# Mohd. Faizan & Ors v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 1000
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-20
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482. No. 734 of 2026
- **Bench:** Brij Raj Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohd-faizan-ors-v-state-of-u-p-anr-54234
- **Pages:** 12

## Text

1000 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

11. From a reading of the above judgement, it becomes crystal clear that the seizure of the
goods has to be based on some specific reason that would indicate that the goods that have been
confiscated/seized are of foreign origin.

12. In the present case, the authorities have not been able to indicate any such reason to believe.
Neither have they been able to provide a basis of the seizure nor have they been able to confirm the origin
of the goods as foreign in nature upon subsequent testing. In fact the records clearly show that the first
laboratory report clearly indicated that the goods were of Indian origin. In such a situation, when the goods
have been identified as goods of Indian origin, the entire exercise of the customs authorities in seizing the
goods and thereafter continuing to detain the said goods appears to be not just arbitrary but also malafide.
It is astonishing to note that the goods were examined once again, that too, from a Government laboratory
that could not ascertain the origin of the goods. Even after the second report has come to light, the
authorities have continued to detain the goods without having any basis in law to do so.

13. On our repeated query from learned counsel appearing for the customs authorities that what is the
material available with the respondents to make out a reason to believe that the goods subject matter of
writ petitions are of foreign origin, he could not place any material before this Court on the basis of which
authorities could have formed opinion that the seized goods are of foreign origin. It is well settled through
catena of judgements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that reasons to believe recorded in the notice must be
based on some material with the authorities and uness there is material, the authorities can not proceed in
the matter. We are of the view that once there is no material available with the customs authorities that the
seized goods are of foreign origin, any proceedings drawn by the customs authorities under the Customs
Act, 1962 are totally without jurisdiction.

14. In light of the above, we are unable to sustain the seizure orders passed by the customs
authorities. The same are accordingly quashed and set-aside with the direction upon the authorities to act
in accordance with law and release the goods to the petitioners within a period of one week from date.

15. With the above directions, all four writ petitions, i.e., Writ Tax No. 258 of 2026, Writ Tax
No. 254 of 2026, Writ Tax No. 253 of 2026 and Writ Tax No. 245 of 2026 are disposed of.
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(2026) 3 ILRA 1000
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 20.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Application U/S 482. No. 734 of 2026

Mohd. Faizan & Ors. ...Applicants
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
3 All. Mohd. Faizan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1001
Whether an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. / 528 BNSS is maintainable against refusal of discharge by
Special Judge, NIA Court, specially, when the offence under Section 121-A IPC (a Scheduled Offence) was
investigated by State Police and prosecuted before NIA Court.

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482, - Indian Penal Code, 1860 -
Sections 121-A, 153-A, 295-A - National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 - Sections - 2, 6, 7, 10,
11, 13, 21, 22 - SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Section 14-A: - Application u/s 482
CrPC / 528 BNSS - against refusal of discharge by the Special Judge NIA, Act, - seeking quashing of
cognizance order as well as entire proceedings - FIR - offences u/s 121-A, 153-A, 295-A IPC - investigated -
charge-sheet - cognizance taken, trial initiated - applicant pleaded NIA Act inapplicable as neither
investigation nor prosecution by NIA, relying on Bahadur Kora, Bikramjit Singh, Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai -
AGA objected citing Sallahuddin, Ravindra Kumar, Sumit Kumar that remedy lies in appeal u/s 21 NIA Act -
Court finds that, offence u/s 121-A IPC is Scheduled Offence, order passed by Special Judge NIA, hence
appeal lies u/s 21(1), Section 482 petition not maintainable - State retains power to investigate Scheduled
Offences till NIA takes over, but once Special Court NIA passes order, statutory appeal is remedy - held,
application u/s 482 is not maintainable since an appeal would be lie under section 21(1) of the NIA Act, 2008
- hence application is rejected with liberty to the applicant to file appeal u/s 21 NIA Act.
Application Rejected. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Bahadur Kora v. State of Bihar (FB, Patna HC, 2015 Cri LJ 2134)
Jagdish Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2016 (4) RLW 3464 (Raj.)
Uttam Shukla v. State of U.P., Bail No. 7249/2018 (decided 26.02.2019)
Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab (2020) 10 SCC 616
Jaffar Sahiq v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2593
Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai v. State of Maharashtra (Bom HC, 2018; affirmed SC, 2022 6 SCC 308)
Bappan @ Arsad Miah v. ATS U.P., Bail Application No. 4506/2022 (decided 31.05.2023)
ATS U.P. v. Bappan @ Arsad Miah; SLP (Crl.) Nos. 600/2024 & 14129/2023
Sallahuddin v. State of U.P. (2022 SCC OnLine All 660)
Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P. (2025 SCC OnLine All 6055)
Sumit Kumar v. State of U.P. (2024 SCC OnLine All 3146)
Ashok Mutu Bharat v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 495

LIST OF ACTS
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - National Investigation Agency Act, - SC/ST
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

LIST OF KEYWORDS
Maintainability - Section 482 CrPC - Section 528 BNSS - NIA Act - Scheduled Offence - Discharge application
- Appeal under Section 21 - Jurisdiction of Special Court - State Police investigation - Saving clause Section
10.

CASE ARISING FROM
Sessions Case No. 2414 of 2023, State v. Mohd. Faizan and others, arising out of Case Crime No. 342 of 2022,
P.S. Bakshi Ka Talab, Lucknow.

APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
Counsel for Applicants: Sri Aftab Ahmad, Harsh Vardhan Kediya, Sheeran Mohiuddin Alavi
Counsel for Opposite Parties: Sri Shiv Nath Tilhari, AGA

(Delivered by Hon'ble Brij Raj Singh, J.)
1002 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

1. The present application has been filed seeking setting aside the order dated 01.07.2025
passed by the Special Judge NIA/Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.3, Lucknow in Sessions
Case No.2414 of 2023, State Vs. Mohd. Faizan and others, arising out of Case Crime No.342 of
2022, under Sections 121-A, 153-A and 295-A IPC, Police Station Bakshi Ka Talab, District
Lucknow and the cognizance order dated 22.12.2022 passed by the Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate-V, Lucknow with a further prayer to quash the entire proceedings of the aforesaid case.

2. At the very outset, Sri Shiv Nath Tilhari, learned AGA has raised a preliminary
objection that application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable against the order of refusal
to discharge in view of Section 21(1) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (for short
?the NIA Act, 2008?), which provides that an appeal shall lie from any judgement, sentence or
order not being an interlocutory order of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and on
law. In support of his contention, learned AGA has placed reliance upon the following
judgements:-

 1. Sallahuddin Vs. State of U.P. and others, (2022) SCC OnLine All 660;

 2. Sumit Kumar and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, (2024) SCC OnLine All 3146;
and

 3. Ravindra Kumar Vs. State of U.P., (2025) SCC OnLine All 6055.

3. On the other hand, Sri Aftab Ahmad, counsel for the applicant has submitted that this
Court has inherent power to entertain the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS and the
rejection of discharge application can be heard and decided by this Court. He has tried to convince
the Court that since the NIA Act, 2008 is not applicable to the applicant, it may be inferred that he
was charge-sheeted by the State of U.P. and the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS
would lie.

4. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the NIA Act, 2008 was enacted with
a view to make provisions for establishment of a National Investigation Agency with provisions for
taking up specific cases under specific Acts for investigation, through Agency and further
provisions setting up of Special Courts and for other related matters. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the NIA Act, 2008 read as under:-

 "An Act to constitute an investigation agency at the national level to investigate and
prosecute offences affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India, security of State,
friendly relations with foreign States and offences under Acts enacted to implement international
treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions of the United Nations, its agencies and other
international organisations and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."

5. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the NIA Act, 2008 was amended in
the year 2019 by way of the NIA (Amendment) Act, 2019, which also contained Statement of
Objects and Reasons, the relevant portion of which is as follows:-
3 All. Mohd. Faizan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1003
 1. The National Investigation Agency Act. 2008 (the Act) was enacted with a view to
constitute an investigation agency at the national level to investigate and prosecute offences
affecting the sovereignty, security and integrity of India, security of State, friendly relations with
foreign States and offences under Acts enacted to implement international treaties, agreements,
conventions and resolutions of the United Nations, its agencies and other international
organisations.

 2. In order to facilitate the speedy Investigation and prosecution of Scheduled Offences,
including those committed outside India against the Indian citizens or affecting the interest of India
and to insert certain new offences in the Schedule to the Act as Scheduled Offences which adversely
affect the national security, it has become necessary to amend certain provisions of the Act."

6. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that a perusal of the said Statement of
Objects and Reasons of both, the NIA Act, 2008 as well as the 2019 Amending Act, shows the
clear intent of the Legislature in enacting the NIA Act, 2008, inasmuch twin conditions of
investigation and prosecution of offences mentioned in the Schedule of the NIA Act, 2008 have
been envisaged. It would thus follow that the Scheduled Offences of the NIA Act, 2008 would have
to be investigated and consequently prosecuted by the NIA, meaning thereby, that such offences
which have not been investigated by the NIA, cannot subsequently be prosecuted by it, even though
such offences may be mentioned in the Schedule to the NIA Act, 2008. However, in the instant
case, the alleged offences under Sections 121A, 153A and 295A IPC have been investigated by the
UP Police and the NIA had no role to play in the investigation of the said offences. It is submitted
that the present case is not even being prosecuted by the NIA inasmuch as the impugned order
dated 01.07.2025 itself records that the prosecution is being conducted by State of UP. It is
submitted that neither of the twin conditions of investigation or prosecution by the NIA are met in
the instant case, therefore, the trial of the present case before the Special Court NIA, Lucknow, is
entirely misplaced and without jurisdiction, and as such it ought to be conducted before the regular
court dealing with the offences in question.

7. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that Chapter-III of the NIA Act, 2008
provides for "Investigation by the National Investigation Agency" The provisions of Section 6
under Chapter-III of the NIA Act, 2008 provide that upon receipt of information and recording
thereof relating to any Scheduled Offence, the police shall forward a report to the State
Government, which, upon receipt of the said report, shall forward it to the Central Government.
Upon receipt of such report, the Central Government shall make a determination as to whether the
offence is a Scheduled Offence or not and also whether, having regard to the gravity of the offence
and other relevant factors, it is a fit case to be investigated by the NIA, and if the Central
Government is satisfied on both the aforementioned counts, it shall direct to the NIA to investigate
the said offence. Section 6 (5) also empowers the Central Government to suo motu direct the NIA
to investigate any such offence which, in its opinion, is a Scheduled Offence and is required to be
investigated by the NIA. It can thus be seen that Section 6 of the NIA Act, 2008 mandates the
formation of a specific opinion by application of mind by the Central Government that an offence,
even though it may be a Scheduled Offence under the NIA Act, 2008, is a fit case for investigation
by the NIA.
1004 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
8. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that Section 7 of the NIA Act, 2008,
specifically section 7(b) empowers the NIA to transfer the investigation to the State Government,
but only after the process under Section 6 has been done and the investigation has been entrusted to
it by the Central Government, that too only with the prior approval of the Central Government. The
NIA Act, 2008 thus provides for two methods for investigation of Scheduled Offences under the
Act, (i) Investigation by the NIA under Section 6 and (n) Investigation by the State Government
under Section 7(b). Apart from these two methods of investigation, if provisions of Sections 6 and
7 are not applied and investigation is not entrusted to Agency, the regular investigation and
prosecution is to continue, which has been provided under Section 10 to avoid stagnation of
investigation and prosecution.

9. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the NIA Act, 2008 shall thus apply
only when investigation of the Scheduled Offence has been conducted in pursuance of either
Section 6 or Section 7 of the Act. There is no other method of investigation provided under the Act
and without the investigation being entrusted to NIA and conducted under either Section 6 or
Section 7, there cannot be applicability of the NIA Act, 2008 since the same is a sine qua non for
the NIA Act to apply This fact is further supported by the provisions of Section 10 which starts
with saving clause', 'save as otherwise provided in the Act', saving the provisions/ action under
Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, the powers of the State Government to investigate and prosecute any
Scheduled Offence or other offences under any law for the time being in force remains unaffected.
It thus follows that if the investigation is not conducted under Section 6 or 7 of the NIA Act, the
State Government shall conduct a regular investigation and prosecution (under the Cr.P.C/BNSS)
and such cases would naturally be tried before the regular court of jurisdiction and not before the
special court under the NIA Act, since the NIA Act, 2008 would not be applicable in such cases
which position is also evident from the fact that Section 10 saves the power of the State
Government to investigate and prosecute all offences under any law for the time being in force and
not only the Scheduled Offences under the NIA Act as "gravity of the offences" has been made the
basis for consideration by the Central Government under Section 6(4) to entrust any investigation
to NIA.

10. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the NIA Act, 2008 also provides
for constitution of Special Court, by the Central Government under section 11 of the Act and by the
State Government under section 22 of the Act. Section 22(4) provides for the transfer of cases
being investigated by the State Government under the provisions of the Act, on designation of
special court. It is submitted that Section 13 of the NIA Act further provides for the trial of
scheduled offences investigated by the Agency, which re-establishes that the Special Courts would
have jurisdiction over trial of scheduled offences only when the same are investigated by the
'Agency', as envisaged in the Act.

11. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that the Patna High Court, while
answering a reference, in the case of Bahadur Kora Vs. State of Bihar (FB), 2015 Cri.LJ 2134,
affirmed the scheme of NIA Act, 2008 holding that in case the investigation is not conducted under
Section 6 or 7 of the NIA Act, 2008, such cases would not be tried before the Special Court under
the NIA Act.
3 All. Mohd. Faizan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1005
12. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that in the case of Bikramjit Singh Vs.
State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616, Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope and
jurisdiction of the NIA Court with regard to Scheduled Offences, drew a new category of offences
which are not investigated by the NIA, but their trial being conferred upon such Special Court
under the NIA Act, 2008 by virtue of the definition of the Court itself viz. Section 2(d) of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred as UAPA), that irrespective of the
investigation agency trial is to be conducted by the Special Court under the NIA Act. The aforesaid
decision was passed without considering the dictum in the case of Bahadur Kora (supra), but the
law laid down therein except UAPA remained undisputed.

13. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that judgement of the Bombay High
Court rendered in the case of Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2018) SCC
OnLine Bom 2122 3081 was challenged before the Hon?ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble
Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by the Bombay High Court leaving no room for doubt in
the case of Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2022) 6 SCC 308. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court while affirming the said judgment, considered the law laid down in the case of
Bikramjit Singh (supra).

14. Counsel for the applicant has further submitted that with respect to the non-obstante
clause occurring in Section 13 of the NIA Act, 2008, it is submitted that it overrides only the
provisions of the Code (CrPC/ BNSS) but not the provisions of the NIA Act, 2008 rather the
scheme of the Act with respect to Section 6 and 7 of NIA Act, 2008 remains intact. It is to say that
unless the investigation of any scheduled offence is entrusted under Section 6 or Section 7 of the
NIA Act, 2008 to the National Investigation Agency or to the State Agency, the provisions of
Section 13 the NIA Act, 2008 will not apply and for such cases, Section 10 of the NIA Act, 2008
comes into play. Therefore, it is fallacious to assume that the trial of every scheduled offence has to
be tried by the Special Court designated under Section 11 or 22 of the NIA Act, 2008. The twin
conditions of offence being a Scheduled Offence, and investigated by the Agency are two separate
and mandatory preconditions, which can't be done away with, in order to make it triable by the
Special Court. It is further submitted that Section 10 of the NIA Act, 2008 vide its saving clause,
saves the provisions of Section 6 and 7 of the NIA Act, 2008 and comes to the rescue in cases
wherein the investigation is not found to be fit by the Central Government to be entrusted to the
NIA or to the State Agency by the NIA, and in such cases legislature in its wisdom, so as to avoid
the vacuum or stagnation in the process of investigation and prosecution has left it open for the
State Government investigate and prosecute cases of scheduled offences. It is further established
from bare perusal of section 6(3) and 6(4) of the NIA Act, which confers discretion upon the
Central Government to decide in each and every cast, whether it is a fir case to be investigated by
the Agency, depending upon the nature and gravity of the offence Thus, merely an offence being in
schedule of the Act, doesn't confer that the same shall mandatorily be investigated and prosecuted
under the scheme of the NIA Act, 2008.

15. In sum and substance, the submission of counsel for the applicant is that the provisions
of NIA Act, 2008 will not extend to the present case, inasmuch as after registration of the FIR
dated 27.09.2022, admittedly no report as contemplated under Section 6(1) NIA Act, 2008 was
forwarded to the State Government. Consequently, the NIA was neither entrusted with the
1006 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
investigation of the instant case under Section 6(4) of the NIA Act, 2008 nor the investigation of
the instant case was transferred to the State Government under Section 7 of the NIA Act, 2008.
After investigation, the charge-sheet dated 19.12.2022 in the case was filed before the Magistrate,
whereupon the cognizance was taken on 22.12.2022. Thereafter, the applicants have been granted
bail by this Court exercising powers under Section 439 Cr.P.C. vide orders dated 25.07.2024
passed in Criminal Misc. Bail Application Nos.2886 of 2023, 3070 of 2023 and 3071 of 2023,
wherein also no objection regarding the maintainability was raised. In support of his contention,
counsel for the applicant reliance upon the following judgements:-

1. Bahadur Kora and others Vs. State of Bihar (supra);

 2. Jagdish Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2016 (4) RLW 3464 (Raj.);

 3. Bail No.7249 of 2018, Uttam Shukla Vs. State of U.P. decided on 26.02.2019;

 4. Bikramjeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab (supra)

 5. Jaffar Sahiq Vs. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2593;

 6. Naser Bin Abu Bakr Yafai Vs. State of Maharashtra, (supra);

 7. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.4506 of 2022, Bappan @ Arsad Miah Vs. A.T.S.,
U.P., Lucknow decided on 31.05.2023;

 8. A.T.S. U.P. Vs. Bappan @ Arsad Miah and Bappan @ Arsad Miah Vs. A.T.S., U.P.
SLP (Crl.) No.600 of 2024 and SLP (Crl.) No.14129 of 2023;

9. Salahuddin Vs. State of U.P. (supra)

10. Ashok Mutu Bharat Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 SCC OnLine Chh. 495.

16. Sri Shiv Nath Tilhari, learned AGA while rebutting the submissions made by the
counsel for the applicant has submitted that the impugned order dated 01.07.2025, which is a
refusal order to discharge the applicant by the NIA Court, therefore, the question of maintainability
is to be seen on the given facts that the case has been decided by the NIA Court. He has further
submitted that this Court has considered the aspect of the maintainability of application under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. in many cases. For the sake of convenience, Section 21(1) of the Act, 2008 is
quoted below:-

 "21. Appeals.

 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any
judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court
both on facts and on law."
3 All. Mohd. Faizan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1007
17. Learned AGA has further submitted that in the case of Sallahuddin (supra), the
rejection of the application for seeking default bail under the NIA Act was challenged in an
application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and this Court passed an order that application under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable against the rejection of bail application. The relevant portion of the
judgement passed in the aforesaid case is quoted below:-

 " 23. In view of the above, this matter may be viewed from another perspective also. The
impugned order rejecting the application seeking default bail was passed on 27.04.2022 by the
learned Additional District & Sessions Judge-3/ Special Judge NIA/ATS, Lucknow. This Special
Court was constituted under Section 22 of N.I.A. Act and as such the impugned order dated
27.04.2022 passed by the special court is appealable under Section 21(4) of N.I.A. Act which, for
ready reference, is quoted herein below:-

 "21 Appeals. -

 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, an appeal shall lie from any
judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the High Court
both on facts and on law.

 (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the
High Court and shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within a period of three months from the
date of admission of the appeal.

 (3) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment,
sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court.

 (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of section 378 of the Code, an
appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail.

 (5) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from
the date of the judgment, sentence or order appealed from: Provided that the High Court may
entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the
appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days:
Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of period of ninety days."

 24. Thus, on the basis of aforesaid, it can safely be said that rejection of application
seeking default bail by Special Court vide order dated 27.04.2022 is an appealable order in view of
the provisions contained in Section 21(4) N.I.A. Act.

 25. In this view of matter also, this Court does not find the instant application to be
maintainable."

18. Learned AGA has further submitted that similar question was also raised in the case of
Ravindra Kumar (supra), in which sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, 2008 has been
considered, wherein it is provided that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the
1008 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Special Court granting or refusing bail. The term ?interlocutory order? has also been considered in
the said judgement of Ravindra Kumar (supra). The relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid
judgement are quoted below:-

 "12. The provision of statutory bail under Section 187(3) BNSS/167(2) Cr.P.C. is
whether an interlocutory order or a final order. The test which could be applied, for an order,
being interlocutory, intermediary or final, can be summarized in two folds; firstly that any such
order, which substantially affects the right of the accused or parties, cannot be termed as an
interlocutory order and secondly, any right, which accrue out of some statutory provisions, is also
not an interlocutory order. Time and again, this issue has exhaustively been dealt with by the Apex
Court starting from a three Judge Bench decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Madhu
Limaye Vs. the State of Maharashtra, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 551 wherein the ratio drawn in the
case of Amar Nath and others Vs. State of Haryana and another, reported in (1977) 4 SCC 137 has
partly been affirmed, holding that the term 'interlocutory order' as is used in Section 397 of the
Cr.P.C. does not invariably mean the converse of the term of 'final order' and certain guidelines
were provided to examine that a particular order is not an 'interlocutory order'.

 13. Subsequently, the Apex Court in the case of V.C. Shukla Vs. State reported in 1980
Supp SCC 92, considering the ratio drawn in Amar Nath (supra) and Madhu Limaye (supra), has
held that the intermediate, quasi final and final orders are revisable. In this view, the provision of
statutory bail under Section 187(3) of BNSS is an intermediary order and the same is revisable,
subject to any other provision provided in a special Act.

 14. Coming to the crux of the issue of maintainability, it is apparent from the provision of
Section 21(4) of the Act 2008 that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the
Special Court granting or refusing bail, notwithstanding contained in Sub Section (3) of Section
378 of the Cr.P.C. This provision is overt in its mandate and while applying this provision in the
present case, it is apparent that this does not speak regarding any difference of any kind of refusing
or granting bail, meaning thereby that if the Special Court (NIA) grants or refuses the bail, the
same is amenable to the provisions of the appeal, prescribed under Section 21 of the Act 2008 and,
therefore, in presence of the obvious provisions, no otherwise definition can be given against the
intent of the legislature. This Court is also aware of the trite law that a thing should be done in the
manner prescribed under the statute, not otherwise. Admittedly, vide order dated 7.7.2025, the
learned Special Judge (NIA) has rejected the default bail application of the applicant. Thus,
against such order the remedy of appeal is provided under the Special Act, i.e., Act 2008.

 15. Further this Court also noticed that the law referred by counsel for the applicant,
which is rendered in case of Harendra Vs. State of U.P. and another (supra), is on different factual
matrix and this will not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case as the dispute in
question in the above-said case was regarding completion of ninety days as the charge sheet was
dispatched on the same day when the application for default bail was moved, therefore, this will
not cover the field of the issue in the instant matter.
3 All. Mohd. Faizan & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1009
16. Ergo, this Court is of the considered opinion that the instant application challenging
the order dated 7.7.2025 passed by the Special Court (NIA) is not maintainable, thus, preliminary
objection taken by counsel for the State; sustains"

19. Learned AGA has further submitted that the offence under Section 121-A IPC falls
under the category of Schedule Offence under VIII-A of the Schedule under the Act, 2008. The
NIA Court deal with the Act, 2008, has issued summons and thereafter the applicants appeared and
filed discharge application, which has been rejected. Section 21(1) of the Act, 2008 clearly
indicates that an appeal shall lie from any judgement, sentence or order not being an interlocutory
order of a Special Court to the High Court both on facts and law.

20. Learned AGA has further submitted that in the case of Sumit Kumar and others
(supra), the summoning order as well as the charge sheet filed under the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989 (for short ?SC/ST Act?) was challenged and
this Court passed a detailed order by observing that application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by
the applicants seeking quashing of the summoning order, charge sheet and the entire proceedings of
the case under Sections 323, 504, 506 and 241 IPC and Section 3(1)(Da)(Dha) of SC/ST Act is not
maintainable and the same was dismissed leaving it open to the applicants to avail statutory remedy
under Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act. For ready reference, Section 14-A of the SC/ST Act is
quoted below?-

 "14-A. Appeals. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie, from any judgment, sentence or order, not being an
interlocutory order, of a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court both on
facts and on law.

 (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974), an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the
Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court granting or refusing bail.

 (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,
every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of ninety days from the date of
the judgment, sentence or order appealed from:

 Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period
of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within the period of ninety days:

 Provided further that no appeal shall be entertained after the expiry of the period of one
hundred and eighty days.

 (4) Every appeal preferred under sub-section (1) shall, as far as possible, be disposed of
within a period of three months from the date of admission of the appeal."

21. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
1010 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
22. The offence under Section 121-A IPC falls under the category of the Scheduled offence
as specified in the Scheduled given in the NIA Act, 2008. The provisions of NIA Act, 2008 would
be applicable in both cases either investigated by NIA or State Agency. For applicability of the Act,
the requirement is that the offence should come in the category of scheduled offence. Section
2(1)(g) of the NIA Act, 2008 defines "Scheduled Offence" according to which an offence is
specified in the schedule. The NIA Act, 2008 provides that the "Scheduled Offences" shall be
investigated by the Agency. The meaning of "Agency" is defined in Section 2(a) of the NIA Act,
2008. According to Section 2(a) of the NIA Act, 2008, ?Agency? means the National Investigation
Agency. However, according to Section 22 sub-section (2), clause 2 "Agency" means the
"Investigating Agency of the State Government".

23. Section 6 of the NIA Act, 2008 provides that on receipt of information under Section
154 of the Code relating to any scheduled offence, the Officer In-charge of the Police Station shall
forward the report to the State Government forthwith. On receipt of the report under sub-section
(1), the State Government shall forward the report to the Central Government as expeditiously as
possible. On receipt of the report from State Government, the Central Government shall determine
on the basis of the information made available by the State Government or received from other
sources, within 15 days from the date of receipt of the report, whether the offence is a scheduled
offence or not and also whether having regard to the gravity of the offence and other relevant
factors, it is a fit case to be investigated by the agency. Where the Central Government is of the
opinion that the offence is a scheduled offence and it is a fit case to be investigated by the agency,
it shall direct the agency to investigate the said offence.

24. Sub-section (7) of Section 6 of the NIA Act, 2008 provides that for removal of doubts,
it is hereby declared that till the Agency take up the investigation of the case, it shall be the duty of
the officer in-charge of the police station to continue the investigation. Further, Section 10 of the
NIA Act, 2008 describes the power of the State Government to investigate the Scheduled Offences,
which says that, save as otherwise provided in this Act, nothing contained in this Act shall affect
the powers of the State Government to investigate and prosecute any Scheduled Offence or other
offences under any law for the time being in force. It is relevant to be noted here that reading of
Section 10 of the Act, 2008 clearly reveals that the State Government has independent power to
investigate the Scheduled Offence.

25. Since the order has been passed by the Special Judge, NIA Act, therefore, an appeal
would lie under Section 21(1) of the Act, 2008, hence the argument of counsel for the applicant that
the NIA Act, 2008 is not applicable in the present case, is not sustainable. The applicability of the
NIA Act, 2008 to the applicants can be seen only when the application under Section 482
Cr.P.C./528 BNSS is maintainable. Since the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C./528 BNSS is
not maintainable against the summoning order and refusal order of discharge, this Court would not
dwell upon the submission made by the counsel for the applicant that the Act, 2008 is not
applicable.

26. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the application is rejected as not maintainable
leaving it open to the applicant to seek remedy under Section 21(1) of the Act, 2008.
----------
3 All. Govind Uttamachandani Director Syska Led Lights Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1011
(2026) 3 ILRA 1011
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 17.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE BRIJ RAJ SINGH, J.

Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 963 of 2026
longwith
Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 969 of 2026
alongwith
Application U/S 528 BNSS. No. 970 of 2026

Govind Uttamchandani Director Syska Led Lights Pvt. Ltd. ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr. ...Opposite Parties

ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION
Whether successive applications under Section 528 BNSS, 2023 seeking quashing of impugned complaint
proceedings are maintainable when earlier relief was confined to setting aside coercive orders and applicant
had undertaken to face trial?

HEADNOTES
Criminal Law - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - section - 84, 528, - Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 - section - 138, 142 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - section 82: -
Multiple Applications u/s 528 BNSS - for seeking quashing of entire proceedings and summoning orders
- preliminary objection regarding subsequent applications for the same cause of action is not maintainable -
in earlier application court had already set aside the NBW and Sec. 82 Cr.P.C. orders with applicant's
undertaking to face trial - Successive petitions under Sec. 528 BNSS/482 Cr.P.C. - Scope of inherent powers of
High Court - Quashing of impugned NI Act complaint proceedings - effect of prior undertaking to face trial -
Abuse of process of court - applicant pleaded that subsequent challenge was permissible under inherent
powers - opposite parties objected citing bar on successive petitions - Court finds that all pleas were available
earlier, no changed circumstance, and applicant cannot resile from his own statement - held - successive
petitions amount to abuse of process and as such second application for the same cause of action is not
maintainable - consequently, all the three applications are rejected being not maintainable and interim order
vacated.
Applications Dismissed. (E-11)

CASE LAW CITED
Bhisham Lal Verma v. State of U.P. (2024) 15 SCC 282
M.C. Ravikumar v. D.S. Velmurugan 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1498
S. Madan Kumar v. K. Arjunana 2006 (1) MWN (Cr.) 1 (DCC)
Anil Khadkiwala v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 17 SCC 294
Kamal Agarwal v. State of U.P. 2025 SCC OnLine All 7847
Vinod Kumar, IAS v. Union of India 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559
Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Mohan Singh (1975) 3 SCC 706

LIST OF ACTS
Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.