# Mohd. Yaqoob & Anr v. District Registrar / A.D.M. Fandr Bahraich & Ors

- **Citation:** (2026) 3 ILRA 655
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2026-03-10
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 1000572 of 2015
- **Bench:** Irshad Ali
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohd-yaqoob-anr-v-district-registrar-a-d-m-fandr-bahraich-ors-54788
- **Pages:** 7

## Text

3 All. Mohd. Yaqoob & Anr. Vs. District Registrar/A.D.M. Fandr Bahraich & Ors.
655
40. Further, in Brahmanand and others Vs. State of U.P. and others and Bhola Vs.
State of U.P., it has been emphasized that the rights accruing under Section 122-B (4-F) flow from
a statutory deeming provision and once the conditions of the provision are satisfied, the eligible
person acquires the status of Bhumidhar with non-transferable rights and the revenue authorities are
under an obligation to recognize such rights.

41. In the present case, the record indicates that the petitioner, who belongs to the
Scheduled Caste community and claims to be a landless agricultural labourer, was granted benefit
under Section 122-B (4-F) by the Pargana Adhikari vide order dated 09.01.1998 after due enquiry.
The subsequent order dated 18.07.1998 setting aside the said order was admittedly passed ex-parte.
The Pargana Adhikari, therefore, rightly recalled the ex-parte order on 25.09.2003 so that the
matter could be heard afresh after giving opportunity to the petitioner.

42. The revisional authority, however, ignored the above legal position as well as the
principles of natural justice and proceeded to set aside the order dated 25.09.2003 on an erroneous
assumption that the earlier order dated 18.07.1998 had been passed on merits. The impugned order,
thus, suffers from manifest illegality and jurisdictional error.

43. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the law laid down in the judgments relied upon
by learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned
order dated 10.08.2004 passed by the revisional authority cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.

44. Accordingly, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and is hereby allowed. The
impugned order dated 10.08.2004 passed by respondent No.1 is quashed.

45. The order dated 25.09.2003 passed by the Pargana Adhikari, Hasanganj, District Unnao
is restored and the concerned authority shall proceed to decide the matter afresh in accordance with
law after providing due opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.

46. No order as to costs.
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(2026) 3 ILRA 655
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 10.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 1000572 of 2015

Mohd. Yaqoob & Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
District Registrar / A.D.M. Fandr Bahraich & Ors. ...Respondents

Issue for consideration
656 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Matter pertains to validity of an appellate order directing registration of a sale deed despite delay, invoking
section 5 of the Limitation Act. It involves whether registration authorities (Sub-Registrar/Appellate Authority)
can condone delay and act as a "court" under the Limitation Act.

Headnotes
A. Constitution of India,1950-Article 226-Registration Act,1908-Limitation Act,1963-Section 5Registration of document-Refusal by Sub-Registrar-Appeal-Filed beyond limitation-Condonation
of delay-Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act-Authorities under Registration Act (SubRegistrar/Appellate Authority) are not "courts" but merely public servants-Hence, provisions of
Limitation act not applicable-Appellate Authority had no jurisdiction to condone delay or
entertain time-barred appeal-Order directing registration of sale deed, without condoning delay,
illegal and without jurisdiction-Liable to be quashed.(Para 10 to 18)
Held
The court ruled that Authorities under the Registration Act are not courts but public servants, hence,
provisions of section 5 of Limitation Act do not apply to such proceedings. The Appellate Authority had no
jurisdiction to entertain or allow a time-barred appeal. (E-6)

Case law Cited
Raghuvir Narain Rastogi Vs State of U.P. & Ors 2005(2) AWC 1814 (LB)-referred to.

List of Acts
Constitution of India, 1950, Registration Act, 1908-Limitation Act,1963

List of Keywords
Sale deed, Time barrd appeal, Delay condonation, Public Servant, Registrar, Sub-Registrar, Appellate
authority, Court, Registration of document, Refusal, Lack of jurisdiction, Section 5 Limitation act.

Case Arising from
Civil jurisdiction: WRIT-C No.- 1000572 of 2015 10.03.2026
Mohd. Yaqoob & Anr. Vs. District Registrar/A.D.M. Fandr Bahraich & 2 Ors.
From the judgment and order dated 10.03.2026 of the High Court of judicature at Allahabad.
`
Appearances for Parties
Adv. for Petitioner(s)
Mohammad Aslam Khan,
Adv. for Respondent(s)
C.S.C., Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi Vinay Shukla

(Delivered by Hon'ble Irshad Ali, J.)

 1. Heard Shri M.A. Khan, learned Senior Advocate holding brief of Mohammad Aslam Khan,
learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent-State,
Shri Vinay Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent no.2 and Shri Abhishek Shukla, learned
Advocate holding brief of Shri Rajeiu Kumar Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent no.3.

2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioners have prayed that a writ of Certiorari
be issued quashing judgment dated 15.12.2014 (Annexure No.6 to the writ petition) passed by
opposite party no.1, with further prayer that writ, order or direction be issued by this Court which
may appear to be just and appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the case.
3 All. Mohd. Yaqoob & Anr. Vs. District Registrar/A.D.M. Fandr Bahraich & Ors.
657
3. Factual matrix of the case is that dispute relates to plot nos.41 and 42 situate in village
Meharban Nagar, Pargana and Tehsil Nanpara, District Bahraich which were recorded in the name
of Vedant Sanstha, Arya Nagar, Nanpara, District Bahraich. Pravin Kumar Sharma, claiming
himself to be President of the Society executed a sale deed in respect to plot no.41 in favour of
opposite party no.2 which was presented for registration before the Sub Registrar, Nanpara on
4.1.2011 who summoned the executant for recording his statement.

 Despite the notice, Praveen Kumar Sharma did not turn up to admit the execution. Sub
Registrar, Nanpara refused to register the document on 3.2.2011. Being aggrieved, opposite party
no.2 filed a time barred appeal along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

 On coming to know about pendency of the appeal, an application under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, the petitioner no.1 filed his objections. Opposite party no.1 vide order dated
15.12.2014, without condoning the delay though he was not empowered in view of the law, relying
upon the judgments passed by the Apex Court, allowed the appeal, after rejecting the objections
filed by the petitioner no.1 directing Sub Registrar, Nanpara to get the sale deed registered, who
accordingly complied the order.

4. Shri M.A. Khan, learned Senior Advocate submits that Section 5 of the Limitation Act
applies to the Court and not to the public servants, therefore, the order of the Appellate Authority
directing registration of sale deed is wholly without jurisdiction and as such, the same is liable to be
set aside by this Court.

5. Learned Senior Advocate next submits that the delay condonation application filed under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act has not been allowed and without condoning the delay, he
proceeded to pass the order.

6. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance upon
judgment rendered in the case of Raghuvir Narain Rastogi v. State of U.P. and others reported
in 2005(2) AWC 1814 (LB).

7. On the other hand, Shri Vinay Shukla, learned counsel for the respondent submits that in
pursuance to the order passed by the Appellate Court, sale deed has been registered and in case the
petitioners are aggrieved by registration of sale deed he may approach the Civil Court for its
cancellation.

8. Learned counsel for the respondent next submits that the petitioners have not approached
the Appellate Court by filing objection in regard to maintainability of application under Section 5
of the Limitation Act.

9. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I have perused the
material on record as well as case-law cited by learned counsel for the petitioners.

10. For deciding the controversy involved in the present writ petition, paragraphs 13, 14,
19, 23 and 24 of the judgment are extracted here-in-below:
658 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 "13. The case of M/s. Goodearth Steels Pvt. Ltd. Industrial Area Oral (supra) relates to
filing of a reference application under Central Excise Act, 1944. A Division Bench of this Court
after considering the various Apex Court judgments reiterated the aforementioned principle and
held that the provision contained in Limitation Act shall be applicable only to courts not to a
proceedings before an authority.

 In view of aforementioned proposition of law that provision contained in Limitation Act
cannot be extended to a proceedings before the authority or Tribunal, the present petition seems to
be well founded.

 14. The office of Sub-Registrar or Registrar does not function as a Court may be
gathered from certain provisions of the Registration Act itself. Sub-Registrars, Registrars are
appointed by the Government in pursuance to provision contained in Sections 5, 6, 6A and 7 of the.
Casual vacancies are filled up in pursuance to provision contained in Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the.
Under Section 14 of theState Government have been empowered to establish several offices under
the. The format for the seal of Registering Officers have been provided under Section 15 of the.

 19. As provided by Section 84 of the Act, every Registering Officer shall deem to be a
public servant but not a Judge or Judicial Officer. It is not necessary that every public servant
should be a Judge or Judicial Officer, though a Judicial Officer or a Judge shall be a public
servant. A person holding the post of Judicial Officer or a Judge is supposed to engage only to
provide justice to the people. Such officer may not have responsibility which is being bore by
ordinary Government servants.

 23. Under the above aforementioned facts and circumstance and provision of law
discussed, the office of Registrar, Additional Registrar or the Sub-Registrar may not be treated as a
Court. Accordingly the provision contained inSection 5 of the LimitationAct shall not be
applicable in a proceeding under the Registration Act.Section 5 of the LimitationAct
categorically extends the power for extension of period beyond the date of limitation provided
bythe LimitationAct or statute to a Court and not to other authorities. For convenience Section
5 of the LimitationAct is reproduced as under :

 "Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--Any appeal or any application, other
than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that
he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period."

 24. Under the above facts and circumstances, the Sub-Registrar or the appellate
authority under the though works as public servant but does not discharge duties as presiding
officer of a Court. Accordingly, the Limitation Act, shall not be applicable. The impugned order
suffers from lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writ petition deserves to be allowed."

11. Perusal of the above-extracted judgment shows that the office of Sub-Registrar or
Registrar does not function as a Court may be gathered from certain provisions of the Registration
Act itself. Sub-Registrars, Registrars are appointed by the Government in pursuance to provision
3 All. Mohd. Yaqoob & Anr. Vs. District Registrar/A.D.M. Fandr Bahraich & Ors.
659
contained in Section 5, 6, 6A and 7 of the Act. Casual vacancies are filled up in pursuance to
provision contained in Sections 10, 11 and 12 of the Act. Under Section 14 of the Act State
Government have been empowered to establish several offices under the Act. The format for the
seal of Registering Officers have been provided under Section 15 of the Act.

12. As provided by Section 84 of the Act, every Registering Officer shall deem to be a
public servant but not a Judge or Judicial Officer. It is not necessary that every public servant
should be a Judge or Judicial Officer, though a Judicial Officer or a Judge shall be a public servant.
A person holding the post of Judicial Officer or a Judge is supposed to engage only to provide
justice to the people. Such officer may not have responsibility which is being bore by ordinary
Government servants. For ready reference, Section 21 of the I.P.C. is repoduced as under:

 "Section 21 of the I.P.C. defines who shall be public servant. For convenience Section 21
is reproduced as under :

 "Public servant".--The words "public servant" denote a person falling under any of the
descriptions hereinafter following, namely :

 First.--(Repeated by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950).

 Second.--Every Commissioned Officer in the Military, Naval or Air Forces of India ;

 Third--Every Judge including any person empowered by law to discharge, whether by
himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions ;

 Fourth--Every Officer of a Court of Justice (including a liquidator, receiver or
Commissioner whose duty it is, as such officer, to investigate or report on any matter of law or
fact, or to make, authenticate, or keep any document, or to take charge or dispose of any property,
or to execute any judicial process, or to administer any oath, or to interpret, or to preserve order in
the Court, and every person specially authorised by a Court of Justice to perform any of such
duties ;

 Fifth--Every juryman, assessor, or member of a panchayat assisting a Court of Justice or
public servant ;

 Sixth--Every arbitrator or other persons to whom any cause or matter has been referred
for decision or report by any Court of Justice, or by any other competent public authority ;

 Seventh--Every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place
or keep any person in confinement ;

 Eighth--Every officer of the Government whose duty it is, as such Officer, to prevent
offences, to give information of offences, to bring offenders to justice, or to protect the public
health, safety or convenience;
660 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
 Ninth--Every Officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any
property on behalf of the Government, or to make any survey, assessment or contract on behalf of
the Government, or to execute any revenue-process or to investigate, or to report, on any matter
affecting the pecuniary interests of the Government, or to make, authenticate or keep any
documents relating to the pecuniary interest of the Government, or to prevent the infraction of any
law for the protection of the pecuniary interests of the Government.

 Tenth--Every Officer whose duty it is, as such officer, to take, receive, keep or expend any
property, to make any survey or assessment or to levy any rate or tax for any secular common
purpose for the ascertaining of the rights of the people of any village, town or district ;

 Eleventh--Every person who holds any office in virtue of which he is empowered to
prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an
election ;

 Twelfth--Every person-

 (a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the
performance of any public duty by the Government;

 (b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a
Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government company as defined inSection 617 of the
Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)."

13. Under the above aforementioned facts and circumstances and provision of law
discussed, the office of Registrar, Additional Registrar or the Sub Registrar may not be treated as a
Court. Accordingly the provision contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not be
applicable in a proceeding under the Registration Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act categorically
extends the power for extension of period beyond the date of limitation provided by the Limitation
Act or statute to a Court and not to other authorities. For convenience Section 5 of the Limitation
Act is reproduced as under:

 "Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--Any appeal or any application, other
than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI ofthe Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the
Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within
such period."

14. In view of the reasons assigned above, it is evident that in the argument of learned
Senior Advocate has force and the order passed by the respondent no.1 allowing the appeal
directing registration of sale deed is whollly without jurisdiction and as such, is liable to be set
aside by this Court. Arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondents that the sale deed
executed is matter of different forum, therefore in the writ petition no further action is to be taken
in response thereof.
3 All. Jai Narain Singh Vs. Board of Revenue Lko. & Anr.
661
15. In the opinion of this Court, the registration of sale deed was executed in pursuance to
an order passed in appeal. Registration of the sale deed was not executed in a independent capacity,
therefore, the order passed by the Appellate Court and registration of sale deed is dependent upon
the order of the Appellate Court.

16. Considering the above facts and circumstances of the case, the Sub-Registrar or the
Appellate Authority under the Act though works as public servant but does not discharge duties as
presiding officer of a Court. Accordingly, the limitation Act shall not be applicable. The impugned
order suffers from lack of jurisdiction. Hence the writ petition deserves to be allowed.

17. In view of the above, writ in the nature of Certiorari is issued quashing the impugned
order dated 15.12.2014 (Annexure No.6 to the writ petition) passed by the opposite party no.1 with
all consequential actions.

18. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed.
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(2026) 3 ILRA 661
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 19.03.2026

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE IRSHAD ALI, J.

Writ C No. 1001887 of 2006

Jai Narain Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
Board Of Revenue Lko. & Anr. ...Respondents

Issue for consideration
The case concerns a dispute arising out of auction proceedings initiated for recovery of bank dues where the
petitioner became the highest bidder and obtained a confirmed sale certificate. The Commissioner/Board of
Revenue set aside the sale on grounds of low price on lack of publicity, without proof of fraud or substantial
injury.

Headnotes
A. Constitution of India,1950-Article 226-U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules 1952Rules 285-I & 285-K-Once an auction sale is duly confirmed and sale certificate issued, the
rights of auction purchaser stand crystallized and can be set aside only on limited grounds such
as fraud or material irregularity in the conduct or publication of sale causing substantial injuryMere inadequacy of price or alleged lack of wide publicity is not sufficient to annul a confirmed
sale-Revisional authorities cannot exercise jurisdicition beyond statutory limits to unsettle such
sale on conjectural grounds-Order setting aside the sale held illegal and perverse, auction sale
restored.(Para 14 to 21)
Held