# Mohd. Shakeel v. Munni Devi & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 2 ILRA 750
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-02-13
- **Case number:** Matters Under Article 227 No. 555 of 2026
- **Bench:** Subhash Vidyarthi
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohd-shakeel-v-munni-devi-ors-54199
- **Pages:** 8

## Text

750 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
judgment debtor company for the execution of the said decree. A coordinate Bench of this Court
has held that there is no provision in the"CPC"which provides for execution of a money decree
against the judgment debtor company by effecting arrest and detention of its employee, director or
General Manager. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner Lucknow
Development Authority is a body corporate and its officers cannot be arrested for effecting
execution of an award or a decree issued against the Authority.

47. Opposing this submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for
the opposite party has submitted that the petitioner Lucknow Development Authority is a juristic
person and it acts through the natural persons who are in-charge of its affairs. Therefore, for any
default committed by the petitioner Lucknow Development Authority as a judgment debtor, where
the statute permits incarceration of the judgment debtor, the judgment debtor being a juristic
person, the natural persons who are in charge and responsible for the affairs of the petitioner will
have to undergo incarceration. However, the learned counsel for the opposite party has not
submitted any case law in support of this submission.

48. Keeping in view the law laid down in Dhanush Vir Singh v. Ila Sharma (supra), I am of
the view that the executing court has no authority to order arrest and detention of the officers and
officials of the petitioner "judgment debtor for execution of the order passed against the petitioner
"judgment debtor. Therefore, the impugned order dated 23.12.2025 is also unsustainable in law and
the same is also set aside.

49. It will be open for LARA to proceed with the execution of the award in question in
accordance with the provisions provided in the CPC by taking appropriate steps against the
Lucknow Development Authority itself and not taking any coercive measure against the persons
who are holding any post or office in Lucknow Development Authority.

50. The petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms.

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(2026) 2 ILRA 750
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 13.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE SUBHASH VIDYARTHI, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 555 of 2026

Mohd. Shakeel ...Petitioner
Versus
Munni Devi & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for Consideration
2 All. Mohd. Shakeel Vs. Munni Devi & Ors.
751
Whether the action of alienation in favour of the opposite party no. 4 is not bona fide and the opposite party
no. 4 is entitled to be impleaded under the provisions contained in Order XXII Rule 10 C.P.C.

Head Notes
The Constitution of India, 1950-Article 227; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XXII Rule
10, Order I Rule 10, Order IX Rule 13; The Transfer of Property Act, 1882- Section 58- There is
nothing in the present case to even prima facie establish that the action of alienation in favour of
the opposite party no. 4 is not bona fide. In absence of the alienation being held to be not bona
fide, the opposite party no. 4 is entitled to be impleaded under the provisions contained in Order
XXII Rule 10 C.P.C- The suit proceeded with and decreed ex-parte and there is nothing on record
to show that the defendant had knowledge of the temporary injunction order. Therefore, it
cannot be said that the sale deed had been executed in deliberate violation of the temporary
injunction order- The plaintiff himself had filed an application for impleadment of opposite party
no. 4 in the execution proceeding which application was allowed by means of an order dated
30.09.2013. Thereafter the ex-parte decree was set aside upon an application filed by the
opposite party no. 4. These facts also provide support to the claim for impleadment of the
opposite party no. 4 as a defendant to the suit.

Held- No error or illegality in the impugned order- Petition lacks merit and the same is hereby
dismissed at the admission stage. (E-15)

(Para 19, 22, 23 & 25)

Case Law Cited
Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon: (2005) 11 SCC 403,; Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra: (1995) 3 SCC
147; Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha: (1996) 10 SCC 53; Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb;
Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Robinson: (2020) 13 SCC 77;

List of Acts
The Constitution of India, 1950; The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; The Transfer of Property Act, 1882

List of Keywords
Order 1 Rule 10; Order XXII Rule 10; Opposite Party No.4 entitled to be impleaded; No knowledge of
temporary injunction; Alienation being held to be not bona fide

Case Arising From
Order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (J.D.), Court No.48, Lucknow in Regular
Suit No.973 of 2000 whereby an application filed by the third party- (the opposite party No.4 to the petition)
has been allowed.

Appearances for Parties
Counsel for Petitioner(s) : Pramod Kumar, S.Mohd Kazim, Syed Jamal Ahmad
Counsel for Respondent(s) :

(Delivered by Hon'ble Subhash Vidyarthi, J.)

1. Heard Shri S. Mohd Kazim, the learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. By means of the instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has challenged the validity of an order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the learned Additional
Civil Judge (J.D.), Court No.48, Lucknow in Regular Suit No.973 of 2000 titled Mohd. Shakeel v.
752 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Munni Devi whereby an application filed by the third party- Babu Lal (the opposite party No.4 to
the petition) has been allowed.

3. The petitioner had filed the aforesaid suit against Munni Devi, mother of the opposite party
Nos.2 and 3- Ramesh Kumar and Naresh Kumar, for specific performance of contract. On
23.12.2000, the trial Court had passed an ex-parte order of temporary injunction restraining the
defendant from selling the property to any other person and from changing the nature of the
property. Thereafter, the suit was decreed ex-parte on 30.05.2002.

4. The plaintiff filed Execution Case No.08 of 2002 for execution of the ex-parte decree dated
30.05.2002.

5. Prior to filing of the Execution Case, the defendant ? judgment debtor Munni Devi had
already executed a sale deed dated 26.03.2002 in respect of the property in question in favour of
one Qadir Hussain and had handed-over physical possession of the property to the purchaser. The
name of purchaser Qadir Hussain was mutated in the revenue records. Qadir Hussain executed a
registered sale deed dated 15.02.2005 in respect of the property in question in favour of opposite
party No.4 - Babu Lal and handed over possession of the property to the purchaser. The name of
opposite party No.4- Babu Lal has been mutated in the revenue records.

6. The plaintiff - decree holder filed an application for impleadment of Qadir Hussain and
Babu Lal in execution proceeding which application was allowed by means of an order dated
30.09.2013, and Qadir Hussain and Babu Lal were impleaded in the execution case. The opposite
party no. 4 stated that prior to it, he had no knowledge of the execution proceedings.

7. The opposite party no. 4 filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree dated
30.05.2002, which application has been allowed by means of an order dated 07.08.2023. Thereafter
the opposite party no. 4 requested for his impleadment in the suit.

8. The petitioner - Shakeel Ahmad filed objections against the application inter alia stating
that the trial Court had passed a temporary injunction order dated 23.12.2000 restraining the
defendants from transferring the property. Munni Devi had sold away the property to Qadir
Hussain and their Qadir Hussain had sold the property to the opposite party no. 4 in violation of the
provision contained in Section 58 of the Transfer of Property Act and the purchaser has no right to
seek his impleadment. Regarding impleadment of the opposite party no. 4 in execution
proceedings, the plaintiff stated that it was wrongly done by some other Counsel, whereas the
newly engaged Counsel of the plaintiff was of a different view. The newly engaged Counsel had
moved an application for deletion of the added defendants but the application under Order IX Rule
13 C.P.C. had been allowed. The plaintiff had challenged the order setting aside the ex-parte decree
by filing Civil Revision No. 167 of 2023, which was pending in the Court of Additional District
Judge, Court No. 9, Lucknow

9. The Trial Court allowed the impleadment application by means of the impugned order dated
13.03.2024 holding that the opposite party No.4 is a transferee pendente lite and he can seek his
impleadment keeping in view the statutory provisions contained in Order I Rule 10 (2), Section 146
2 All. Mohd. Shakeel Vs. Munni Devi & Ors.
753
and Order XXII Rule 10 CPC. The Court also noted that the original defendant and her transferee
having sold away the property are not interested in defending the proceedings. In these
circumstances, non-impleadment of the opposite party No.4 would adversely affect his interests in
the litigation. The Trial Court further held that the question of legality of the sale would be decided
in the suit. The trial Court has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon: (2005) 11 SCC 403 in which it has been held that a
transferee pendente lite is a necessary party to the suit.

10. The petitioner had challenged the aforesaid order by filing Civil Revision No.65 of 2024
which has been dismissed by means of the judgment and order dated 17.11.2025 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Court No.12, Lucknow and validity of the revisional order has
also been challenged by the petitioner.

11. Assailing validity of the aforesaid orders, the learned counsel for the petitioner has placed
reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anil Kumar Singh v.
Shivnath Mishra (1995) 3 SCC 147, Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha: (1996) 10 SCC 53,
Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb: (2004) 1 SCC 191 and Gurmit Singh Bhatia v.
Kiran Kant Robinson: (2020) 13 SCC 773.

12. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act provides as follows: -

"52. Transfer of Property pending suit relating thereto. - During the pendency in any
Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or
established beyond such limits by the Central Government, of any suit or proceeding which is not
collusive and in which any right to immoveable property is directly and specifically in question, the
property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as
to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made
therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.

Explanation.?For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall
be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the
proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has
been disposed of by a final decree or order, and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree
or order, has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period
of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force."

13. Order I Rule 10, C.P.C. provides as follows: -

Order 1 Rule 10

"10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff.?(1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of
the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of
the right plaintiff, the court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted
through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in
754 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as
the court thinks just.

(2) Court may strike out or add parties.?The court may at any stage of the proceedings,
either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the
court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or
defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether
as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable
the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the
suit, be added.

(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next
friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.

(4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.?Where a defendant is added, the
plaint shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary,
and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if
the court thinks fit, on the original defendant.

(5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877), Section 22,
the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on
the service of the summons."

14. Rule 10 of XXII C.P.C. provides as follows: -

"10. Procedure in case of assignment before final order in suit. -(1) In other cases of
an assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by
leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come
or devolved.

(2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an
interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1)."

15. In Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon: (2005) 11 SCC 403, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: -

"14. An alienee pendente lite is bound by the final decree that may be passed in the suit.
Such an alienee can be brought on record both under this rule as also under Order 1 Rule 10.
Since under the doctrine of lis pendens a decree passed in the suit during the pendency of which a
transfer is made binds the transferee, his application to be brought on record should ordinarily be
allowed.

* * *
2 All. Mohd. Shakeel Vs. Munni Devi & Ors.
755

16. The doctrine of lis pendens applies only where the lis is pending before a court.
Further pending the suit, the transferee is not entitled as of right to be made a party to the suit,
though the court has a discretion to make him a party. But the transferee pendente lite can be
added as a proper party if his interest in the subject-matter of the suit is substantial and not just
peripheral. A transferee pendente lite to the extent he has acquired interest from the defendant is
vitally interested in the litigation, where the transfer is of the entire interest of the defendant; the
latter having no more interest in the property may not properly defend the suit. He may collude
with the plaintiff. Hence, though the plaintiff is under no obligation to make a lis pendens
transferee a party, under Order 22 Rule 10 an alienee pendente lite may be joined as party. As
already noticed, the court has discretion in the matter which must be judicially exercised and an
alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests. The court has
held that a transferee pendente lite of an interest in immovable property is a representative-ininterest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. He is entitled to be impleaded in
the suit or other proceedings where his predecessor-in-interest is made a party to the litigation;
he is entitled to be heard in the matter on the merits of the case."

(Emphasis added)

16. In Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra: (1995) 3 SCC 147, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held that: -

"3. Order 22, Rule 10 postulates continuation of suit by or against a person who has, by
devolution, assignment or creation, acquired any interest during the pendency of a suit, by leave
of the court. The obtaining of a decree and acquiring the status as a co-owner during the pendency
of a suit for specific performance, is not obtaining, by assignment or creation or by devolution, an
interest. Therefore, Order 22, Rule 10 has no application to this case."

17. In Vijay Pratap v. Sambhu Saran Sinha: (1996) 10 SCC 53, the suit was filed for
specific performance wherein the father during his lifetime was alleged to have entered into
compromise and requested to delete his name from the array of parties as Respondent 1. His name
was deleted after his demise. Pending suit before the compromise was recorded, the petitioners
sought impleadment under Order 1 Rule 10. The trial court rejected the application holding that to
decide right, title and interest of co-plaintiffs in suit property is beyond the scope of this suit and a
suit of specific performance of contract can't be turned into a regular title suit and, therefore, the
petitioners are not necessary and proper parties under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC. The question of
impleadment / substitution of a transferee under Order XXII Rule 10 C.P.C. was not involved in
this case.

18. In Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb: (2004) 1 SCC 191, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that: -

"9. It is not disputed that the present petitioner purchased the property during pendency
of the suit and without seeking leave of the court as required by Section 52 of the Transfer of
Property Act. The petitioner being a transferee pendente lite without leave of the court cannot, as
of right, seek impleadment as a party in the suits which are long pending since 1983. It is true that
756 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
when the application for joinder based on transfer pendente lite is made, the transferee should
ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interest. But in the instant case, the
trial court has assigned cogent reasons for rejecting such joinder stating that the suit is long
pending since 1983 and prima facie the action of the alienation does not appear to be bona fide.
The trial court saw an attempt on the part of the petitioner to complicate and delay the pending
suits."

19. There is nothing in the present case to even prima facie establish that the action of
alienation in favour of the opposite party no. 4 is not bona fide. In absence of the alienation being
held to be not bona fide, the opposite party no. 4 is entitled to be impleaded under the provisions
contained in Order XXII Rule 10 C.P.C.

20. In Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. Kiran Kant Robinson: (2020) 13 SCC 773, the short
question for consideration was, whether the plaintiffs can be compelled to implead a person in the
suit for specific performance, against his wish and more particularly with respect to a person
against whom no relief has been claimed by him? The Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon a
judgment in the case of Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal, (2005) 6 SCC 733 wherein it was held that the
question of jurisdiction of the court to invoke Order 1 Rule 10 CPC to add a party shall not arise
unless a party proposed to be added has direct and legal interest in the controversy involved in the
suit. It was further observed and held that two tests are to be satisfied for determining the question
as to who is a necessary party. The tests are: (1) there must be a right to some relief against such
party in respect of the controversies involved in the proceedings; (2) no effective decree can be
passed in the absence of such party. In a suit for specific performance the first test that can be
formulated is, to determine whether a party is a necessary party there must be a right to the same
relief against the party claiming to be a necessary party, relating to the same subject-matter
involved in the proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell. In a suit for specific
performance of the contract, a proper party is a party whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the
controversy involved in the suit. The parties claiming an independent title and possession adverse
to the title of the vendor and not on the basis of the contract, are not proper parties and if such party
is impleaded in the suit, the scope of the suit for specific performance shall be enlarged to a suit for
title and possession, which is impermissible. A third party or a stranger cannot be added in a suit
for specific performance, merely in order to find out who is in possession of the contracted property
or to avoid multiplicity of the suits. A third party or a stranger to a contract cannot be added so as
to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character.

21. In the present case, as the opposite party no. 4 has purchased the property in question
through a registered sale deed and presently he is the owner of the property in question, the plaintiff
has the right to claim relief against the opposite party no. 4 relating to the subject-matter involved
in the proceedings for specific performance of contract to sell and his presence is necessary to
adjudicate the controversy involved in the suit. The opposite party no. 4 is not claiming an
independent title and possession adverse to the title of the vendor, rather he is claiming the same
under a sale deed executed by the vendor. Therefore, he is entitled to be impleaded under Order
XXII Rule 10 C.P.C.
2 All. Shri Gopal Kishan Khandelwal Vs. Smt. Archana Tripathi
757

22. Regarding the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the original
defendant had executed the sale deed in violation of an order of temporary injunction restraining
transfer of the property, suffice it to say that the suit was proceeded with and decreed ex-parte and
there is nothing on record to show that the defendant had knowledge of the temporary injunction
order. Therefore, it cannot be said that the sale deed had been executed in deliberate violation of the
temporary injunction order.

23. Further, the plaintiff himself had filed an application for impleadment of Qadir Hussain
and Babu Lal (opposite party no. 4) in the execution proceeding which application was allowed by
means of an order dated 30.09.2013. Thereafter the ex-parte decree dated 30.05.2002 was set aside
by means of an order dated 07.08.2023 passed upon an application filed by the opposite party no. 4.
These facts also provide support to the claim for impleadment of the opposite party no. 4 as a
defendant to the suit.

24. The submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that it was wrongly done by some
other Counsel, whereas the newly engaged Counsel of the plaintiff was of a different view, also
does not deserve acceptance, because the mere change of Counsel would not justify a change
towards the approach adopted by the party when the case was being conducted by another Counsel.

25. Keeping in view the foregoing discussion, there appears to be no error or illegality in the
impugned order dated 13.03.2024 passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (J.D.), Court
No.48, Lucknow in Regular Suit No.973 of 2000 allowing the application for impleadment filed by
Babu Lal - the opposite party No.4 to the petition.

26. The petition lacks merit and the same is hereby dismissed at the admission stage.
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(2026) 2 ILRA 757
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.02.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE DR. YOGENDRA KUMAR SRIVASTAVA, J.

Matters Under Article 227 No. 650 of 2026

Shri Gopal Kishan Khandewal ...Petitioner
Versus
Smt. Archana Tripathi ...Respondent

Issue for Consideration
The petition raises a significant question concerning the scope and application of Order XVIII Rule 17 of the
Code of Civil Procedure read with Sections 137, 138 and 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, particularly the
fine distinction between an impermissible attempt to fill up lacunae in evidence and a permissible exercise of
seeking clarification of an ambiguity in a witness's testimony, so as to enable the Court to arrive at the truth
and ensure a fair adjudication.