# Mohit Chaudhary v. State of U.P. & Anr

- **Citation:** (2015) 3 ILRA 1532
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-12-10
- **Case number:** Application U/S 482 No. 32940 of 2015
- **Bench:** Mrs. Ranjana Pandya
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohit-chaudhary-v-state-of-u-p-anr-43415
- **Pages:** 5

## Headnote

Cr.P.C.-Section 482-Quashing of criminal
proceeding including summoning orderoffence u/s 213 Gangsters & Anti Social
Activities (Prevention) Act 1986-on ground
all charge sheet relied by authoritiesconcluded
in
acquittal-petitioner
being
Addl. Advocate General worked as standing
counsel in different public sector-appearing
standing counsel for state of J & K-before
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court-held-matter
pending Since 1999-applicant not even
surrendered
before
Trail
Court
hence
proceeding delayed-all ground can be
raised and considered by the Trail Court
itself-warrant no interference-Application
rejected.
Held: Para-12
Thus, the factual aspect of the matter
cannot be examined by this Court while
examining the matter under Section 482
Cr.P.C. The cases mentioned in the gangchart have ended in acquittal or not has
to be seen by the trial court while
deciding the case of applicant under
Section 2/3 Gangster Act. The validity of
the approval/sanction of the D.M. can
also be looked into by the trial court. The
matter is pending since 1999 and the
applicant has not yet surrendered.
Case Law discussed:
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; (2006) 7 SCC 296;
(2008) 1 SCC 474; (2008) 8 SCC 781; (2009) 9
SCC 682; JT 2010 (6) 588; 2011 (1) SCC 74;
JT 2012 (2) SC 237; 2008 (62) ACC 650; AIR
1992 Supreme Court 604; AIR 1960 SC 866.

## Text

1532
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
required to qualify as an act of ''sedition' or
an act intended to induce persons to commit
an offense against the State. Was the article a
call to arms, rebellion, insurrection? The
answer must obviously be in the negative.
The Magistrate in the opinion of the Court
clearly failed to apply judicial mind, acted
irresponsibly and failed to bear in mind the
caution and circumspection which should
have preceded his assuming jurisdiction and
issuing summons.
G. OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS
29. For the aforesaid reasons, the
instant application shall stand allowed.
Consequently all proceedings relating to
Complaint Case No. 382 of 2015 State v.
Arun Jaitley u/s 124A, 505 IPC P.S.
Kulpahar District Mahoba pending in the
court of the Judicial Magistrate Kulpahar
Mahoba U.P. as well as the order issuing
summons dated 19 October 2015 shall
stand quashed and set aside.
--------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 10.12.2015
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. RANJANA PANDYA, J.
Application U/S 482 No. 32940 of 2015
Mohit Chaudhary
 ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. & Anr.
.....Opp. Parties
Counsel for the Applicant:
Samit Gopal
Counsel for the Opp. Parties:
G.A.
Cr.P.C.-Section 482-Quashing of criminal
proceeding including summoning orderoffence u/s 213 Gangsters & Anti Social
Activities (Prevention) Act 1986-on ground
all charge sheet relied by authoritiesconcluded
in
acquittal-petitioner
being
Addl. Advocate General worked as standing
counsel in different public sector-appearing
standing counsel for state of J & K-before
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court-held-matter
pending Since 1999-applicant not even
surrendered
before
Trail
Court
hence
proceeding delayed-all ground can be
raised and considered by the Trail Court
itself-warrant no interference-Application
rejected.
Held: Para-12
Thus, the factual aspect of the matter
cannot be examined by this Court while
examining the matter under Section 482
Cr.P.C. The cases mentioned in the gangchart have ended in acquittal or not has
to be seen by the trial court while
deciding the case of applicant under
Section 2/3 Gangster Act. The validity of
the approval/sanction of the D.M. can
also be looked into by the trial court. The
matter is pending since 1999 and the
applicant has not yet surrendered.
Case Law discussed:
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; (2006) 7 SCC 296;
(2008) 1 SCC 474; (2008) 8 SCC 781; (2009) 9
SCC 682; JT 2010 (6) 588; 2011 (1) SCC 74;
JT 2012 (2) SC 237; 2008 (62) ACC 650; AIR
1992 Supreme Court 604; AIR 1960 SC 866.
(Delivered by Hon'ble Mrs. Ranjana
Pandya, J.)
1. This Criminal Misc. Application
No. 32940 of 2015 has been preferred
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with prayer to
quash the proceedings of G.S.T. No. 350
of 1999, State of U.P. Vs. Rakesh
Chaudhary and others, arising out of Case
Crime No. 376 of 1997 under Section 2/3
of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti Social
Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, Police
Station Kotwali, District Mathura as well
as the summoning order dated 29.10.1999
passed by the Special Judge (Gangsters
3 All.
 Mohit Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1533
Act), Agra in aforementioned G.S.T No.
350 of 1990. Further prayer is to stay the
proceedings of G.S.T. No. 350 of 1999
and also the summoning order dated
29.10.1999 during the pendency of the
present application.
2. Heard Sri G.S. Chaturvedi,
learned counsel for the applicant and
learned A.G.A. for the State.
3. It has been contended on behalf of
the applicant that the learned court below has
passed a cryptic order without assigning any
reasons. It is further submitted that in all the
cases mentioned in the gang-chart, the
applicant has been acquitted. The applicant is
a qualified advocate on record of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India. He has a law firm at
New Delhi and does legal consulting and
litigation cases on behalf of various Indian
and Foreign Corporate Groups, Legal
Entities and their subsidiary companies. It is
further submitted that the applicant has been
Standing Counsel for various Public Sector
Banks/Entities like PNB, Allahabad Bank,
NSIC etc. He has worked in various heavy
stakes tax matters as a panel counsel for the
Union of India before the Hon'ble Apex
Court and presently is designated as Standing
Counsel for State of J & K before the
Hon'ble Apex Court with the status of
Additional Advocate General. He has also
been appointed as amicus curiae in matters
by the Hon'ble Apex Court. He has also
qualified A.R.O. Exam. He has been falsely
implicated due to enmity when he was a
student. On 29.10.1999, cognizance was
taken by the Court. No notice of any kind
was ever served upon the applicant.
Thereafter, bailable warrants were issued
against him which were also not served.
Later on, non-bailable warrants were ordered
to be issued. The applicant and co-accused
Rakesh Chaudhary after lodging of the F.I.R.
moved bail application (bearing number 353
of 1997) before the Special Judge (Gangsters
Act),
Agra
but,
ultimately,
the
bail
application was rejected in absence of the
applicant. No approval/sanction was granted
by the District Magistrate. Thus, the prayer
sought for is liable to be allowed.
4. Learned A.G.A. while supporting
summoning order has stated that the relief
prayed for in this application cannot be
granted under the provisions of Section
482 Cr.P.C.
5.
I am required to consider whether
such an application under Section 482
Cr.P.C. with the prayer, as aforesaid, is
entertainable. The scope of Section 482
Cr.P.C., as is evident from a bare reading of
aforesaid provision, can be culled out from
the provision itself, which reads as under:-
"482. Saving of inherent powers of
High Court.- Nothing in this Code shall
be deemed to limit or affect the inherent
powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect
to any order under this Code, or to
prevent abuse of the process of any Court
or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."
(emphasis added)
6.
The power under Section 482
Cr.P.C. is not to be exercised in a routine
manner, but it is for limited purposes,
namely, to give effect to any order under the
Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any
Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice.
Time and again, Supreme Court and various
High Courts, including ours one, have
reminded when exercise of power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. would be justified,
which cannot be placed in straight jacket
formula, but one thing is very clear that it
should not preampt a trial and cannot be used
1534
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
in a routine manner so as to cut short the
entire process of trial before the Courts
below. If from a bare perusal of first
information report or complaint, it is evident
that it does not disclose any offence at all or
it is frivolous, collusive or oppressive on the
face of it, the Court may exercise its inherent
power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. but it
should be exercised sparingly. This will not
include as to whether prosecution is likely to
establish its case or not, whether the evidence
in question is reliable or not or whether on a
reasonable appreciation of it, accusation
would not be sustained, or the other
circumstances, which would not justify
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. I need not go into various aspects in
detail but it would be suffice to refer a few
recent authorities dealing all these matters in
detail, namely, State of Haryana and others
Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others 1992 Supp (1)
SCC 335, Popular Muthiah Vs. State
represented by Inspector of Police (2006) 7
SCC 296, Hamida vs. Rashid @ Rasheed
and Ors. (2008) 1 SCC 474, Dr. Monica
Kumar and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors.
(2008) 8 SCC 781, M.N. Ojha and Ors. Vs.
Alok Kumar Srivastav and Anr. (2009) 9
SCC 682, State of A.P. vs. Gourishetty
Mahesh and Ors. JT 2010 (6) SC 588 and
Iridium India Telecom Ltd. Vs. Motorola
Incorporated and Ors. 2011 (1) SCC 74.
7. In Lee Kun Hee and others Vs. State
of U.P. and others JT 2012 (2) SC 237, it
was reiterated that Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot
go into the truth or otherwise of the
allegations and appreciate evidence, if any,
available on record. Interference would be
justified only when a clear case of such
interference is made out. Frequent and
uncalled interference even at the preliminary
stage by High Court may result in causing
obstruction in the progress of inquiry in a
criminal case which may not be in public
interest. It, however, may not be doubted, if
on the face of it, either from the first
information report or complaint, it is evident
that allegation are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no fairminded and informed observer can ever
reach a just and proper conclusion as to the
existence
of
sufficient
grounds
for
proceeding, in such cases refusal to exercise
jurisdiction may equally result in injustice,
more particularly, in cases, where the
complainant sets the criminal law in motion
with a view to exert pressure and harass the
persons arrayed as accused in the complaint.
8. In the present case, fortunately and
interestingly it is not the allegation of
applicants that there is any non-compliance
of order passed by Court under Cr.P.C. or
that there is any abuse of process on the part
of Court or that there is any failure or
travesty of justice on the part of Court below.
9. In 2008 (62) ACC 650, Pankaj
Kumar Vs. State of Maharashtra, the
Hon'ble Court has laid down as under
"10. ....The inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the
High Court to act according to whim or
caprice. The powers have to be exercised
saparingly, with circumspection and in the
rarest of rare cases, where the Court is
convinced, on the basis of material on
record, that allowing the proceedings to
continue would be an abuse of the process
of the Court or that the ends of justice
require that the proceedings ought to be
quashed. (See: Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary
and
others,
Kurukshetra
University and another v. State of
Haryana and another, and State of
Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and
others).
3 All.
 Mohit Chaudhary Vs. State of U.P. & Anr.
1535
11. Although in Bhajan Lal's case
(supra), the Court by way of illustration,
formulated as many as seven categories of
cases, wherein the extra-ordinary power under
the aforestated provisions could be exercised
by the High Court to prevent abuse of process
of the Court yet it was clarified that it was not
possible to lay down precise and inflexible
guidelines or any rigid formula or to give an
exhaustive list of the circumstances in which
such power could be exercised."
10. In State of Haryana and others Vs.
Ch. Bhajan Lal and others reported in AIR
1992 Supreme Court 604, the Hon'ble Apex
Court while referring the case of R.P. Kapur
Vs. The State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866,
has observed in para 88 as under:-
88. Gahendragadkar, J. speaking for the
Court while considering the inherent powers
of the High Court in quashing the First
Information Report Under Section 561-A of
the old Code (corresponding to Section 482 of
the new Code) in R.P. Kapur v. The State of
Punjab (cited above) at page 393 made the
following observation:-
Cases may also arise where the
allegations in the First Information Report or
the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do
not constitute the offence alleged; in such
cases no question of appreciating evidence
arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the
complaint or the First Information Report to
decide whether the offence alleged is
disclosed or not. In such cases, it would be
legitimate for the High Court to hold that it
would be manifestly unjust to allow the
process of the criminal court to be issues
against the accused person.
11. In State of Haryana and others
Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others (supra), the
Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed
in paras 105 and 106 as under:-
"105. In the backdrop of the interpretation
of the various relevant provisions of the Code
under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law
enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers
Under Section 482 of the Code which we have
extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of
illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process
of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay
down any precise, clearly
defined and
sufficiently
channelised
and
inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an
exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases
wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the
First Information Report or the complaint,
even if they are taken at their face value
and accepted in their entirety do not
prima-facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First
Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155 (2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations
made in the FIR or complaint and the
evidence collected in support of the same do
not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do
not constitute a cognizable offence but
constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no
investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as
1536
 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
contemplated Under Section 155 (2) of the
Code.
5. Where the allegations made in the
FIR or complaint are so absurd and
inherently improbable on the basis of which
no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
6. Where there is an express legal bar
engrafted in any of the provisions of the
Code or the concerned Act (under which a
criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution
and
continuance
of
the
proceedings and/or where there is a
specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious
redress for the grievance of the aggrieved
party.
7. Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with mala fide and/or
where
theproceeding
is
maliciously
instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and
with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.
106. We also give a note of caution to
the effect that the power of quashing a
criminal proceeding should be exercised very
sparingly and with circumspection and that
too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court
will not be justified in embarking upon an
enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the
F.I.R. or the complaint and that the
extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court
to act according to its whim and caprice."
12.
Thus, the factual aspect of the
matter cannot be examined by this Court
while examining the matter under Section
482 Cr.P.C. The cases mentioned in the
gang-chart have ended in acquittal or not has
to be seen by the trial court while deciding
the case of applicant under Section 2/3
Gangster
Act.
The
validity
of
the
approval/sanction of the D.M. can also be
looked into by the trial court. The matter is
pending since 1999 and the applicant has not
yet surrendered.
13. Accordingly, this application has
no force, which is dismissed.
--------