# Mohd. Saleem v. State of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2022) 1 ILRA 1110
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-01-03
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 7780 of 2019
- **Bench:** Rohit Ranjan Agarwal
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohd-saleem-v-state-of-u-p-ors-48096
- **Pages:** 17

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950Article 226-challenge to-STAT order-the
State Transport Authority had deliberately
granted permits to the five petitioners,
though they were lower in merit and
having vehicles of lower model-grant of
permit was totally against the dictum of
Apex Court as the relevant date was the
date of consideration of the applications
and not the date on which it was made
before
the
authority-Moreover,
the
transport
authority
was
required
to
consider all the applications strictly on the
basis of comparative merit which has been
ignored and applications of the contesting
respondents had been overlooked and the
appeals
and
revisions
filed
by
the
contesting respondents were dismissed
solely on the ground of limitation-the act
or the rules does not bar any remedy to
the applicants whose applications are
refused or they can be non-suited on the
technical ground-the Act or the Rule
nowhere
puts
embargo
upon
the
entertainment of any appeal or revision
filed
with
any
delay-Hence,
no
interference required as the order passed
by the STA was in defiance to the
directions of the Court.(Para 1 to 49)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

_Characters 0–39,774 of 51,687. This is a partial read: ask again with offset=39774 for what follows._

1110 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Rule 12 of the G.P.F. Rules, 1985 is
declared to be ultra-vires and is set aside.

15. In view thereof, the impugned
order dated 13.11.2019 cannot stand and is
set aside.

16. Respondents are directed to
calculate and pay bonus to the petitioner as
per Rule 12(1) of G.P.F. Rules of 1985
along with permissible interest thereon
within a period of two months from today.
Respondents are also directed to decide the
claim of petitioner with regard to delayed
payment of interest on his dearness
allowances and provident fund account
within the aforesaid period of two months.

17. With the aforesaid, present writ
petition is allowed.
----------
(2022)01ILR A1110
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 03.01.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ROHIT RANJAN AGARWAL, J.

Writ-A No. 7780 of 2019
With Writ-A Nos. 9058 of 2019, 6340 of 2020 &
17224 of 2019

Mohd. Saleem ...Petitioner
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Shiv Ram Misra, Sri Shashi Nandan, Sr.
Advocate

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Greesh Kumar Malviya, Sri Shesh
Kumar, Sri G.K. Singh, Sr. Advocate

A. Civil Law - Constitution of India, 1950Article 226-challenge to-STAT order-the
State Transport Authority had deliberately
granted permits to the five petitioners,
though they were lower in merit and
having vehicles of lower model-grant of
permit was totally against the dictum of
Apex Court as the relevant date was the
date of consideration of the applications
and not the date on which it was made
before
the
authority-Moreover,
the
transport
authority
was
required
to
consider all the applications strictly on the
basis of comparative merit which has been
ignored and applications of the contesting
respondents had been overlooked and the
appeals
and
revisions
filed
by
the
contesting respondents were dismissed
solely on the ground of limitation-the act
or the rules does not bar any remedy to
the applicants whose applications are
refused or they can be non-suited on the
technical ground-the Act or the Rule
nowhere
puts
embargo
upon
the
entertainment of any appeal or revision
filed
with
any
delay-Hence,
no
interference required as the order passed
by the STA was in defiance to the
directions of the Court.(Para 1 to 49)

The writ petition is dismissed. (E-6)

List of Cases cited:
1. A.S. Jalaluddin Vs Balasubramania Bus
Services (P) Ltd.

2. MSRTC Vs Mangrulpir Jt. Motor Service(P)
Ltd. (1971) 2 SCC 222

3. Esskey Roadways (Firm) Vs Annadhakrishnan
Bus Service (1994) 6 SCC 71

4. Collector, Land Acqusition, Anantnag & anr.
Vs Mst. Katiji & ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107

5. Zila Bus Operators. Assn. & ors.. Vs St. of U.P
& ors., Writ-A No 9993 of 2018

6. Automotive Prarivahan Sahkari Samiti Ltd. &
anr. Vs State Transport Appellate Tribunal &
anr. (Misc. Single No . 6760 of 2019)

(Delivered by Hon'ble Rohit Ranjan
Agarwal, J.)
1 All. Mohd. Saleem Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1111

1. Heard Sri Shashi Nandan, Senior
Advocate, assisted by Sri Shiv Ram Misra,
learned counsel for the petitioner, learned
Standing Counsel for respondents No.1 to
3, Sri G.K.Singh, Senior Advocate, assisted
by Sri Greesh Kumar Malviya for private
respondent Nos.4 and 5 and Sri Shek
Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for
respondent No.6.

2. These are four connected writ
petitions which are in regard to the dispute
among the private bus operators for inter
state route known as Datia-Chatarpur-viaJhansi Naugaon. Writ petition nos. 7780 of
2019 and 9058 of 2019 have been filed
assailing the order dated 09.05.2019 passed
in Appeal No. 28 of 2015 by the State
Transport Appellate Tribunal, U.P. at
Lucknow (hereinafter referred as STAT),
while writ petition no. 6340 of 2020 assails
the order dated 27.02.2020 passed by the
STAT passed in Appeal No. 33 of 2015.
While in writ petition no. 17224 of 2019 a
civil misc. recall application has been filed
by one Tanveer Ahamad for recalling the
order dated 01.11.2019 passed by this
Court.

3. As the controversy raised in all four
connected writ petitions are similar, thus,
these petitions are heard together and
decided by a common order with the
consent of counsel for the parties.

4.

Facts
in
brief
for
better
appreciation of the controversy are herein
stated as under;

5. That within the jurisdiction of State
Transport Authority there is a route known
as
Datia-Chatarpur-via-Jhansi
Naugaon
route. Total length of the route is 158
kilometres out of which 87 kilometres lie
within the jurisdiction of State of U.P.,
while
71
kilometres
stretch
in
the
jurisdiction of State of M.P.

6. For providing transport facilities to
the public of inter state route a reciprocal
agreement was arrived between the State of
U.P. and State of M.P. on 21.11.2006 which
was published in the gazette. According to
the agreement, route at serial no. 86
provided for ten permits with twenty trips
to be allotted to the private bus operators of
State of U.P. Pursuant to which several
applications were filed for grant of permits
for the route by the petitioners as well as
the contesting respondents.

7. For the first time, on 17.03.2011
the applications came up for consideration
before the STA, and the authority rejected
all the applications on the ground that some
of the information in column of form no.
S.R. 20 was not filled by the applicants.
Against the decision of STA, appeals were
filed before the STAT and vide order dated
21.02.2013 all the appeals filed by the
different applicants were allowed and
matter was remitted to the STA for
reconsideration.

8. The order of STAT was subject
matter of challenge before this Court
through various writ petitions, being writ
petition nos. 13684 of 2013, 13686 of
2013, 13689 of 2013, 13687 of 2013 and
12157 of 2013, on the ground that power of
the STAT was co-extensive with that of
STA and it should have decided the matter
itself without remitting the matter to the
STA. On 5/12-3/2013 all the writ petitions
were allowed by this Court and matter was
remitted to the STAT who was required to
decide the same on merits. STAT on
10.05.2013 dismissed all the appeals.
1112 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Against the said decision several writ
petitions being writ petition nos. 29556 of
2013, 30406 of 2013, 30404 of 2013,
30396 of 2013 and 30401 of 2013, were
filed challenging the order of STAT.

9. This Court on 19.12.2014 allowed
all the writ petitions and remitted the matter
to the STA for reconsideration with specific
directions to consider the applications of
the
applicants
after
considering
the
comparative merit. The entire exercise was
to be concluded within six weeks from the
date of the judgment.

10. STA on 16.04.2015 granted five
permits to petitioners of writ petition no.
6340 of 2020. The said decision was
questioned by one Rauf Khan by filing writ
petition no. 28044 of 2015. This Court on
15.05.2015 dismissed the said writ petition
on the ground of alternative remedy and
required him to file an appeal against the
decision of STA.

11. Rauf Khan filed Appeal No. 28 of
2015 before the STAT. One Gulsher
Ahamad also filed an appeal and revision
on 01.06.2015 against the order of STA
dated 16.04.2015 before the STAT. The
appeal and revision of Gulsher Ahamad
was dismissed by the STAT on 10.04.2019
and 13.02.2019 on the ground of limitation,
as it was filed beyond the period of
limitation i.e. 30 days as the STA had taken
decision on 16.04.2016.

12. Appeal and revision filed by one
Garima Agarwal against the order of STA
was also dismissed by the STAT on
26.09.2018 on the ground of limitation.
However, appeal filed by Rauf Khan was
heard by the STAT, and was partly allowed
on 09.05.2019 granting permit to Rauf
Khan,
Gulsher Ahamad
and
Garima
Agarwal. Further, the permit granted earlier
to Mohd. Saleem, Mohd. Ayub and Tanveer
Ahamad was cancelled on the ground that
Rauf Khan, Gulsher Ahamad and Garima
Agarwal were higher in merit and their
vehicles were of later models. The order of
STAT was challenged in writ petition nos.
7780 of 2019 and 9058 of 2019 by Mohd.
Saleem and Mohd. Ayub, as far as the
permits granted to Gulsher Ahamad and
Garima Agarwal are concerned, on the
ground that the order dated 09.05.2019
failed to take note of the fact that appeals
and revisions filed by Gulsher Ahamad and
Garima Agarwal stood dismissed by the
earlier order of the STAT on the ground of
limitation and their case cannot be
considered.

13. Gulsher Ahamad filed writ
petition nos. 17224 of 2019 and 17222 of
2019 challenging the order passed by the
STAT dismissing his appeal and revision on
the ground of limitation dated 13.02.2019
and
10.04.2019.
On
01.11.2019
and
13.11.2019 this Court while allowing the
writ petition directed the STAT to decide
the appeal and revision on merit. In the said
writ petition counsel of Mohd. Saleem,
petitioner no. 1 in writ petition no. 6340 of
2020, had appeared, however, a recall
application has been filed in writ petition
no. 17224 of 2019 by one Tanveer Ahamad.

14. Acting on the remand order
passed by this Court, the appellate authority
on 27.02.2020 partly allowed the appeal of
Gulsher Ahamad and remitted the matter to
the STA for reconsideration on merits,
setting aside the earlier decision of STA
dated 16.04.2015. While the revision of
Gulsher Ahamad, after remand order was
passed by this Court, has been dismissed. It
is against the order dated 27.02.2020
passed on the appeal of Gulsher Ahamad
1 All. Mohd. Saleem Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1113
that writ petition no. 6340 of 2020 has been
filed by the petitioners in that writ
petitions.
Hence,
the
following
writ
petitions have been preferred.

15. Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior
Counsel, appearing for the petitioners in
writ petition nos. 7780 of 2019, 6340 of
2020 and 9058 of 2019, submitted that
once the appeal and revision of Gulsher
Ahamad
and
Garima Agarwal
stood
dismissed by the STAT in the year 2018
and 2019, no question arose for allowing
and granting them permit by the STAT in
the appeal filed by Rauf Khan vide order
dated 09.05.2019. He next contended that
the provisions of Limitation Act does not
apply in the proceedings under the Motor
Vehicle Act 1988 (hereinafter called as the
''Act of 1988'), the power to condone the
delay does not vest in the authorities.

16. It was next urged that Section 89
of the Act of 1988 only provides for filing
of an appeal by an aggrieved person whose
application is refused by the State or the
Regional Transport Authority for grant of
permit. While Section 90 empowers the
STAT to entertain the revision where no
appeal lies. According to him, there is no
power vested with the Tribunal to condone
the delay in challenging the order passed by
the State or Regional Transport Authority.

17. Once the Tribunal had found that
there was delay in filing the appeal and
revision by the two applicants namely
Gulsher Ahmad and Garima Agarwal, the
Tribunal was not justified in granting
permit to both these applicants granting
benefit in the appeal filed by Rauf Khan.
He, however, categorically submitted that
the petitioners are not claiming any relief
against Rauf Khan and their grievance is
only against Gulsher Ahamad and
Garima Agarwal.

18. On the question of recall
application filed in writ petition no. 17224
of 2019, learned Senior Counsel submitted
that it was filed without issuing notice to all
the applicants and the present recall
application was at the behest of one
Tanveer Ahamad, who was not heard
before the delay was condoned and the
matter was remitted to the Tribunal to hear
the matter afresh. Apart from the plea of
limitation no other point was canvassed by
the learned Senior Counsel challenging as
to the merits of the case.

19. Sri G.K. Singh, learned Senior
Counsel, appearing for the contesting
respondent
Gulsher
Ahamad,
in
all
connected matters, submitted that the U.P.
Motor Vehicle Rules, 1998 (hereinafter
referred as the ''Rules of 1998'), Rule 60
provides that every decision of the
Regional Transport Authority and the State
Transport Authority shall be published on
the notice board by the Secretary of the
concerned authority. He then contended
that Rule 91 provides for the period for
filing the appeal which is 30 days and has
to be counted from the date of receipt of the
order. As
in
the
present
case
the
information which was received by Gulsher
Ahamad was on 06.05.2015 about the order
dated 16.04.2015, thus, the appeal was
within the prescribed time limit.

20. He next submitted that second
proviso to Section 90 of the Act of 1988
provides
that
the
revision
may
be
entertained after the prescribed period of 30
days upon an application subject to
satisfaction of Tribunal, thus, it is wrong to
say that no provision for condonation of
1114 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
delay has been provided under the Act. He
next urged that the controversy relating to
the condonation of delay and appeals being
filed beyond the period of limitation has
been dealt in case of Mansoor Beg Vs.
State of U.P. (Misc. Single No. 13158 of
2019) decided on 09.05.2019, Mohd. Javed
Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and
2 others (Writ-A No. 13418 of 2019)
decided on 26.08.2019, Smt. Roshan Ara
Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal and
2 others (Writ-A No. 15933 of 2019)
decided on 14.10.2019 and Ganesh Prasad
Sahu
Vs.
State
Transport
Appellate
Tribunal, Lucknow and others (Misc.
Single No. 25976 of 2018) alongwith
connected matters decided on 10.12.2019.

21. He then submitted that after the
remand by this Court on 19.12.2014 the
STA was duty bound to consider all the
applications on the basis of comparative
merit, but the authority proceeded to grant
the permit ignoring the fact that on the date
of consideration the vehicles which were of
later models of Gulsher Ahamad and
Garima Agarwal and Rauf Khan were not
considered and placed at a lower merit than
those of the petitioners whose vehicles
were of older model, and were placed at a
higher merit. According to the learned
Senior
Counsel
appearing
for
the
respondent the controversy regarding the
limitation as raised by the petitioners'
counsel has been set to rest by the decisions
as quoted above and the Tribunal has
wrongly interpreted provisions of Section
89 and 90 of the Act of 1988 and has not
considered the Rule 91 of the Rules of
1998.

22.

Having
heard
the
rival
submissions and upon careful consideration
of
the
material
on
record,
before
proceeding to decide the matter on merits,
relevant extract of the provisions of Act of
1988 and Rules of 1998 are necessary for
better appreciation of the case. Section 89
and 90 of the Act of 1988 are extracted
hereasunder;

"89. Appeals.--(1) Any person-

(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the
State or a Regional Transport Authority to
grant a permit, or by any condition attached
to a permit granted to him, or

(b) aggrieved by the revocation or
suspension of the permit or by any
variation of the conditions thereof, or

(c) aggrieved by the refusal to transfer
the permit under section 82, or

(d) aggrieved by the refusal of the
State or a Regional Transport Authority to
countersign a permit, or by any condition
attached to such countersignature, or

(e) aggrieved by the refusal of renewal
of a permit, or

(f) aggrieved by the refusal to grant
permission under section 83, or

(g) aggrieved by any other order
which may be prescribed,

may, within the prescribed time and in
the prescribed manner, appeal to the State
Transport Appellate Tribunal constituted
under sub-section (2), who shall, after
giving such person and the original
authority an opportunity of being heard,
give a decision thereon which shall be
final.

1[(2) The State Government shall
constitute such number of Transport
Appellate Tribunals as it thinks fit and each
such Tribunal shall consist of a judicial
officer who is not below the rank of a
District Judge or who is qualified to be a
Judge of the High Court and it shall
exercise jurisdiction within such area as
may be notified by that Government.]

(3)
Notwithstanding
anything
contained in sub-section (1) or sub- section
1 All. Mohd. Saleem Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1115
(2),
every
appeal
pending
at
the
commencement of this Act, shall continue
to be proceeded with and disposed of as if
this Act had not been passed.

Explanation.-For
the
removal
of
doubts, it is hereby declared that when any
order is made by the State Transport
Authority or
the
Regional Transport
Authority in pursuance of a direction issued
by the Inter-State Transport Commission
under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
section 63A of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 (4 of 1939), as it stood immediately
before the commencement of this Act, and
any person feels aggrieved by such order
on the ground that it is not in consonance
with such direction, he may appeal under
sub-section (1) to the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal against such order but
not against the direction so issued.

90. Revision.--The State Transport
Appellate Tribunal may, on an application
made to it, call for the record of any case in
which an order has been made by a State
Transport Authority or Regional Transport
Authority against which no appeal lies, and
if it appears to the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal that the order made by
the State Transport Authority or Regional
Transport Authority is improper or illegal,
the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may
pass such order in relation to the case as it
deems fit and every such order shall be
final:

Provided that the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any
application from a person aggrieved by an
order of a State Transport Authority or
Regional Transport Authority, unless the
application is made within thirty days from
the date of the order:

Provided
further
that
the
State
Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain
the application after the expiry of the
said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied
that the applicant was prevented by good
and sufficient cause from making the
application in time:

Provided also that the State Transport
Appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order
under this section prejudicial to any person
without
giving
him
a
reasonable
opportunity of being heard."

23. Likewise Rule 60 and Rule 91 of
the
Rules
of
1998
are
extracted
hereasunder;

"60. Publication of the decisions of
the Transport Authority--Every decision
of each Regional Transport Authority and
the State Transport Authority shall be
published on the notice board by the
Secretary of the concerned Regional
Transport Authority or the State Transport
Authority, as the case may be for
information to the persons concerned.

91. Appeal against the order of State
or Regional Transport Authority.--(1)
The authority to decide an appeal against
the order of the State Transport Authority
or a Regional Transport Authority in
respect of matters dealt with in clauses (a),
(b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of sub-section
(1) of Section 89 shall be the State
Transport Appellate Tribunal, constituted
under sub-section (2) of Section 89.

(2) Any person aggrieved by an order
referred to in sub-rule (1) may prefer an
appeal within thirty days of the receipt of
the order to the Chairman of the said
Tribunal in the form of memorandum along
with the requisite number of envelopes and
necessary postage stamps for making
service of notices through registered post
on the respondents other than the State and
Regional
Transport
Authorities.
The
1116 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
memorandum shall set-forth concisely and
under distinct heads the grounds of
objection to the order appealed from. The
memorandum shall be accompanied by as
many
copies
thereof
as
there
are
respondents and shall also be accompanied
by a certified copy of the order appealed
against.

(3) (i) The appeal may be filed and
argued by the appellant himself or by an
agent or an Advocate, duly authorised in
this behalf. On behalf of the respondent,
other than the transport authority, the
appeal may be argued by the respondent
himself, by an agent or an Advocate duly
authorised in this behalf.

(ii) On behalf of the transport
authority,
the
Deputy
Transport
Commissioner (Tribunal) or an officer of
the Transport Department, an agent or an
Advocate duly authorised in this behalf by
the Transport Commissioner may argue the
appeal and may generally appeal", act and
plead before the Appellate Tribunal.

(4) Upon receipt of an appeal in
accordance with sub-rules (1), (2) and (3),
the Tribunal may fix a date within the
office hours, for hearing of the appeal
giving the transport authority concerned,
other respondents, if any and the appellant,
not less than thirty days' notice and shall in
that case, order the appellant to deposit the
fee as specified under Rule 125.

(5) The notice of the date of the hearing
shall be given by registered post to the
appellant and the respondent, other than the
transport authority on the address given in the
memorandum of appeal or at any other
address that may be filed by them for the
purpose. The notice to the transport authority
shall be given through the Deputy Transport
Commissioner (Tribunal) or through such
other person who may be appointed to argue
the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.

(6) The Appellate Tribunal may for
sufficient
reason,
restore
an
appeal
dismissed in default or for want of
prosecution on an application moved by an
appellant within fifteen days from the date
of the knowledge of the order of dismissal
of the appeal.

(7)
The
appellant
shall,
within
fourteen days of the receipt of the
intimation of the date of hearing, submit to
the Tribunal copies of the documents upon
which the appellant proposes to rely. The
respondent shall have a right to file papers,
on which he relies, within a week of the
filing of the documents by the appellant.

(8) The Secretary, State Transport
Authority, or Regional Transport Authority
may
give
copies
of
any
document
connected with an appeal preferred under
sub-rule (2) on payment of fee as specified
under Rule 125.

(9) The Secretary, State Transport
Authority, or Regional Transport Authority
may allow any person interested in an
appeal to inspect the file connected with
such appeal on payment of fee as specified
under Rule 125."

24. From careful reading of Section
89 of the Act of 1988 it is clear that any
person aggrieved by the refusal of the State
or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a
permit, or by any condition attached to a
permit granted to him, or by any condition
attached to a permit granted to him or
aggrieved by revocation or suspension of
permit, or by any portion of condition,
refusal to transfer the permit, refusal of
State or Regional Transport Authority to
countersign of permit or any condition
attached to such counter signature or
refusal of renewal of a permit or refusal to
grant permission under Section 83 may file
an appeal with the STAT.
1 All. Mohd. Saleem Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1117

25. Likewise Section 90 of the Rules
of 1998 deals with making an application to
STAT against an order of State Transport
Authority or Regional Transport Authority
against which no appeal lies. The first
proviso to Section 90 provides that no
revision application shall be entertained
unless it is made within 30 days from the
date of order.

26. Second proviso to Section 90
provides
leverage
to
the
STAT
for
entertaining application after expiry of 30
days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was
prevented by good and sufficient cause
from making an application in time.

27. The Rules of 1998 having been
framed under the provisions of the Act of
1988 read with Section 21 of General
Clauses Act, 1987. Rule 60 provides for
publication of every decision of the
Regional Transport Authority and State
Transport Authority on the notice board by
the concerned Secretary for information to
the persons concerned. Rule 91 (2)
provides for procedure for filing an appeal
by any aggrieved person before the STAT
against the order of the STA or Regional
Transport Authority within 30 days of the
receipt of the order, meaning thereby that
the period of limitation shall start running
from the date of receipt of the order and not
from the date of passing of the order.

28. This case has chequered history
and initially applications filed by the bus
operators for plying on Datia-Chatarpurvia-Jhansi-Naugaon route for the first
time came for consideration in the year
2011. As the application stood rejected on
technical
ground
the
decision
was
challeged before the Tribunal, which
allowed and remanded the matter to the
STA. However, on the writ petitions
filed by the different applicants on the
ground of power of Tribunal being coextensive with that of STA, the matter
was remanded to the Tribunal to decide
the same. However, the appeals were
dismissed by the Tribunal, which led to
the filing of number of petitions by the
bus operators before this Court, and on
19.12.2014 the matter was remitted to the
STA for reconsideration, allowing the
writ petition with specific direction for
considering the comparative merit of each
applicant and the entire exercise was to
be completed within six weeks.

29. It was from here on that the real
dispute arose as the STA on 16.04.2015
considered
all
the
applications
and
granted permit to five petitioners of writ
petition no. 6340 of 2020 on the ground
that Mohd. Saleem, Mohd. Ayub and
Tanveer Ahamad on the date of earlier
meeting held on 17.03.2011 had the latest
model of the vehicle, which as on date is
old and, thus, 45 days time was given to
them to procure vehicle of new model
while Hajjan Shamsunnisha Begam and
Amir Raza, who had purchased the
vehicle in the year 2015 were entitled for
the grant of permit. It would be apposite
to place the record relied by the STA in
its meeting held on 16.04.2015 for the
grant
of
permit
considering
the
applications of various applicants, their
vehicles,
model
and
the
date
of
registration. Relevant portion of the said
meeting is extracted hereasunder;

"आज के बैठक में पररदशष्ट-ख के िमाांक1 से 10 पर एवां पररदशष्ट-ग के िमाांक-01 से 16
तक उस्ल्लस्खत आवेदकोां द्वारा प्रस्तादवत वाहनोां
का दववरण दनम्नवत् है-
1118 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
पररदशष्ट-ख के आवेदकोां का दववरण
िमाांक आवेद
क का
नाम
प्रस्ता
दवत
वाहन
माड
ल
पांजीर्
न
दतदथ
1
श्री
मोहम्म
द
सलीम
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
5657
िरव
री,
2013
22.4.
2013
2
हज्जन
समशून
दनशा
बेगम

र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
6645
ददसांब
र,
2014
27.1.
2015
3
गुलशेर
अहमद
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
6647
जनव
री,
2015
27.1.
2015
4
श्री
मुहम्मद
अय्युब
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
2569

िरव
री,
2013

30.4.
2013

5
श्री
आदमर
रजा
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
6646
ददसांब
र,
2014
27.1.
2015
6
श्री
सांतोष
कुमार
कोरी
हररजन
एवां श्री
मो०
र्ूनुस
खाां
र्ूपी-
95/बी
-3286
2011
10.5.
2011
सह
आवे
दक
श्री
मो०
र्ूनुस
खाां के
नाम
पांजी
कृत
है।

7
श्री
रऊि
खाां
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
6649
जनव
री,
2015

27.1.
2015
8
श्रीमती
सिीना
बानो
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
6648
नवांब
र,
2014
27.1.
2015
9
श्री
तनवीर
अहमद
र्ूपी-
93/टी
-6780
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
3193
2011
2011
10.3.
2011
10.3.
3201
1
10
श्रीमती
गररमा
अग्रवा
ल
र्ूपी-
93/ए
टी-
6888
ददसांब
र,
2014
2.3.2
015

पररदशष्ट-ग के आवेदकोां का दववरण।

1
श्री जावेद
अख्तर
MP16/P0358
2014 वाहन
िर्
करने का
सौदा
होने की
बात कही
गर्ी
है
दकांतु वह
वाहन
आवेदक
के
नाम
पांजीकृत
नहीां है।
2
श्रीमती
शशी
अरोरा
UP7
5/M3
515
2012
22.3.201
2
3
श्रीमती
MP0
7/P6
2014
13.10.20
14
1 All. Mohd. Saleem Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1119
आथथा
अरोरा
777
4
श्रीमती
सीमा
अरोरा
MP0
7/P5
777
2014
9.10.201
5
5
श्री
राजकुमा
र अरोरा
UP7
5/M7
652
अग
स्त,2
014
1.11.201
4
6
श्री पवन
अरोरा
MP0
7/P9
777
2014
13.10.20
14
7
श्री
तनवीर
अहमद
UP9
3/AT
3193
2011
10.3.201
1
8
श्री मो०
सलीम
UP9
3/AT
5657
2013
22.4.201
3
9
श्री मो०
आर्ूब
UP9
3/AT
2569
2013
30.4.201
3
10 श्री
मजीद
खान

मेससय
अशोका
लीलेंड से
वाहन
बुक
कराने
की बात
कही
गर्ी।
11 श्री अनूप
दशवहरे
MP0
7/P2
255
2009
1.12.200
9
12 श्रीमती
गररमा
अग्रवाल
UP9
3/T9
556
2011
20.4.201
2
13 श्रीमती
दसर्ा
जानकी
---
---
परदमट
स्वीकृत
होने पर
नई वाहन
िर् कर
परदमट
प्राप्त
करने की
बात कही
गर्ी।
14 श्री
शहरर्ार
अहमद
UP93/A
T1732
---
आवेदन
पत्र
के
प्रस्तादवत
वाहन
आवेदक
के
नाम
पांजीकृत
होने का
प्रमाण
प्रस्तुत
नहीां
दकर्ा
गर्ा।
परदमट
स्वीकृत
होने पर
नई वाहन
िर् कर
परदमट
प्राप्त
करने की
बात कही
गर्ी।
15 क्षेत्रीर्
प्रबांधक,
उत्तर
प्रदेश
राज्य
स़िक
पररवहन
दनगम,
झाांसी।
UP9
3/T0
611
2008
27.3.200
8
1120 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
16 क्षेत्रीर्
प्रबांधक,
उत्तर
प्रदेश
राज्य
स़िक
पररवहन
दनगम,
झाांसी।
UP9
3/T2
482
2009
4.6.2009

आज की बैठक ददनाांक 16.4.2015 में
आवेदकोां द्वारा प्रस्तादवत वाहनोां के माडल एवां
पांजीर्न के आधार पर पररदशष्ट-ख के िमाांक10 पर उस्ल्लस्खत आवेददका श्री गररमा अग्रवाल,
िमाांक-7 पर उस्ल्लस्खत आवेदक श्री रऊि
खाां, िमाांक-3 पर उस्ल्लस्खत श्री गुलशेर
अहमद, िमाांक-5 पर उस्ल्लस्खत श्री आदमर
रजा एवां िमाांक-2 पर उस्ल्लस्खत हज्जन
समसुनदनशा बेगम मेररट में िमशः 1, 2, 3, 4 व
5 पर आते हैं। "

30. From the decision of STA it is
clear that Rauf Khan, Gulsher Ahamad and
Garima Agarwal, who were having the
vehicles of 2014-15 model, were not
considered eligible while the petitioners
having the older model were granted permit
ignoring the directions of this Court dated
19.12.2014, solely on the ground that on
the
initial
date
of
application
i.e.
17.03.2011 they were having the vehicles
of the higher model. The challenge made
by Gulsher Ahamad to the order of STA
was to be seen from the date of receipt of
the order as provided under Rule 91 (2),
and not from the date of order. The
appellate authority recorded a categorical
finding that Gulsher Ahamad came to know
about the order on 06.05.2015, thus, his
appeal was within time and rightly setaside the order of STA and remanded the
matter for reconsideration.

31. Similarly, in the appeal filed by
Rauf Khan the Tribunal recorded a
categorical finding that the STA had not
complied the direction of this Court dated
19.12.2014
and
had
considered
the
applications which were lower in merit
vis.a.vis. granted permit to those vehicles
which were of older models, and vehicles
of later models were denied from the zone
of consideration. The Tribunal rightly
cancelled the permit granted to Mohd.
Saleem, Mohd. Ayub and Tanveer Ahamad
whose vehicles were of older models while
those of Gulsher Ahamad, Rauf Khan and
Garima Agarwal were of later models.

32. The law relating to whether the
State Transport Authority should consider
respective
claim
on
the
date
of
consideration or on the date of application
stood decided by the Apex Court as early as
in 1965 in case of A.S. Jalaluddin Vs.
Balasubramania Bus Services (P) Ltd.
decided on 31.10.1967 followed by another
decision of Apex Court in case of
Maharashtra
State
Road Transport
Corporation Vs. Mangrulpir Jt. Motor
Service (P) Ltd. 1971 (2) SCC 222 which
was followed and reaffirmed by Apex
Court in case of Esskey Roadways (Firm)
Vs. Anandhakrishnan Bus Service 1994
(6) SCC 71, wherein Apex Court held that
the date of consideration of application was
relevant and not the date of application.
Relevant paragraph nos. 2 and 3 are
extracted hereasunder;

"2. The only question that arises for
consideration in this appeal is whether the
RTA should consider the respective claims
as on the date of the consideration or as on
the date of the application. The RTA held
that the date of application was the relevant
date. But the Appellate Authority and the
High Court found that the date of the
1 All. Mohd. Saleem Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1121
consideration
was
the
relevant
date.
Admittedly,
the
respondent-partnership
firm was reconstituted on 1-4-1976 taking
one Easwaran as a managing partner and it
was registered on 21-5-1976 under Section
69 of the Partnership Act. Admittedly, the
managing
partner
had
the
technical
qualification
as
on
the
date
of
consideration. The managing partner being
the
technically
qualified
man,
the
respondents are entitled to the award of two
more marks on the ground of qualifications.
The Appellate Tribunal taking that fact into
consideration awarded 10 marks and on
comparative
evaluation,
since
the
respondent by then had three permits,
granted the permit to the respondent. The
question whether the date of consideration
is the relevant date is no longer res integra.
This Court in Maharashtra State Road
Transport Corpn. v. Mangrulpir Jt. Motor
Service (P) Ltd. held that: (SCC p. 230,
para 22)

"The High Court was in error on the
second question in holding that the
Regional Transport Authority would have
to consider the respective qualifications of
the applicants as on the date of their
applications and not as on the date of the
actual consideration by the Regional
Transport Authority of the applications for
the grant of permit."

This
Court
considered
diverse
circumstances
in
support
of
that
conclusion. This Court said that as on the
date of the application if insolvency
petition is pending against one of the
applicants,
but
on
the
date
of
consideration if he is declared to be an
insolvent, he becomes disentitled to the
grant of permit by operation of law. As on
the date of the application if there is no
conviction, but as on the date of
consideration,
if
an
applicant
is
convicted, he also becomes ineligible
for consideration.

3. Another circumstance arose in
Dhani Devi v. Sant Bihari case was that
when one of the applicants before the
consideration died and his LRs were
brought
on
record.
When
it
was
questioned, this Court held that the LRs
are entitled to be considered as inheriting
the estate of the deceased applicant for
grant of permit. In A.S. Jalaluddin v.
Balasubramania Bus Service (P) Ltd.3 the
question arose that whether the applicant
who secured the residential qualification
by establishing a branch office at one of
the terminus of the route would be
considered eligible as on the date of the
consideration. This Court held that he is
entitled. In view of these considerations,
it must be held that the date of
consideration is the relevant date for the
purpose of considering the eligibility to
grant the required marks under Section 46
of Act 4 of 1939. This law being in
operation from 1970, we do not think that
it requires any reconsideration by this
Court by a larger Bench. Accordingly, we
hold that the date of consideration is the
relevant date on which the respective
claims of the candidates have to be
considered for award of the marks for
grant of permit. It is made clear that this
declaration of law is confined to and
peculiar of the statutory operation under
Section 46 Act 5 of 1958."

33. Argument of learned Senior
Counsel Sri Shashi Nandan that no
provision for condonation of delay exist
under Section 89 and 90 of the Act of 1988
cannot be accepted, as the second proviso
to Section 90 categorically provides for the
same giving the power to the Tribunal to
condone the delay in case the cause shown
1122 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
is sufficient. Similarly, Rule 60 read with
Rule 91 (2) of the Rules of 1998 clearly
provides for the publication of the decision
of the transport authority as well as SubRule 2 of Rule 91 provides for period of
limitation of 30 days from the date of
receipt of order. As there is no denial to the
fact that the order of the State Transport
Authority was conveyed on 06.05.2015, the
appeal was within time.

34. Moreover, after the remand of the
matter by this Court on 19.12.2014 the STA
was duty bound to comply with the
directions
while
disposing
of
the
applications for grant of route permit only
on the basis of comparative merit of the
parties, including considering the latest
model of vehicle. The decision of the STA
holding that on the date of earlier application
of petitioner Mohd. Saleem, Mohd. Ayub
and Tanveer Ahamad were having the
vehicles of latest model and thus a window
of 45 days was granted in the year 2015 so
as to enable them to get the vehicle of latest
model was totally against the mandate of
this Court, as the applicants on the date of
consideration i.e. 16.04.2015 were not
having vehicles of the latest model and were
lower in merit, but the STA arbitrarily and
illegally granted permit which was totally in
defiance of this Court's order.

35. A coordinate Bench of this Court
in case of Mansoor Beg (Supra) had in
extenso considered the power of condoning
delay relying upon the decision of Apex
Court
in
case
of
Collector,
Land
Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs.
Mst. Katiji and others, 1987 (2) SCC
107. Relevant paragraph is extracted
hereasunder;

"Hon'ble Supreme Court not once but
on several occasions has emphasized on
adopting justice-oriented approach by the
courts/judicial authorities or Tribunals. In
the case of Collector, Land Acquisition,
Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katiji
and others, reported in [(1987) 2SCC
107], it has been held that the power to
condone the delay is conferred in order to
enable the courts to do substantial justice
to the parties by disposing of the matters
on merits and further that the expression
"sufficient cause" is elastic enough to
enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaningful manner to subserve the ends
of justice. Hon'ble Supreme Court goes on
to the extent of observing that to subserve
the ends of justice is the life-purpose of
existence of the institution of Courts. In the
said case, Hon'ble Supreme Court calls for
adopting a liberal approach in the matters
relating to condonation of delay in
instituting the proceedings before the
Courts/Tribunal and has thus formulated
the following principles:

"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not
stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can
result in a meritorious matter being
thrown out at the very threshold and cause
of justice being defeated. As against this
when delay is condoned the highest that
can happen is that a cause would be
decided on merits after hearing the
parties.

3. "Every day's delay must be
explained" does not mean that a pedantic
approach should be made. Why not every
hour's delay, every second's delay? The
doctrine must be applied in a rational
common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and
technical considerations are pitted against
each other, cause of substantial justice
deserves to be preferred for the other side
cannot claim to have vested right in
1 All. Mohd. Saleem Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.
1123
injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay
is occasioned deliberately, or on account
of culpable negligence, or on account of
mala fides. A litigant does not stand to
benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he
runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalize injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so."

Thus, on a bear reading of the
aforesaid legal principles enunciated by
Hon'ble Supreme Court, broadly speaking
the approach while considering a prayer or
application seeking condonation of delay in
instituting any proceedings which should
be adopted by a court or a judicial forum
or tribunal is that it should not proceed on
the premise or assumption that delay in
approaching the court is always deliberate
and that the primary function of the court
or
an
adjudicatory
authority
is
to
adjudicate the dispute, rather than to shut
its door to a litigant or a party.