# Mohit Kumar Goyal v. State Of U.P. & Ors

- **Citation:** (2016) 3 ILRA 186
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2015-12-07
- **Bench:** Ran Vijai Singh
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mohit-kumar-goyal-v-state-of-u-p-ors-43427
- **Pages:** 10

## Headnote

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988-Ss. 69(2), 80(2) proviso, 89(1)(g)

Inter-State stage carriage permit- an application for inter-State permit made under Section 69(2)
of the Motor Vehicles Act is governed by the procedural safeguards contained in Section 80 of the Act,
and refusal to grant such permit must necessarily be supported by recorded reasons and preceded by
affording an opportunity of hearing to the applicant.

Refusal to grant permit- refusal of a permit without disclosing reasons and without granting
opportunity of hearing results in violation of the principles of natural justice and leads to serious civil
consequences, particularly where the livelihood of the applicant is affected.

Absence of inter-State agreement- mere reference to alleged pronouncements of the Supreme
Court or High Courts, without citing or disclosing the decisions relied upon, cannot constitute a valid
reason for refusal of an inter-State permit.

Violation of fundamental rights-Right to privacy and free movement.- police surveillance
and maintenance of a history-sheet directly infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d)
means free movement in its real sense and not mere physical locomotion under constant police watch.

Opportunity of hearing-an appeal against an order refusing grant of permit is maintainable under
Section 89(1)(g) of the Act, being an order not covered under clauses (a) to (f) thereof, and dismissal
of such appeal as not maintainable amounts to failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the appellate
authority.

Appeal-Maintainability-Failure to exercise jurisdiction -both the order of the State Transport
Authority refusing grant of inter-State permit and the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal
dismissing the appeal as not maintainable being arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of principles of
natural justice, are unsustainable in law and liable to be quashed. Matter remanded to the State
Transport Authority for fresh decision in accordance with law. Writ petition allowed.
3 All. Mohit Kumar Goyal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
187

Writ petition allowed.

List of Cases cited:

## Text

186 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 7.12.2015

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE RAN VIJAI SINGH, J.

Writ A No. - 61445 of 2015

Mohit Kumar Goyal ...Petitioner
Versus
State Of U.P. & Ors ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Manoj Kumar Singh

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C.

MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988-Ss. 69(2), 80(2) proviso, 89(1)(g)

Inter-State stage carriage permit- an application for inter-State permit made under Section 69(2)
of the Motor Vehicles Act is governed by the procedural safeguards contained in Section 80 of the Act,
and refusal to grant such permit must necessarily be supported by recorded reasons and preceded by
affording an opportunity of hearing to the applicant.

Refusal to grant permit- refusal of a permit without disclosing reasons and without granting
opportunity of hearing results in violation of the principles of natural justice and leads to serious civil
consequences, particularly where the livelihood of the applicant is affected.

Absence of inter-State agreement- mere reference to alleged pronouncements of the Supreme
Court or High Courts, without citing or disclosing the decisions relied upon, cannot constitute a valid
reason for refusal of an inter-State permit.

Violation of fundamental rights-Right to privacy and free movement.- police surveillance
and maintenance of a history-sheet directly infringes the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
19(1)(a), 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Freedom of movement under Article 19(1)(d)
means free movement in its real sense and not mere physical locomotion under constant police watch.

Opportunity of hearing-an appeal against an order refusing grant of permit is maintainable under
Section 89(1)(g) of the Act, being an order not covered under clauses (a) to (f) thereof, and dismissal
of such appeal as not maintainable amounts to failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the appellate
authority.

Appeal-Maintainability-Failure to exercise jurisdiction -both the order of the State Transport
Authority refusing grant of inter-State permit and the order of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal
dismissing the appeal as not maintainable being arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of principles of
natural justice, are unsustainable in law and liable to be quashed. Matter remanded to the State
Transport Authority for fresh decision in accordance with law. Writ petition allowed.
3 All. Mohit Kumar Goyal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
187

Writ petition allowed.

List of Cases cited:

1. D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., (1993) SCC 259;
2. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: (1978) 2 SCR 621;
3. Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1;
4. Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, (2005) 6 SCC 321;
5. Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Association v. Central Valuation Board, (2007) 6 SCC 668;
6. Dev Dutt v. Union of India, (2008) 3 ESC 433 (SC);
7. State of Orissa v. (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269;
8. Raghunath Thakur v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 SC 620;
9. Gronsons Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 2001 SC 3707;
10. Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1975 SC 266;
11. Southern Painters v. Fertilisers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd., AIR 1994 SC 1277;
12. Suresh Singh v. Board of Revenue, 2014 (5) ADJ 697;
13. Smt. Rajni Chauhan v. State of U.P., 2010 (6) AWC 5762;
14. Society for Education and Welfare Awareness (SEWA) v. Union of India, 2011 (6) ADJ 787.

(Delivered by Hon'ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.)

1. Heard Sri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned
Standing Counsel appearing for the State respondents.

2. Through this writ petition, prayer has been made to issue a writ of certiorari quashing
the orders dated 13.3.2015 passed by the State Transport Authority and order dated 3.8.2015
passed by the State Transport Appeallate Tribunal in Misc. Appeal No. 06 of 2015 (Mohit
Kumar Goyal Vs. U.P. Transport Commissioner, Lucknow)

3. Vide order dated 13.3.2015, the respondent no. 3 has refused to grant permit to the
petitioner whereas by the subsequent order dated 3.8.2015, appeal filed by the petitioner
against the order dated 13.3.2015 has been dismissed by the Tribunal as not maintainable.

4. The facts giving rise to this case are that the petitioner is the owner of bus and
applied for inter-state permit under SubSection 2 of Section 69 of the Motor Vehicles Act
(hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The said permit has been rejected by the State Transport
Authority by the following order:-

महोदय,
उपयुि चवर्यक डाक से प्रेचर्त अपने आवेदन पत्र चदनांक 7-2-2015 क संदभि ले, चिसके साथ रु०-200/-का स्िाम्प एवं रु०1000/- तथा रु०-6000/- क बैंक ड्राफ्ि संलग्न चकया गया है।
इस संबंध में अवगत कराना है की सहारनपुर-चवकासनगर मागि अंतरििीय मागि है िो उत्तर प्रदेश एवं उत्तराखंड राज्य के मध्य अवचस्थत
है। उत्तर प्रदेश एवं उत्तराखंड राज्य के मध्य अभी पारस्पररक पररवहन समझोता सम्पन्न नहीं हुआ है। मा० उच्ि न्यायालय के चवचभन्न आदेशों
एवं अश्वनी कुमार के केश में मा० उच्ितम न्यायालय द्वारा पाररत अचभमत के अनुसार अंतरििीय मागों पर चबना समझोंता के परचमि नहीं चदया
िा सकता। अत: डाक से प्राप्त उि आवेदन पत्र मूल रूप में वापस चकया िाता है। उत्तराखंड राज्य से पारस्पररक पररवहन समझोता सम्पन्न होने
पर यथाचस्थचत आप आवेदन पत्र प्रस्तुत कर सकते है।
188 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner herein has filed appeal under SubSection 1(g) of Section 89 of the Act. The said appeal has been dismissed as not
maintainable by the following order:

आदेश

यह अपील चद० 18-5-2015 अपीलाथी द्वारा उत्तरदाता चवपक्षी के आदेश संख्या 375/एस०िी०ए/ 2015 चद० 13-3-2015
के चवरुद्ध योचित की है। चवपक्षी ने अपीलाथी क प्राथिना पत्र चद० 7-2-2015 सम्बचन्ध सहारनपुर शाकूम्बरी देवी रायपुर तािेवाला- चवकास
नगर अन्तरािज्य/अरास्त्रीयकृत मागि पर स्थाई बस पचमि हेतु अस्वीकृत कर चदया है।

अपीलाथी का कथन हैं की प्राथी ने प्राथिना पत्र चदनांक 7-2-2015 में कोई त्रुचि नहीं है वह मोिरयान अचधचनयम संख्या 59/1988
की धारा 69(2) के तहत पोर्र्ीय है चवपक्षी का अस्वीकृचत आदेश चद० 13-3-2015 सम्बचन्धत चनयम- चनयमावली व संदचभित तथ्यों से
समचथित नहीं है। सम्बचन्धत राज्य को उि एक्ि की धारा 69(2) के चवपरीत कोई भी आदेश पाररत करने का कोई अचधकार नहीं है। आदेश
चद० 13-3-2015 खंचडत कर अपीलाथी का प्राथिना पत्र चदनांक 7-2-2015 स्वीकार होना व आवेचदत स्थाई बस पचमि िारी चकया िाना
िरूरी है। अपीलाथी ने अपने कथने के समथिन में माननीय उच्ि न्यायलायो एवं उच्ितम न्यायालय भारत की स्थचपत चवचध व्यवस्था भी संदचभित
है।

चवपक्षी ने अपने आदेश चद० 13-3-2015 के समथिन में कोई साक्ष्य प्रस्तुत नहीं चकया है केवल इतना ही तकि चदया है की आवेचदत
बस पचमि िारी होने से अनेक िाचतलिाए पैदा हो िायेगी। पचमि िारी चकया िाना िनचहत में नहीं है। अपील खंचडत की िाये।

आदेश

अपीलाथी की अपील पोर्र्ीय न होने के कारर् खंचडत की िाती है अपीलाथी सक्षम न्यायालय में कायिवाही में स्वतंत्र है।
चदनांक-3-8-2015
ह०अध्यक्ष
द्वारा- पुििीलाल मुंसीरम
20-8-2015

6. When the case was argued, on the first date i.e. on 3.11.2015 following order was
passed:-

The submission is that the state transport authority has erred in rejecting the
application of the petitioner for grant of stage carriage permit on the ground that on interstate route, permit cannot be granted without there being any agreement in between the
States pursuant to the judgment of the Apex Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that there is no such judgment, which prohibits grant of permit without there being
any agreement in between the States.

Learned Standing Counsel is directed to seek instructions in this matter apprising
the court as to whether on inter state route, permit cannot be granted without there being
any agreement in between the States. Put up on 26th November, 2015 as fresh. 3
3 All. Mohit Kumar Goyal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
189
7. Pursuant thereto, no instruction could be obtained by the learned Standing Counsel.
The case was again taken up on 27.11.2015 and the learned Standing Counsel was again
granted time to seek instructions but that too is of no avail.

8. From the perusal of the order dated 13.3.2015 passed by the State Transport
Authority, it is apparent that the State Transport Authority has refused to grant permit to the
petitioner for the reasons that there was no agreement in between the States for grant of
permit in view of the various pronouncements of Supreme Court and High Court. So far as
the appellate order is concerned, the appellate authority, after noting the submission of
learned counsel for the parties, dismissed the appeal as not maintainable without assigning
any reason.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in view of Sub-Section 1(g) of
Section 89 of the Act, the appeal would lie against any order not covered by Sub-Section 1
(a) to (f) of Section 89 of the Act. The next submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner
is that in view of Second Proviso to SubSection 2 of Section 80 of the Act, in case, the
authority refuses to grant permit, for that it has to record the reason after affording an
opportunity of hearing to the persons who have applied for permit, therefore impugned
orders are unsustainable and deserves to be quashed.

10. In response to that, learned Standing counsel appearing for the State respondents
submitted that the provisions contained under Section 80 are relating to the permit to be
issued under Section 66 of the Act and it will not be applicable in the cases where the
application has been filed under SubSection 2 of Section 69 of the Act.

11. For appreciating the controversy, it would be appropriate to quote the provisions
contained under Sections 66, 69 and 80, which are reproduced hereinunder :-

66. Necessity for permits :- (1) No owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit
the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such vehicle
Is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a
permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any
prescribed authority authorising him the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in
which the vehicle is being used:

Provided that a stage carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may be
specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a contract carriage:

Provided further that a stage carriage permit may, subject to any conditions that
may be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle as a goods carriage either
when carrying passengers or not:

Provided also that goods carriage permit shall, subject to any conditions that may
be specified in the permit, authorise the use of the vehicle for the carriage of goods for or in
connection with a trade or business carried on by him.
190 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(2) The holder of a goods carriage permit may use the vehicle, for the drawing of
any public or semi-trailer not owned by him, subject to such conditions as may be
prescribed.

[Provided that the holder of a permit of any articulated vehicle may use the primemover of that articulated vehicle for any other semi-trailor]

(3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply-

a. To any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State
Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial
enterprise;
b. To any transport vehicle owned by a local authority or by a person acting under
contract with a local authority and used solely for road cleansing, road watering or
conservancy purposes;
c. To any transport vehicle used solely for police, fire brigade or ambulance
purposes; d. To any transport vehicle used solely for the conveyance of corpses and the
mourners accompanying the corpses;
e. To any transport vehicle used for towing a disabled vehicle or for removing
goods from a disabled vehicle to a place of safety;
f. to any transport vehicle used for any other public purpose as may be prescribed
by the State Government in this behalf;
g. to any transport vehicle used by a person who manufactures or deals in motor
vehicles or builds bodies for attachment to chassis, solely for such purposes and in
accordance with such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the
Offical Gazette, specify in this behalf;
(h) omitted by Act 27 of 2000.
(i) to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 3,000
kilograms;
(j) subject to such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in
the Official Gazette, specify, to any transport vehicle purchased in one State and proceeding
to a place, situated in that State or in any other State, without carrying any passenger or
goods;
(k)To any transport vehicle which has been temporarily registered under section
43 while proceeding empty to any place for the purpose of registration of the vehicle;
(l) omitted by Act 39 of 2001.
(m) to any transport vehicle which, owing to flood, earthquake or any other
natural calamity, obstruction on road, or unforeseen circumstances is required to be
diverted through any other route, whether within or outside the State, with a view to
enabling it to reach its destination;
(n) to any transport vehicle used for such purposes as the Central or State
Government may, by order, specify;
(o) to any transport vehicle which is subject to a hire-purchase, lease or
hypothecation agreement and which owing to the default of the owner has been taken
3 All. Mohit Kumar Goyal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
191
possession of by or on behalf of, the person with whom the owner has entered into such
agreement, to enable such motor vehicle to reach its destination; or
(p) To any transport vehicle while proceeding empty to any place for purpose of
repair.
4. Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), sub-section (1) shall if the State
Government by rule made under section 96 so prescribes, apply to any motor vehicle
adapted to carry more than nine persons excluding the driver.

69. General provision as to applications for permits.

1.Every application for a permit shall be made to the Regional Transport
Authority of the region in which it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles:

Provided that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more regions
lying within the same State, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport
Authority of the region in which the major portion of the proposed route or area lies, and in
case the portion of the proposed route or area in each of the regions is approximately equal,
to the Regional Transport Authority of the region in which it is proposed to keep the vehicle
or vehicles:

 Provided further that if it is proposed to use the vehicle or vehicles in two or more
regions lying in different States, the application shall be made to the Regional Transport
Authority of the region in which the applicant resides or has his principal place of business.
2. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that in the case of any vehicle or vehicles
proposed to be used in two or more regions lying in different States, the application under
that sub-section shall be made to the State Transport Authority of the region in which the
applicant resides or has his principal place of business.

80. Procedure in applying for and granting permits. (i) An application for a
permit of any kind may be made at any time.

(2) A Regional Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an
application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act:

Provided that the Regional Transport Authority may summarily refuse the
application if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application would have the
effect of increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in
the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 71 or of contract carriages
as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-section
(3) of section 74:

Provided further that where a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application
for the grant of a permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing
its reasons for the refusal of the same and an opportunity of being heard in the matter.
192 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

(3) An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary
permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or by altering the route or
routes or area covered by it, or in the case of a stage carriage permit by increasing the
number of trips above the specified maximum or by the variation, extension or curtailment
of the route or routes or the area specified in the permit shall be treated as an application
for the grant of a new permit:

Provided that it shall not be necessary so to treat an application made by the
holder of stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route to increase the
frequency of the service so provided without any increase in the number of vehicles:
Provided further that,--

(i) in the case of variation, the termini shall not be altered and the distance
covered by the variation shall not exceed twenty-four kilometres;

(ii) in the case of extension, the distance covered by extension shall not exceed
twenty-four kilometers from the termini, and any such variation or extension within such
limits shall be made only after the transport authority is satisfied that such variation will
serve the convenience of the public and that it is not expedient to grant a separate permit in
respect of the original route as so varied or extended or any part thereof.

4. A Regional Transport Authority may, before such date as may be specified by it
in this behalf, replace any permit granted by it before the said date by a fresh permit
conforming to the provisions of section 72 or section 74 or section 76 or section 79 as the
case may be, and the fresh permit shall be valid for the same route or routes or the same
area for which the replaced permit was valid:

Provided that no condition other than a condition which was already attached to
the replaced permit or which could have been attached thereto under the law in force when
that permit was granted shall be attached to the fresh permit except with the consent in
writing of the holder of the permit.

5. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 81 a permit issued under the
provisions of sub-section (4) shall be effective without renewal for the remainder of the
period during which the replaced permit would have been so effective.

12. From the bare reading of Section 66 of the Act, it would transpire that it talks about
the necessity for permit. SubSection 3 of Section 66 provides the necessity of permit for
plying the vehicle on road. Sub-Section 3 of Section 66 also carves out exceptions where the
permit will not be necessary. Section 69 deals with the general provisions for grant of
permit. Sub-Section 2 of Section 69 covers the case of the petitioner where the petitioner
desires to have inter-State permit. Second Proviso to Sub-Section 2 of Section 80 provides
that the Regional Transport Authroity/ State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority
referred to Sub-Section 1 of Section 66 of the Act shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an
3 All. Mohit Kumar Goyal Vs State Of U.P. & Ors.
193
application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act. The proviso to SubSection 2 of Section 80 of the Act talks about the refusal of the permit stipulating the
condition that the reason has to be recorded while refusing to grant permit and for that, an
opportunity is required.

13. In view of aforesaid legal position, the submissions of learned standing counsel
appears to be misconceived to the extent that the Second Proviso to Sub-Section 2 of
Section 80 would not be attracted as the petitioner has filed application under Section 2 of
Section 69. Section 69 enables a person to file application under Section 69 to obtain a
permit of any kind and as has been discussed above, the provisions contained under Section
66 talks about the necessity for permits carving out the conditions when the permit would
not be required.

14. Otherwise also, assuming the argument of learned Standing Counsel that Second
Proviso to Section 2 of Section 80 would not be applicable is taken to be true, the order
would suffer from breach of principles of natural justice as refusal to grant permit without
assigning any reason and without giving any opportunity would lead to serious prejudice to
the petitioner, which involves the livelihood of the petitioner who desires permit for
purposes of running his business.
15. Therefore, in my considered opinion, before refusing to grant permit to the
petitioner, two conditions were to be fulfilled namely :-

(i). the refusal order must have contained the reasons.
(ii). he same was to be passed only after affording an opportunity of hearing.

16. The Apex Court in the case of D.K.Yadav Vs. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. ( 1993,SCC
259 ) has made the following observations:

"The cardinal point that has to be borne in mind, in every case, is whether the
person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and the
authority should act fairly, justly, reasonably and impartially. It is not so much to act
judicially but is to act fairly, namely, the procedure adopted must be just, fair and
reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. In other words application of the
principles of natural justice that no man should be condemned unheard intends to prevent
the authority from acting arbitrarily effecting the rights of the concerned person."

In Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248: (1978) 2 SCR 621 a
Bench of seven judges of the Apex Court has held that the substantive and procedural laws
and action taken under them will have to pass the test under article 14. The test of reasons
and justice cannot be abstract. They cannot be divorced from the needs of the nation. The
tests have to be pragmatic otherwise they would cease to be reasonable. The procedure
prescribed must be just, fair and reasonable even though there is no specific provision in a
statute or rules made thereunder for showing cause against action proposed to be taken
against an individual, which affects the right of that individual. The duty to give reasonable
opportunity to be heard will be implied from the nature of the function to be performed by
194 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the authority which has the power to take punitive or damaging action. Even executive
authorities which take administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on
inherent fundamental rights of citizens, must take care to see that justice is not only done but
manifestly appears to be done. They have a duty to proceed in a way which is free from even
the appearance of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. They have to act in a
manner which is patently impartial and meets the requirement of natural justice.

17. This view has consistently been followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in number of
cases namely, Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998 (8) SCC 1,
Canara Bank vs. V.K.Awasthy (2005 (6) SCC 321), Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Ass.
vs. Central Valuation Broad and Others ((2007) 6 SCC 668) and Devdutt vs. Union of
India and others (2008(3) ESC 433(SC) as well as this Court in Suresh Singh Vs. Board
of Revenue and others, 2014 (5) ADJ 697.

18. It is also well settled law that an order which leads to civil consequences must be
passed in conformity with the principles of natural justice.

19. Here in this case, since non grant of permit to the petitioner affect the livelihood of
the petitioner, therefore it leads to civil consequences.

20. In State of Orissa Vs. (Misss) Birapani Dei (1967 AIR S.C. 1269) Hon'ble Apex
Court has held that even an administrative order which involves civil consequences must be
made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed
of the case, the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to
meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given it
was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice.

21. The same view has been reiterated in the case of Raghunath Thakur Vs. State of
Bihar and Others (AIR 1989 SC 620), Gronsons Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. & Anr. Vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., A.I.R. 2001 SC 3707, M/s Erusian Equipment 10 and
Chemicals Ltd. Vs. State of West Bengal and Another (AIR 1975 SC 266) and M/s
Southern Painters Vs. Fertilisers & Chemical Travancore Ltd. and another AIR 1994 SC
1277, as well as Division Bench judgment of this Court in Smt Rajni Chauhan Vs. State
of U.P. & Ors. (2010 (6) AWC 5762) and Society for Education and Welfare Awareness
(Sewa) thru it secretary vs. Union of India thru Ministry of Human welfare (Manav
Sansadhan) New Delhi and others (2011 (6) ADJ 787).

22. I have seen the impugned orders referred hereinabove.

23. The State Transport Authority has refused to grant permit for the reasons that there
are decisions of the Supreme Court and High Court that without there being any agreement,
no stage carriage permit can be issued but while observing so the State Transport Authority
has not disclosed those cases giving citations where those propositions have been laid down
by the Hon'ble Apex court. On the contrary, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
there is no such decision of the Apex court which prohibits the issuance of permit on inter
3 All. Prem Sagar Pandey Vs State Of U.P.
195
state route without there being an agreement in between the States. Considering the
same, on two occasions, time was granted to the learned Standing Counsel to obtain
instructions but no instructions has yet been obtained, therefore the impugned order refusing
to grant permit is faulty on this count. Otherwise also, from the perusal of the order, it does
not transpire that before refusing to grant permit any opportunity of hearing was given to the
petitioner whereas the petitioner has taken specific ground that the impugned order dated
13.3.2015 has been passed without affording an opportunity of hearing.

24. So far as appellate order is concerned, the appellate authoirty, taking note of the
submissions of both the sides, has dismissed the appeal holding it to be not maintainable. I
fail to understand as to how the appeal would not be maintainable ignoring the statutory
provisions contained under Section 89 (1) (g) of the Act only because of noting of the
contentions of learned counsel for the parties. Here, the appellate authority has failed to
exercise its jurisdiction vested in it in view of the provisions contained under Sub-Section
1(g) of Section 89 of the Act. The factum of which could not be disputed by learned
Standing Counsel. Hence, both the orders cannot be sustained in the eye of law.

25. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated
13.3.2015 passed by the State Transport Authority and order dated 3.8.2015 passed by the
State Transport Appeallate Tribunal in Misc. Appeal No. 06 of 2015 (Mohit Kumar Goyal
Vs. U.P. Transport Commissioner, Lucknow) are hereby quashed. The State Transport
Authority is directed to pass a fresh order on the application of the petitioner in accordance
with law taking note of the observation made hereinabove.
---------
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 02.03.2016

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ARUN TANDON, J.

Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.- 39462 of 2014

Prem Sagar Pandey ...Applicant
Versus
State of U.P. .......Respondent

Counsel for Applicant:
Ramji Tripathi, Sheshadri Trivedi

Counsel for Opposite Party:
Govt. Advocate, Dileep Kumar

HELD:
1. This was the second bail application filed by the applicant in Special Sessions Trial No. 68 of 2011
arising from Case Crime No. 237/2010 involving Sections 302, 307, 427, 429, 120-B IPC, Explosive
Substances Act, Gangsters Act, and Criminal Law Amendment Act.