# Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET) v. The Presiding Officer & Ors

- **Citation:** (2020) 7 ILRA 299
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2020-05-04
- **Case number:** Writ C No. 25221 of 1995
- **Bench:** J.J. Munir
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/motilal-nehru-farmers-training-institute-cordet-v-the-presiding-officer-ors-45882
- **Pages:** 11

## Headnote

A. Labour Law - The Uttar Pradesh
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 4K - Validity of Award (Impugned) directing
reinstatement with continuity in service and
payment of full back-wages -- Reference by
state government - Section 2-A - Conciliation -
Section 6-N,6-P,6-Q - retrenchment - Labour
Court is a Court of referred jurisdiction - derives
its jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute from the
terms of the order of reference, under Section
4-K of the Act - Labour Court cannot venture
into questions that are not part of the reference
or the necessary incidents of it - Issues or
questions
that
are
concomitant
of
the
substantial dispute referred, can well be gone
into - matters that would give rise to a different
300 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
issue
or
question
altogether
cannot
be
examined by a Labour Court, unless referred -
award - unlawful - quashed.(Para-22,28)

State Government not at all empowered
determined the fact that it is a case of
termination, leaving it to the Labour Court to
determine the validity - reference made with
little or no application of mind by the
Authority competent to act for the State
Government under Section 4-K - fact of
termination becomes a jurisdictional fact -
Labour
Court
cannot
go
behind
that
jurisdictional fact - proceeded to record a
finding with reference to evidence that it is a
case where the services of the workman have
been terminated in breach of Section 6-N of
the Act - ordered that the respondentworkman be reinstated with continuity in
service and full back-wages.(Para - 23,24)

HELD:- Impugned award is held to be without
jurisdiction and manifestly illegal - State
Government directed to make a fresh reference
to the competnt labour court of the industrial
dispute on the basis of existing material,
particularly the record of the conciliation
proceedings
between
the
workman
(Respondent-2) and the Employer (Petitioners) -
All monies received by the workman in terms of
the interim order of this Court, passed in this
petition, shall, however, not be recovered from
him.(Para-27,28)

Petition allowed (E-7)

List of cases cited:-

## Text

7 All. Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET) Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors.
299
proceedings by notice dated 02.09.2004
were initiated against the petitioner in view
of many criminal cases against him as
mentioned in the said notice, which was
withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003. In so
far as the initiation for proceedings of
cancellation by notice dated 02.09.2004 is
concerned, the same were initiated on the
ground
that
in
the
incident
dated
14.07.2004, the petitioner misused his fire
arm and opened fire in the premises of
Tehsil Kaul in which Shahbudeen and
Dinesh Kumar Sharma were seriously
injured, resulting into breach of peace, law
and order and consequently case crime nos.
289 of 2004 and 290 of 2004 were
registered against the petitioner. These are
the criminal cases registered after the order
dated 28.10.2003 and can very well form
the basis of initiation of fresh proceedings
for cancellation of fire arm license, even if
the earlier notice dated 03.08.2003 was
withdrawn by order dated 28.10.2003.

24. Mere mention of the earlier criminal
cases in the present notice dated 02.09.2004
is not sufficient to quash the impugned order
dated 15.07.2005 in as much as the court
finds that the same was mentioned only to
show the petitioner's criminal history. These
cases are not the basis of the initiation of the
proceedings nor the impugned order has been
passed on the basis of those criminal cases.
The present proceedings, the court finds that,
are independent of the earlier proceedings.
The subject matter of both the notices is
different and as such the order dated
28.10.2003 does not come in the way of the
authorities in giving notice dated 02.09.2004
and passing the order dated 15.07.2005 under
Section 17(3) of the Arms Act, 1959.

25. Thus, considered, I do not find any
illegality in the order of cancellation dated
15.07.2005 passed by the licensing authority.

26. The appellate order has also been
rightly passed by the appellate authority,
affirming the order of the licensing authority.

27. The writ petition lacks merits and is
dismissed. No orders as to cost.
----------
(2020)07ILR A299
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 04.05.2020 &
12.05.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE J.J. MUNIR, J.

Writ C No. 25221 of 1995
And
CIVIL MISC. CORRECTION NO. 1 of 2020

Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute
(CORDET) ...Petitioner
Versus
The Presiding Officer & Ors.
 ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri V.R. Agarwal, Sri Piyush Bhargava

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri K.P. Agarwal, Seema Singh, Ms.
Sumati Rani Gupta

A. Labour Law - The Uttar Pradesh
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 4K - Validity of Award (Impugned) directing
reinstatement with continuity in service and
payment of full back-wages -- Reference by
state government - Section 2-A - Conciliation -
Section 6-N,6-P,6-Q - retrenchment - Labour
Court is a Court of referred jurisdiction - derives
its jurisdiction to adjudicate a dispute from the
terms of the order of reference, under Section
4-K of the Act - Labour Court cannot venture
into questions that are not part of the reference
or the necessary incidents of it - Issues or
questions
that
are
concomitant
of
the
substantial dispute referred, can well be gone
into - matters that would give rise to a different
300 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
issue
or
question
altogether
cannot
be
examined by a Labour Court, unless referred -
award - unlawful - quashed.(Para-22,28)

State Government not at all empowered
determined the fact that it is a case of
termination, leaving it to the Labour Court to
determine the validity - reference made with
little or no application of mind by the
Authority competent to act for the State
Government under Section 4-K - fact of
termination becomes a jurisdictional fact -
Labour
Court
cannot
go
behind
that
jurisdictional fact - proceeded to record a
finding with reference to evidence that it is a
case where the services of the workman have
been terminated in breach of Section 6-N of
the Act - ordered that the respondentworkman be reinstated with continuity in
service and full back-wages.(Para - 23,24)

HELD:- Impugned award is held to be without
jurisdiction and manifestly illegal - State
Government directed to make a fresh reference
to the competnt labour court of the industrial
dispute on the basis of existing material,
particularly the record of the conciliation
proceedings
between
the
workman
(Respondent-2) and the Employer (Petitioners) -
All monies received by the workman in terms of
the interim order of this Court, passed in this
petition, shall, however, not be recovered from
him.(Para-27,28)

Petition allowed (E-7)

List of cases cited:-

1.
Sitaram
Vishnu
Shirodkar
Vs
The
Administrator, Government of Goa & ors. (1985)
1 LLJ 480.

2. Eagle Fashions Vs Secretary (Labour) & ors.
(1999) 1 LLJ 232 Delhi

3. Malloys India Agra Vs P.O., Labour Court
Agra & anr. Writ -C No. - 14416 of 1998

4. Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi Vs Hindalco
Industries Ltd. (2014) 11 SCC 85

(Delivered by Hon'ble .J. J. Munir, J.)

1. The petitioner has put in issue an
award of the Presiding Officer, Labour
Court,
Allahabad
dated
16.02.1995
(published on 20.06.1995) passed in
Adjudication Case No. 4 of 1989 between
Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute
(CORDET), Phulpur, Allahabad through its
Principal and Santlal.

2. Admittedly, Motilal Nehru Farmers
Training Institute (CORDET), Phulpur,
Allahabad through its Principal are the
Employers
whereas
Santlal
is
their
workman between whom an industrial
dispute has arisen. The former are the
petitioners before this Court and shall
hereinafter
be
referred
to
as
''the
Employers'. The latter, that is to say,
Santlal, is arrayed as respondent no. 3 to
this petition. He will henceforth be called
''the workman'.

3. At the instance of the workman, an
industrial dispute under Section 4-K of the
Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(for short, ''the Act') was referred by the
State Government to the adjudication of the
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad
in the following terms:

"क्या सेवायोजक द्वारा अपने श्रभमक
सींत लाल श्र मेवा लल पद "मजदूर" क सेवाएीं
भदनाींक 21.03.1988 से समाप्त भकया जाना
उभचत तथा/ अथवा वैधाभनक है? यभद नह ीं, तो
सम्बींभधत श्रभमक क्या लाि/ अनुतोष (ररल फ)
पाने का अभधकार है तथा अन्य भकन भववरण
सभहत?"

4. The Labour Court, Allahabad
found for the workman and made an award
holding that termination of services of the
workman with effect from 21.03.1988 was
one in breach of the provisions of Section
6-N of the Act, and, therefore, unlawful. It
7 All. Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET) Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors.
301
was ordered that the respondent-workman
be reinstated with continuity in service and
full back-wages. Cost of Rs.100/- were also
awarded. The award aforesaid, details of
which have been indicated hereinbefore,
shall hereinafter be called ''the impugned
award'.

5. This petition was filed on
05.09.1995. It was admitted to hearing on
12.09.1995 and by a separate order passed
on the stay application, it was ordered that
operation of the award, insofar as it directs
payment of back wages, shall remain
stayed, provided the respondent-workman
is reinstated forthwith and paid wages from
16.02.1995 till the date of reinstatement. In
addition, it was directed that future wages
post-reinstatement would be paid as and
when they fall due.

6. A stay vacation application along
with a counter affidavit was filed on 12th
October, 1995 on behalf of the workman.
The Employers filed a rejoinder affidavit
on 11.08.1997. The stay matter along with
the workman's stay vacation application
came up before this Court for orders on
15.11.2008. By an order of the last
mentioned date, the stay order dated
12.09.1995 was confirmed and the stay
vacation application was rejected. This
petition was ordered to be listed for hearing
on 08.12.2008. A supplementary affidavit
was filed on behalf of the Employers on
13th April, 2012. In the midst of hearing,
on the request of learned counsel for the
Employer,
a
second
supplementary
affidavit was permitted to be filed on
14.05.2019 after withdrawing the case from
hearing. A supplementary counter affidavit
in answer to the second supplementary
affidavit on behalf of the Employer, was
filed on the behalf of the workman on
15.05.2019. A supplementary rejoinder
affidavit was filed on behalf of the
Employer on 20.05.2019. This makes for
the entire pleadings of the parties before
this Court.

7. It appears that the workman moved
the Conciliation Officer, Allahabad under
Section 2-A of the Act seeking conciliation
of the industrial dispute between the
Employers and the workman, set out in his
application dated 08.04.1988. The case
before the Conciliation Officer that was
registered on his file as C.P. Case No. 46 of
1988, was to the effect that the workman
was
employed
in
the
Employers
establishment
since
the
month
of
December, 1976. He was retained on the
post of a labourer on a permanent basis.
The workman's services were terminated
with effect from 21.03.1988 by the
Employers without any prior notice and
without compliance with the provisions of
the Act relating to retrenchment, embodied
in Section 6-N, 6-P and 6-Q. It was also
claimed that a demand was made by the
workman on 30.03.1988 in writing, asking
the Employers to settle the matter amicably
but the Employers did not respond. It was
requested
that
through
conciliation
proceedings the workman be extended
relief of reinstatement with continuity in
service, together with backwages since
31.03.1988 till his reinstatement. The
Employers appear to have put in their
written statement dated 05.05.1988 before
the Conciliation Officer, in substance,
taking a categorical stand that they never
terminated the services of the workman.
Rather, it was the workman who absented
from his duties with effect from 21st
March, 1988. Dilating on this stand of
theirs, the Employers asserted that due to
losses in the Fisheries Department where
the workman was engaged at the relevant
time, the workman was asked to render
302 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
service in the crop fields which he refused.
It was the Employers further stand in their
written statement that the workman, in case
he wanted to work, could join duties in the
crop files rightaway.

8. The conciliation proceedings failed
and a reference was made to the adjudication
of the Labour Court, in terms already set out
hereinbefore. Before the Labour Court, the
case was registered as Adjudication Case No.
4 of 1989 and notice was issued to parties.
The workman put in his written statement
dated 2nd May, 1989 where he asserted that
he was appointed in the capacity of a labourer
(Mazdoor) on a permanent post in the month
of December, 1976 by the Employers. He
continued in uninterrupted service of the
Employers
from
December,
1976
to
20.02.1988. The workman had worked for
more than 240 days in the Employers'
harness. His services were terminated by the
Employers, with effect from 21.03.1988,
illegally. There has been no complaint against
him and he had an unblemished service
record to his credit. It was further averred that
the workman's services were terminated
without the service of a chargesheet or
affording him opportunity of being heard. No
domestic inquiry was ever held and that his
services have been terminated in violation of
principles of natural justice. It was more
particularly averred that the workman has not
been served with a month's notice in writing,
indicating the reasons for his retrenchment.
Also, the workman has not been paid wages
in lieu of notice or has he been paid
retrenchment compensation. The termination
was claimed by the workman to be in breach
of the provisions of Section 6-N, 6-P and 6-Q
of the Act, besides Section 25-F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. It was also
specifically averred that the work that
afforded employment to the workman was
still available and juniors to the workman
have been retained by the Employers.

9. The Employers filed a written
statement and a rejoinder statement. The
written statement of the Employers is not
on record. Nevertheless, from a perusal of
the impugned award, it appears that the
written statement of the Employers was
filed before the Labour Court, bearing
Paper No. 4A. There, the Employers have
disputed the fact that the workman was
retained in the month of December, 1976.
Instead it appears to be their case that the
workman was employed from time to time
according to the exigencies of work. There
is then that specific case of the Employers
that they never terminated the workman's
services but the workman, of his volition,
stopped reporting to duty with effect from
21.03.1988. It is also their case noticed in
the impugned award that the workman was
taken
off
roster
from
the
Fisheries
Department and detailed to work in the
crop fields; but, he refused to work there
and ceased to report for duty since
21.03.1988.

10. The workman in his rejoinder
statement has said that he was appointed in
the establishment of the IFFCO, Phulpur
Farm Project in the month of December,
1976. This project was transferred to the
Employers by IFFCO. It was in the
aforesaid
manner
that
the
workman
continued in the services of the Employers.
The
workman
was
appointed
on
a
permanent post, and that he never refused
to work in the fields. The Employers in the
rejoinder statement dated 29th June, 1988,
which is on record as Annexure-6 to the
writ
petition,
have
reiterated
their
substantial case in paragraph-4 thereof; it is
quoted in extenso:
7 All. Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET) Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors.
303

"4. That the contents of paragraph
3 are wrong and denied. The employer
never terminated the services of the
concerned workman, but he is himself
absenting in his duties from 21-3-88. The
concerned workman was asked to work in
crop fields instead of fisheries but the
concerned workman refused to work there."

11. The workman applied to the
Labour
Court
to
summon
certain
documents
through
his
application
numbered Paper No. 6D which included the
attendance register from the month of
December, 1976 to March, 1988 and the
annual
report
of
the
Employers'
establishment
from
the
month
of
December, 1976 to March, 1988. A further
application was made to summon the
records of C.P. Case No. 46 of 1988 from
the Conciliation Officer. The Labour Court
allowed the petitioner's application bearing
Paper No. 6D, ordering the Employers to
produce
documents
sought
to
be
summoned, vide order dated 07.09.1990.
The Employers filed four documents
through a list bearing Paper No. 11/B-1.
This list carried at serial No. 1, 2 and 3 the
monthly progress report relating to the
Employers' establishment and at serial no.
4, the muster roll from the month of
December, 1986 to 31.06.1988. The
Presiding Officer passed an order on the list
of documents submitted by the Employers
to the effect that the required documents
have not been produced and, therefore, the
workman was at liberty to produce
secondary
evidence.
The
workman,
availing that opportunity, filed eight
documents through a list bearing Paper No.
12B-2. The documents produced by the
workman were marked as Exhibit Nos.
WW/2 to WW10. The parties also led oral
evidence. The workman supported his case
by entering the witness box and deposed
before the Labour Court as WW1.
Likewise, the Employers also supported
their case by oral evidence with the
Principal of the Employers' establishment
at the relevant time, Laxman Singh,
entering the witness box to testify as EW-1.

12. This Court has carefully perused
the impugned award and the evidence of
parties
brought
on
record
through
affidavits.

13. Heard Sri Piyush Bhargava,
learned
counsel
for
the
Employer
(petitioner) and Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta,
learned counsel appearing for the workman
(respondent no.2).

14. It appears on a perusal of the
impugned award that before the Labour
Court,
the
Employers'
plea,
that
consistently figures in the conciliation
proceedings and in the written statement
filed before the Labour Court to the effect
that the Employers never terminated the
workman's services but the workman of his
own accord absented from work, was taken
note of. The Labour Court has pointedly
noticed the Employers' case that the
reference made by the State Government is
fallacious and that no industrial dispute
exists
between
parties,
requiring
adjudication. In order to decide the
industrial dispute, the Labour Court has
posed unto itself the following question
that, in its perception, fell to be decided
(translated
into
English
from
Hindi
vernacular):

"Whether the claimant workman,
Santlal's services have been terminated
with effect from 21.03.88 without any
justifiable cause or the workman has of his
volition stopped reporting for work with
effect from 21.03.88."
304 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES

15. The Labour Court has proceeded
to answer the aforesaid question, in
substance, holding that the Employers' case
about the workman not reporting to duty
cannot be said to be established. A case of
unlawful termination from service has been
held in favour of the workman on account
of breach of the provisions of Section 6-N
of the Act. It has also been remarked as one
of the foundations for these findings that
the fact that the workman is a casual
labourer, has not been proved by the
Employers. It is on the basis of these
findings that the impugned award has been
entered.

16. Sri Piyush Bhargava, learned
counsel for the Employer submits that the
impugned award is without jurisdiction
inasmuch as it is founded on a reference
that does not encapsulate the substance of
the
dispute
between
parties.
It
is
emphasised by him that the Labour Court,
in considering evidence, could not have
travelled beyond the reference which in this
case it has decidedly done. It is his
submission that the terms of reference
being
limited
to
a
question
about
termination of the workman's services, the
Labour Court could not have gone into the
issue about the workman's voluntarily not
reporting to duty. He submits that, in fact,
the reference is bad because it thrusts upon
the Labour Court a case of termination
from service whereas on the parties' case
that was well disclosed in conciliation
proceedings,
it
is
evident
that
the
Employers' stand was that they never
terminated the workman's services. The
Employers had disclosed their stand before
the Conciliation Officer that it was the
workman who had refrained from reporting
for duty with effect from 21.03.88.
Therefore, according to learned Counsel for
the Employers, the dispute between the
parties is whether the workman voluntarily
refrained from reporting to work on and
after 21.03.88 and not whether his services
were terminated. In the event, on the
evidence led by parties in an adjudication
founded on a reference about the workman
abstaining from joining duties, the answer
went in favour of workman, the dispute
would be competently decided, entitling the
workman to relief. In that event, according
to learned counsel that question about the
Employer preventing the workman from
joining duties, as he claims, could well be
gone into. This, according to learned
counsel, is particularly so as the Employers
case is that they never terminated the
workman's services. He emphasises that
there being no acknowledgment of the fact
by the Employer that the workman's
services were ever terminated, a reference
about the legality of the workman's
termination from service is manifestly
illegal. The order of reference, according to
Sri Bhargava, has been made without
application
of
mind
by
the
State
Government to the substance of the dispute
between parties. No valid adjudication,
according to learned counsel, could,
therefore, be founded on it.

17. In support of his contention,
learned counsel for the petitioner has
placed reliance on the decision of the
Bombay High Court in Sitaram Vishnu
Shirodkar
vs.
The
Administrator,
Government of Goa and others, reported
in 1985 (1) LLJ 480. Learned counsel for
the petitioner has drawn the attention of the
Court to paragraph 8 of the report in
Shirodkar (supra) where M.R.Waikar, J.
speaking for the Division Bench held:

"8.
We
are
in
respectful
agreement with the above observations of
the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court. In
7 All. Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET) Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors.
305
the instant case also the real dispute was
whether the services of the respondent No.
4 were terminated or he had voluntarily
abandoned the services and the reference
that was made to this effect.

"Whether the action of the
Management of M/s. Hotel Cafe Real,
Panaji in terminating the services of Shri
Shanu Mango Kunkolienkar, with effect
from 1st March, 1978 is legal and justified.
If the answer be in the negative, to what
relief, if any, is the aforementioned
workman entitled to?"

The Tribunal could not travel
beyond the reference and decide the
question whether the respondent No. 4
had abandoned his services. That the
petitioner had terminated the services of
the respondent No. 4 was an act fastened
on the petitioner by this reference and
the only question left open for decision
was whether the termination was legal
and proper. In this view of the matter, in
our opinion, the reference itself was bad
and has to be quashed......."
 (emphasis by Court)

18. Sri Bhargava has further placed
reliance upon the decision of a Division
Bench of the Delhi High Court in Eagle
Fashions vs. Secretary (Labour) &
Others reported in 1999 (1) LLJ 232
Delhi. In Eagle Fashions (supra) it has
been held:

"....The
principal
ground
on
which challenge has been laid on the order
of reference is that the terms of reference
presume employment of Respondents 2 to
8 having been terminated and seeks
adjudication on whether such termination
was illegal or unjustified on the part of the
Management. It is submitted by the learned
counsel for the Petitioner that there was no
material available with the appropriate
Government for arriving at a finding of the
employment of Respondents 2 to 8 having
been terminated and as such the question of
seeking adjudication on the legality or the
justness thereof did not arise.

2.
The
learned
counsel
for
Respondents 2 to 8 has supported the order
of reference including the terms thereof.

3. Having heard the learned
counsel for the parties and having perused
the material brought on record, we are
satisfied that the terms of reference have
not been properly drawn up and therefore
the order of reference is vitiated. The Full
Bench decision of this Court in India
Tourism Development Corporation v. Delhi
Administration, 1982 LIC 1309 is an
authority for the proposition that the terms
of reference should clearly spell out the real
dispute between the parties and if that be
not so, the order of reference would be
liable to be interfered with in exercise of
writ jurisdiction of this Court as the Labour
Court would not travel beyond the
reference and decide the real question in
dispute.

4.
When
the
factum
of
employment and termination itself were
in dispute, the terms of reference could
not have been so framed as to presume
the employment and its termination and
confining
the
reference
merely
to
adjudication of illegality or unjustness
thereof. We are of the opinion that the
order of reference has been drawn up
without application of mind and hence is
vitiated. (emphasis by Court)

19. Learned counsel for the Employer
has also to the same end reposed faith in a
306 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
decision of this Court in Malloys India
Agra vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court
Agra and Another, Writ -C No. - 14416
of 1998, decided on 14th March, 2019. In
Malloys India Agra (supra), it has been
held by B. Amit Sthalekar, J.:

"In my opinion, the submission of
the learned counsel for the respondents is
absolutely misconceived. When a reference
is made by the State Government to the
Labour Court, the Labour Court is bound to
decide only that dispute which is referred to
it and it cannot travel beyond the scope of
the reference. The Labour Court itself is a
creature of the reference and cannot
adjudicate matters not within the purview
of the dispute actually referred to it by the
order of the reference. The law in this
regard is well settled."

20. Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta, learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
workman
submits, repelling the petitioners contention
on this count, that the reference is
appropriately made so as to carry the
substance of the industrial dispute between
parties. She submits that the petitioner's
case that the services of the workman were
never terminated but that he abstained of
his volition, is no more than the Employers'
defence. The factum of termination claimed
by the workman, according to Ms. Gupta,
is the substance of dispute. In judging the
validity of the Employers' action in
terminating the workman's services, their
case about non termination, could well be
determined. According to the learned
counsel
for
the
workman,
what
substantially has to be decided by the
Labour Court is whether the workman's
services have been illegally dispensed with
by the Employers. The Labour Court while
going
into
this
question,
would
be
competent to examine the Employer's case
which is no more than their defence that the
workman has abandoned employment. In
judging the validity of the termination, it is
implicit that the Labour Court would have
to go into to the question whether, in fact,
the
workman's
services
have
been
determined by the Employers. It is only in
the event that the Labour Court finds it for
a fact that the workman's services have
been terminated that it would go into its
validity. In case, the Labour Court were to
find that the Employers never terminated
the workman's services, the reference
would have to be answered that way
entitling the workman to continue. In short,
according to learned Counsel for the
workman, the terms of reference are
appositely framed and empower the Labour
Court to well examine the Employers case
that they never terminated the workman's
services. It cannot, therefore, be said,
according to learned Counsel for the
workman, that the reference does not clothe
the Labour Court with jurisdiction to
examine the industrial dispute involved.

21. Away from the point of
jurisdiction on the reference made, learned
Counsel for the workman submits that the
Labour Court has appreciated relevant
evidence and come to the categorical
conclusion that the workman has been
illegally retrenched, in violation of Section
6-N of the Act. It is submitted further that
this Court cannot look into the correctness
of findings of fact recorded by the Labour
Court unless they are manifestly illegal,
without jurisdiction or based on irrelevant
evidence.
Learned
counsel
for
the
respondent has placed reliance upon the
decision
of
the
Supreme
Court
in
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi vs. Hindalco
Industries Limited, (2014) 11 SCC 85.
On this score, she has drawn the attention
of the Court to paragraph 22 of the report in
7 All. Motilal Nehru Farmers Training Institute (CORDET) Vs. The Presiding Officer & Ors.
307
Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra), where
it has been held by their Lordships thus:

22. A careful reading of the
judgments reveals that the High Court can
interfere with an order of the Tribunal only
on the procedural level and in cases, where
the decision of the lower courts has been
arrived at in gross violation of the legal
principles. The High Court shall interfere
with factual aspect placed before the
Labour Courts only when it is convinced
that the Labour Court has made patent
mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or
have made grave errors in law in coming to
the conclusion on facts. The High Court
grating contrary relief under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution amounts to
exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it.
Therefore, we accordingly answer Point (I)
in favour of the appellant."

22. There is little doubt about the
principle that the Labour Court is a Court of
referred jurisdiction. It derives its jurisdiction
to adjudicate a dispute from the terms of the
order of reference, under Section 4-K of the
Act. There can be little quarrel, again for a
principle, that the Labour Court cannot
venture into questions that are not part of the
reference or the necessary incidents of it.
Issues or questions that are concomitant of
the substantial dispute referred, can well be
gone into. But matters that would give rise to
a different issue or question altogether cannot
be examined by a Labour Court, unless
referred. An intrinsically different dispute,
though very proximate to the one referred,
cannot be adjudicated upon by the Labour
Court, in the absence of a reference clearly
incorporating or carrying that dispute.

23. The question that then arises here is,
whether the order of reference postulates a
dispute about abandonment of or forsaking
his employment by the workman. Learned
Counsel for the workman submits that it is
implicit in the idea of termination and is to be
examined on the basis of evidence with the
Employer urging it for a defence. This Court
does not think so. The order of reference once
it speaks about the validity of termination
from service with effect from 21.03.88 binds
the Labour Court to assume that the services
of the workman were terminated. The Labour
Court is left only to adjudge whether that
termination is lawful or not; and if not, to
what relief the workman is entitled. Nothing
more or nothing less has been referred to the
Labour Court. Here is a case where the State
Government have for themselves determined
the fact that it is a case of termination, leaving
it to the Labour Court to determine the
validity. The State Government is not at all
empowered to decide or determine that it is a
case of termination of services. Apparently,
the reference has been made with little or no
application of mind by the Authority
competent to act for the State Government
under Section 4-K. An appropriately drawn
up reference would have clearly referred the
dispute
about
the
workman
having
abandoned services voluntarily and further
the dispute that if it be not abandonment,
termination from service is lawful or not.
Then, of course, there would be a specific
reference to the relief, if any.

24. The order of reference here, as
already said, proceeds on a premise that the
workman's services have been terminated.
This being the scope and content of the
reference made to the Labour Court, the
fact of termination becomes a jurisdictional
fact. The Labour Court cannot go behind
that jurisdictional fact to hold that in fact it
is a case where the workman has
voluntarily
forsaken
or
abandoned
employment or he has not done so. The
Labour Court has gone into the question of
308 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
the workman voluntarily staying away from
work after 21.03.88 and held for a fact on
the basis of evidence that he did not do so.
He has then proceeded to record a finding
with reference to evidence that it is a case
where the services of the workman have
been terminated in breach of Section 6-N of
the Act. Clearly, the Labour Court had no
jurisdiction
to
decide
the
emergent
industrial dispute, in the absence of the
order of reference carrying clear terms,
asking it to examine the issue whether the
workman had voluntarily stayed away from
work or abandoned employment with effect
from 21.03.88.

25. The view that this Court takes
finds particular support in the decision of
the Bombay High Court in Sitaram
Vishnu Shirodkar (supra), where the
Division Bench held to like effect on
principle in a case with very similar facts.
The principle on which this Court has
proceeded also has endorsement of the
decisions of the Delhi High Court in Eagle
Fashions (supra) besides this Court in
Malloys India Agra (supra).

26. Learned counsel for the Employer
and workman have exchanged further
pleadings
by
way
of
supplementary
affidavits,
including
a
supplementary
counter and a supplementary rejoinder,
where
the
Employer
has
tried
to
demonstrate
that
the
workman
was
reinstated in service in compliance with the
interim order passed by this Court and paid
wages as directed. Later on, he again
abandoned employment and took up work
with the Employers as a contractor.
Learned counsel for the Employer has
pointed out, on the basis of some of the
contracts annexed, that the workman found
opting out of employment and to work as a
contractor for the Employer more lucrative.
Ms. Sumati Rani Gupta has asserted that
the contracts have been forced upon the
workman in order to get rid of obligations
that the Employers would owe him, if he
were to continue as their employee. It is
also emphasised on the basis of facts and
figures disclosed in the supplementary
counter affidavit that the contracts yield
lesser advantage to the workman that what
he would get in remuneration as an
employee. It is not for this Court to go into
this post award event. It does not arise
either on the reference made or on the
terms of the impugned award. In the event,
the workman post reinstatement in terms of
the award passed by this Court, has left
employment and has some grievance about
it, it would be a fresh transaction that may
give rise to a fresh industrial dispute. It has
nothing to do with the industrial dispute
that is subject matter of the impugned
award.

27. In view of what has been said
above, the impugned award is held to be
without
jurisdiction
and,
therefore,
manifestly illegal. The State Government
shall, however, make a fresh reference of
the
industrial
dispute
between
the
Employer and the workman, appropriately
drawn up bearing in mind what has been
said in this judgment. This reference shall
be made by the State Government on the
basis of existing material, particularly the
record of the conciliation proceedings
between the workman and the Employer.
The reference, as above indicated, shall be
made within three months next to the
competent Labour Court for adjudication in
accordance with law. Any sum of money
that the workman has received under
interim orders of this Court, shall not be
recovered from him bearing in mind the
fact that the workman has rendered service
for a substantial period of time in terms of
7 All. Smt. Vimla Devi Vs. Commissioner Vindhyachal Division Mirzapur & Ors.
309
the award impugned, the interim order
passed here and also the totality of
circumstances obtaining.

28. In the result, this petition succeeds
and is allowed. The impugned award dated
16.02.1995 (published on 20.06.1995)
passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, Allahabad in Adjudication Case No.
4 of 1989, is hereby quashed. The State
Government shall make reference afresh,
within three months next, to the competent
Labour Court bearing in mind what has
been said in this judgment. All monies
received by the workman in terms of the
interim order of this Court, passed in this
petition, shall, however, not be recovered
from him. Costs easy.
----------
(2020)07ILR A309
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 05.03.2020

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE ASHWANI KUMAR MISHRA, J.

Writ C No. 25519 of 2016

Smt. Vimla Devi ...Petitioner
Versus

Commissioner
Vindhyachal
Division
Mirzapur & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Petitioner:
Sri Rajesh Kumar Dubey, Sr Narendra Deo
Upahdayay, Sri Santosh Kumar Tiwari, Sri
Vinay Bhushan Upadhyay, Sri Virandra
Singh.

Counsel for the Respondents:
C.S.C., Sri Bhoop Nath Yadav, Sri H.K
Asthana, Sri Om Singh Rathaur, Sri Ram
Babu Yadav

A. Civil Law - U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901
- Section 202 - Object and Binding effect of
compromise/family settlement - - Correction of
error or omission - courts would lean in favour
of family settlement unless it is unfair, tainted
by fraud or lacks bona fide - binding effect of
compromise cannot be avoided in proceedings
for correction of records on the ground that
devolution of estate is contrary to course
contemplated in law - No specific case of error
or omission - appellate court and revisional
court - correctly rejected the application filed by
the present petitioner under Section 202 of the
L.R. Act, 1901 - fair settlement for devolution of
property from the mother to her three
daughters has been agreed upon in the family
settlement/compromise, which has also been
given effect to .(Para-13,15,18)

Parties to dispute - three real sisters - inherited
agricultural land and Abadi from their mother -
initially agreed for the property to be settled in a
manner such that each party got a fair share -
also
executed/signed
a
family
settlement/compromise before the Tehsildar,
which was acted upon and mutation was carried
out in the revenue records in terms of the
compromise - However, greed on part of one of
the daughters (Petitioner), later, led to filing of
an application for correction in the revenue
records,
notwithstanding
the
compromise,
leading to filing of the present writ petition.
(Para-1)

HELD:- The effect of compromise, therefore,
cannot be nullified in the garb of proceedings
initiated for correction in records under Section
202 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901. (Para-17)

Petition dismissed. (E-7)

List of cases cited: -

1. Arjan Singh Vs Punit Ahluwalia & ors. (2009)
107 RD 259

2. Ram Abhilakh & ors. Vs D.D. C. & ors. (2017)
135 RD 605

3.
Kale
&
ors.
Vs
Deputy
Director
of
Consolidation, AIR (1976) SC 807