# Mukesh Kumar Yadav v. Union of India

- **Citation:** (2023) 4 ILRA 1212
- **Court:** High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
- **Decided:** 2023-03-29
- **Case number:** Writ-A No. 1768 of 2013
- **Bench:** Karunesh Singh Pawar
- **Source:** https://unisonlegal.in/judgment/allahabad-high-court/mukesh-kumar-yadav-v-union-of-india-49836
- **Pages:** 8

## Headnote

A. Civil Law - Termination of Probationer -
Natural Justice - Constitution of India,
Article
311
-
Central
Civil
Services
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, Rule
4 All. Mukesh Kumar Yadav Vs. Union of India
1213
5(1) - Termination of temporary service -
Services of a temporary government
servant are liable to termination at any
time by a notice in writing given by the
appointing authority to the government
servant. Protection under Article 311(2) of
the Constitution of India is available to
probationers and temporary employees in
the event that a termination order is by
way of punishment and is punitive or
stigmatic in nature. The tests to determine
whether,
in
substance,
an
order
of
termination is punitive are to see whether
prior to the termination there was (a) a
full-scale
formal
enquiry,
(b)
into
allegations involving moral turpitude or
misconduct, (c) which culminated in a
finding of guilt. If all three factors are
present, the termination is considered
punitive irrespective of the form of the
termination order. Conversely, if any one
of the three factors is missing, the
termination is non-punitive.

B. In this case, petitioner was appointed
on temporary basis. His appointment
order clearly stated that the petitioner's
service was purely temporary and could
be
terminated
at
any
time
without
assigning any reason, by giving him one
month's
notice.
Petitioner,
after
his
appointment,
remained
unauthorizedly
absent, without intimation or permission,
for 22 days within the initial three months
of his service. He left the police line/camp
without
any
prior
intimation
to
his
superior authorities. A one-month notice
for termination of the petitioner's service
was issued vide letter dated 30.11.2011,
and the petitioner was terminated from
service
effective
31.12.2011
upon
completion
of
the
one-month
notice
period. Held : The termination order
showed
that
it
was
a
termination
simpliciter.
No
charges
were
framed
against the petitioner. The termination
order was not stigmatic, and no punitive
or penal consequences flowed from the
termination
order.
Terminating
the
services of the petitioner, in the exercise
of the employer's right to dispense with
the services of an employee within the
probation period, would not make an
otherwise innocuous order of discharge or
termination punitive in nature. (Para 14)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

## Text

1212 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
dismissed the writ petition but also
observed that we must not be too rigid in
such matters and must give some free play
to the joints of the State machinery.
Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that if
a small part of tax collected is utilized for
providing some conveniences or facilities
or
concessions
to
any
religious
denomination, that will not be violative of
Article 27 of the Constitution of India.

25. Thus, if the State spends some
money out of the taxes/revenue collected
by it from the citizens and appropriates
some
amount
for
providing
some
conveniences or facilities to any religious
denomination it will not be violative of
Article 27 of the Constitution of India.
While observing this, we have to always
keep in mind that there exits a clear line of
distinction between a secular activity and
religious activity which may be undertaken
by the State, like providing conveniences
and facilities and indulgence of a State in
maintenance and propagation of religion or
religious denomination.

26. We may also make a reference to
yet another judgment of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the case of State of Gujarat and
another v. Islamic Relief Committee,
Gujarat and others [(2018) 13 SCC 687].
Dealing with a situation of damage,
destruction and desecration of religious
places and institutions in communal riots,
Hon'ble
Supreme
Court
repelled
the
submissions raised on behalf of the State
that the State cannot be commanded to
repair or restore the places of worship as
any such act on the part of the State shall
create a dent in the secular fabric of our
society. Hon'ble Supreme Court further
repelled the submissions made on behalf of
the State that the expenditure in such a
situation for repair and restoration of any
place of worship is impermissible in view
of
Article
27
of
the
Constitution.
Accordingly, a Scheme for such purpose
was approved by Hon'ble Supreme Court
which permitted the State to undertake
repair and restoration of places of worship
which were damaged, destructed and
desecrated during communal riots.

27. For the reasons aforesaid, we find
that the petitioner in this case has
completely misread the provisions of
Government
Order/Letter
dated
10.03.2023. We are, thus, not persuaded to
interfere in the P.I.L. which is hereby
dismissed.

28. However, there will be no order as
to costs.
----------
(2023) 4 ILRA 1212
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: LUCKNOW 29.03.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE KARUNESH SINGH PAWAR, J.

Writ-A No. 1768 of 2013

Mukesh Kumar Yadav ...Petitioner
Versus
Union of India ...Respondent

Counsel for the Petitioner:
M.P. Raju, Gyanender Singh, Pt. Surya
Kumar Awasthi, Sanjeev Kumar Pandey,
Vimal Kumar Pandey

Counsel for the Respondent:
A.S.G., Ajay Kumar Singh, Nandita Bharti,
Raj Kumar Singh, Rajeev Singh Chauhan

A. Civil Law - Termination of Probationer -
Natural Justice - Constitution of India,
Article
311
-
Central
Civil
Services
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, Rule
4 All. Mukesh Kumar Yadav Vs. Union of India
1213
5(1) - Termination of temporary service -
Services of a temporary government
servant are liable to termination at any
time by a notice in writing given by the
appointing authority to the government
servant. Protection under Article 311(2) of
the Constitution of India is available to
probationers and temporary employees in
the event that a termination order is by
way of punishment and is punitive or
stigmatic in nature. The tests to determine
whether,
in
substance,
an
order
of
termination is punitive are to see whether
prior to the termination there was (a) a
full-scale
formal
enquiry,
(b)
into
allegations involving moral turpitude or
misconduct, (c) which culminated in a
finding of guilt. If all three factors are
present, the termination is considered
punitive irrespective of the form of the
termination order. Conversely, if any one
of the three factors is missing, the
termination is non-punitive.

B. In this case, petitioner was appointed
on temporary basis. His appointment
order clearly stated that the petitioner's
service was purely temporary and could
be
terminated
at
any
time
without
assigning any reason, by giving him one
month's
notice.
Petitioner,
after
his
appointment,
remained
unauthorizedly
absent, without intimation or permission,
for 22 days within the initial three months
of his service. He left the police line/camp
without
any
prior
intimation
to
his
superior authorities. A one-month notice
for termination of the petitioner's service
was issued vide letter dated 30.11.2011,
and the petitioner was terminated from
service
effective
31.12.2011
upon
completion
of
the
one-month
notice
period. Held : The termination order
showed
that
it
was
a
termination
simpliciter.
No
charges
were
framed
against the petitioner. The termination
order was not stigmatic, and no punitive
or penal consequences flowed from the
termination
order.
Terminating
the
services of the petitioner, in the exercise
of the employer's right to dispense with
the services of an employee within the
probation period, would not make an
otherwise innocuous order of discharge or
termination punitive in nature. (Para 14)

Dismissed. (E-5)

List of Cases cited:

1. Purushotam Lal Dhingra Vs U.O.I AIR 1958
SC 36

2. Chandra Prakash Shahi Vs St. of U.P. & ors.
2000 (5) SCC 152

3. V.P. Ahuja Vs St. of Pun. & ors. 2000 SCC (3)
239

4. U.O.I. & ors. Vs Mahaveer C. Singhvi 2010
SCC (8) 220

5. St. of Pun. & ors. Vs Sukhwinder Singh
(2005) 5 SCC 569

6. Pavanendra Narayan Verma Vs Sanjay Gandhi
P.G.I. of Medical Sciences & anr. (2002) 1 SCC
520

7. U.O.I. & anr. Vs K. Balakrishnan Kani 1990
(Supp) SCC 283

8. Champaklal Chimanlal Shah Vs U.O.I. 7
(1964) 5 SCR 190: AIR 1964 SC 1854

(Delivered by Hon'ble Karunesh Singh
Pawar, J.)

1. Heard Shri Sanjeev Kumar Pandey,
learned Counsel for the petitioner as well as
Ms. Alina Masoodi, Advocate holding brief
of Shri Raj Kumar Singh, learned Counsel
for the respondents.

2. Through this petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has challenged the order of
termination dated 30.12.2011 passed by the
Commandant,
91st
Battalion,
Group
Kendra, Central Reserve Police Force,
District Lucknow (opposite party no.4)
contained as Annexure-1 to the writ
1214 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
petition and the appellate order dated
14.11.2012 passed by the Inspector General
of Police, Central Sector, Central Reserve
Police Force, Lucknow (opposite party
no.2) contained as Annexure-2 to the writ
petition. The petitioner is also seeking a
writ of Mandamus directing the opposite
parties to reinstate him in service on the
post of Constable with effect from the date
of termination from service i.e. on
3.11.2012 with all consequential benefits.

3. The brief facts of the case are that
the petitioner was appointed on the post of
Constable by means of order dated
20.8.2011. This appointment order clearly
stated that petitioner's service is purely
temporary in nature and can be terminated
at any time without assigning any reason by
giving
him
one
month notice.
The
petitioner was enlisted on a temporary basis
as Constable w.e.f. 16.8.2011.

On 4.11.2011, at about 20:45
hours, the petitioner left the police
line/camp without any prior intimation,
notice
and
permission
of
his
superiors/competent
authority.
The
petitioner remained absent from 4.11.2011
till 25.11.2011 for 22 days and reported at
his own convenience on 26.11.2011 at
09:00 hours. The petitioner, while reporting
back on 26.11.2011 at 09:00 hours, has not
provided any supporting documents along
with his report dated ''Nil' wherein he stated
that he went to take care of his ailing
father. Therefore, the petitioner's services
were
terminated
in
exercise
of
the
provisions contained in Rule 5(1) of the
Central Civil Services (Temporary Service)
Rules, 1965 by means of impugned order
dated 30.12.2011 and prior to it, one
month's notice was issued to him vide letter
no.P.VIII.21/2011-EC-II dated 30.11.2011
through
Deputy
Commandant
(Administration),
GC,CRPF,
Bijnore,
Lucknow (U.P.).

Aggrieved
by
the
afroresaid
termination order dated 30.12.2011, the
petitioner filed an appeal before the
Appellate Authority, which was considered
and was rejected being time barred by the
Appellate
Authority
vide
letter
No.
R.XIII.33/2012-CS-Adm-3
dated
14.11.2012.

Against the aforesaid termination
order dated 30.12.2011 and appellate order
dated 14.11.2012, the petitioner has filed
the present petition.

4. Submission of learned counsel for
the petitioner is that prior to terminating the
services of the petitioner, no reason has
been
assigned.
According
to
him,
termination is a major penalty and it cannot
be passed without giving opportunity of
hearing and without holding an enquiry.
Therefore, the impugned termination order
dated 30.12.2011 is violative of Article 21
of the Constitution of India and also
violative of Article 311 of the Constitution
of India. His submission is that in case the
termination order is not quashed, it will
take away the right of livelihood of an
employee. The impugned order has been
passed de horse the principles of natural
justice and it has also not been passed in
accordance with relevant Rules. He also
submitted that the Appellate Authority,
while passing the impugned appellate order
dated 14.11.2012, has also not considered
the matter to the aforesaid effect.

5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner,
in support of his contention, has relied
upon the decisions of Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in AIR 1958 SC36,
Purushotam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of
India; 2000 (5) SCC 152, Chandra
Prakash Shahi vs. State of U.P. and
4 All. Mukesh Kumar Yadav Vs. Union of India
1215
others; 2000 SCC (3) 239, V.P. Ahuja Vs.
State of Punjab and others and 2010 SCC
(8) 220, Union of India and others vs.
Mahaveer C. Singhvi.

6. Per contra, Ms. Alina Masoodi,
learned counsel for the respondent/Union
of India submits that as per the admitted
position, the petitioner was a temporary
employee and had barely completed 3
months of service as a Constable. Since the
right exists under contract or service rules
to terminate services of a probationer or a
temporary employee, the employer in
exercise of the said right, terminated the
services of an employee. Since the
petitioner was appointed on a temporary
basis, which is evident by his appointment
letter dated 20.08.2011, the employer or the
competent
authority
had
a
right
to
terminate the services of the petitioner by
giving him one month's notice. She has
submitted that the petitioner's services were
terminated from service in exercise of the
provisions contained in Rule 5(1) of the
Central Civil Services (Temporary Service)
Rules,
1965
w.e.f.
31.12.2011
after
completion of the one month's notice
period. In such circumstances, the motive
operating on the mind of the employer is
wholly irrelevant.

7.

Learned
Counsel
for
the
respondents has further submitted that
admittedly, no charges were framed against
the petitioner; no stigmatic or punitive
order was passed against the petitioner; no
preliminary or departmental enquiry was
conducted against the petitioner; and no
punitive or penal consequences flowed
from the order of termination. The order of
termination was termination simplicitor to
ensure that the petitioner could find other
means of employment and not to bar him
from any future prospects of employment.
Thus, the impugned termination order is
not stigmatic or punitive in nature.

8.

Learned
Counsel
for
the
respondents has also submitted that the
protection under Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India is available to
probationers and temporary employee in
the event that a termination order was by
way of punishment and punitive and
stigmatic in nature, which is not the present
case.
As
per
Rules,
the
competent
authority, in the present case, had a right to
terminate the services of the petitioner as
long as he was a temporary employee and
had not completed 3 years of service by
giving him one month's notice period and
this procedure was admittedly followed in
the present case and his termination
simplicitor has been passed pursuant to
Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil Services
(Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 as well as
his appointment order dated 20.08.2011.

9. It is next submitted that the
distinction
between
temporary
employees/probationers
and
permanent
employees would be completely obliterated
if protection afforded by Article 311 (2) of
the Constitution of India is afforded to all.
It is submitted that the whole purpose of
probation and being a temporary employee
is that it gives the superior authority the
chance to judge the suitability of a
temporary employee as to whether he
meets all requirements of the job and he
should be made permanent or not.

10. In support of his submission,
learned Counsel for the respondents has
relied upon the judgments of Hon'ble
Supreme Court reported in (2005) 5 SCC
569, State of Punjab and others vs.
Sukhwinder Singh; (2002) 1 SCC 520,
Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs. Sanjay
1216 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Gandhi P.G.I of Medical Sciences and
Another; 1990 (Supp) SCC 283, Union of
India and another vs. K.Balakrishnan
Kani; and (1964) 5 SCR 190: AIR 1964
SC 1854, Champaklal Chimanlal Shah
vs. Union of India.

11. I have considered the arguments
advanced by learned Counsel for the
parties.

12. A perusal of the appointment
order of the petitioner shows that the
petitioner was appointed on temporary
basis and his services were terminable at
any time by giving him one month's notice.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner, after
his appointment, remained absent without
any
intimation
or
permission
unauthorizedly
from
4.11.2011
to
25.11.2011 for a period of 22 days within
the initial three months of his service. He
left the police line/camp without any prior
intimation to his superior authorities and
even when he reported back on 26.11.2011,
no supportive documents along with his
representation have been given by the
petitioner. Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965
is extracted below:-

" 5. Termination of temporary
service.

(1)
(a)
The
services
of
a
temporary Government servant shall be
liable to termination at any time by a notice
in writing given either by the Government
servant to the appointing authority or by
the appointing authority to the Government
servant;"

13. After the petitioner reported for
duty on 26.11.2011 from his unauthorized
absence, one month's notice for termination
of service of the petitioner was issued vide
letter dated 30.11.2011 to him and the
petitioner was terminated from service
w.e.f. 31.12.2011 on completion of period
of one month's notice. The termination
order dated 31.12.2011 is extracted below:-

( सेिा समार्प्त नोर्टस)

केन्रीय र्सर्िल सेिा (अााई र्नयमार ली 1965) के
र्नयम के उप र्नयम (1) के साथ पर्ठत केन्रीय ररजिि पुर्लस बल
र्नयमािली 1938 के र्नयम 16 एिं पररर्शष्ठ एक (10) के नीचे नोट-2
के अनुसरर् में, मैं ज्ञानेन्र कुमार कनान्डेण्ट, ग्रुप केन्र, के०रर०पु०बल,
लखनऊ (उत्त), इस ग्रुप केन्र के बल संख्या - 115182734 ररकूट
(जी०डी०) मुकेश कुमार यादि को एतद्द्वारा इस आशय का नोर्टस देता िै
र्क उसकी सेिाएं यि नोर्टस जारी िो के तारीख से एक माि समाप्त िोने
की तारीख से समाप्त कर दी जाएर्ी।

14. A perusal of the impugned
termination order shows that it is a
termination simplicitor. No charges were
framed
against
the
petitioner.
The
termination order is not stigmatic or
punitive. No preliminary or departmental
enquiry has been conducted and no
punitive or penal consequences flowed
from the order of termination.

15. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of State of Punjab and others vs.
Sukhwinder Singh (supra), in paragraphs
19 and 20, has held that superior authorities
of the departments have to take work from
an employee and they are the best people to
judge whether an employee should be
continued in service and made a permanent
employee or not having regard to his
performance,
conduct
and
overall
suitability for the job. The probationer is on
test and a temporary employee has no right
to the post. Relevant paragraphs 19 and 20
of the judgment are extracted below:-

"19. It must be borne in mind that
no employee whether a probationer or
temporary will be discharged or reverted,
arbitrarily, without any rhyme or reason.
4 All. Mukesh Kumar Yadav Vs. Union of India
1217
Where a superior officer, in order to satisfy
himself whether the employee concerned
should be continued in service or not makes
inquiries for this purpose, it would be wrong
to hold that the inquiry which was held, was
really intended for the purpose of imposing
punishment. If in every case where some
kind of fact finding inquiry is made, wherein
the employee is either given an opportunity
to explain or the inquiry is held behind his
back, it is held that the order of discharge or
termination from service is punitive in
nature, even a bona fide attempt by the
superior officer to decide whether the
employee concerned should be retained in
service or not would run the risk of being
dubbed as an order of punishment. The
decision to discharge a probationer during
the period of probation or the order to
terminate the service of a temporary
employee is taken by the appointing
authority or administrative heads of various
departments, who are not judicially trained
people. The superior authorities of the
departments have to take work from an
employee and they are the best people to
judge whether an employee should be
continued in service and made a permanent
employee or not having regard to his
performance, conduct and overall suitability
for the job. As mentioned earlier a
probationer is on test and a temporary
employee has no right to the post. If mere
holding of an inquiry to ascertain the
relevant facts for arriving at a decision on
objective considerations whether to continue
the employee in service or to make him
permanent is treated as an inquiry "for the
purpose of imposing punishment" and an
order of discharge or termination of service
as a result thereof "punitive in character",
the fundamental difference between a
probationer or a temporary employee and a
permanent employee would be completely
obliterated, which would be wholly wrong.

"20. In the present case neither
any formal departmental inquiry nor any
preliminary fact finding inquiry had been
held and a simple order of discharge had
been passed. The High Court has built an
edifice on the basis of a statement made in
the written statement that the respondent
was habitual absentee during his short
period of service and has concluded
therefrom that it was his absence from duty
that weighed in the mind of Senior
Superintendent of Police as absence from
duty is a misconduct. The High Court has
further gone on to hold that there is direct
nexus between the order of discharge of the
respondent from service and his absence
from duty and, therefore, the order
discharging him from service will be
viewed as punitive in nature calling for a
regular inquiry under Rule 16.24 of the
Rules. We are of the opinion that the High
Court has gone completely wrong in
drawing the inference that the order of
discharge dated 16.3.1990 was, in fact,
based upon the misconduct and was,
therefore, punitive in nature, which should
have
been
preceded
by
a
regular
departmental inquiry. There cannot be any
doubt that the respondent was on probation
having been appointed about eight months
back. As observed in Ajit Singh and others
etc. vs. State of Punjab and another (supra)
the period of probation gives time and
opportunity to the employer to watch the
work ability, efficiency, sincerity and
competence of the servant and if he is
found not suitable for the post, the master
reserves a right to dispense with his service
without anything more during or at the end
of the prescribed period, which is styled as
period of probation. The mere holding of
preliminary inquiry where explanation is
called from an employee would not make
an otherwise innocuous order of discharge
or termination of service punitive in nature.
1218 INDIAN LAW REPORTS ALLAHABAD SERIES
Therefore, the High Court was clearly in
error in holding that the respondent's
absence from duty was the foundation of
the order, which necessitated an inquiry as
envisaged under Rule 16.24(ix) of the
Rules".

16. In the case of Union of India and
another
vs.
K.
Balakrishnan
Kani
(supra), where the services of Peon in the
Custom department on a temporary post
were terminated after a couple of months of
service under Rule 5(1) of the Central Civil
Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965,
it was held that since there is no indication
of any stigma in the order of termination,
quotation
of
rule
in
the
impugned
termination order should have been taken
as a sufficient reason and nothing more
should have been looked for.

17. Likewise in the case of
Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra),
Hon'ble Supreme court in paragraphs 21
and 22 held as under:-

"21. One of the judicially evolved
tests to determine whether in substance an
order of termination is punitive is to see
whether prior to the termination there was
(a) a full scale formal enquiry (b) into
allegations involving moral turpitude or
misconduct (c) which culminated in a
finding of guilt. If all three factors are
present the termination has been held to be
punitive irrespective of the form of the
termination order. Conversely if any one of
the three factors is missing, the termination
has been upheld.

22.The
three
factors
are
distinguishable in the following passage in
Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (supra)
where it was said:(SCC p. 851, para 64)

"64. Before a probationer is
confirmed the authority concerned is under
an obligation to consider whether the work
of the probationer is satisfactory or
whether he is suitable for the post. In the
absence
of
any
rules
governing
a
probationer in this respect the authority
may come to the conclusion that on account
of inadequacy for the job or for any
temperamental
or
other
object
not
involving moral turpitude the probationer
is unsuitable for the job and hence must be
discharged. No punishment is involved in
this. The authority may in some cases be of
the view that the conduct of the probationer
may result in dismissal or removal on an
inquiry. But in those cases the authority
may not hold an inquiry and may simply
discharge the probationer with a view to
giving him a chance to make good in other
walks of life without a stigma at the time of
termination of probation. If, on the other
hand, the probationer is faced with an
enquiry on charges of misconduct or
inefficiency or corruption, and if his
services are terminated without following
the provisions of Article 311(2) he can
claim protection."

 (Emphasis supplied)

18.
 So
far
as
judgement
of
Purushotam
Lal
Dhingra
(supra)
is
concerned, in that case, adverse remarks
against the appellant in the confidential
report were made and communicated to the
appellant and thereafter he was punished by
reducing in rank without any opportunity to
show cause against the action proposed to
be taken in that regard to him, then, it was
held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the
order was invalid or non-compliance of
provisions
of
Article
311
of
the
Constitution of India. The facts of this case
is entirely different from the peculiar facts
of the case in hand as herein, no remarks or
stigma has been made in the impugned
order of termination.
4 All. Gokul Ram & Ors. Vs. Shiv Jokhan Singh & Ors.
1219

19. Likewise in the case of Chandra
Prakash Shahi (supra), the termination
preceeded by a preliminary enquiry in
which appellant was found involved in
incident of quarrel, hence it was held that
termination was founded upon misconduct
and, therefore, punitive. The facts of this
case is also distinguishable from the
present case.

20. In the case of V.P. Ahuja
(supra), the impugned order was ex facie
found to be stigmatic and also punitive.
The order was passed on the ground that
the appellant failed in discharging his
duties administrively and technically. Then
it was held that termination order could not
have been passed without holding regular
enquiry and the termination was held to be
punitive, which is not the case in the
present case.

21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Sukhwinder Singh (supra) has held that
the superior authorities of the department
has to take work from employee and they
are the best people to judge whether an
employee should be continued in service
and made a permanent employee or not.
The probationer is on test and a temporary
employee has no right to the post.

22. In the present case, the petitioner
was on probation; he was appointed just
three months' back; he was unauthorizedly
absent from duty for a period of 22 days,
therefore, the competent authority has
rightly terminated the services of the
petitioner under Rule 5(1) of the Central
Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules,
1965 after giving one month's notice by a
simplicitor order, which is neither punitive
in nature nor stigmatic. Terminating the
services of the petitioner in exercise of
employer's right to dispense with the
services of such employee within a period
of probation, would not make an otherwise
innocuous order of discharge or termination
of service punitive in nature.

23. In view of the aforesaid, no
interference is required in the impugned
order
of
termination
and
impugned
appellate order.

24. The petition being devoid of merit
is dismissed.
----------
(2023) 4 ILRA 1219
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL SIDE
DATED: ALLAHABAD 24.03.2023

BEFORE

THE HON'BLE VIVEK CHAUDHARY, J.

Second Appeal No. 2019 of 1978

Gokul Ram & Ors. ...Appellant
Versus
Shiv Jokhan Singh & Ors. ...Respondents

Counsel for the Appellant:
Sri S.L. Yadav, Sri P.K. Dubey, Sri Prabhat Kumar,
Sri Siddharth Niranjan, Sri D.P. Singh(Sr. Adv.)

Counsel for the Respondents:
Sri Amish Kumar Srivastava, Sri Manish Dev
Singh, Sri R.N. Singh, Sri S.N. Singh

A. Civil Law - Sale Deed by Natural
Guardian - Voidable Sale Deed - Uttar
Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950, S. 331 - Civil Court
versus Revenue Court Jurisdiction - Civil
Court had exclusive jurisdiction to decide
the suit for cancellation of the voidable
sale deed executed by natural guardian -
Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939, S. 9(1) -
Hindu Women's Right to Property Act,
1937, S. 3(1) - United Provinces Hindu
Women's Rights to Property (Extension to
Agricultural Land) Act, 1942, Section 2 -
U.P.
Zamindari
Abolition
and
Land