# Mohd. Idris & another v. State of U.P. & others

- **Citation:** (1999) 3 ILRA 90
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 1999
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohd-idris-another-v-state-of-u-p-others-39417
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

90 THE INDIAN LAW REPORTS [1999
maintainability of writ petition at the behest of the petitioners cannot
be sustained.

5.
On merits we find that the selection of the fifth respondent
was approved by the authorities under the U.P. Intermediate
Education Act, 1921 U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 U.P.
Intermediate Education Act,1921 and challenge to the appointment
was made by the petitioner four years after his selection and
appointment. The Challenge, it may be observed, was based on the
ground that the fifth respondent was found using unfair means at the
intermediate examination and he was debarred from appearing in the
subsequent examination. The learned counsel submitted that the said
conduct of the fifth respondent would show that the he was
undesirable and unsuitable for the post of principal which is a post
of pivotal importance in the life of an institution. Reliance has been
placed on a decision of Supreme Court in Daya Shanker Pandey
versus The High Court of Allahabad and others, AIR 1987 SC 1469.
In our considered view the decision therein has no application to the
facts of the present case. The appellant therein was appointed as a
judicial officer and thereafter, with the permission of the court, he
appeared in L.L.M. Examination at Aligarh University where he was
found using unfair means. This conduct of the judicial officer led to
his removal from service. In the instant case the offending conduct
of the fifth respondent was not after he was selected for the post of
principal. Therefore, the decision aforesaid is of no avail to the
appellants.

In the result, therefore, the appeal is dismissed. The parties
shall bear their own cost.

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1999
------
Mohd. Idris &
another
 Vs.
State of U.P. &
others
------
N.K. Mitra . C.J.
S.R. Singh, J.
1999
------
July, 29
3 All.] ALLAHABAD SERIES
91

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Case Law Discussed.
1998 (5) SCC.170
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By the Court

1.
Those who are under liability to pay lacs and lacs of rupees as
dues, may be electricity dues or otherwise, try to find out some way
to thwart the recovery proceedings. Provisions of law and agreement,
therefore, have to be pointedly looked into find out whether the
objections are genuine or only an effort to by-pass the lawful dues.

2.
Harshvardhan Mittal, Shiv Kumar ,Bramh Singh and Som Pal
Singh are the four petitioners challenging the recovery certificates
dated 4.3.99 and 1.4.99 for Rs. 14,12,778/- and Rs. 32,04,144
respectively, Annexures- 7 and 8 to the writ petition) . At the outset
it may be stated that two recovery certificates have not named the
petitioners Shiv Kumar Singh, Bramh Singh and Som Pal Singh but
it indicates the recovery proceedings only as against the petitioner,
no. 1, Harshvardhan Mittal, the objection of the learned counsel for
the respondent that the impleadment of petitioner nos. 2,3, and 4 may
be only a legal step to thwart some future proceedings may not be
1999
------
H. Mittal
 Vs.
U.P.S.E.B.
through its
Chairman,
Lucknow &
others
------
Palok Basu, J.
R. K. Agarwal, J.
92 THE INDIAN LAW REPORTS [1999
out of place. However, no final verdict on this issue is necessary for
determining the point raised on behalf of Harshvardhan Mittal.

3.
Sri Ravi Kiran Jain, Senior Advocate for the petitioners
assisted by Sri Pramod Kumar Jain has been heard in this matter at
substantial length and the entire writ petition has been thoroughly
scrutinised. Sri Jain placed reliance on certain provisions contained
in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, U.P. Government Electrical
undertakings (Dues Recovery) Act, 1958 and also on a decision of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.K. Bhargava Vs. Collector, Chandigarh
and others, reported in 1998(5) SCC., 170.

Sri Sudhir Agrawal has appeared on behalf of the U.P. State
Electricity Board and Sri S.C. Rai, Addl. Chief Standing Counsel
appearing for the opposite parties No.s 3 and 4, i.e. Tehsil and
Collector, Muzaffargangar who are the recovering revenue officials
have been heard. It may be pointed out that the admitted position as
emerging from the writ petition indicates that there was an
agreement dated 23rd December, 95 a copy of which has been filed
by the petitioners as Annexure-2 to the writ petition . The first page
of the Annexure indicates that the parties to the agreement are
classified into two parts. The first part describes the "Supplier"
which has been noted therein as U.P. State Electricity Board and the
other part describes the "Consumer".In this column of consumer the
name of Sri Harshvardhan Mittal, son of Sri S.S. Mittal, permanent
resident of E.45 and E.50 Jashodharpur has been mentioned followed
by the name, M/s Vaibhay Steel Pvt. Ltd. Mjashodharpur described
as a company registered under the Companies Act through its
Director Harshvardhan, S/o Sri S.S. Mittal, permanent resident of
E.45 and E.50 Jsashodharpur (Kotdwar). The words partnership
concern/ Partnership concern have not been cut out but since copy
as filed indicates the name of the petitioner as Director, the other two
description shall be deemed to have been irrelevant for the purposes
of this agreement which has been acted upon by the parties.

4.
There are several provisions in the agreement detailed in
paragraphs 1 to 20. In the end where the execution column is printed,
the signature of the petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal exists showing as
Director, for and on behalf of the consumer M/s. Vaibhav steel Pvt.
Ltd. It has been further mentioned in the writ petition that the
petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal has resigned from the Directorship on
1.3.97 (vide agreement in para-12 of the writ petition). It has been
mentioned therein that intimation to all concerned departments have
1999
------
H. Mittal
 Vs.
U.P.S.E.B.
through its
Chairman,
Lucknow &
others
------
Palok Basu, J.
R. K. Agarwal, J.
3 All.] ALLAHABAD SERIES
93
been given and the name of U.P. State Electricity Board is
mentioned. In para-13 it is written that copy of the letter of
information addressed to the U.P. State Electricity Board was filed as
Annexure-3 to the writ petition. It may be pointed out that the letter
Annexure-3 does not bear any date nor the annexure indicates as to
whom it is addressed to. However, assuming that it was sent to the
U.P. State Electricity Board and that it was conveyed that all the four
petitioners have resigned on different dates i.e. Shiv Kumar Singh
and Bramh Singh on 23.11.96 and Sompal Singh and the petitioner
Harshvardhan on 1.3.97 . Neither the existing agreement was
cancelled, nor new connection was taken.

5.
On the strength of the material noted above reliance was
placed on the definitions of "consumer" in the aforesaid two Acts
and Sri Jain argued that the petitioners cannot be taken to be
personally liable for the electricity charges payable for the
factory/company. The definitions are quoted below for ready
reference:

"In the Indian Electricity Act.1910:

Definition:

 "Consumer" means any person who is supplied with energy by a
licensee or the Government or by any other person engaged in the
business of supplying energy to the public under this Act or any
other law for the time being in force, and includes any person whose
premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of
receiving energy with the works of a licensee, the Government or
such other person, as the case may be.

In the U.P. Government Electrical Undertakings(Dues Recovery)
Act,1958:-

"Consumer:" means any person who is supplied with the energy by a
Government electrical undertaking, whether for his own
consumption or in connection with his business of supplying energy
or otherwise."

6.
Simultaneously Sri Jain canvassed strongly that the decision
of the Apex Court in S.K. Bhargava (Supra) had gone into the
question of applicability of principles of natural justice at the time of
recovery process under the Haryana Public Moneys( Recovery of
1999
------
H. Mittal
 Vs.
U.P.S.E.B.
through its
Chairman,
Lucknow &
others
------
Palok Basu, J.
R. K. Agarwal, J.
94 THE INDIAN LAW REPORTS [1999
Dues )Act, 1979 and held that since the petitioner in that case
namely, S.K. Bhargava should have been afforded an opportunity,
the petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal or for that matter the other
petitioners should have been heard by the officials concerned who
directed issuance of the two recovery for Rs. 14,12,778/= and
Rs.32,09,144 respectively, certificates and their representation
should have been decided because no notice of demand was served
upon the petitioners.

7.
In reply it was contended that in the representation which was
said to have been made by the petitioners, copy of which has been
filed as Annexure-9 to the writ petition, there is not even a whisper
that no notice has or had been served on them. It was argued that in
fact, it virtually admits the service of notice because only thereupon
they could make the representation. Such being the position, the very
factual basis of the argument of Sri Jain is totally obliterated. The
petitioners obviously had notice of the demand against them where
after recovery certificates have been issued.

8.
As to the contention that all the petitioners having resigned
from the office of "Director", no individual liability could flow from
the agreement and thus the recovery certificates were wrongly
issued, it may be mentioned that recovery proceedings have been
started only against petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal, therefore, this
contention has to be examined only so far as he is concerned and no
other.

9.
Coming to the question whether the petitioner Harshvardhan
against whom the recovery proceedings have been initiated can be
proceeded against or not, the argument of Sri Jain suffers from two
fallacies. Firstly, the agreement itself says that the petitioner
Harshvardhan Mittal, with his parentage and address, is a consumer,
Once this is so, the petitioner is the consumer. Secondly , the
provisions contained in the Act, and the actual description of the
"Consumer" in the statutory agreement will have to be adhered to not
only for supplying electricity but also for realising the bills amounts
and arrears for consuming the electricity.

10.
Therefore, showing the name Vaibhav Steels Pvt. Ltd. ,
through Sri Harshvardhan, Mittal, as Director of the Company, in the
column of the 'Consumer' does not in any way absolve him from
being the "Consumer" within the meaning of the said agreement. If
the "Company through its director" alone was to be the consumer,
1999
------
H. Mittal
 Vs.
U.P.S.E.B.
through its
Chairman,
Lucknow &
others
------
Palok Basu, J.
R. K. Agarwal, J.
3 All.] ALLAHABAD SERIES
95
that alone should have been written at the relevant column The
name of the petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal has been specifically
shown as an individual, in his individual capacity, as has been noted
above. Thus there is no escape for Harshvardhan Mittal from this
statutory agreement and liability arising therefore.

It may further be pointed out that Sri Sudhir Agarwal has
placed reliance on paras-13 and 18 of the agreement in order to reply
to the argument of Sri Jain that petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal would
not be covered by the definition of the word 'consumer' as given in
the Recovery Act(Quoted above). Paras-13 and 18 read as under:-

(13) Any notice by the supplier to the consumer shall be deemed to
be duly given and served, delivered by had act, or sent by registered
post to the address specified in the consumer's application or as
subsequently notified to the supplier.

(18) That the consumer hereby further agrees to abide by the terms
and conditions as stipulated in the Electricity Supply (Consumers)
Regulations, 1984 formed under Section 79 of the Electricity
(Supply ) Act, 1948 and this agreement shall be subject to the
provisions of the same. Provided that in case of any inconsistency
between the terms of this covenant shall prevail."

11.
It has thus been provided in Para-18 that the term and
conditions of the agreement between the consumer and the supplier
will prevail over certain other covenants. Therefore, the petitioner
Harshvardhan is bound by the terms of the state agreement.

12.
Sri Jain has also argued that since the new Directors have been
inducted in the meantime, the Company can be proceeded with and
the recovery proceedings if necessary can be taken against the
company and its property and also the newly inducted Director.

13.
Sri Sudhir Agarwal on the other hand rightly argued that the
petitioner Harshvardhan is a consumer and his liability emanates
from the agreement itself and it has not been disputed that arrears of
the electricity charges can be realized as arrears of land revenue vide
Section-5 of the Recovery Act of 1958. He further rightly argued that
the petitioner's representation after having been served with the
notice of demand did not lie and the Board could proceed lawfully
even after the resignation of the petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal was
submitted.
1999
------
H. Mittal
 Vs.
U.P.S.E.B.
through its
Chairman,
Lucknow &
others
------
Palok Basu, J.
R. K. Agarwal, J.
96 THE INDIAN LAW REPORTS [1999

14.
In this view of the matter the recovery proceedings initiated
against the petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal has full sanction of law
and no illegality could be found therein. The decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in S.K. Bhargava(Supra) was not against a
"consumer" and in this case since the petitioner Harshvardhan Mittal
is the consumer, the ruling is not applicable at all on the facts of the
case and the restrictive provision are totally different

The writ petition fails and is hereby summarily dismissed.

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1999
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July, 12