# Mohd. Siddique & Anr v. Mohd. Nafees

- **Citation:** (2022) 12 ILRA 925
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2022-10-18
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 35525 of 2016
- **Bench:** Ajit Kumar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohd-siddique-anr-v-mohd-nafees-48069
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

Sri Pavan Kumar

U.P.
Urban
Buildings
(Regulation
of
Letting, Rent and Eviction ) Act, 1972Section 21 (1)-Landlord-Petitioner-who is
subsequent
purchaser-Tenant
admitted
the
Petitioner
as
his
Landlord-inspite
release
application by Petitioner- no plea of six months'
notice taken in objection-Tenant would be taken
to waive his right of protection objection-Tenant
waived his right of protection u/s 21(1).

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1 Martin & Harris Ltd. Vs VIth Additional District
Judge & ors., (1998) 1 SCC 732

2 Mahesh Kumar Agarwal (Dead) By LRs. Vs
Naresh Chandra & ors., 2022 (1) CRC 662 SC

3 Pradeep Kumar @ Pradeep & anr. Vs Smt.
Meena Devi Sahu & anr., 2019 (3) ARC 408

## Text

12 All. Mohd. Siddique & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Nafees
925
(2022) 12 ILRA 925
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 18.10.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Writ-A No. 35525 of 2016

Mohd. Siddique & Anr. ...Petitioner
Versus
Mohd. Nafees ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Pradeep Kumar Sinha, Sri Iqbal Ahmad, Sri
Atul Dayal (Sr. Advocate)

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Pavan Kumar

U.P.
Urban
Buildings
(Regulation
of
Letting, Rent and Eviction ) Act, 1972Section 21 (1)-Landlord-Petitioner-who is
subsequent
purchaser-Tenant
admitted
the
Petitioner
as
his
Landlord-inspite
release
application by Petitioner- no plea of six months'
notice taken in objection-Tenant would be taken
to waive his right of protection objection-Tenant
waived his right of protection u/s 21(1).

W.P. allowed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1 Martin & Harris Ltd. Vs VIth Additional District
Judge & ors., (1998) 1 SCC 732

2 Mahesh Kumar Agarwal (Dead) By LRs. Vs
Naresh Chandra & ors., 2022 (1) CRC 662 SC

3 Pradeep Kumar @ Pradeep & anr. Vs Smt.
Meena Devi Sahu & anr., 2019 (3) ARC 408
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Atul Dayal, learned
Senior Advocate assisted by Iqbal Ahmad,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri
Pavan Kumar, learned counsel for the
respondent.

2. The short question involved in the
present case is as to whether in the event of
not taking an objection qua maintainability
of
release
application
under
Section
21(1)(a) for the reasons that six months
period had not expired after service of
notice by the landlord who is admittedly
subsequent
purchaser
of
the
rented
property, the tenant would be taken to have
waived his right of protection prescribed
under first proviso to sub-section (1) of
Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings
(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)
Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ''Act,
1972').

3. The proposition of law in respect of
the above legal issue is well settled. In the
case of Martin & Harris Ltd. v. VIth
Additional District Judge and others,
(1998) 1 SCC 732; the Supreme Court had
an occasion to interpret the provision and in
paragraph 9 of the said judgment it has
been held that application may not be
entertained
but
would
certainly
be
maintainable even if it has been prematurely filed i.e. before expiry of six
months' notice. Paragraph 9 of the
judgment runs as under:

"9. Even that apart there is an internal
indication in the first proviso to Section
21(1) that the legislature has made a clear
distinction between 'entertaining of an
application for possession under Section
21(1) (a) of the Act and `filing' of such
application. so far as the filling of such
application is concerned it is clearly
indicated by the Legislature that such
application cannot be filled before expiry of
six months form the date on which notice is
given by the landlord to the tenant seeking
926 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
eviction under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act.
The words, `the landlord has given a notice
in that behalf to the tenant not less than six
months before such application', would
naturally mean that before filing of such
application or moving of such application
before the prescribed authority notice must
have preceded by at least six months.
similar terminology is not employed by the
Legislature in the very same proviso so far
as three years' period for entertaining such
application by the prescribed authority is
concerned. Therefore, it must necessarily
mean that when the prescribed authority is
required to entertain an application on the
grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section
21(1) a stage must be reached when the
Court applies its judicial mind and takes up
the case for decision on merits concerning
the grounds for possession mentioned in
clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act.
Consequently on the very scheme of this
Act it cannot be said that the word
'entertain' as employed by the Legislature
in the firs proviso to Section 21(1) of the
Act would mean 'Institution' of such
proceedings before the prescribed authority
or would at least mean taking cognizance
of such an application by the prescribed
authority
by
issuing
summons
for
appearance to the tenant- defendant. It
must be half that on the contrary the term
'entertain' would only show that by the time
the application for possession on the
grounds mentioned in clause (a)) of Section
21(1) is taken up by the prescribed
authority for consideration on merits, at
least minimum three years' period should
have elapsed since the date of purchase of
the premises by the landlord."

4. On the question whether a decree
being passed by a prescribed authority
granting release in favour of the landlord
even in case an application for release was
filed pre-maturely would be a nullity, the
court vide paragraph 10 of the judgment
held that decree of the trial court having
been passed much after three years' period
created as a moratorium in respect of the
right of the landlord to get tenanted
property released, would not be nullity for
want of jurisdiction.

5. Interpreting the law on the point qua
entertainability/
maintainability
of
the
application for release the court observed
that it must be held that when the
Legislature
has
provided
that
no
application under Section 21(1) (a) of the
Act shall be entertained by the prescribed
authority on grounds mentioned in clause
(a) of Section 21(1) of the Act before expiry
of three years from date of purchase of
property by the landlord it must necessarily
mean consideration by the prescribed
authority of the grounds mentioned in
clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act of
merits. On the facts of the present case, as
we have seen earlier, that stage was
reached after 1988 when the prescribed
authority on the basis of the affidavit
evidence led before it took up the plaintiff's
case for consideration on merits of the
grounds under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act
and at that stage more than three years had
expired. from the date on which the
respondent-landlord had purchased the
property. Consequently no fault can be
found with the decision of the High Court
to the effect that the prescribed authority
was
justified
in
entertaining
the
consideration of the grounds under Section
21(1) (a) of the Act at that stage and the
decree
passed
on
the
said
ground,
therefore, cannot be said to be a nullity, nor
can the entertaining of such application on
the ground under Section 21(1) (a) of the
Act be said to be illegal. The first point for
consideration is, therefore, answered in the
12 All. Mohd. Siddique & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Nafees
927
negative, in favour of the respondent
landlord and against the appellant.

6. On the question of waiver of
protection by a tenant in the event objection
was not raised as to entertainability of the
application before expiry of six months
period, the court held that the tenant has to
raise objection at the very threshold when
the notice of the case was served upon him
and then he is faced with the release
application , he should take the objection
but in the event he failed to do so, in such
an event it would be taken as lost
opportunity of the respondent-tenant as he
failed to pursue this objection any further.
The court observed, looking to the facts of
that case where instead of taking objection
to the entertainability of the application, the
tenant joined the issues on merits seeking
permission to cross-examine the plaintiffs
on merit of the case. So, ultimately the
court held that the provision for six months'
notice before initiation of proceedings
under Section 21 (1) of the Act, though is
mandatory and confers protection to the
tenant concerned, it can be waived by him.
On the facts of the present case there is no
escape from the conclusion that the
appellant, for the reasons best known to it,
consciously and being alive to the clear
factual situation that the suit was filed on
the ground prior to the expiry of six
months' notice, did not think it fit to pursue
that point any further and on the contrary
joined issues on merits expecting a
favorable decision in the suit and having
lost therein and got an adverse decision did
not think it fit even to challenge the
decision on the ground of maintainability of
the suit while filing an appeal and argued
the appeal only on merits and only as an
afterthought at the stage of writ petition in
the High Court such a contention was
sought to be taken up for the first time for
consideration. On the facts of the present
case, therefore, it must be held that the
appellant had waived that contention about
the suit being premature having been filed
before the expiry of six months from the
date of the suit notice.

7. The case of Martin Harris (supra)
came to be considered subsequently in the
case of Mahesh Kumar Agarwal (Dead)
By LRs. v. Naresh Chandra and others,
2022 (1) CRC 662 SC; and the view was
reiterated vide paragraph 8 of the judgment.
In the case of Mahesh Kumar (supra) the
landlord had purchased the property 4th
January, 1997 from the previous landlord
and moved an application under Section
21(1)(a) in the year 2008, which was
preceded by a legal notice dated 22nd
December, 2007.

8. The argument advanced on behalf
of the landlord in the said case that even if
the notice fell foul of the mandate of the
proviso the conduct in that case of the
tenant would be taken to have waived his
right of protection. In that case also neither
in reply to the notice nor, in the written
statement any such objection was taken.
The court followed the earlier judgment of
Martin Harris (supra) and vide paragraph
9 held thus:

"(9) In view of the judgment of this
Court in Martin & Harris Ltd.(supra),
where this Court has taken the view
interpreting the very same provision with
which we are concerned, that the objection
relating to defective notice is capable of
being waived, we are of the view that the
appellant should not be denied the benefit
of the said view. We further notice that, on
facts, the present case stands on a more
sturdier footing. In Martin & Harris Ltd.
(supra), the tenant had, in fact, raised
928 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
objection, which he did not press, whereas,
in the facts of this case, the tenant has not
raised any objection in not only the reply
notice, but even in the written statement
before the Rent Controller. What fortifies us
further is that even in the appeal before the
appellate Court, the tenant did not urge the
ground. If at all there is a case for waiver,
this would be one."

9. In the case of Pradeep Kumar @
Pradeep and another v. Smt. Meena Devi
Sahu and another, 2019 (3) ARC 408; a
concurrent Bench of this Court followed the
judgment in the case of Martin Harris
(supra). In the said case the purchaser of the
property vide registered sale deed dated
22nd January, 2010 became the landlady.
The intimation of the same was sent to him
to the tenant same day but he did not pay the
rent. On 3rd August, 2010 the defendantlandlady
terminated
the
tenancy
and
demanded arrears of rent and ultimately she
filed release application on 28th October,
2010 and Section 21(1)(a) of the Act No.- 13
of 1972 setting up a bona fide need and also
for default in payment of rent.

10. Written statement was filed in the
said case by the tenant denying the
ownership of the landlady. However, an
objection
was
taken
in
the
written
statement vide paragraph 21 that the release
application was pre-mature one as three
years period had not expired. The court in
the aforesaid case framed three questions
vide paragraph 10 which runs as under:

"10. (a) Whether under the facts and
circumstances of the case the release
application
filed
by
the
plaintifflandlady/respondent No.1 before expiry of
three years from the date of purchase of the
house was barred by the 1st proviso to
Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972?

(b) Whether under the facts and
circumstance of the case, the defendanttenant/petitioner has waived the condition
of six months notice required under the 1st
proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13
of 1972?
(c)
Whether
under
the
facts
and
circumstance of the case the comparative
hardship of the disputed house has been
rightly held to be in favour of the plaintifflandlady/respondent No.1?"

11. Question Nos. (a) and (b) are
relevant for the purpose of the present case.
Vide paragraphs 14 and 17 the court
answered the question Nos.(a) and (b)
against the tenant. Paragraphs 14 and 17
run as under:

"14. From the bare reading of 1st
proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13
of 1972 and principles of law laid down by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Martin
&
Harris
Ltd.(supra)
and
Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd.(supra), it can be safely
concluded that the phrase "entertain" used
in the 1st proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of
U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 would mean that
the period of three years since the date of
purchase by the landlord must have expired
when the Prescribed Authority is required
to entertain the release application on the
grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section
21(1) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. This would be
a stage reached when the Court applies its
judicial mind and takes up the case for
decision on merits concerning the grounds
mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of
the Act. The word "entertained" mentioned
in the first proviso to Section 21(1) in
connection with the grounds mentioned in
Clause
(a)
would
necessarily
mean
entertain the grounds for consideration for
the purpose of adjudication of merits and
not at any stage prior thereto i.e. neither at
12 All. Mohd. Siddique & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Nafees
929
the stage at which the application is filed in
the office of the Prescribed Authority nor at
the stage when summons is issued to the
tenant. The crux of the conclusion is that by
the time the application for possession on
the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of
Section 21(1) is taken up by the Prescribed
Authority for consideration on merits, at
least minimum three years' period should
have elapsed since the date of purchase of
the premises by the landlord/landlady. In
the present set of facts, the disputed house
was
purchased
by
the
plaintifflandlady/respondent no.1 on 21.01.2010
and the case has been taken up for
consideration on merit and was decided by
the Prescribed Authority on 16.04.2016.
Therefore, the 1st proviso to Section 21(1)
of the Act stood complied with. Question
No.(a) is answered accordingly.

"17. From the discussion made above
and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme
Court as aforequoted, it can be safely
concluded that requirement of six months
notice under the 1st proviso to Section
21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, is
mandatory but it can be waived by the
tenant. These proceedings under Section
21(1)(a) of the Act are neither of public
nature nor it involves any public interest. It
would be between landlord and tenant.
Only personal interest of landlord on the
one hand and the tenant on the other hand
get clashed and called for adjudication by
the Prescribed Authority. Six months'
breathing time is given to the tenant after
service of notice to enable him to put his
house in order and to get the matter settled
amicably
or
to
get
alternative
accommodation if the tenant realises that
the landlord has a good case. This type of
protection to the tenant would naturally be
personal to him and could be waived. In the
present
set
of
facts
the
defendanttenant/petitioner
neither
raised
any
objection nor filed an application under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure
Code
for
dismissal
of
the
release
application on the ground that it is
premature or barred by the proviso to
Section 21(a) of the Act. This clearly
established
that
the
defendanttenant/petitioner has waived the protection
of six months' notice as provided in the
proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act.
Therefore, the submission of learned
counsel for the defendant-tenant/petitioner
deserves rejection and is hereby rejected. If
an objection would have been raised before
the Prescribed Authority in the very
beginning
then
the
plaintifflandlady/respondent
would
have
an
opportunity to take leave of the Court to
withdraw the release application and to file
a fresh release application after expiry of
six months period."

12. The court then vide paragraph 20
summarized the legal position on the
provision as contained in the first proviso
to Section 21(1)(a) vide paragraph 20 thus:

"20. The legal position and
conclusions
stated
above
are
briefly
summarized as under:-

(i) The phrase "entertained" used
in the 1st proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of
U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 would mean that
the period of three years since the date of
purchase by the landlord must have expired
when the Prescribed Authority is required
to entertain the release application on the
grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section
21(1) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. This would be
a stage reached when the Court applies its
judicial mind and takes up the case for
decision on merits concerning the grounds
mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of
the Act. The word "entertained" would
necessarily mean entertain the grounds for
930 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
consideration
for
the
purpose
of
adjudication of merits and not at any stage
prior thereto i.e. neither at the stage at
which the application is filed in the office
of the Prescribed Authority nor at the stage
when summons is issued to the tenant. The
crux of the conclusion is that by the time
the application for possession on the
grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section
21(1) is taken up by the Prescribed
Authority for consideration on merits, at
least minimum three years' period should
have elapsed since the date of purchase of
the premises by the landlord/landlady. In
the present set of facts, the disputed house
was
purchased
by
the
plaintifflandlady/respondent no.1 on 21.01.2010
and the case has been taken up for
consideration on merit and was decided by
the Prescribed Authority on 16.04.2016.
Therefore, the 1st proviso to Section 21(1)
of the Act stood complied with. Question
No.(a) is answered accordingly.

(ii) requirement of six months
notice under the 1st proviso to Section
21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, is
mandatory but it can be waived by the
tenant. These proceedings under Section
21(1)(a) of the Act are neither of public
nature nor it involves any public interest. It
would be between landlord and tenant.
Only personal interest of landlord on the
one hand and the tenant on the other hand
get clashed and called for adjudication by
the Prescribed Authority. Six months'
breathing time is given to the tenant after
service of notice to enable him to put his
house in order and to get the matter settled
amicably
or
to
get
alternative
accommodation if the tenant realises that
the landlord has a good case. This type of
protection to the tenant would naturally be
personal to him and could be waived.

(iii) In the present set of facts the
defendant-tenant/petitioner neither raised
any objection nor filed an application
under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil
Procedure Code for dismissal of the release
application on the ground that it is
premature or barred by the proviso to
Section 21(a) of the Act. This clearly
established
that
the
defendanttenant/petitioner has waived the protection
of six months' notice as provided in the
proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act."

13. Now coming to the facts of the
case in hand, I find that premises in
question was purchased by the petitioner on
5th July, 2001 from the erstwhile owner
and landlord. It was pleaded in the release
application by the petitioner that the son of
the petitioner No.- 2 was jobless person
and, therefore, landlord needed the shop to
settle him in some business of phone and
mobile repair works. On different occasions
the request was made to the tenant to
vacate the shop but he refused to do the
same and instead demanded Rs.1 lac for
vacating the shop. Although more than
three years had already expired and the
tenant was admitting the petitioner to be
landlord yet landlord issued notice on 8th
March, 2011 to the opposite party to release
the shop and respondent having not done so
in spite of service of notice, release
application was filed. In the written
statement filed by the tenant respondent he
admitted himself to be tenant of Mohd.
Siddique and Mohd. Zubair, namely, the
landlord - petitioners.

14. He disputed the bona fide need set
up by the landlord and claimed that release
application was filed only with an intention
to get the rent further increased. An
additional written statement was also filed
stating therein that he had never been
served with notice dated 8th March, 2011.
However, in the entire affidavit, written
12 All. Mohd. Siddique & Anr. Vs. Mohd. Nafees
931
statement and additional written statement,
he has not taken any plea that the release
application was not entertainable in view of
non compliance of provision of six months'
advance notice. This plea was not even
taken in appeal. As per the recitals made in
the body of the judgment by the appellate
court wherein it is clearly recorded that
main ground taken in appeal to assail the
order of the prescribed authority is that
prescribed authority has not appropriately
appreciated the evidence on record and that
the order passed by the prescribed authority
was against the law inasmuch as the
prescribed authority has not referred to
various provisions of the Act, 1972 which
were cited by the tenant appellant and had
those provisions being considered the
landlord was liable to be non-suited. It was
also further pleaded that the order was not
well reasoned one and was absolutely
contrary to the facts pleaded. The judgment
was also assailed on the point that the
comparative hardships were not correctly
evaluated.

15. The recitals in the judgment do
not indicate as to what provisions of law
were pleaded in defence and were not
considered as per the memo of appeal
which was summarized in the judgment by
the appellate court. However, the appellate
court had proceeded to decide that since six
months' notice did not precede to release
application, therefore, there was non
compliance of statutory provision and
hence the release application was barred.

16. It is worth noticing that
respondent is duly represented by Sri
Pawan Kumar, learned Advocate, who has
filed vakalatnama on 26th July, 2019 but no
counter affidavit has been filed in the
matter.

17. Applying the legal principle on
the point of maintainability of release
application beyond the period of three
years of purchase of the property by the
landlord inasmuch as the requirement of
law to have six months' notice before
presenting the release application, I find
that this case is fully covered by the
judgments that have been referred to
hereinabove in this judgment.

18. It is a case where the property was
purchased by the present landlord much
much ago and the tenant in his written
statement
has
admitted
the
present
landlords to be his landlords, the notice I
find to have been issued to the tenant
respondent on 8th March, 2011 by the
landlord to the tenant by registered post and
the Central Information Officer of Postal
Department, Kanpur Division, Kanpur
certified that notice stood delivered on 10th
March, 2011 upon the noticee.

19. The above certificate of the postal
department has been issued on 14th March,
2013, which has been brought on record by
means of supplementary affidavit which
has not been disputed by filing any counter
affidavit. The RTI information (information
obtained under Right to Information Act,
2005) was also placed before the prescribed
authority which has been discussed. The
release application was filed in April, 2012
whereas the notice was sent by the
registered post on 8th March, 2011
delivered on 10th March, 2011.

20. I, therefore, do not find any fault
with the findings of the trial court regarding
service of notice, inasmuch as no plea of
six months' notice as such having been
taken in the objection/ written statement
filed to the release application, the tenant
932 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
would be taken to have waived his right of
protection under the proviso.

21. The moratorium of three years
period having already expired because the
property was purchased by the present
landlord way back in the year 2001, and the
fact that the tenant respondent was admittedly
paying the rent to landlord-respondents,
tenant by his own and statement made in the
written statement, the release application was
maintainable. So, judgment granting release
application having been passed on 23rd
December, 2014, it would not got rendered as
null and void or bad for corum non judis as
the prescribed authority concerned had the
jurisdiction
to
entertain
the
release
application and pass order thereupon.

22. In view of the above, therefore, the
judgment passed by the court of appeal dated
31st May, 2016 holding that release
application was barred by proviso to Section
21 (1) of the Act, 1972, cannot be sustained
in law both on facts and legal premise, and
the same is hereby set aside.

23. Accordingly, writ petition succeeds
and is allowed and the order passed by the
Prescribed Authority is hereby confirmed. No
order as to cost.
----------
(2022) 12 ILRA 932
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 15.11.2022

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE AJIT KUMAR, J.

Matter under Article 227 No. 7364 of 2015
(CIVIL)

Ram Babu ...Petitioner
Versus
Raj Kumar Singh ...Respondent
Counsel for the Petitioner:
Smt. Anita Tripathi, Sri Tripathi B.G. Bhai

Counsel for the Respondent:
Sri Pankaj Agarwal, Sri Pankaj Agarwal

Tenant Petitioner -aggrieved against orderwhere landlord has been non suited on the
ground that the service of notice was not
effected upon the tenant-as to determine the
tenancy-as Petitioner was not found to be in
default of payment of rent-and entitled to
protection u/s 20(4) of the Act, 1972-only duty
of the landlord to ensure that a registered notice
is duly sent at the correct address and then if it
is refused or returned for non availability of the
notice-deemed sufficient-findings of revisional
court legal.

W.P. dismissed. (E-9)

List of Cases cited:

1. Balloo Ram Bookseller Vs Chhedi Lal, 1968
ALJ

2. Shri Ram Mittal Vs XIth A.D.J., Meerut & ors.

3. Rajendra Vs Sanatan Dharam Intermediate
College, 2008(70) AIR 61 (MANU/ UP/ 1308/
2007)

4.Green View Radio Service Vs Laxmibai Ramji &
ors.,
AIR
1990
(SC)
2156
(MANU/SC/
0378/1990)

5. Gujarat Electricity Board & ors. Vs Atmaram
Sungomal Poshani, AIR 1989 (SC) 1433
(MANU/SC/0200/1989)

6. Ganga Ram Vs Phulwati, AIR 1970 ALL. 446
(MANU/UP/0071/1970 )

7. Gokaran Singh & ors. Vs 1st Additional District
and Session Judge, Hardoi & ors., 2000 SCFRC
193 (MANU/UP/1528/2000)
(Delivered by Hon'ble Ajit Kumar, J.)

1. Heard Sri Tripathi B.G. Bhai,
learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri