Haryana
and others, AIR 2005 SC 565; and
Kastha Niwarak G. S. S. Maryadit,
Indore
Vs.
President,
Indore
Development Authority, AIR 2006 SC
1142 has clearly held that Article 14 has no
application in such cases.

10. In view of aforesaid discussion, I
find no merit in this petition. It is
accordingly dismissed. No costs.
---------

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.02.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE ARUN TANDON, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 48485 of 2000

Narendra Pratap Singh and others

 ...Petitioners
Versus
Board Of Revenue U.P. Lkw and others

 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioners:
Sri Atma Ram Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

Lekhpal
Service
Rule
1956-Rule-6Petitioner-based his claim on estopple
and
acquiescence-once
admitted
by
Training School can not be deprived from
completing the same-on Query made by
court regarding working of 100 days as
untrained Lekhpal-No proper response
given-voluminous documents placed in
counter
affidavit-proved
that
never
worked as untrained Lekhpal-claim not
based
upon
statutory
provisions
or
Government Order-can not be acceptedJudgment
relied
by
petitionerdistinguishable.

Held: Para 8

This Court has no hesitation to hold that
in the facts of the case it was established
beyond doubt that the petitioners were
not eligible for admission to the Lekhpal
Training
Institute
either
under
the
statutory rules or under the Government
Order dated 15.01.1986. The admission
to the Lekhpal Training Institute was
obtained by the petitioners on incorrect
statement
of
facts.
Therefore,
any
training obtained by the petitioners on
such false statement of fact cannot be
perpetuated by this Court by issuing a
1 All] Narendra Pratap Singh and others V. Board of Revenue, U.P. and others
237
direction to the respondent to offer
appointment
to
the
petitioners
as
Lekhpal on the basis of the training so
obtained. This Court, therefore, refuses
to exercise its discretion under Article
226 of the Constitution of India in the
facts of the present case.
Case law discussed:
2003 (2) SCC 111; AIR 2008 SCW 5817

(Delivered by Hon'ble Arun Tandon, J.)

1. On a pointed query being made by
the Court as to whether the petitioners are in
a position to disclose as to in which Halkas
he had worked as untrained Lekhpal for a
period of 100 days which could entitle them
for admission in the Lekhpal Training
Institute, counsel for the petitioners refused
to answer the query and stated that the
petitioners had submitted their application
form which was verified by the respondents
and therefore it is to be presumed that the
petitioners were eligible for admission of
Lekhpal training on the relevant date.

2. This petition is directed against an
order dated 13.09.2000. Under the order
impugned the Prabhari Adhikari Bhoolekh
on behalf of the District Magistrate, Varanasi
has required the petitioners to submit such
documents as they may be advised for
establishing that they had worked as
untrained Lekhpal for the required period
which could entitle them for admission to the
Lekhpal Training Institute and on being
successful in the said training to be appointed
as Lekhpal.

3. The order specifically records that
unless such information is disclosed by the
petitioners, they cannot be appointed as
Lekhpal although their result of Lekhpal
Training Institute has been declared.

Counsel for the petitioner with all
vehemence at his command contended that
since petitioners had been admitted to the
Training Institute, it is to be presumed that
they had completed requisite number of days
for being eligible for such admission and
further that the petitioners had completed
their training at the Lekhpal Training
Institute and they were declared successful.
Therefore, at this later point of time the
respondents are not justified in interfering in
the working of the petitioners as Lekhpal or
for not offering appointment to the
petitioners as Lekhpal even after declaration
of their result of Lekhpal Training. Hence
this petition.

4. A detail counter affidavit has been
filed in the present writ petition containing as
many as 10 documents. It has specifically
been stated that admission to Lekhpal
Training Institute is regulated by Rule 6 of
the Lekhpal Service Rules, 1958. Under the
aforesaid statutory rules the process of
admission to Lekhpal Training Institutes,
established at five centers in the State of
Uttar Pradesh, is on the basis of a
competitive examination to be held by the
District Magistrate. The selected candidates
merit-wise are sent for training to the
Lekhpal Training Institute.

5. The State Government vide
Government Order dated 15.01.1986 took a
decision to get certain categories of untrained
Lekhpal trained i. e. who satisfied two
conditions (a) who had been working
between 13.09.1976 to 08th June, 1983, and
(b) have actually worked for 100 days as
untrained Lekhpal.

I have heard counsel for the petitioners
and have examined the records.
238 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES [2011

Admittedly the petitioners had not
appeared in any examination held by the
District Magistrate. They claim to be
admitted to the Training Institute in terms of
the Government Order dated 15.01.1986.
From
the
Government
Order
dated
15.01.1986 it is apparently clear that not all
untrained Lekhpals became entitled to
admission to the Lekhpal Training Institute
and it is only a particular category of such
untrained Lekhpals, who satisfy the aforesaid
two conditions, could be admitted under the
Government Order. For the purpose the
petitioners had made applications claiming
that they had worked for 100 days as
untrained Lekhpal. It is with reference to the
facts so disclosed by the petitioners that they
had been admitted to the Training Institute.

6. The facts disclosed in the application
form by the petitioners qua their period of
working
as
untrained
Lekhpal
was
specifically
verified
by
the
District
Magistrate, Varanasi from the records of his
subordinate offices and as per the report
dated 16.01.2000 it had been found that the
petitioners had actually not worked for 100
days as untrained Lekhpal. It is in this
background that the impugned notice has
been issued to the petitioners to explain as to
why they may not be denied appointment as
Lekhpal, as admission to the Lekhpal
Training Institute had been obtained on
incorrect and false statements made in the
application form.

7. As already noticed above, despite
the specific query of the Court calling upon
the petitioners to disclose as to whether they
had worked as untrained Lekhpal for a
period of 100 days and if so, where, the
counsel for the petitioners refused to answer
the query. Reliance is placed only on the fact
that admission to Lekhpal Training Institute
had been granted to the petitioners.

8. This Court has no hesitation to hold
that in the facts of the case it was established
beyond doubt that the petitioners were not
eligible for admission to the Lekhpal
Training Institute either under the statutory
rules or under the Government Order dated
15.01.1986. The admission to the Lekhpal
Training Institute was obtained by the
petitioners on incorrect statement of facts.
Therefore, any training obtained by the
petitioners on such false statement of fact
cannot be perpetuated by this Court by
issuing a direction to the respondent to offer
appointment to the petitioners as Lekhpal on
the basis of the training so obtained. This
Court, therefore, refuses to exercise its
discretion
under
Article
226
of
the
Constitution of India in the facts of the
present case.

9. So far as the judgment relied upon
by the counsel for the petitioners dated
22.03.2005 passed in Writ Petition No.
19555 of 1992 and in the Special Appeal No.
492 (Defective) of 2005 as well as upon the
judgment of Apex Court in Special Leave to
Appeal No. 4623 of 2008. Suffice is to
record that the basic judgment of the Hon'ble
Single Judge proceeded on the fact that no
document or record has been produced and
the orders of this Court has not been
complied with.

10. The facts on record of the present
writ petition are otherwise. There is
voluminous evidence on record by way of
counter affidavit, which demonstrate the
statement made by the petitioners in the
application form, that they actually worked
as untrained Lekhpal for 100 days, was false.
The judgments relied upon by the counsel for
the petitioners are clearly distinguishable.

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in the case of Bhavnagar University
1 All] Vinayendra Nath Upadhyay V. State of U.P. and others
239
Vs. Palitana Sugar Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. & Ors.,
reported in 2003 (2) SCC 111, has held that
it is well settled that a little difference in facts
or additional facts may make a lot of
difference in the precedential value of a
decision. The said judgment has been
followed in the recent judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of Dr. Rajbir Singh Dalal
vs. Chaudhari Devi Lal University, Sirsa &
Anr. Reported in AIR 2008 SCW 5817.

12. In view of the aforesaid, writ
petition is dismissed.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 11.02.2011

BEFORE
THE HON'BLE F. I. REBELLO, C.J.
THE HON'BLE V. K. SHUKLA, J.
THE HON'BLE A.P. SAHI, J.

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.51979 of 2005

Vinayendra Nath Upadhyay ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. and others ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri S.S. Pandey
Sri A.K. Tripathi
Sri Y.D. Dwivedi
Sri Navin Sinha

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri R.C. Singh
Sri M.C. Chaturvedi
C.S.C.

U.P. Urban Planning and Developmenty
Act 1972-Section 39 (1) read with Indian
Stamp
Act
1899-Section
2(16)-
Registration of instrument of leaseregarding realisation of toll tax from
Shashtri and Chandra Shekhar Bridgewhether
comes
within
preview
of
immovable Property?-held-"Yes" case of
Bilal Ahmad Shervani-not laid down
correct law-overruled.

Held: Para 32 and33

For the reasons aforesaid, we are of the
considered view that the instrument
which
has
been
registered
is
an
instrument of lease which amounts to an
instrument
relating
to
immoveable
property with its extended meaning as
contained under Section 2(16)(c) of the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and therefore
we would answer questions No. 1 and 2
in the affirmative in favour of the State.

Accordingly, the decision in the case of
M/s Bilal Ahmad Sherwani does not lay
down the law correctly and stands
overruled. Question No. 3 therefore
stands answered accordingly.
Case law discussed:
AIR 1992 All. 181; AIR (1992) Allahabad 181

(Delivered by Hon'ble F. I. Rebello, C.J.)

1. This reference raises issues
involving the power of the State to impose
and realise Additional Stamp Duty on an
instrument of lease executed for a contract
to realise toll in respect of two bridges in the
district of Allahabad over the river Ganges,
namely Lal Bahadur Shastri Bridge and
Chandra
Shekhar
Azad
Bridge.
The
imposition of this Additional Stamp Duty is
under the provisions of Section 39 (1) of the
U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act,
1972 read with the Indian Stamp Act 1899.

2. The petitioners in all the writ
petitions have assailed the orders of the
Addl. Collector (Finance & Revenue),
Allahabad, under Section 31 of the 1899
Act as also the revisional orders passed by
the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority
under Section 56 (2) of the Act, upholding
the said imposition.